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Frontispiece : 


(Leiden, University Library, ms Vulcanianus 46, f. 130) 

Produced at Fulda in 1176-77, it accompanies the text of Hugh's Didascalicon. On the 
open book appears the first sentence of the Didascalicon : Omnium expetendoritm prima est 
sapientia in qua (perfecti boni) forma consistit (Of all things to be sought, the first is that 
Wisdom in which the Form of the Perfect Good stands fixed). 

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 61-10982 
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Seth Low Professor of History 


Bryce Professor Emeritus of the History of International Relations 

Professor Emeritus of History 




Associate Professor of History 

editors: oriental records 

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Professor of Chinese and Japanese 

consulting editors 

Professor of Jewish History, Literature, 
and Institutions on the Miller Foundation 


Anthon Professor of the Latin Language and Literature 


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Professor of Philosophy 


William R. Shepherd Professor of European History 

special editor for this volume 



The present translation, the first complete one in English, is 
based upon Brother Charles Henry Buttimer's critical edition of 
Hugh of Saint Victor's Didascalicon : De studio legendi. An effort 
has been made to meet the demands of technical accuracy by 
consistently adhering to a single rendering for philosophical and 
theological terms, despite the varying contexts in which these 
recur. It is hoped that readability has not been sacrificed there- 
by. Buttimer's text, excellent in the main, has not been above 
correction, and upwards of forty emendations of his text have 
been made. These vary from the correction of apparent mis- 
prints to recasting the punctuation of several passages in which 
unawareness of Hugh's source or of his meaning had produced 
confusion. Significant alterations of Buttimer's text are in- 
dicated in the footnotes. 

The purpose of the notes is primarily to indicate new sources 
and to set Hugh's text in illustrative relief against the contrasting 
work of predecessors and contemporaries. Authors and works 
from classical, patristic, and Carolingian times, as well as from 
the twelfth century, are cited. At one extreme, the discoveries 
made involve minor curiosities like Hugh's inexplicable trans- 
ference to geometry of a portion of the traditional definition of 
"topica" (n. xv. n. 55), or his use of a Hermetic prayer to 
conclude the Didascalicon (vi. xiii. n. 54); or they involve the 
identification of incidental phrases from Boethius, Chalcidius, 
Augustine, Jerome, and Gregory the Great — phrases which, 
precisely by their incidental character, suggest the extent to 
which Hugh's thought was penetrated by the very expressions of 
these authors. At the other extreme, the notes report the sources 
of whole chapters, e.g., the Isagoge Johanitii ad Tegni Galiegni, 
which provides the substance of the chapter on medicine 
(11. xxvi); or they elucidate complex relationships like those 
which chapters i, vi, vii, ix, and x of Book I bear to texts in the 
commentary traditions on Boethius's De consolatione philosophiae, 
Plato's Timaeus, and Macrobius's commentary on the S omnium 


Scipionis of Cicero — relationships which reveal not merely Hugh's 
indebtedness to the traditions but, more significantly, his reser- 
vations in the use of heterodox cosmological texts and themes. 
The recent publication by Professor Theodore Silverstein of the 
"Liber Hermetis Mercurii Triplicis de VI rerum principiis" 
made it possible to identify a contemporary analogue of Book i, 
chapter vii, and perhaps to identify the source, in a pseudo- 
Pythagorean Matentetraden, of certain cosmological distinctions 
occurring in the same chapter. Professor A. van de Vyver's 
report of the existence of Hugh's personal copy of Remigius of 
Auxerre's commentary on Martianus Capella in the Bibliotheque 
Nationale led to the discovery of the source, in Remigius's 
commentary, of numerous details on the authors of the arts 
reported by Hugh in Book in, chapter ii. 

But the notes do more than indicate sources and analogues. 
They attempt, at times, to offer sketches in the history of an 
idea, a phrase, a definition, together with a selection of primary 
sources and recent secondary studies. Such, for example, are 
the notes on "nature" as the archetypal Exemplar of creation 
and as a cosmic fire (i. x. n. 69, 71), on the Boethian phrase 
"Form of the Good" (1. i. n. 1), on Hugh's definition of philo- 
sophy as "the discipline which investigates comprehensively the 
ideas of all things, human and divine" (1. iv. n. 27), on Hugh's 
curious use of the term "entelechy" (1. i. n. 7), on the literary 
practice of concealing inner meaning beneath a fabulous surface 
{involucrum or integnmenturn) (1. iv. n. 26), on the doctrine of the 
"three works" (1. ix. n. 59) and that of the "three manners of 
things" (1. vi. n. 34, 3 5, 38, 42), and on the "number 'four' of the 
soul" (n. iv. n. 25-29). 

The notes also call attention to not yet recognized citations or 
reminiscences of the Didascalicon in twelfth-century authors, as 
in John of Salisbury and Alanus de Insulis. Moreover, Hugh's 
dependence on John the Scot's translation of the pseudo- 
Dionysian Celestial Hierarchy in preparing his own commentary 
on that work, plus the appearance in the Didascalicon of certain 
terms frequently a sign of Scotist influence, raised the whole 
question of Hugh's relationship to John the Scot and made it 
desirable to call particular attention to differences or likenesses 
between Hugh and the Carolingian author as these were found 


at various points (e.g. in i. i. n. 16; i. ii. n. 21; 1. vi. n. 42). 
Finally, the singular consistency and unity of Hugh's thought, 
often remarked upon by scholars, invited frequent citations 
from his other works to illustrate or expand his meaning in the 

The introductory essay attempts to go beyond what is current- 
ly said of the Didascalicon and to offer new suggestions regarding 
its date, its argument for a fourfold "philosophy," its peculiar 
use of cosmological lore, and its distinctiveness vis-a-vis the 
De doctrina Christiana of Augustine and the Institutiones divinarum 
et saecularium lectionum of Cassiodorus. The aim has been to 
make some beginning, however slight, toward setting the 
originality and achievement of the Didascalicon in clearer light. 

Several matters of editorial nature deserve notice. Biblical 
quotations are given in the Douay translation of the Latin 
Vulgate as revised by Bishop Challoner, and the names and 
numeration of the books of the Bible follow this version, as 
does the spelling of all proper names. Occasionally, however, as 
in Book v, chapter iv, the original Latin quotations are so dis- 
posed as to make it impossible to use the corresponding Douay- 
Challoner translation without alteration. Where terms such as 
"Truth," "Wisdom," "Nature," "Idea," "Pattern," and "Exem- 
plar" are capitalized, the capital indicates that Hugh, in the trans- 
lator's understanding, is referring to God, or, more specifically, 
to the Second Person of the Trinity. The terms "catholic," 
"catholic church," and "catholic faith" are not capitalized 
because to have capitalized these would have been to suggest 
the modern sense of "Catholic" as contrasted to "Protestant,"a 
distinction which could hardly have been in Hugh's thought. 
For him, it was still possible to refer simply to the universal 
belief of Christians and to the universal church. 

Latin sources quoted in the footnotes have generally been 
translated, except when the original is a new source or analogue 
found in a manuscript or in a book hard to come by; in such 
cases, the Latin text has been reproduced for readers who may 
wish to compare it with Hugh's Latin in Buttimer's text. Names 
of twelfth-century authors have been modernized, except when 
identification of the place name has been disputed, as in the case 
of Honorius Augustodunensis and Alanus de Insulis, or when 


the Latin form of the name has come into general usage, as in 
the case of Bernardus Silvestris and Clarenbaldus of Arras. How- 
ever, the form "Abaelard" has been adopted in preference to the 
more common "Abelard" in order to indicate the proper 
pronunciation of the name, which seems to have been accented 
on the second syllable. 

I am grateful to Professor Theodore Silverstein of the Uni- 
versity of Chicago for first interesting me in Hugh of Saint 
Victor, and to Professors Blanche Boyer and Richard Peter 
McKeon of the same University, as well as to Professor Nicholas 
Haring of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 
for reading the translation, notes, and introduction and offering 
helpful criticisms and suggestions. I am indebted to the 
American Council of Learned Societies and to the Danforth 
Foundation for year-long fellowships which enabled me to work 
on the project, and to Dartmouth College and the University of 
Notre Dame for leaves of absence which made possible the 
acceptance of the fellowships ; in the case of Notre Dame, I am 
indebted for a subsidy as well. Thanks are likewise due to 
Canon Astrik L. Gabriel, Director of the Institute of Mediaeval 
Studies of the University of Notre Dame, for assistance in 
obtaining microfilm materials from the Victorine collection of 
the Bibliotheque Nationale; to Doctor R. W. Hunt of the 
Bodleian for several helpful suggestions and for allowing me to 
read two as yet unpublished articles on the divisions of phi- 
losophy in the twelfth century; to Brother Charles Henry 
Buttimer for obtaining for me a copy of his edition of the 
Didascalicon^ which has for some time been out of print ; and, 
last but not least, to Professors Austin P. Evans and Jacques 
Barzun of Columbia University for encouraging me to submit 
the translation to the Records of Civilization series. To 
Professor Evans, I am above all indebted for his meticulous care 
and perceptive guidance in the final editing of the manuscript, 
and to Mr. Edward McLeroy, editor, Columbia University 
Press for expertly seeing the work through to final publication. 

The University of Notre Dame jerome taylor 

December 28, 19 ; 9 













NOTES 158 


INDEX 237 



I. General Nature, Date, Significance of the Didascalicon. The 
Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor aims to select and define all 
the areas of knowledge important to man and to demonstrate 
not only that these areas are essentially integrated among them- 
selves, but that in their integrity they are necessary to man for 
the attainment of his human perfection and his divine destiny. 
Composed at Paris in the late 1120's, 1 the book provided 
intellectual and practical orientation for students of varying 
ages and levels of attainment who came in numbers to the open 
school 2 of the newly founded Abbey of Saint Victor. To such, 
as they took up studies at their different levels, it offered a survey 
of all they should ultimately read, and of the order, manner, and 
purpose which should govern their reading, both in the arts or 
disciplines and in Sacred Scripture. 

The very title of the work places it squarely in a long ante- 
cedent tradition of didascalic, or didactic, literature concerned 
in various ways with what arts or disciplines a man should study 
and why he should acquire them. In the Latin Christian West, 
such literature begins with Augustine and continues through 
Boethius, Cassiodorus, Isidore of Seville, Bede, Alcuin, 
Rhabanus Maurus, and the late Carolingian masters, including 
John the Scot. Before them, it is found in the writings of 
Cicero and Quintilian on the education of the orator; in the lost 
works of M. Terentius Varro on the arts; in the introductions to 
specialized treatises on particular arts, like that of Vitruvius on 
architecture or that of Galen on medicine; in certain moral 
epistles of Seneca; and in the allegory on the arts by Martianus 
Capella, Augustine's contemporary. Its roots reach far back to 
the ancient Greek conception of an 'eyxiixXto? TioaSsia to the 
objections of Socrates to Sophist education in the fifth century 
B. C. and to the opposed views of education propounded in the 
next generation by Isocrates on the one hand and by Plato and 
Aristotle on the other. 3 In a sense, the Didascalicon can be 
regarded as both a summary and an extension of this tradition ; 


it is bound to it in most of its materials and in aspects of its 
form, yet it provides a new synthesis of the materials, a synthesis 
remarkable for its originality and its wholeness. 

However, the Didascalicon is important not only because it 
recapitulates an entire antecedent tradition, but because it inter- 
prets that tradition in a special and an influential way at the very 
dawn of the twelfth-century renaissance. A crude index of its 
influence on its own and subsequent ages can be seen in its 
survival in nearly a hundred manuscripts of the twelfth through 
the fifteenth centuries, preserved in some forty-five libraries 
stretching across Europe from Ireland to Italy, from Poland to 
Portugal. 4 It appeared at a time when centers of education had 
moved from the predominantly rural monasteries to the cathedral 
schools of growing cities and communes ; when education in the 
new centers was becoming specialized, hence unbalanced, ac- 
cording to the limited enthusiasms or capacities of particular 
masters ; and when, in response to the flowering of secular life, 
learning itself was making secularist adaptations. 5 In contrast, 
for example, to the specializations in law, medicine, or the 
poetic arts at the schools of Bologne, Salerno, Montpellier, 
Tours, and Orleans ; in contrast to the belletristic humanism of a 
John of Salisbury, a Bernardus Silvestris, or a Matthew of 
Vendome; in contrast to the concern with a Platonized quad- 
rivium and physics of the Chartrian masters, or the absorption 
in dialectic of an Abaelard, or the demand for a quick, money- 
making education by the Cornificians; in contrast, finally, to 
Cistercianism, which forbade "profane" learning and aimed to 
make of every monastery a "school of charity" only, the 
Didascalicon set forth a program insisting on the indispensability 
of a whole complex of the traditional arts and on the need for 
their scientific pursuit in a particular order by all men as a 
means both of relieving the physical weaknesses of earthly life 
and of restoring that union with the divine Wisdom for which 
man was made. 

The Didascalicon 's influence was immediate and penetrating. 
It provided on the one hand an outline of work partly fulfilled 
in Hugh's own scholarly production, continued in that of 
Andrew and Richard, his successors in the Victorine chair, and 
reflected in the philosophical poetry of Godfrey and the liturgical 


sequences of Adam, so that the book forms a kind of key to the 
Victorine corpus . On the other hand, for twelfth- and thirteenth- 
century writers as different from the Victorines and from one 
another as John of Salisbury, Clarenbaldus of Arras, William of 
Conches (or his disciples), Peter Comestor, Stephen Langton, 
Robert Kilwardby, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Saint Bonaventure, 
and Vincent of Beauvais it served either as a source of references 
and extracts which they incorporated into their own writings or, 
more significantly, as a source of leading ideas to the guidance 
of which they submitted their thought and their work. 

It is evident, then, that the Didascalicon can be approached 
from many different points of view. Considering it as a docu- 
ment in the didascalic tradition as a whole, one might seek to 
measure the extent to which it transmits and adapts the common 
materials of that ancient tradition. 6 More narrowly, one might 
compare and contrast its particular schematization of the sciences 
to earlier and later schematizations in the Christian tradition and 
attempt to trace the line of a developing scholastic Wissenschajts- 
lehre. 1 More narrowly still, one might study the relation it 
establishes between the arts and scriptural exegesis and ask how 
its program figured in the shift from positive to systematic 
theology which took place across the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries. 8 Turning to educational history, one might center 
attention on what the work reveals of the teaching aims, 
methods, and materials of the schools of the same period. 9 
Finally, one might examine the Didascalicon' 's treatment of the 
individual arts, following the previous history of their various 
terms in such fashion as to explicate their special significance in 
Hugh — a most important approach and one which, if followed 
through, would produce in effect a critical history of the arts in 
the middle ages. 10 

But if the variety and scope of these historical considerations, 
each of which would require a separate study or series of studies 
for its adequate development, suggest the importance of the 
Didascalicon, they imply its originality as well. Of the work's 
originality, in fact, there has never been doubt, though the 
grounds on which it has been advanced leave much to be 
desired. In part, the Didascalicon has been given a deceptive 
prominence because closely affiliated schematizations of knowl- 


edge in its own time have been ignored. 11 In part, the attempt 
to qualify its originality with greater accuracy has led to the 
proposal of other schematizations, actually of later date, as its 
antecedents, and to the irrelevant measurement of its achieve- 
ment against theirs. 12 Again, it has been given a value borrowed 
from Aristotle or Aquinas, and, brought into step with the 
march of truth from the Stagirite to the Angelic Doctor, it has 
been praised because it makes advances over the former and 
almost, but not quite, achieves the perfection of the latter. 1 3 
Yet again, its purposeful and organic arrangement of twenty-one 
arts has been contrasted to the listing, "encore rudimentaire," 
of the seven liberal arts by writers from Martianus Capella 
through the Carolingians, and the causes of its great advance 
over these sought (i) in the entrance into the West of new 
Arabic learning, which, however, Hugh gives no evidence of 
having known, (2) in the discovery of the new logic of Aristotle, 
with which, however, Hugh seems to have been unacquainted, 
and (3) in the actual state of development, by the twelfth century, 
of each of the arts which Hugh mentions, a state not historically 
verifiable and one which, even if shown to exist, would explain 
only the material and not the formal aspects of Hugh's work. 14 
When the attempt has been made to place the Didascalicon with 
respect to like works of its own time, it has been bracketed with 
the Heptateuchon of Thierry of Chartres and with it made the 
source of broad inferences concerning "le programme d'en- 
seignement generalised de son temps" ; or it has been contrasted 
with John of Salisbury's Metalogicon, which appeared more than 
a quarter of a century later, in 1 1 5 9, and therefore exercised no 
influence upon it; or it has been balanced in general terms 
against an assortment of twelfth-century "humanists," utili- 
tarians, and scientists, as well as religious reformers and 
dialecticians, a procedure which provides illuminating com- 
parisons, to be sure, but which fails to shed particular light on 
precisely those immediately antecedent authors, texts, and 
problems to which the Didascalicon applies and to which many 
features of the text seem a direct response. 15 In particular, the 
work of William of Conches, which appears to have challenged 
Hugh to a particular line of argument at many points in the 
Didascalicon, and, together with that of Abaelard, to have 


exercised a determining influence even upon his choice of 
certain authorities and terms, has not been examined from this 
point of view. 16 

Of the Didascalicon' s relation to earlier works in its tradition, 
it has been said, for example, that it provides a "refonte com- 
plete" of the De doctrina Christiana, adapting Augustine's ideas 
to the special needs of the twelfth century and calling a rebellious 
learning back to the scriptural basis posited by Augustine for 
Christian intellectual and spiritual formation. 1 ~> It has also been 
said that the Didascalicon was to its time what the Institutiones 
divinarum et saecularium lectionum of Cassiodorus were to the sixth 
century, the Etymologiae of Isidore to the seventh, and Rhabanus 
Maurus's De institutione clericorum to the ninth. 18 Such com- 
parisons are suggestive and, up to a point, true. Like all 
analogies, however, they ignore specific differences in order to 
stress general similarities ; they do not pinpoint what is distinctive 
or original about the Didascalicon.^ 

If, then, by way of introduction to the Didascalicon, we wish 
to know something of the work's originality, it will be necessary 
to examine, if even on a severely limited scale, how the work 
compares in intention and structure, in its terms and its argu- 
ment, and in its adaptation of source materials, with certain 
selected earlier and contemporary works in the didascalic 
tradition. Because Book 1, and to a lesser extent, Books 11 and 
in, seem determined in many ways by problems peculiar to the 
early twelfth century, the contemporary relationships of the 
work will be discussed first. Because Books iv, v, and vi — and 
in particular the disputed connection of divinitas or sacra pagina 
with the arts and philosophia — are best discussed with reference 
to Augustine's De doctrina Christiana and the Institutiones 
divinarum et saecularium lectionum of Cassiodorus, the relationship 
of the Didascalicon to earlier works will be treated last. 

II. The "Quaternary" of the Arts. The first book of the 
Didascalicon provides a carefully articulated demonstration that 
philosophy must comprise four, and only four, master-categories 
of arts and disciplines — theoretical, practical, mechanical, and 
logical. The caption "De origine artium," which in the Buttimer 
edition is affixed only to the first chapter of the Didascalicon, must 


therefore be taken as the title of the whole first book, 20 the 
"origin" in question being Hugh's reasoned derivation of these 
four categories from certain fundamental postulates concerning 
the divine Wisdom in relation to the postlapsarian state, but 
divinely ordained restoration, of man. 

Hugh's fourfold scheme, Aristotelian in ultimate inspiration 
and character, stands in contrast to a threefold division of 
philosophy into physics, ethics, and logic, which, largely on the 
authority of Augustine, prevailed as Plato's division almost 
without exception in the West until the twelfth century. 21 
Famous in his own time for his fidelity to Augustine, 22 Hugh 
has nonetheless been credited with taking unexplained leave of 
Augustine on this essential matter and with introducing an 
Aristotelian division of knowledge to the later middle ages. 
That the Didascalicon cooperated in spreading interest in the 
so-called Aristotelian division is evident from the book's wide 
dissemination and use. But that Hugh's originality did not 
consist in the initial rediscovery and rehabilitation, for his time, 
of the Aristotelian scheme is evident from the reappearance of 
the Boethian version of that scheme in William of Conches' 
glosses on the De consolatione philosophiae, datable between 1 1 20 
and 1 125, or some years earlier than the Didascalicon, and 
possibly in the pre-1125 version of William's commentary on 
the Timaeus as well. 23 Moreover, that Hugh's departure from 
Augustine was strictly limited and that, paradoxically, it was 
motivated by his loyalty to Augustine in other and more basic 
respects, becomes clear when certain structural and material 
features of the first book of the Didascalicon are studied with 
reference to fuller expressions of Hugh's thought in others of his 
works and to contrasting points of view in his immediate 
contemporaries. His true originality then appears to lie in the 
adaptation of an already current Aristotelian division of phi- 
losophy within a system of thought and action radically 
Augustinian, attentively orthodox, and mystically oriented as 
against certain contemporaries, including William of Conches, 
who are heterodox in tendency and more concerned with 
disputation, the quadrivium, and physics than with the final end 
of man. 


The argument of the first book of the Didascalicon may be 
summarized as follows : 

Through knowledge, man's immortal mind is capable of containing all 
things, visible and invisible. As man recognizes this dignity of his nature by 
the light of the divine Wisdom, he turns from mere animal existence to 
pursuit of that same Wisdom, which deserves to be sought above all things 
(c. i). The name of this pursuit is "philosophy," and the divine Wisdom 
sought is the divine Mind, living primordial Pattern or Idea of things. 
Calling man back to Itself, It bestows Its own divinity on man's soul and 
restores human nature to proper force and purity through leading it to 
truth and to holiness of action (c. ii). Soul has three kinds of power: the 
first produces growth and nourishment and is found in plants ; the second 
includes the first and adds sense perception — it is found in animals; the 
third includes the first two and adds reason — it is found exclusively in man, 
whom it prompts to seek out the natures of things and instruction in morals 
(c. iii). Because philosophy is the peculiar prerogative of human nature, it 
must extend not only to studying the natures of things and regulating 
conduct but to the ideas of all human acts and pursuits whatever (c. iv). But 
all human acts and pursuits are ordered either to restoring the likeness of 
man's soul to divine and supernal substances, or to relieving the weaknesses 
of man's body, which belongs to the lowest, or temporal category of things 
(c. v). There are three categories of things : eternal, in which existence and 
the existing individual are identical — such alone is the Begetter and Artificer 
of nature; perpetual, in which endless existence is conferred upon individuals 
by an extrinsic principle — such alone is nature, the twofold character of 
which is exemplified by the ousiai on the one hand and the superlunary 
bodies on the other ; temporal, in which temporary existence is conferred by 
nature — such are the corporeal beings, or "works of nature," begotten upon 
the sublunary earth by an artifacting fire descending from above (c. vi). 
Astronomers have divided the world into superlunary, which they call 
"nature," and sublunary, which they call "the work of nature" because all 
living things in the lower world are nourished by emanations from above. 
They also call the upper world "time" because it governs movement in the 
lower world, and "elysium" because its order contrasts with the flux and 
confusion of the lower region, or "infernum." Man, who resembles the 
divine in his soul, is subject to necessity in his bodily or temporal part, which 
must be cherished and conserved in proportion to its weakness (c. vii). The 
contemplation of truth and the practice of virtue, divine actions because 
they restore the divine likeness in man, constitute "understanding," higher 
of the two parts of wisdom. Understanding is theoretical when it concerns 
truth, practical when it concerns morals. "Knowledge," lower of the two 
parts of wisdom, is properly called "mechanical," that is, adulterate (c. viii). 
For there are three works — the work of God, which is to create nature ; the 
work of nature, which is to bring forth; and the work of the human artificer, 
adulterate because it only copies the work of nature, yet a tribute to man's 
reason by its ingenuity (c. ix). By "nature" men of former times have 


meant (i) the archetypal Exemplar of all things in the divine Mind, pri- 
mordial cause of each thing's existence and character ; (2) the peculiar being of 
each thing; and (3) an artificer fire coming forth with a certain power from 
above and begetting sensible objects upon the earth (c. x). After the inven- 
tion of the theoretical, the practical, and the mechanical sciences, the logical 
sciences were invented because men became conscious of inconsistencies 
and errors in their discussions. Though invented last, the logical sciences 
should be studied first, for without them no philosophical explanation is 
possible. The four branches of knowledge can be taken as that sacred 
"four" which ancient authority attributed to the soul (c. xi). 

The tightly knit, chapter-to-chapter sequence of the argument, 
observed in passing by Baur but without attention to its 
significance, 24 evinces the deliberateness with which Hugh 
expands to four the two categories of theoretical and practical 
science which Boethius, and William of Conches following him, 
report in philosophy. The first three chapters, developing the 
soul's capacity to know all things, its relationship with the 
divine Wisdom, and its possession of vegetative and animal as 
well as rational functions, prepare directly for chapters iv, v, 
and viii, which contain the heart of the argument. The argu- 
ment can be expressed in three propositions : 

Philosophy, as the unique prerogative of human nature, must contain as 
many parts as there are types of human action. 

But of the types of human action, two restore human nature through 
knowledge or virtue ; a third aims to relieve the weaknesses of bodily life. 

Therefore, philosophy, first of all, has three parts : theoretical, ordered to 
truth; practical, ordered to virtue; mechanical, ordered to the relief of 
physical existence. 

The fourth part, last to be discovered and therefore left to 
last by Hugh, is introduced in chapter xi as the indispensible 
means of assuring clear and true conclusions in the other three. 
The excursion into cosmology in chapters vi and vii, though 
recognized as digressive by Hugh, is justified by him as making 
clear the temporal, dependent, and fragile nature of bodily life, 
and hence relates to the mechanical arts. 25 Chapters ix and x 
may be similarly accounted for. 

Hugh's management of three long extracts from Boethius in 
Book 1 affords a second evidence of the care with which he 
builds his argument for the fourfold division of philosophy. 
The first passage, taken from Boethius's earlier commentary on 


the Isagoge of Porphyry, 26 supplies the material on the divine 
Wisdom for the larger part of Hugh's chapter ii. It continues in 
the original source with a merely bipartite division of philosophy 
and suspends judgment on whether logic is part, or an instru- 
ment only, of philosophy. Suppressing this portion of the 
passage, which contradicts the fourfold division of philosophy 
he seeks to establish, Hugh selects for the continuation of his 
first extract a portion of Boethius's later commentary on the 
Isagoge. Selected to need no explanatory transition, this passage 
is placed immediately after the first extract and forms the last 
paragraph of Hugh's chapter ii and the entire content of chapter 
iii. 27 In Boethius, the passage provides the psychological basis 
for logic ; in Hugh, by adroit alteration of context, it provides 
the psychological basis for his fourfold division of philosophy. 28 
Again, in the original, this passage moves on at once to a 
discussion of the errors committed by Epicurus and other 
ancient philosophers through ignorance of logic, and to a clear 
pronouncement that logic is both instrument and part of philoso- 
phy. This discussion and pronouncement Hugh reserves for his 
chapter xi, where they form the third long extract from Boethius 
and serve to round out Hugh's quaternary of the arts. 29 

Hugh's concern to establish a fourfold division of philosophy 
derives from a view of fallen man which is peculiarly Augustinian 
even when, as in the Didascalicon, passages lifted from Boethius 
or reminiscent of Plato, are made to express certain of its 
aspects. The sense of a disaster primitively suffered by man 
pervades Book i, though never set forth in familiar religious or 
doctrinal terms. Thus, the divine Wisdom must call man back 
to Itself, must restore the proper force and purity of his nature. 30 
The mind of man, "stupefied by bodily sensations and enticed 
outside itself by sensuous forms, has forgotten what it was, and, 
because it does not remember that it was anything different, 
believes that it is nothing but what is seen"; it is restored through 
instructional Finally, in the first chapter of book two: "This, 
then, is what the arts are concerned with, this is what they 
intend, namely, to restore within us the divine likeness . . . then 
there begins to shine forth again in us what has forever existed in 
the divine Idea or Pattern, coming and going in us but standing 
changeless in God." 32 


The relationship of the four branches of philosophy to the 
fall of man is made clear by the interlocutor in Hugh's dialogue, 
the Epitome Dindimi in philosophiam. Asked how philosophy 
arose, the interlocutor explains that its four branches presented 
necessary expedients against as many evils resulting from the fall : 

Although, Sosthenes, a great chaos of forgetfulness clouds human minds 
so that the hearts of mortals, submerged in an abyss of ignorance, cannot 
fully remember their origin, there nonetheless lives in men something of that 
eternal fire of Truth, which, gleaming in the midst of their darkness, en- 
lightens them to see a little way in their search for Wisdom. Wisdom stirred 
our nature to that search by providing that we should neither know all we 
had lost nor be totally unaware of what we yet retained. For by that self- 
same light gleaming within us we saw our darkness; our nature knew its 
evils and understood from them what opposed goods to seek. It knew to 
what evils mortal life lay subject and what things hostile to its original good- 
ness it sustained, both interiorly and exteriorly, when it became corrupted. 
Three were the sources of all those evils which infected human nature 
interiorly and exteriorly when the pestilence passed over it. Ignorance of 
good and desire for evil beset the mind of man ; the weakness of mortality 
sickened his flesh. And man knew of his change because he was aware of 
his inability to approve the evils he now desired or to hate the things which 
had once been his goods. Therefore, with what strength he could summon, 
he began to strive for his liberation — to avoid his evils and obtain his goods. 
And so arose the pursuit of that Wisdom we are required to seek — a pursuit 
called "philosophy" — so that knowledge of truth might enlighten our 
ignorance, so that love of virtue might do away with wicked desire, and so 
that the quest for necessary conveniences might alleviate our weaknesses. 
These three pursuits first comprised philosophy. The one which sought 
truth was called theoretical; the one which furthered virtue men were 
pleased to call ethics; the one devised to seek conveniences custom called 
mechanical. Art had not yet joined logic to philosophy; crude discourse 
handled the secrets of Wisdom with common and vulgar simplicity until 
finally a more skilled teaching, setting up the form of polished discourse, 
added logic last of all and completed the quaternary. 33 

That Hugh's conception of philosophy should be rooted in 
Genesis reflects on the one hand Augustine's own preoccupation 
with that book, 34 an d on the other a twelfth-century pre- 
occupation with the creation account as part of a larger concern 
with the relationship of the entire order of nature to the 
divine. 35 Hugh's interest in Genesis, however, true to the spirit 
of Augustine's thought, is man-centered; he seeks in it the 
antecedents of the present human condition and a norm of 
human nature to which man may return. His historical approach, 


careful to preserve the literal features of the biblical text, stands 
in contrast to that of William of Conches, who, approaching 
Genesis primarily as a physicist, seeks to reconcile revelation 
with the science of the day, particularly with the cosmogony of 
Plato's Timaeus. To do so, William is willing to interpret key 
features of the text allegorically and, from Hugh's point of view 
irresponsibly. Thus, whereas William of Conches denies the 
existence of initial chaos and holds that the six days of creation 
must be taken figuratively, Hugh insists that chaos literally 
existed and that its ordering in an equally literal six-day period 
is a mystery, a "sacrament," through which the Creator de- 
termined to teach the rational creature that it must rise from the 
disorder of its initial and untaught existence to an intellectual 
and moral beauty of form conferred by the divine Wisdom. 3 <> 
Differences between Hugh and the Chartrians in matters of 
cosmology and cosmogony, as these relate to the Didascalicon, 
will be further examined in the next section of the introduction. 
The interest here is to note that Hugh's approach to the 
materials of Genesis focuses upon their relation to the spiritual 
perfectibility of man — a concern which dominates the whole of 
his theology. 37 

The conception of the divine Wisdom as archetypal Exemplar 
of creation, elaborated in patristic and especially in Augustinian 
exegesis of Genesis, is one of the most important of such 
materials. The sources of the conception as it appears in twelfth- 
century writers are, to be sure, many and complex. 38 It recurs 
in various forms in the Platonic, Neoplatonic, Stoic, and 
Hermetic texts which interested Abaelard and fascinated the 
Chartrians — in Chalcidius's translation of and commentary on 
the Timaeus, in Macrobius's commentary on Cicero's Somnium 
Scipionis, in Boethius's De consolatione philosophiae, in the Latin 
Asclepius. It is implicit in the Bible, not only in Genesis but in 
the sapiential books, in the Joannine prologue, in scattered 
verses of the psalms; and it finds full elaboration in the 
commentaries upon all of these by the Fathers, in whom Neo- 
platonic influences and Christian teaching meet. From his 
contemporaries Hugh parts ways to expose, following Augustine, 
not the cosmological nor even the Trinitarian, but especially the 
moral implications of this concept and these texts. 


Thus, in his De sapientia animae Christi, Hugh transmits in 
detail, and in the Didascalicon he echoes, Augustine's doctrine 
that there are not many wisdoms, but only one Wisdom which 
makes men wise, and this Wisdom is God — the Wisdom begotten 
from all eternity by the Father. 3 9 In holding further that the 
rational creature's wisdom is a participation in the "ideas and 
causes, likenesses and forms, dispositions and foreseeings" of 
all things begotten in the divine Wisdom, Hugh follows 
Augustine in such manner as to remove the ambiguity and 
paradox of the teaching of John the Scot and the twelfth- 
century Bernard of Chartres on the nature and location of the 
ousiai — the "essences" or "substances" of all things. 40 Accord- 
ing to John and Bernard, these "essences," primordial exemplars 
of all created realities, subsisted in the Mind of God, yet were 
created; though one with God, they were distinct from Him, 
and though eternal, they were not quite coeternal with Him. 
Hugh, who likewise believes that the primordial exemplars of 
created realities subsist in the Mind of God, simply identifies 
them with the divine Mind or Wisdom, uncreated and coeternal 
with God. The term ousiai he reserves for the participated 
knowledge of the primordial exemplars on the part of the 
rational creature — angels and the mind of prelapsarian man, who 
enjoyed such participation in the divine Wisdom "not through 
study or any teaching over periods of time, but simultaneously 
and immediately from the first moment of his creation, by a single 
and simple illumination of divine imparting." 41 

What man saw before the fall, what he lost by it, and what he 
must do to restore the loss, Hugh expresses by the pseudo- 
Dionysian figure of the three eyes. 42 Before the fall man saw 
the physical world with the eye of flesh; with the eye of reason 
he saw himself and what he contained; with the eye of con- 
templation he saw within himself God and "the things which 
are within God" (primordial exemplars). By the fall the eye of 
flesh was left unimpaired, the eye of reason and self-knowledge 
bleared, and the eye of contemplation blinded. Philosophy must 
therefore perfect man's self-knowledge (eye of reason) through 
the practical arts, which "cleanse the heart by the study of virtue 
so that it may thereafter see clearly for the investigation of truth 
in the theoretical arts." 43 And it must then renew the know- 


ledge of God and "the things which are within God," that is, 
must renew man's eye of contemplation, through the theoretical 
arts, which, because they are specifically restorative of the divine 
Wisdom's image in man, are "wisdom" in a preeminent sense, 
while the remaining arts, though necessary parts of philosophy, 
are "more precisely spoken of as prudence or knowledge." 44 
The first stage in the restoration of man which philosophy 
effects is lectio, or study, with which alone the Didascalicon is 
concerned, 45 though the book points beyond lectio to the 
meditation, prayer, performance, and finally contemplation, 
"foretaste even in this life of what the future reward of good 
work is," 46 in which the task of philosophy is consummated. 

In such a view as this, the pursuit of the arts becomes, 
in effect, convertible with religion — an equivalence explicitly 
stated by John the Scot but asserted before him by Augu- 
stine, who, rather than John, inspires Hugh. 47 Hugh's 
consciousness of the need to justify the view in his own 
time is reflected in his statement that the etymology of 
"philosophy" requires explanation because, though the verbal 
components of the term are commonly known, not all men 
understand the same thing by "love" and "Wisdom," or "the 
True." 48 Granted Hugh's integration of the four parts of 
philosophy in the task of man's relief and restoration, his attack, 
in the Epitome, upon "the commonly bruited opinion of many 
persons" who "try to eliminate certain of the arts from phi- 
losophy by an excessively rigid test" 49 is understandable. "In 
fact," Hugh observes, "one may not deny that the things in 
which the practice of philosophy consists belong to it first; but 
second, so do the things which further that practice." Of the 
arts, he says : 

...certain ones are both in the search for the True and for the search for 
the True, and no one denies that these must be thought parts of philosophy, 
as authority declares. But others, because they are for that search only, and 
are not found in it, certain men have condemned. 50 I mean grammar and the 
mechanical arts. Grammar is for philosophy only, not about philosophy nor 
developed philosophically; the mechanical arts are developed philosophi- 
cally, but they are not about philosophy nor are they for it. Some wish to 
exclude the whole of logic from philosophy, but this makes little sense, since 
obviously the theory of argument is not only for philosophy but about 
philosophy. In my opinion, men of greater discrimination hold that it is not 


only philosophizing which ought to be called philosophy, but also what- 
ever has been established for the sake of philosophizing, whether for 
philosophy or whether philosophically developed in itself. 51 

Held up to scorn are those who, apparently forgetting phi- 
losophy altogether, become lost in disputes about disputations : 

In former times, seekers who did not know how to philosophize disputed 
about philosophy. Now another generation has succeeded them, and these 
do not even know for sure how one ought to conduct a dispute about 
philosophy. They have gone one step back beyond those who were already 
backward enough, in order to learn how to dispute about disputations, and 
they can't figure out where to classify 52 the very disputations they dispute 
about. For if philosophy is an art, and to dispute about philosophy is an art, 
to what art do we leave it to dispute about disputations? 53 

Against those who separate the arts of speech from phi- 
losophy and, devoting themselves to the former, shamelessly 
ignore the latter, William of Conches also writes. 54 The reverse 
pretension that the arts of speech are useless because no part of 
philosophy, John of Salisbury, looking back toward the third 
decade of the century, attributes to the Cornificians. 55 He 
observes in passing that this sect had small reverence for Hugh, 56 
and he praises William of Conches, along with Abaelard, 
Thierry of Chartres, and Gilbert of Porree, for active resistance 
to the Cornifician "madmen." Yet he notes that not all of these 
masters resisted successfully, but succumbed instead to the very 
foolishness they combatted. 57 Whether John has William of 
Conches in mind here or not, William himself maintains the 
distinctness of eloquentia and philosophia in his commentary on 
the De consolatione phi/osophiae, and does so in terms suggestive 
of Hugh's statement quoted just above: 

. . . neither eloquentia nor any part of it is about philosophy. This is con- 
firmed by the authority of Tully, who, in the prologue to the Rhetoric [De 
inventione], says: 'Wisdom without eloquence is helpful, but not much; 
eloquence without wisdom not only is not helpful — it is harmful ; eloquence 
and wisdom together are truly helpful.' So Tully wanted eloquence and 
wisdom to be distinct. Likewise Sallust, who in his description of Catiline 
says: 'He had eloquence enough but small wisdom.' 58 

The persistence of William's point of view is evident in the 
reviser of William's De philosophia mundi, who, writing con- 
siderably later, makes unmistakable references to the Didascalicori' 's 


conception of a fourfold philosophy as something that should 
not disturb his readers if they encounter it, and himself main- 
tains, following William, that the theoretical and practical arts 
are "about philosophy itself," the arts of speech only "for 
philosophy" ("its appendages and tools"), and the mechanical 
arts its mere "menials." 59 

In standing against such positions, Hugh is not seeking 
agreement on the meaning of a word — "philosophy": 

If anyone thinks that the term 'philosophy' should be reserved to philos- 
ophizing-proper and to the search for the True which I have put in first 
place, I will not argue with him about a name. What good is that? As 
anyone is free to use words in a plausible manner as it pleases him, so I 
judge a teaching and its utility by one same standard of truth. 60 

Hugh's one standard is the necessity for so pursuing all 
knowledge, all human activity, that human restoration to 
beatitude in the knowledge and love of God will result. 

The starting-point of a division of philosophy, the term 
initially divided, is above all what determines the whole 
character of the result. Hugh begins with a conception of man's 
fall and divides man's pursuit of restoration into parts which 
reflect the effects of that fall. By contrast, William of Conches 
begins simply with natural knowledge, scientia. Borrowing an 
Augustinian distinction, but a subordinate one, between res 
(things) and verba (words), he divides knowledge into "wisdom," 
or knowledge of things, and "eloquence," or knowledge of how 
to state one's knowledge of things decorously. Wisdom he 
equates with philosophy; the sole difference between "wisdom" 
and "philosophy" for him is that one name is Latin, the other 
Greek. 61 From such naturalistic rationalism Hugh's thought is 
poles apart. For Hugh, Wisdom is the second person of the 
trinitarian Godhead, and philosophy is pursuit of that Wisdom; 
secondarily, from the standpoint of the intellectual creature, 
wisdom is a participation in the divine Wisdom. Without such 
orientation, without the divine root and end, knowledge is 
fruitless : "Logic, mathematics, and physics teach a sort of truth, 
but they do not attain to that Truth in which the salvation of 
the soul lies and without which everything that is, is vain"; 62 
and again, "Behold, we have shown. . . the cause of our disease, 
namely love of the world, and the cure of that disease, namely 


love of God . . . without which to have known all other things 
avails either little or nothing."" 

Against Haureau's misconception of Hugh as one who had 
"pris en degout la science elle-meme" or against the textual 
misrepresentation by Ueberweg and Heinze to the same effect, 64 
Hugh's stress upon knowledge has been exaggerated to the level 
of an absolute and his "Learn everything... A skimpy know- 
ledge is not a pleasing thing" 65 quoted without the qualification 
afforded by its context, where it forms part of an exhortation 
to learn perfectly the letter or historia of Scripture and the arts 
that will make that letter clear. Hugh, unlike William of 
Conches and others of his time, will not allow study to be the 
proposition (objective) or occupatio (preoccupation) of his 
students. 66 One thinks of Abaelard's complaint that his enemies 
kept objecting to him "quod scilicet proposito monachi valde 
sit contrarium saecularium librorum studio detineri" ("that it 
is altogether contrary to a monk's objective to be seduced by 
worldly books"). 67 Not against natural science, Hugh none- 
theless teaches that the man engrossed in the investigation of 
temporal things "not only forgets his Creator, but neglects 
himself, and becomes preoccupied in the lowest order of 
things — things without relevance for salvation"" — one thinks 
of William of Conches' grouchy remonstrance against those 
who, "ignorant themselves of the forces of nature, don't want 
others to find out anything about them either, so that they may 
have everyone as companions in their ignorance." 69 

Differing from, and, it seems, in part replying to, the natural- 
istic conception of philosophy of William of Conches or the 
interest in disputation of Abaelard ; differing equally from such 
ingenious but fictive conceptions as that of Honorius Augusto- 
dunensis, who sees philosophy as a highway and the arts as 
cities strung along it, leading the soul from ignorant exile to 
scriptural wisdom ; 7 o more profound, finally, than Adelard of 
Bath, who sees the arts as "liberal" because they liberate the 
soul from the chains of worldly love which bind it within the 
prison-house of the body 71 — Hugh presents philosophy as the 
instrument of a literal return to the divine Wisdom from the 
literal exile of the fall; as the means of restoring to man an 
ontological perfection which he knows, through experience, 


that he lacks; which by faith he believes he lost in Adam; which 
by philosophy he struggles toward in time; and which by grace 
he receives abundantly in eternity. 

III. The Readaptation of Heterodox Cosmological Texts and 
Themes. It is not only in the adaptation of an Aristotelian 
division of knowledge to an Augustinian view of man's fall and 
redemption through "philosophy" that Hugh, as it were, con- 
fronts and reorients contemporary interests. In the first book of 
the Didascalicon, and to a smaller extent in the second, he has 
chosen to express and support his argument by allusions to 
Platonic, Neoplatonic, and Hermetic texts and themes which 
reflect, not directly through uncritical repetition of them, but 
obliquely and correctively through implicit alteration of their 
meaning, certain dominant cosmological concerns of the early 
twelfth century. One such concern deals with the divine 
Wisdom, formal cause or Exemplar of the created universe, and 
with the specific agency by which the prototypes therein con- 
tained are transferred to the material world. Directly related to 
the latter is also the concern for "nature," conceived not only as 
the primordial form of each thing residing in the divine Mind 
or as the form inhering in the actualized thing itself, but also 
as an intermediary of uncertain character presiding in one way 
or another over creation. 

It seems to have been Abaelard who, zealous to refute the 
Sabellianism of Roscelin with a great show of authority as well 
as of dialectic, first marshaled for the twelfth century those loci 
from Plato, Chalcidius, Macrobius, "Mercury," Vergil, the 
Sybil, and others, by which he intended to show that even the 
pagans had knowledge of the three divine persons and which, 
for a quarter of the century and partly through the influence of 
Abaelard upon the Platonizing cosmologists of Chartres, were 
to become involved in the heated disputes over the existence and 
identity of the world-soul and over the role of the Son and of the 
Holy Spirit in creation. 72 At the same time, the De consolatione 
philosophiae of Boethius, orthodox and congenial to the Victorine 
outlook by the quest for the Summum Bonum which forms its 
central subject matter but suspect and alien to the Victorines in 
the Timaean cosmology of the celebrated Book in, metre ix, 7 ^, 


attracted renewed interest after a century of disfavor and neglect, 
and the twelfth century saw the production of at least the four 
new commentaries reported by Courcelle, 74 including that by 
William of Conches, which was destined to a diffusion surpassing 
even that of Remigius of Auxerre's commentary, on which it 
relies heavily but over which it makes numerous original 
advances. Led constantly back to the Timaeus in his efforts to 
gloss the De consolatione philosophiae, William ultimately produced 
a full-length commentary on the Platonic dialogue as well. 
Both commentaries are replete with cosmological, cosmogonal, 
and other themes widely circulated throughout the century and 
reflected, with careful selection and adaptation, in the Didas- 
calicon. 15 Finally, the Hermetic tradition not only provided the 
concepts of Nous or secundum Dominum, of a generating celestial 
natura, and of the divine stars as found in the Latin Asclepius, 
known to and even quoted by Hugh in the Didascalicon, 16 but it 
served as a cover for pseudepigraphous concoctions like the 
"Liber Hermetis Mercurii Triplicis de VI rerum principiis," 
through which a broader selection of cosmological materials 
from sources like Firmicus Maternus, Alcabitius, and Zahel ben 
Bischr were diffused in the twelfth century. 77 The "Liber 
Hermetis" is of particular interest because, by a passage having 
close verbal resemblance to the Didascalicon, it suggests the 
existence of a further cosmological pseudepigraph, a Alatentetrade 
ascribed to Pythagoras, which is possibly a source common to 
Hugh and the "Liber Hermetis" author. 78 

The Didascalkon bears evidence of Hugh's intimate knowledge 
of these works through direct quotations, through unmistakable 
allusions, and, perhaps more telling than both of these, through 
incidental phrases which are not easy to recognize and which 
were introduced, it seems, rather by the unconscious prompting 
of Hugh's memory than by his deliberate intention. 79 That 
Hugh should have studied these works with the attentiveness 
suggested by his use of them, however, or that knowing them 
he should have employed them in his own work, seems at first 
sight inconsistent with attitudes he abundantly expresses else- 
where. Unlike Remigius of Auxerre, whose commentaries on 
Statius, Cato, Persius, Juvenal, Martianus Capella, Prudentius, 
Sedulius, and the De consolatione philosophiae mark him as "un 


humaniste qui ne veut rien perdre de l'heritage antique, rien 
condamner"; 80 unlike William of Conches, whose creationist 
interpretation of the De consolatione philosophiae and the Timaeus 
marks him as "un humaniste nourri de culture antique et 
convaincu de ses secretes harmonies avec la foi," 81 Hugh, 
though a voluminous commentator, has no commentary on 
texts other than scriptural or religious, 82 and never recommends 
such texts as those under discussion, or any commentary on them, 
to his students. In the Didascalicon itself, purely literary or 
poetic works are classified as the mere appendicta artium, "which 
touch in scattered and confused fashion upon some topics lifted 
out of the arts"; 83 the writings of philosophers are described as 
so many "whitewashed walls of clay," shining with eloquence 
on their verbal surface but concealing the clay of error and 
falsehood underneath. 84 

In others of his works, Hugh deplores the number of con- 
temporary men of letters who think more often of pagan lore, 
of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, than of Christ and his saints ; 
who delight in the trifles of poetry and contemn Scripture ; who 
know truth but love falsehood. 85 To the "philosophers of the 
gentiles," whom he characterizes as peering toward Wisdom 
with "an alien love that comes seeking from afar," he ascribes 
three types of false opinion, of groundless teaching, on the 
origin and continuing existence of the world : 

Some say that nature alone exists and nothing else, and that God is 
nothing but the invention of empty fear, and that things were always as they 
are, from the beginning, before the beginning, without beginning. And the 
ages roll by, and nature produces and renews itself, and nothing can be 
different from what it has always been. Others declare the contrary and 
fight because of such insults to the Creator, and think that they are defending 
him, when in fact they too are attacking him with their lies. They say that 
there is an "opifex," who shaped all things out of matter coeternal with 
himself, giving matter an improved form. These do not know the power of 
the Creator ; they deny that anything has been made from nothing or can fall 
back into nothingness, and they make the work of the Creator consist only 
in shifting things about. 86 

The third group, Hugh continues, admit that all things were 
made from nothing, that once nothing was yet created, that then 
the Maker of all things existed and has always existed. But from 
this promising beginning they come to a bad end : 


Seeming to perceive the truth about creation, they fall into countless lies 
about the subsistence of things. They invent essences and forms and atoms 
and 'ideas of the principal constitutions' and numerous elements and infinite 
births and invisible motions and procreative agencies. And in all these 
things they multiply mere shadows of thought . . . and the truth is in none 
of them. 87 

Repeatedly Hugh remarks upon the disparity between the 
cosmogony of the Timaeus and the truth taught by Christian 
authors according to the true faith. 88 Since the basic truth about 
the creation and subsistence of the world is known, continued 
disputes over its constitution are "the disputes of men who, out 
of vain curiosity, pry into the hidden things of God's works — 
disputes which they multiply by making up for themselves lies 
about things of which they are ignorant." 89 

For Hugh, philosophy is essentially Christian philosophy. The 
pagan philosophers, to be sure, wished to find Wisdom, but not 
believing in Christ, they did not know the Way. Serving as 
their own guides, they explored moon, sun, the stars of heaven, 
heaven itself, and beyond heaven, the firmament. There was 
nothing higher toward which they could reach in their search 
for Wisdom. But that Wisdom which is above all things lies in 
none of the physical things He has made. He resides within 
man — and these philosophers sought him in the outside world ! 90 
In the arts of the trivium and quadrivium — wherever they were 
not dealing with God, whether taken in himself, or as Creator, 
or as the final end of man — Hugh concedes that the ancients 
were preeminent. But even here he minimizes their role by 
asserting their subservience to the Christian philosophers who 
were to follow them. If for Bernard of Chartres the ancients 
were giants on whose shoulders the moderns perched like 
dwarfs, for Hugh the ancients were but laborers upon an inferior 
truth, while to Christians, to the sons of Life, was reserved the 
consummation of truth. 91 

Heterodox and inconsistent with the general tenor of Hugh's 
thought, the cosmological texts and allusions found in the 
Didascalicon seem at first sight not only out of place but 
peculiarly gratuitous. While they appear in the opening chapter 
of Book i, they are above all centered in chapters vi and vii, 
and ix and x, the digressive and inessential character of which, 


from the standpoint of the argument of Book 1, has been noted 
above. 92 It is only when Hugh's use of such texts and allusions 
in the Didascalicon is examined in some detail that they are found 
carefully altered in meaning and thus made consistent with his 
thought as elsewhere expressed. Further, once their adaptation 
is recognized, their introduction into the Didascalicon ceases to 
seem gratuitous and assumes instead a rhetorical value. Given 
new currency by revived interest in the works which embody 
them, propounded by teachers as dynamic and contentious as 
Abaelard and William of Conches, receiving added importance 
by the very notoriety of Abaelard's condemnation at Soissons 
in 1 121, such texts and ideas would be well known to readers of 
the Didascalicon. By using them, Hugh spoke to his contempo- 
raries in terms significant in their times; by adapting their 
meaning, he made them promote a point of view actually alien, 
as we have seen, to the borrowed texts themselves, and hence 
gave, even to those who might disagree with him, an attractive 
proof of ingenuity. 

The opening, or keynote, sentence of the Didascalicon, with its 
Boethian "Form of the Perfect Good," at once evokes a 
commentary tradition which, from as far back as John the Scot 
and Remigius of Auxerre, risked heterodoxy in order to give 
Christian accommodation to Timaean concepts of the world and 
its origin. 93 While the over-all phraseology of the opening 
sentence derives from the De consolatione pbilosoftbiae, Book in, 
prose x, and from Boethius's inquiry there into the existence and 
identity of the Perfect Good, source of human felicity, the term 
"perfecti boni forma" looks back also to the "insita summi 
forma boni," "ratio perpetua," "supermini exemplum," "mens," 
"lux," and "fons boni" of the De consolatione pbilosopbiae, Book 
in, metre ix. Consistently identifying these terms with the 
Joannine Creator-Logos, with the Pauline "Christ, Wisdom of 
the Father," or "Christ, form of God," commentators from the 
ninth century onward were led into a variety of strategems in 
their efforts to give comparable Christian naturalization to 
Platonic teaching on the perpetuity of matter, on God as the 
mere shaper of a preexistent material chaos, on the descent 
through the cosmos of souls created on stars, or on the stars 
themselves as living divine beings sharing with the "anima 


mundi" a superintendence over life and motion in the inferior 
reaches of the cosmos. 

Hugh's acceptance of the Christianized Platonic Nous in its 
cosmic and creationist role is explicit in his mention of "that 
archetypal Exemplar of all things which exists in the divine 
Mind, according to the idea of which all things have been 
formed." 94 The opening words of the Didascalkon, however, 
present the divine Wisdom not as exemplary cause of creation 
at large, but specifically as instigator and term of man's illumin- 
ation and restoration; not as a general ontological cause, but as a 
moral objective, as something to be sought, and sought first, by 
man. By reminding man of his origin, the divine Wisdom, 
Hugh says, keeps man from being like the other animals. 95 The 
"tripod" of Apollo, with its superscription "Know theyself " is 
actually the threefold sense of Scripture, inspired by the divine 
Wisdom to teach man self-knowledge. 96 Further relations 
between the divine Wisdom and man are detailed in the Boethian 
definition of philosophy in chapter ii, which extends the 
materials of the opening paragraph of chapter i. Thus, with an 
emphasis wholly different from that of Chartrian contemporaries 
who were preoccupied with the role of the divine Wisdom in the 
genesis of the cosmos — from Bernard of Chartres, who became 
entangled in the paradoxes of John the Scot's "natura quae et 
creatur et creat"; 97 or from William of Conches, bent upon 
eliciting an Augustinian creationism from the Timaeus;^ or 
from Thierry of Chartres, who drew upon Neopythagorean 
arithmology to explain how the created many derive from the 
creating One 99 — Hugh begins, in his very opening words, to 
lead toward the expression of his belief, following Augustine, 
that the human mind is made in the image of the divine Wisdom, 
and that this image, damaged by the fall, is to be restored 
through the arts, in cooperation with grace. 100 

Arresting, however, is the sudden reference to the Timaeus, 
and thus, ostensibly, to the world-soul, in the second paragraph 
of the first chapter. 101 Plato's Timaeus, we are told, 

...formed the entelechy out of substance \ which is 'dividual' and 
'individual' and mixed of these two ; and likewise out of nature which is 
'same' and 'diverse' and a mixture of this pair, by which the universe is 
defined. 102 


We are told further, in a passage lifted from the Chalcidian 
elucidation of the "anima mundi," that the entelechy grasps 
"not only the elements but all things that are made from them," 10 3 
and to substantiate this capacity certain Empedoclean verses, 
found also in Chalcidius and also in connection with the "anima 
mundi" (though a second time in connection with man's soul), are 
cited. 104 Lastly, a verse from the De consolatione philosophiae, Book 
in, metre ix("Quae cum secta duos motum glomeravit inorbes" — 
line 1 5), a verse alluding to the two circles into which the world- 
soul is arranged in Timaeus 36 B-C, is closely paraphrased. 105 

Interpretations of these passages current at the time the 
Didascalkon was written were associated with heretical points of 
view and were, in fact, abandoned by their authors within a 
decade or a little after the appearance of the Didascalkon. To 
Abaelard, the Timaean passage on the world-soul referred "per 
pulcherrimuminvolucrum"to the Holy Spirit, "same" innature 
with Father and Son, "diverse" in person; "individual," that is, 
indivisible, because the divine substance is simple, "dividual" 
because it divides its gifts among many. 106 To William of 
Conches, who also identified the world-soul with the Holy 
Spirit 107 but who explained Plato's terms with a typical cos- 
mological emphasis, the world-soul is "individual" because, as 
spirit, it lacks parts, "dividual" because of the different grades of 
vital power it bestows upon plants, upon animals, upon men; 
"same" as productive of reason and intellect, which are un- 
changing, "diverse" as productive of sense and opinion, which 
change and err. 108 Following Chalcidius, William cited the 
Empedoclean verses in his commentary on the Timaeus as 
showing why the world-soul, if it was to discern as well as to 
vivify all things, would have, in some fashion, to be composed 
of them. 109 The "Quae cum secta duos" verse from the De 
consolatione philosophiae he interpreted as referring to the spheres 
of the planets and the firmament, which, contrary in movement, 
exercise different influences upon the corporeal world. 110 The 
term "entelechy," moreover, was reported by John the Scot and 
Remigius of Auxerre to be Plato's name for the "anima mundi," 
and its use in this sense in Bernardus Silvestris's De mundi 
universitate testifies to the currency of this mistaken identification 
in the twelfth century. 111 


But by all these terms — "entelechy," the "same and diverse" 
and "dividual and individual" of the Timaeus passage, the 
Empedoclean verses, and the terms taken from the "Quae cum 
secta duos" line of the De consolatione philosophiae, Book in, 
metre ix — Hugh intends not the "anima mundi" but the human 
soul. That "entelechy" was not Plato's but Aristotle's term for 
"the first perfection of a natural organic body" he might have 
learned from Chalcidius, who makes the point in a context 
dealing with man; 112 and one notes that Hugh endows his 
entelechy with senses and sense perceptions, explicitly denied to 
the animate world by Plato in Timaeus, 33. That "persons of 
better judgment" apply the Timaeus passage to man, to the 
microcosm rather than to the macrocosm, he might also have 
read in John the Scot and Remigius, 113 and John the Scot 
supplies the psychological interpretation of the "Quae cum 
secta duos" verse which, rather than William of Conches' 
astrological one, Hugh follows ; the "two spheres" being those 
of sensory and intellectual cognition. 114 

The bases for Hugh's application of these materials to man 
thus exist in aspects of the commentary tradition ignored by 
William of Conches. But beyond this, the opening chapter's 
concluding references to the dignity, fall, and restoration of 
human nature make it unmistakable, should one have missed 
Hugh's meaning earlier in the chapter, that he has been speaking 
of the human soul. Similarly, the title of chapter iii, "Con- 
cerning the threefold power of the soul, and the fact that man 
alone is endowed with reason," excludes the common attribution 
of reason to the world-soul, just as the chapter itself, by present- 
ing vegetative, sensitive, and rational life with reference to 
terrestrial beings alone, stands pointed against the current inter- 
pretation of the world-soul as threefold in nature because of the 
source of these three forms of life. 115 In his De tribus diebus, 
Hugh admits that God fills the universe as source of vitality and 
motion, but he denies that "the Creator Spirit" can be present 
to the universe as a soul. 116 Finally, the brano revision of 
William of Conches' De philosophia mundi lists several con- 
temporary interpretations of the Timaean "dividual and in- 
dividual substance" and "same and diverse nature"; one of 
these, agreeing in all particulars with various passages in the 


Didascalicon, refers entirely to the human soul and may safely be 
concluded to be Hugh's. 117 

In later chapters Hugh makes further modifications in current 
cosmological teachings. Among the commonest current syno- 
nyms for "world-soul" was the term "nature." 118 Hugh first of 
all uses "nature" to indicate the whole of creation, intellectual 
and material, viewed as a perpetual ordinance of God. 1 19 Second, 
he uses "nature" to indicate the superlunary world, following 
the pseudepigraphous "Liber Hermetis" in strictly astronomical 
details but no farther. He does not, like that work, make the 
celestial "nature" an offspring of the divine Cause or Good 
("Tugaton") and the Nous or Ratio, a generative hierarchy un- 
comfortably suggestive of the Trinity; he does not, like that 
work, make the celestial "nature" distributor to the inferior 
world of those essences of which Nous is the source, but 
reserves that function to the divine Exemplar itself, in accord- 
ance with a more orthodox view of Providence. 120 Last, in a 
brief survey of three basic meanings of "nature" among the 
ancients, he limits himself to recording the term's extension to 
the archetypal Exemplar, to the "proprium esse" of each 
created thing, and to a certain cosmic fire, which, as we learn 
from his homilies on Ecclesiastes, he would locate not in a 
world-soul, but in nothing more mysterious than the sun, 
William of Conches' objections to this view notwithstanding. 121 

The distinction among "the work of God," "the work of 
nature," and "the work of the artificer, who imitates nature," 
Hugh borrows from Chalcidius, but with basic modifications in 
meaning. 122 Both the title of Didascalicon 1. vi ("Concerning the 
three 'manners' of things") and that chapter's differentiation 
among "eternal," "perpetual," and "temporal" can be traced to 
WilHam of Conches' commentaries on the De consolatione 
philosophiae and the Timaeus, 12 ^ but Hugh includes the chapter, 
as he includes Didascalicon 1. x, not for its intrinsic cosmological 
interest but to identify precisely the temporal nature of the needs 
served by the mechanical arts and the "adulterate" character of 
their products. 124 The chapter "Concerning the three sub- 
sistences of things," 125 possibly intended for interpolation after 
Didascalicon 1. vi, 126 presents the angels not in Chalcidian terms 
as cosmically localized fiery intermediaries between God and 


man, as do William of Conches and numerous contemporaries, 127 
but as participants, through knowledge, in the primordial causes 
subsisting in the divine Mind and in this sense as containing the 
exemplars according to which material creation was made. 128 

The reactivation of the Timaean, Boethian, and Hermetic 
cosmological materials in the twelfth century did not spring 
from a simple desire to bring these to light for their own sakes, 
from what Chenu has called "une curiosite de bibliothecaire en 
mal de souvenirs antiques." 129 Chartres had its own immediate 
interests and purposes in regard to these materials, and so did 
Abaelard, as Parent and others have long ago shown. Perhaps 
we can now see as well the reason for the interest which Hugh 
displays in the same materials in the Didascalicon. If he used 
them there at all, it was because others had misused them first; 
if he was interested in them, it was because others were ex- 
cessively interested in them. He used them in an altered sense, 
and he reapplied and absorbed them into the ethico-mystical 
objective which governs the program of study set forth in the 

IV. The Didascalicon and Earlier Works in the Didascalic 
Tradition. Original in its own time for its argument for a four- 
fold "philosophy" oriented toward the perfecting of fallen man, 
and for its distinctive adaptation of currently fashionable 
cosmological texts and themes within the line of that argument, 
the Didascalicon is original in relation to traditional Christian 
didascalic works as well. Thus, though it has been likened to the 
De doctrina Christiana of Augustine, the Institutiones divinarum et 
saecularium lectionum of Cassiodorus, the Etymologiae of Isidore, 
and the De institutione clericorum of Rhabanus Maurus, as we have 
seen, 130 it is essentially different from all four. 

The Didascalicon, in the first place, is not rhetorical in aim, 
like the De doctrina Christiana; it is not, like it, a manual for 
Christian indoctrination, showing first how to discover truth 
from Scripture and then how to teach, please, and persuade in 
presenting the discovered truth to others. In short, it is not 
conceived by a bishop for the preparation of preachers. Nor is 
it a manual of clerical, much less of monastic formation, and in 
this it differs from the work of Rhabanus, written to form a 


clergy for the German missions, and of Cassiodorus, who out- 
lined a plan of study and work peculiarly adapted to the re- 
sources and aims of his new monastic foundation at Vivarium. 
Finally, the Didascalicon is not an impersonal digest of universal 
knowledge, an encyclopedic source book, and in this it differs 
from the Etymologiae of Isidore. 131 

But since Hugh was undoubtedly inspired by Augustine more 
than by any other single authority, it will be particularly in- 
structive to compare the Didascalicon and the De doctrina 
christiana in greater detail. 

The orientation of the Didascalicon is toward the restoration 
within the individual lector ^ or student, of the image of the 
divine Wisdom, the second person of the trinitarian Godhead, 
through whom, as through the primordial Idea or Pattern of all 
things, the Father has established the universe and through 
whose mysteries, from the fall to the end of time, he accomplish- 
es the work of restoration. The orientation of the Didascalicon 
is therefore, in a sense, mystical, since it looks toward man's 
union with the divine Wisdom, or Son. It must also be called 
noetic and ethical, since the mystical union is to be promoted 
through the pursuit and contemplation of truth on the one hand 
and the practice of virtue on the other. It must also be called 
"philosophical," not only because of the love of the divine 
Wisdom which motivates the pursuit but because of the full 
complement of arts and disciplines which effects that pursuit. 
Lastly, it must be called universal, intended for all men, partly 
because in the preface to the Didascalicon Hugh exhorts all men 
to study at the cost even of great efforts should they lack ability 
and of keen physical sufferings should they lack material means, 
partly because the program itself is postulated upon a catastrophe 
which Hugh accepts as universal for the race, but finally because 
he teaches expressly that no man may excuse himself from the 
obligation to construct within his own soul the "area Sapientiae" 
— a dwelling place for the divine Wisdom. 132 The result of the 
philosophic quest is the restoration in man of that form of the 
divine nature or Wisdom, lost to him through the fall : 

This, then, is what the arts are concerned with, this is what they intend, 
namely, to restore within us the divine likeness, a likeness which to us is a 
form but to God is his nature. The more we are conformed to the divine 


nature, the more do we possess Wisdom, for then there begins to shine forth 
again in us what has forever existed in the divine Idea or Pattern, coming 
and going in us but standing changeless in God. 133 

It cannot be doubted that for Augustine, as for Hugh, the 
philosophic quest had a religious importance, that he valued at 
least certain of the arts as assisting man to the divine Wisdom, 
and that he regarded the restoration of the divine likeness in 
man as man's destined end. But beyond this point qualifications 
accumulate. For Augustine, the restoration of the divine likeness 
in man is altogether reserved to the perfect vision of God in 
glory to come; 134 it is not, as in Hugh, a process which begins 
with a study of the arts in this life. The arts render a man 
"quicker, more persevering, and better equipped for the truth 
he should embrace," 135 but they are not themselves integral parts 
of that truth, increments of a growing divine likeness in man, as 
Hugh would have them; philosophy, whatever its part in 
Augustine's own spiritual growth, is not the normal avenue of 
Christian intellectual development as he finally conceives it in 
the De doctrina Christiana. 1 ^ 

The De doctrina Christiana holds up the study of Scripture as the 
exclusive source of normal Christian intellectual development ; 
the result immediately intended is charity, not Wisdom. The 
opening book of the De doctrina Christiana is devoted, not like 
that of the Didascalicon, to elucidating the relationship between 
the arts and man's pursuit of the divine Wisdom, but to 
elucidating the twofold law of love which directs that God 
alone be enjoyed and one's fellow-man well used in reference to 
God as man's end. For Augustine, all knowledge is reducible 
to charity, or love. Whatever a man has learned outside of 
Scripture, if it is harmful, is condemned in Scripture; if it is 
useful, is found in Scripture in greater abundance along with 
much that can be found nowhere else; 137 yet Scripture teaches 
nothing but love in all that it says. 138 To be sure, Augustine 
speaks of the knowledge gained from Scripture as the third step 
in a sevenfold ascent to Wisdom: 139 but the "knowledge" of 
which Augustine here speaks has nothing in common with the 
knowledge Hugh seeks from the arts; it is man's "knowledge" 
that he is entangled in temporal things, that he lacks the great 
love Scripture enjoins, and that he has good hope of deliverance; 


and "Wisdom" in this context is not specifically identified, as in 
Hugh, with the divine Idea or Pattern of all things, source and 
object of truth and virtue even in the secular arts. 

Of the arts, the De doctrina Christiana offers a scheme radically 
different from that of the Didascalicon. Hugh elaborates a 
division of philosophy containing twenty-one distinct arts, with 
further subdivision possible. 140 While seven of these are singled 
out for special attention, 1 *! all constitute "divisive parts of 
philosophy" and are integral to its pursuit. Augustine, on the 
other hand, interpolates his analysis of the arts into a discussion 
of what pagan learning a Christian intellectual may not im- 
properly acquire. His analysis is not presented as a division of 
philosophy but, more loosely, as a critical survey of the kinds of 
teachings practiced among the pagans. 142 Pagan knowledge he 
classifies thus: 

I. Knowledge of things men have instituted : 

A. In cooperation with demons: magic, soothsaying, omens, super- 
stitious practices. 

B. Among themselves : 

i. Unnecessarily and excessively: acting, dancing, painting, 

sculpture, fiction. 
2. Usefully and indispensably: weights, measures, coins, uniforms, 

written notations, and various arrangements necessary for the 

management of society. 

II. Knowledge of things done through time or divinely instituted : 

A. Pertaining to the senses : 
i. History. 

2. Natural history. 

3. Astronomy. 

4. Useful corporeal arts : 

a. Those producing enduring effects like a house, a bench, or 
a dish. 

b. Those assisting God in his works, like medicine, agriculture, 

c. Those terminating in an action, like leaping, running, 

B. Pertaining to the reason: 

1. The science of conclusions, definitions, and divisions. 

2. Eloquence. 

3. The science of number considered in itself or applied to figures, 
sounds, and motions. 143 


Having outlined pagan knowledge, Augustine classifies as 
unsuitable for Christians various parts of it which Hugh accepts 
as necessary. Of things instituted by men, Augustine counte- 
nances only those useful and indispensable for the management 
of society (I. B. 2.). He disallows dramatics and fiction (I. B. 1.), 
the former of which finds a place in Hugh's scheme as one of the 
mechanical arts, 144 and the latter of which Hugh recommends 
for recreation though not for serious study. 145 On the con- 
demnation of magic both men agree. 146 Of things done through 
time or divinely instituted, Augustine dismisses astronomy 
(II. A. 3.) as useless 147 and depreciates the importance of formal 
study of eloquence (II. B. 2.), 148 both of which Hugh finds 
essential. Of all the teachings of the pagans, none are useful, 
Augustine thinks, except history, natural history (II. A. 1 and 2.), 
corporeal arts (II. A. 4.), and the sciences of reasoning and 
number (II. B. 1 and 3.). 149 His criterion is the immediate value 
of every branch of knowledge in the interpretation of Scripture. 
The limits of study as Augustine conceives it appear in the 
projects he recommends: histories to supplement scriptural 
history; handbooks to explain scriptural names, places, animals, 
plants, trees, stones, metals, numbers, and, if possible, types of 
reasoning. 150 Hugh, too, regards secular learning as of value 
for scriptural exegesis, but he requires a broader base of secular 
arts as preparation for this purpose than Augustine does, and he 
groups the secular arts according to their service to particular 
levels of scriptural interpretation. 151 Finally, while Hugh is 
faithful to Augustine in the concept of the divine Wisdom's 
relation to the rational creature, a concept which underlies the 
Didascalicon, it must be said that he draws from this concept, in 
his fourfold "philosophy" and his web of twenty-one arts, a 
program of study which exceeds anything that Augustine 
thought necessary. 

But it has also been claimed that the Didascalicon bears closer 
resemblance to the Institutiones divinarum et saecularium lectionum 
of Cassiodorus than to any other previous work. 152 The 
comparison, whatever its truth, obscures differences at least as 
radical as those distinguishing the Didascalicon from the De 
doctrina Christiana. Written "for the instruction of simple and 
unpolished brothers in order that they may be filled with an 


abundance of Heavenly Scriptures," the Institutiones outlines for 
the cenobites of Vivarium a reading course in the Bible and the 
Fathers. 153 A compendium of secular arts is added only because 
these arts, though they do not promote spiritual advancement 
and can even be dangerous, are useful for interpreting Scripture, 
and because those already instructed in this sort of knowledge 
may wish a brief review, while those who are not, may profit by 
a few rudiments. 154 The arts treated are only the seven of the 
trivium and quadrivium; missing are theology and physics, the 
three branches of ethics, and the seven mechanical arts, all 
integral to Hugh's scheme. A division of philosophy into 
"inspective" and "actual" arts, prefixed to the chapter on 
dialectic in obedience to a custom set by commentators on 
Porphyry's Isagoge, 155 is analogous to Hugh's divisions of the 
theoretical and practical arts, different, however, in terminol- 
ogy 156 and without organic relevance to Cassiodorus's total 
presentation. Of Hugh's mechanical arts, agriculture, fishing, 
and medicine appear, but the first is a last resort for brethren too 
simple for instruction in letters, the last two are praised as works 
of mercy, especially to strangers; 157 there is no vision of a 
complex of mechanical arts serving the philosophic quest by 
repairing physical weaknesses sustained by man in the fall. In 
fact, Hugh is indebted to the Institutiones principally for a 
definition of theology which he enriches by associating it with 
concepts found in Boethius, 158 and possibly for a definition of 
philosophy, in which, however, he modifies the words and the 
meaning. 159 

Responsible for the notion that Hugh resembles Cassiodorus 
is the bipartite division of the Didascalicon into the first three 
books, which deal, as some have alleged, with philosophy or the 
profane sciences, and the last three, which deal, according to the 
same view, with theology or sacred science. 160 The bipartite 
division into two groups of three books each cannot be denied ; 
but to infer that it represents a cleavage between sacred and 
profane like that in Cassiodorus, or a distinction between 
philosophy and theology like that common from the thirteenth 
century onwards is to misread the Didascalicon and do violence 
to Hugh's thought as there and elsewhere expressed. For Hugh, 
philosophy is the pursuit of the divine Wisdom; 161 it is the only 


wisdom a man can have in this life; 162 it governs all human 
actions or occupations; 163 it comprehends all knowledge what- 
ever. 164 Philosophy is simply the whole of human life pursued 
in proper relation to its final cause, or, one may also say, its 
formal cause. 165 Its all-inclusive divisions are outlined in the 
first part of the Didascalicon without concern for the sources of 
the knowledge, whether in reason or faith, in the created world 
or the mysteries of revelation, in secular writings or in Sacred 
Scripture. The last three books, then, do not "add" theology 
to the first three. Theology, the science of intellectible being, 
however that science be obtained, has its place among the dis- 
ciplines outlined in the first three books, and a different ex- 
planation must be found for the bipartite division of the 

The explanation lies in the divine Wisdom's double mani- 
festation of itself in the works of creation and the works of 
salvation, the former constituting the matter of secular writings, 
the latter constituting the matter of Sacred Writings. 166 The 
existence of the Sacred Scripture alters the character of phi- 
losophy for Hugh, and no adequate grasp of his thought is 
possible without clear understanding of the reciprocal role he 
assigns to secular writings and Scripture in the one pursuit of 
the one Wisdom, the one philosophy. 

Scripture, in the first place, is the primary "documentum," or 
evidence, in the theological art. A false "worldly theology" was 
elaborated by the ancients, who, first ignoring, then proudly 
rejecting the works of salvation, restricted themselves to the 
indistinct natural evidences of the created world. The terms in 
which Hugh speaks of "worldly theology" are almost vitu- 
perative: "dense gloom," "deep darkness of ignorance," "a trap 
of error to ensnare the proud," "foolishness," "lying fictions of 
their own fashioning." 167 Clearly, he does not think oimundana 
theologia as, in the thirteenth century and later, men were to 
think of natural theology. It can hardly be "worldly theology," 
so characterized and, moreover, a purely natural theology, which 
is meant by "theology" in the first three books of the Didacalicon. 
The great mistake of non-Christian theologians, Hugh teaches, 
was precisely that they reasoned exclusively from natural 
evidences and so became fools : 


Invisible things can only be made known by visible things, and therefore 
the whole of theology must use visible demonstrations. But worldly 
theology adopted the works of creation and the elements of this world that 
it might make its demonstration in these... And for this reason, namely, 
because it used a demonstration which revealed little, it lacked ability to 
bring forth the incomprehensible truth without the stain of error. . . In this 
were the wise men of this world fools, namely, that proceeding by natural 
evidences alone and following the elements and appearances of the world, 
they lacked the lessons of grace. 168 

True theology, divine because it bases itself primarily on the 
works of restoration, on the humanity of Jesus and his mysteries 
from the beginning of the world, does not ignore the works of 
creation altogether, however; it "adds natural considerations 
in due measure, in order that it may fashion instruction from 
them." 169 In part these "natural considerations" are demonstra- 
tions of the existence and even the trinitarian nature of God 
drawn from the immensity, beauty, and utility of the external 
world as well as from introspective examination of the rational 
creature in operation. 170 In part, they are the "natural arts" or 
"lower wisdom" — the arts of the trivium, the quadrivium, and 
physics — needed for the interpretation of Scripture. For the 
Sacred Text "excels all other writings in subtlety and profundity, 
not only in its subject matter but also in its method of treatment, 
for whereas in other writings words alone convey the meaning, 
in it things as well as words are significant." 171 Hence, the arts 
of the trivium are needed to illuminate the verbal surface of the 
Sacred Writings as of non-sacred; while physics and the arts of 
the quadrivium are uniquely needed to illuminate the meaning 
of scriptural things, which, allegorically interpreted {facta 
mysticd), lead to truth, tropologically interpreted (facienda 
my s tied), lead to virtue. 172 

Scripture, then, is the source par excellence, but not the only 
source, of theology; and theology in turn is the "peak of 
philosophy and the perfection of truth." 173 Scripture is like- 
wise, though again not exclusively, the source par excellence for 
ethics. 174 All the other arts, apart from their intrinsic value, 
serve to explain Scripture. Because Scripture exists as a distinct 
corpus, having its own history and canon and requiring its own 
bibliographical approach, and because it has unique properties 
demanding specialized techniques of interpretation and fitting it 


for varied uses at different points in the spiritual and intellectual 
development of man, it is given special attention in the latter 
half of the Didascalicon. 

The originality of the Didascalicon does not extend, then, to an 
anticipation of the Thomistic distinction between philosophy 
and theology, as Hugonin, Mignon, Marietan, Manitius, Kleinz, 
Vernet, and others have believed. On the contrary, the Didas- 
calicon is true to Augustine, as to its own time, in adhering to a 
conception of philosophy as coterminous with all knowledge 
whatever, including revealed or scriptural knowledge, and as 
consisting essentially in man's search for reunion with the God 
by and for whom he was made and without whom he can have 
neither peace nor profit in any earthly pursuit. It is true to 
Augustine in its independent rehandling of an Aristotelian 
division of knowledge, grouping the arts into a fourfold remedy 
for the needs of fallen man. It is true to its time as well, though 
in a different sense, by endeavoring, as it seems, to stand against 
secularist adaptations of learning everywhere current, but 
especially among the Chartrians, and by reclaiming even suspect 
cosmological texts and themes for its divinely oriented formu- 
lation of the intellectual life. And finally, in the very vigor of its 
response to the interests of its time, in its very willingness to 
formulate its Augustinian viewpoint in terms currently vital, it 
is led beyond the achievement of Augustine, as it is led beyond 
that of Cassiodorus, and cannot adequately be described as a 
refurbishment either of the De doctrina christiana or thclnstitutiones 
divinarum et saecularium lectionum. 

V. The Author of the Didascalicon. Hugh is an author who is, 
as de Ghellinck has remarked, "tres discret quand il parle de 
lui-meme." 175 In all his writings, only three passages shed light 
upon his origin and early life. Two of these appear in the 
Didascalicon. The first, in Didascalicon in. xix, occurs in con- 
nection with Hugh's observation that the perfect lover of 
Wisdom considers all the world a place of exile. The unpracticed 
beginner, he remarks, must try little by little to withdraw him- 
self from love of the world. He must separate himself first of all 
from those tender ties which bind him to his homeland, 
extending his love to all lands equally. Later he can withdraw 


his love even from these. Then he adds : "From boyhood I have 
dwelt on foreign soil, and I know with what grief the mind takes 
leave of the narrow hearth of a peasant's hut, and I know too 
how frankly it afterwards disdains marble firesides and panelled 
halls." Apart from the reference to dwelling abroad since early 
life, the statement seems to be largely rhetorical, a tissue of 
allusions to Vergil, Horace, Cicero. 176 In the second passage, in 
Didascalicon vi. iii, Hugh reminisces on his love of learning, 
specifically his experimental curiosity in the arts of the trivium 
and quadrivium, while still a schoolboy. 177 The third, which 
comprises the dedicatory epistle to the De arrha animae, 11 * shows 
a fondness for and a familiarity with the brethren of the small 
Augustinian priory of St. Pancras, Hamersleben, which have led 
to the identification of that far-off Saxon house as the scene of 
Hugh's early religious life and his schoolboy pursuits. 

To these passages from Hugh's works must be added several 
items from the Victorine archives. The Victorine necrology for 
February n records the "anniversarium solemne" of Master 
Hugh, "who, yielding himself to the service of God in this our 
house from the first flower of his youth, so outstandingly took 
to himself the gifts given him by the heavenly Wisdom from 
above that in all the Latin Church, no man can be found to 
compare with him in wisdom." The necrology goes on to 
mention relics of the martyr St. Victor which Hugh brought to 
the Abbey from Marseilles, having "sought them with much 
effort and begged them with great difficulty." For May 5, the 
necrology mentions Hugh's uncle, also named Hugh, whom it 
identifies as "an archdeacon of the church of Halberstadt, who 
came to us from Saxony, following in the footsteps of Master 
Hugh, his nephew." It observes that he "enriched our 
establishment magnificently with gold, silver, precious vest- 
ments, carpets, draperies, and other furnishings from his own 
goods" and that he supplied funds for the building of the 
Abbey church. For June 17, the day on which the Abbey 
celebrated the feast of its reception of the relics of St. Victor, the 
necrology and ordo prescribe that mass be celebrated for the 
soul of Hugh, their donor. Adam of St. Victor's twelfth- 
century sequence for this feast likewise records the story of the 
relics having been brought from Marseilles. 


These records, plus a variety of references to Hugh in 
chronicles from the region of Halberstadt, lie at the basis of the 
account of Hugh's life which the Victorines prefixed to the 
Rouen, 1648, edition of Hugh's works and of the comparably 
circumstantial version of his life found in the mid-sixteenth- 
century Halberst'ddter Bischofschronik of Johann Winnigstedt. If 
the complementary data of these two accounts are combined, 
the following story emerges : Hugh was born a lord of Blanken- 
burg in the diocese of Halberstadt toward the end of the 
eleventh century. His parents sent him to the newly founded 
Augustinian house of St. Pancras, Hamersleben, in the same 
diocese, to learn letters. There, captivated by love of learning, 
he chose to become a novice, despite the unwillingness of his 
parents. His uncle, Reinhard, was bishop of Halberstadt. When 
he was eighteen years of age, Bishop Reinhard, his diocese about 
to be devastated by the Emperor Henry V, sent Hugh to Paris 
accompanied by his uncle and namesake, the Archdeacon Hugh. 
The two Hughs traveled first to Marseilles, where they obtained 
relics of St. Victor from the monastery of that name. Sub- 
sequently, they went to Paris, where, on June 17 in approxi- 
mately the year 1 1 1 5 , they offered both the relics and their vows 
to Gilduin, first abbot of the Paris Abbey of St. Victor. When, 
after a time, Hugh had confirmed his vows, he was placed in 
charge of studies in the trivium and quadrivium, and finally 
made master of the school. After twenty-five years of life at the 
Abbey, he died on February 11, 11 40 or 1141. An eye-witness 
account of his death, written by the infirmarian Osbert, is 
extant. 179 

Belief in this story of Hugh's life is not universal, but for 
reasons set forth in detail elsewhere, it seems to the present 
writer to be dependable in main outline. 180 Significant is Hugh's 
early contact with the canonical movement, which sought to 
make available to men living in the world the life of primitive 
Christian perfection — the vita apostolica et canonica primitivae 
ecclesiae — formerly confined to the monasteries. 181 To this aim 
of the canonical movement in general may perhaps be traced 
Hugh's interest in a view of "philosophy," that is, of education 
and life, which is directed to all men; to it may also be traced, in 
part, his desire to incorporate the mechanical arts, beginning to 


flourish in the rising centers of urban life, into "philosophy" so 
conceived. Apart from this, it is difficult to see what influence 
the facts of his life, meager as we know them, exercised upon 
his work. 


On the Study of Reading 
by Hugh of Saint Victor 


There are many persons whose nature has left them so poor in 
ability that they can hardly grasp with their intellect even easy 
things, and of these persons I believe there are two kinds. There 
are those who, while they are not unaware of their own dullness, 
nonetheless struggle after knowledge with all the effort they can 
put forth and who, by tirelessly keeping up their pursuit, 
deserve to obtain as a result of their will power what they by no 
means possess as a result of their work. Others, however, 
because they know that they are in no way able to compass the 
highest things, neglect even the least, and, as it were, carelessly 
at rest in their own sluggishness, they all the more lose the light 
of truth in the greatest matters for their refusal to learn those 
smallest of which they are capable. It is of such that the 
Psalmist declares, "They were unwilling to understand how they 
might do well." 1 Not knowing and not wishing to know are 
far different things. Not knowing, to be sure, springs from 
weakness; but contempt of knowledge springs from a wicked 

There is another sort of man whom nature has enriched with 
the full measure of ability and to whom she shows an easy way 
to come at truth. Among these, even granting inequality in the 
strength of their ability, there is nevertheless not the same virtue 
or will in all for the cultivation of their natural sense through 
practice and learning. Many of this sort, caught up in the 
affairs and cares of this world beyond what is needful or given 
over to the vices and sensual indulgences of the body, bury the 
talent of God in earth, 2 seeking from it neither the fruit of 
wisdom nor the profit of good work. These, assuredly, are 
completely detestable. Again, for others of them, lack of family 
wealth and a slender income decrease the opportunity of 
learning. Yet, we decidedly do not believe that these can be 


altogether excused by this circumstance, since we see many 
laboring in hunger, thirst, and nakedness attain to the fruit of 
knowledge. And still it is one thing when one is not able, or to 
speak more truly, when one is not easily able to learn, and 
another when one is able but unwilling to learn. Just as it is 
more glorious to lay hold upon wisdom by sheer exertion, even 
though no resources support one, so, to be sure, it is more 
loathsome to enjoy natural ability and to have plenty of wealth, 
yet to grow dull in idleness. 3 

The things by which every man advances in knowledge are 
principally two — namely, reading and meditation. Of these, 
reading holds first place in instruction, and it is of reading that 
this book treats, setting forth rules for it. For there are three 
things particularly necessary to learn for reading: first, each 
man should know what he ought to read; second, in what order 
he ought to read, that is, what first and what afterwards; and 
third, in what manner he ought to read. These three points are 
handled one by one in this book. The book, moreover, instructs 
the reader as well of secular writings as of the Divine Writings. 
Therefore, it is divided into two parts, 4 each of which contains 
three subdivisions. In the first part, it instructs the reader of the 
arts, in the second, the reader of the Sacred Scripture. It 
instructs, moreover, in this way : it shows first what ought to be 
read, and next in what order and in what manner it ought to be 
read. But in order to make known what ought to be read, or 
what ought especially to be read, in the first part it first of all 
enumerates the origin of all the arts, and then their description 
and division, that is, how each art either contains some other or 
is contained by some other, thus dividing up philosophy from 
the peak down to the lowest members. Then it enumerates the 
authors of the arts and afterwards makes clear which of these 
arts ought principally to be read; then, likewise, it reveals in 
what order and in what manner. Finally, it lays down for students 
their discipline of life, and thus the first part concludes. 

In the second part it determines what writings ought to be 
called divine, and next, the number and order of the Divine 
Books, and their authors, and the interpretations of the names of 
these Books. It then treats certain characteristics of Divine 
Scripture which are very important. Then it shows how Sacred 


Scripture ought to be read by the man who seeks in it the 
correction of his morals and a form of living. Finally, it instructs 
the man who reads in it for love of knowledge, and thus the 
second part too comes to a close. 


Chapter One : Concerning the Origin of the Arts 

Of all things to be sought, the first is that Wisdom in which 
the Form of the Perfect Good stands fixed. 1 Wisdom illumi- 
nates man so that he may recognize himself; 2 for man was like 
all the other animals when he did not understand that he had 
been created of a higher order than they. 3 But his immortal 
mind, illuminated by Wisdom, beholds its own principle and 
recognizes how unfitting it is for it to seek anything outside 
itself when what it is in itself can be enough for it. It is written 
on the tripod of Apollo: yv£>6i oeaurov, that is, "Know thy- 
self," 4 for surely, if man had not forgotten his origin, he would 
recognize that everything subject to change is nothing. 5 

An opinion approved among philosophers maintains that the 
soul is put together out of all the parts of nature. And Plato's 
Timaeus 6 formed the entelechy 7 out of substance which is 
"dividual" and "individual" and mixed of these two; and like- 
wise out of nature which is "same" and "diverse" and a mixture 
of this pair, by which the universe is defined. 8 For the entelechy 
grasps "not only the elements but all things that are made from 
them,"9 since, through its understanding, it comprehends the 
invisible causes of things and, through sense impressions, picks 
up the visible forms of actual objects. "Divided, it gathers 
movement into twin spheres" 10 because, whether it goes out to 
sensible things through its senses or ascends to invisible things 
through its understanding, it circles about, drawing to itself the 
likenesses of things ; and thus it is that one and the same mind, 
having the capacity for all things, is fitted together out of every 
substance and nature by the fact that it represents within itself 
their imaged likeness. 

Now, it was a Pythagorean teaching that similars are com- 
prehended by similars: so that, in a word, the rational soul 


could by no means comprehend all things unless it were also 
composed of all of them; or, as a certain writer puts it: 

Earth we grasp with the earthly, fire with flame, 
Liquid with moisture, air with our breath. 11 

But we ought not to suppose that men most familiar with all 
the natures of things thought that simple essence was in any way 
distended in quantitative parts. 12 Rather, in order to demon- 
strate the soul's marvelous power more clearly did they declare 
that it consists of all natures, "not as being physically composed 
of them, but as having an analogous type of composition." 13 
For it is not to be thought that this similitude to all things comes 
into the soul from elsewhere, or from without; on the contrary, 
the soul grasps the similitude in and of itself, out of a certain 
native capacity and proper power of its own. As Varro says in 
the Periphysion : 14 Not all change comes upon things from with- 
out and in such a way that whatever changes necessarily either 
loses something it had or gains from the outside some other and 
different thing which it did not have before. We see how a wall 
receives a likeness when the form of some image or other is put 
upon it from the outside. But when a coiner imprints a figure 
upon metal, the metal, which itself is one thing, begins to repre- 
sent a different thing, not just on the outside, but from its own 
power and its natural aptitude to do so. It is in this way that the 
mind, imprinted with the likenesses of all things, is said to be all 
things and to receive its composition from all things and to 
contain them not as actual components, or formally, but virtu- 
ally and potentially. 15 

This, then, is that dignity of our nature which all naturally 
possess in equal measure, 16 but which all do not equally under- 
stand. For the mind, stupefied by bodily sensations and enticed 
out of itself by sensuous forms, has forgotten what it was, and, 
because it does not remember that it was anything different, 
believes that it is nothing except what is seen. But we are 
restored through instruction, so that we may recognize our 
nature and learn not to seek outside ourselves what we can find 
within. "The highest curative in life," 17 therefore, is the pursuit 
of Wisdom: he who finds it is happy, and he who possesses it, 
blessed. 18 


Chapter Two : That Philosophy is the Pursuit of Wisdom 

"Pythagoras was the first to call the pursuit of Wisdom 
philosophy" 19 and to prefer to be czlledphilosophos : for previous- 
ly philosophers had been called sophoi, that is, wise men. Fitly 
indeed did he call the seekers of truth not wise men but lovers of 
Wisdom, for certainly the whole truth lies so deeply hidden that 
the mind, however much it may ardently yearn toward it or 
however much it may struggle to acquire it, can nonetheless 
comprehend only with difficulty the truth as it is. Pythagoras, 
however, established philosophy as the discipline "of those 
things which truly exist and are of themselves endowed with 
unchangeable substance." 20 

"Philosophy, then, is the love and pursuit of Wisdom, and, 
in a certain way, a friendship with it: not, however, of that 
'wisdom' which is concerned with certain tools and with knowl- 
edge and skill in some craft, but of that Wisdom which, wanting 
in nothing, is a living Mind and the sole primordial Idea or 
Pattern of things. This love of Wisdom, moreover, is an illumi- 
nation of the apprehending mind by that pure Wisdom and, in 
a certain way, a drawing and a calling back to Itself of man's 
mind, so that the pursuit of Wisdom appears like friendship 
with that Divinity and pure Mind. This Wisdom bestows upon 
every manner of souls the benefit of its own divinity, and brings 
them back to the proper force and purity of their nature. From 
it are born truth of speculation and of thought and holy and 
pure chastity of action." 21 

"But since this most excellent good of philosophy has been 
prepared for human souls, we must begin with those very 
powers of the soul, so that our exposition may follow an orderly 
line of progression." 22 

Chapter Three : Concerning the Threefold Power of the Soul,, and the 
Fact that Man Alone is Endowed with Reason 

"Altogether, the power of the soul in vivifying bodies is 
discovered to be of three kinds : one kind supplies life to the 
body alone in order that, on being born, the body may grow 
and, by being nourished, may remain in existence; another 


provides the judgment of sense perception; a third rests upon 
the power of mind and reason. 

"Of the first, the function is to attend to the forming, nour- 
ishing, and sustaining of bodies; its function is not, how- 
ever, to bestow upon them the judgment either of sense 
perception or of reason. It is the vivifying force seen at work in 
grasses and trees and whatever is rooted firmly in the earth. 

"The second is a composite and conjoint power which sub- 
sumes the first and makes it part of itself, and which exercises 
judgment of several different kinds upon such objects as it can 
compass; for every animal endowed with sense perception is 
likewise born, nourished, and sustained; but the senses it 
possesses are diverse and are found up to five in number. Thus, 
whatever receives nutriment only, does not also have sense 
perception ; but whatever has sense perception does also receive 
nutriment, and this fact proves that to such a being the first 
vivifying power of the soul, that of conferring birth and 
nourishment, also belongs. Moreover, such beings as possess 
sense perception not only apprehend the forms of things that 
affect them while the sensible body is present, but even after the 
sense perception has ceased and the sensible objects are removed, 
they retain images of the sense-perceived forms and build up 
memory of them. Each animal retains these images more or less 
enduringly, according to its ability. However, they possess them 
in a confused and unclear manner, so that they can achieve 
nothing from joining or combining them, and, while they are 
therefore able to remember them all, they cannot do so with 
equal distinctness; and, having once forgotten them, they are 
unable to recollect or re-evoke them. As to the future, they have 
no knowledge of it. 

"But the third power of the soul appropriates the prior 
nutritional and sense-perceiving powers, using them, so to 
speak, as its domestics and servants. It is rooted entirely in the 
reason, and it exercises itself either in the most unfaltering grasp 
of things present, or in the understanding of things absent, or 
in the investigation of things unknown. This power belongs to 
humankind alone. It not only takes in sense impressions and 
images which are perfect and well founded, but, by a complete 
act of the understanding, it explains and confirms what imagi- 


nation 2 3 has only suggested. And, as has been said, this divine 
nature is not content with the knowledge of those things alone 
which it perceives spread before its senses, but, in addition, it is 
able to provide even for things removed from it names which 
imagination has conceived from the sensible world, and it makes 
known, by arrangements of words, what it has grasped by 
reason of its understanding. For it belongs to this nature, too, 
that by things already known to it, it should seek after things 
not known, and it requires to know of each thing not only 
whether it exists, but of what nature it is, and of what properties, 
and even for what purpose. 

"To repeat, this threefold power of soul is the exclusive 
endowment of human nature, whose power of soul is not 
lacking in the movements of understanding. By this power it 
exercises its faculty of reason properly upon the following four 
heads: either it inquires whether a thing exists, or, if it has 
established that it does, it searches out the thing's nature; but 
if it possesses reasoned knowledge of both these things, it 
investigates the properties of each object, and sifts the total 
import of all other accidents ; and knowing all these things, it 
nevertheless further inquires and searches rationally why the 
object exists as it does. 

"While the mind of man, then, so acts that it is always con- 
cerned with the apprehension of things before it or the under- 
standing of things not present to it or the investigation and 
discovery of things unknown, there are two matters upon which 
the power of the reasoning soul spends every effort : one is that 
it may know the natures of things by the method of inquiry; 
but the other is that there may first come to its knowledge those 
things which moral earnestness will thereafter transform into 
action." 24 

Chapter Four: What Matters Pertain to Philosophy 

But, as I perceive, the very course of our discussion has 
already led us into "a trap from which there is no escape." 25 
However, it is not involved words but an obscure subject 
matter that gives rise to our difficulty. 26 Because we have under- 
taken to speak of the pursuit of Wisdom, and have affirmed 


that this pursuit belongs to men alone by a distinct prerogative 
of their nature, we must consequently seem committed now to 
the position that Wisdom is a kind of moderator over all human 
actions. For while the nature of brute animals, governed by no 
rational judgment, produces movements guided only by sense 
impressions and in pursuing or fleeing anything uses no dis- 
cretion born of understanding but is driven by a certain blind 
inclination of the flesh : it remains true that the actions of the 
rational soul are not swept away by blind impulse but are always 
preceded by Wisdom as their guide. If this is settled as true, 
then we shall say that not only such studies as are concerned 
with the nature of things or the regulation of morals but also 
those concerned with the theoretical consideration of all human 
acts and pursuits belong with equal fitness to philosophy. 
Following this view, we can define philosophy thus : Philosophy 
is the discipline which investigates comprehensively the ideas of 
all things, human and divine. 27 

And yet we ought not to retract what we said at the outset, 
namely, that philosophy is the love and the pursuit of Wisdom, 
not, however, of that "wisdom" which is deployed with tools, 
like building and farming and other activities of this kind, but 
of that Wisdom which is the sole primordial Idea or Pattern of 
things. For the same action is able to belong to philosophy as 
concerns its ideas and to be excluded from it as concerns its 
actual performance. For example, to speak in terms of instances 
already before us, the theory of agriculture belongs to the 
philosopher, but the execution of it to the farmer. Moreover, 
the products of artificers, while not nature, imitate nature, 28 and, 
in the design by which they imitate, they express the form of 
their exemplar, which is nature. 

You see, then, for what reason we are compelled to extend 
philosophy to all the actions of men, so that necessarily the parts 
of philosophy are equal in number to the different types of those 
things over which its extension has now been established. 29 

Chapter Five : Concerning the Rise 30 of the Theoretical, the Practical, 
and the Mechanical 

Of all human acts or pursuits, then, governed as these are by 
Wisdom, the end and the intention ought to regard either the 


restoring of our nature's integrity, or the relieving of those 
weaknesses to which our present life lies subject. What I have 
just said, let me more fully explain. 

In man are two things — the good and the evil, his nature and 
the defective state of his nature. The good, because it is his 
nature, because it has suffered corruption, because it has been 
lessened, requires to be restored by active effort. The evil, 
because it constitutes a deficiency, because it constitutes a 
corruption, because it is not our nature, requires to be removed, 
or, if not able to be removed completely, then at least to be 
alleviated through the application of a remedy. This is our 
entire task — the restoration of our nature and the removal of 
our deficiency. 

The integrity of human nature, however, is attained in two 
things — in knowledge and in virtue, and in these lies our sole 
likeness to the supernal and divine substances. 31 For man, since 
he is not simple in nature but is composed of a twofold substance, 
is immortal in that part of himself which is the more important 
part — that part which, to state the case more clearly, he in fact 
is* 2 In his other part, however — that part which is transitory 
and which is all that has been recognized by those too ignorant 
to give credit to anything but their senses 33 — he is subject to 
death and to change. In this part man must die as often as he 
loses concrete substantiality. This part is of that lowest category 
of things, things having both beginning and end. 

Chapter Six: Concerning the Three "Manners" of Things** 

Among things there are some which have neither beginning 
nor end, and these are named eternal; there are others which 
have a beginning but are terminated by no end, and these are 
called perpetual; and there are yet others which have both 
beginning and end, and these are temporal. 35 

In the first category we place that in which the very being 
(esse) and "that which is" (id quod est) are not separate, that is, in 
which cause and effect are not different from one another, 36 and 
which draws its subsistence not from a principle distinct from 
it but from its very self. Such alone is the Begetter and Artificer 
of nature. 


But that type of thing in which the very being (esse) and "that 
which is" {id quod est) are separate, that is, which has come into 
being from a principle distinct from it, 37 and which, in order 
that it might begin to be, flowed into actuality out of a preceding 
cause — this type of being, I say, is nature, which includes the 
whole world, and it is divided into two parts: 38 it is that certain 
being which, in acquiring existence from its primordial causes, 39 
came forth into actuality not as moved thereto by anything it- 
self in motion, but solely by the decision of the divine will, 40 
and, once in existence, stood 41 immutable, free from all de- 
struction or change (of this type are the substances of things, 
called by the Greeks ousiai) 42 and it is all the bodies of the super- 
lunary world, which, from their knowing no change, have also 
been called divine. 43 

The third type of things consists of those which have both 
beginning and end and which come into being not of their own 
power but as works of nature. These come to be upon the earth, 
in the sublunary world, by the movement of an artifacting fire 
which descends with a certain power to beget all sensible 
objects. 44 

Now, of the second sort it is said, "Nothing in the world 
perishes," 45 for no essence suffers destruction. 46 Not the 
essences but the forms of things pass away. 47 When the form is 
said to pass away, this is to be understood as meaning not that 
some existing thing is believed to have perished altogether and 
lost its being, but rather that it has undergone change, perhaps 
in one of the following ways: that things once joined are now 
apart, or once apart are now joined; or that things once standing 
here now move there; or that things which now are only 
"have-beens" once subsisted; in all these instances the being of 
the things suffers no loss. Of the third sort it is said, "All things 
which have arisen fall, and all which have grown decline": 48 
for all the works of nature, as they have a beginning, so have 
they an end. Of the second sort, again, it is said, "Nothing 
comes from nothing, and into nothingness can nothing revert," 49 
from the fact that all of nature has both a primordial cause and a 
perpetual subsistence. And of the third sort, once more, "That 
which before was nothing returns again thereto" : 50 for just as 
every work of nature flows temporarily into actuality out of its 


hidden cause, so when its actuality has temporarily been 
destroyed, that work will return again to the place from which 
it came. 

Chapter Seven : Concerning the Superlunary and Sublunary World 

Because of these facts, 51 astronomers {tnathematici) have 
divided the world into two parts: into that, namely, which 
stretches above the sphere of the moon and that which lies 
below it. 52 The superlunary world, because in it all things 
stand fixed by primordial law, they called "nature," 53 while the 
sublunary world they called "the work of nature," 54 that is, the 
work of the superior world, because the varieties of all animate 
beings which live below by the infusion of life-giving spirit, 
take their infused nutriment through invisible emanations from 
above, not only that by being born they may grow but 
also that by being nourished they may continue in existence. 
Likewise they called that superior world "time" because of the 
course and movement of the heavenly bodies in it, and the 
inferior world they called "temporal" because it is moved in 
accordance with the movements of the superior. 55 Again, the 
superlunary, from the perpetual tranquility of its light and 
stillness, they called elysium, while the sublunary, from the 
instability and confusion of things in flux, they called the under- 
world or infemum. 56 

Into these things we have digressed somewhat more broadly 
in order to explain how man, in that part in which he partakes of 
change, is likewise subject to necessity, whereas in that in which 
he is immortal, he is related to divinity. From this it can be 
inferred, as said above, that the intention of all human actions is 
resolved in a common objective: either to restore in us the 
likeness of the divine image or to take thought for the necessity 
of this life, which, the more easily it can suffer harm from those 
things which work to its disadvantage, the more does it require 
to be cherished and conserved. 

Chapter Bight: In What Man Is like unto God 

Now there are two things which restore the divine likeness in 
man, namely the contemplation of truth and the practice of 


virtue. For man resembles God in being wise and just — though, 
to be sure, man is but changeably so while God stands change- 
lessly both wise and just. Of those actions which minister to the 
necessity of this life, there are three types : first, those which 
take care of the feeding of nature ; second, those which fortify 
against harms which might possibly come from without; and 
third, those which provide remedy for harms already besieging 
us. When, moreover, we strive after the restoration of our 
nature, we perform a divine action, but when we provide the 
necessaries required by our infirm part, a human action. Every 
action, thus, is either divine or human. The former type, since 
it derives from above, we may not unfittingly call "under- 
standing" {intelligentid); the latter, since it derives from below 
and requires, as it were, a certain practical counsel, "knowledge" 
(scientia). 51 

If, therefore, Wisdom, as declared above, is moderator over 
all that we do deliberately, we must consequently admit that it 
contains two parts, understanding and knowledge. Under- 
standing, again, inasmuch as it works both for the investigation 
of truth and the delineation of morals, we divide into two 
kinds — into theoretical, that is to say speculative, and practical, 
that is to say active. The latter is also called ethical, or moral. 
Knowledge, however, since it pursues merely human works, is 
fitly called "mechanical," that is to say adulterate. 58 

Chapter Nine : Concerning the Three Works 

"Now there are three works — the work of God, the work of 
nature, and the work of the artificer, who imitates nature." 59 
The work of God is to create that which was not, whence we 
read, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth"; 60 the 
work of nature is to bring forth into actuality that which lay 
hidden, whence we read, "Let the earth bring forth the green 
herb," 61 etc.; the work of the artificer is to put together things 
disjoined or to disjoin those put together, whence we read, 
"They sewed themselves aprons." 62 For the earth cannot create 
the heaven, nor can man, who is powerless to add a mere span 
to his stature, 63 bring forth the green herb. 

Among these works, the human work, because it is not 


nature but only imitative of nature, is fitly called mechanical, 
that is adulterate, just as a skeleton key is called a "mechanical" 
key. 64 How the work of the artificer in each case imitates nature 
is a long and difficult matter to pursue in detail. For illustration, 
however, we can show the matter briefly as follows: The 
founder who casts a statue has gazed upon man as his model. 
The builder who has constructed a house has taken into con- 
sideration a mountain, for, as the Prophet declares, "Thou 
sendest forth springs in the vales ; between the midst of the hills 
the waters shall pass"; 65 as the ridges of mountains retain no 
water, even so does a house require to be framed into a high 
peak that it may safely discharge the weight of pouring rains. 
He who first invented the use of clothes had considered how 
each of the growing things one by one has its proper covering 
by which to protect its nature from offense. Bark encircles the 
tree, feathers cover the bird, scales encase the fish, fleece 
clothes the sheep, hair garbs cattle and wild beasts, a shell 
protects the tortoise, and ivory makes the elephant unafraid of 
spears. But it is not without reason that while each living thing 
is born equipped with its own natural armor, man alone is 
brought forth naked and unarmed. 66 For it is fitting that nature 
should provide a plan for those beings which do not know how 
to care for themselves, but that from nature's example, a better 
chance for trying things should be provided to man when he 
comes to devise for himself by his own reasoning those things 
naturally given to all other animals. Indeed, man's reason shines 
forth much more brilliantly in inventing these very things than 
ever it would have had man naturally possessed them. Nor is it 
without cause that the proverb says: "Ingenious want hath 
mothered all the arts." Want it is which has devised all that you 
see most excellent in the occupations of men. From this the 
infinite varieties of painting, weaving, carving, and founding 
have arisen, so that we look with wonder not at nature alone but 
at the artificer as well. 

Chapter Ten: What "Nature" Is 

But since we have already spoken so many times of "nature,' ' 
it seems that the meaning of this word ought not to be passed 


over in complete silence, even though as Tully says, "'Nature' 
is difficult to define." 67 Nor, because we are unable to say of it 
all we might wish, ought we to maintain silence about what we 
can say. 

Men of former times, we find, have said a great deal concerning 
"nature," but nothing so complete that no more should seem to 
remain to be said. So far as I am able to conclude from their 
remarks, they were accustomed to use this word in three special 
senses, giving each its own definition. 68 

In the first place, they wished by this word to signify that 
archetypal Exemplar of all things which exists in the divine 
Mind, according to the idea of which all things have been 
formed; and they said that nature was the primordial cause of 
each thing, whence each takes not only its being (esse) but its 
"being such or such a thing" {talis esse) as well. 69 To the word 
in this sense they assigned the following definition: "Nature is 
that which gives to each thing its being." 

In the second place they said that "nature" meant each thing's 
peculiar being (proprium esse), and to "nature" in this sense they 
assigned this next definition: "The peculiar difference giving 
form to each thing is called its nature." 70 It is with this meaning 
in mind that we are accustomed to say, "It is the nature of all 
heavy objects to tend toward the earth, of light ones to rise, of 
fire to burn, and of water to wet." 

The third definition is this: "Nature is an artificer fire coming 
forth from a certain power to beget sensible objects." 71 For 
physicists tell us that all things are procreated from heat and 
moisture. 72 Therefore Vergil calls Oceanus "father," 73 and 
Valerius Soranus, in a certain verse which treats Jove as a 
symbol of aethereal fire, says : 

Jupiter omnipotent, author of things as of kings, 
Of all true gods the father and womb in one! 74 

Chapter Eleven : Concerning the Origin of Logic 

Having demonstrated the origin of the theoretical, the 
practical, and the mechanical arts, we must now therefore 
investigate as well the derivation of the logical ; and these I have 
left to the end because they were the last to be discovered. All 


the other arts were invented first; but that logic too should be 
invented was essential, for no man can fitly discuss things unless 
he first has learned the nature of correct and true discourse. 
For, as Boethius declares, when the ancients first applied them- 
selves to searching out the natures of things and the essentials 
of morality, they of necessity erred frequently, for they lacked 
discrimination in the use of words and concepts: "This is 
frequently the case with Epicurus, who thinks that the universe 
consists of atoms, and who falsely maintains that pleasure is 
virtue. Clearly, such errors befell Epicurus and others because, 
being unskilled in argument, they transferred to the real world 
whatever conclusion they had reached by reasoning. This is a 
great error indeed, for real things do not precisely conform to 
the conclusions of our reasoning as they do to a mathematical 
count. In counting, whatever result obtains in the figures of one 
who computes correctly is sure to obtain in reality as well, so 
that if a count of one hundred is registered, one hundred objects 
will also necessarily be found as the basis for that count. In 
argument, however, such a relationship does not obtain with 
equal force, and whatever emerges in the course of a discussion 
does not find a fixed counterpart in nature, either. Thus it is 
that the man who brushes aside knowledge of argumentation 
falls of necessity into error when he searches out the nature of 
things. For unless he has first come to know for certain what 
form of reasoning keeps to the true course of argument, and 
what form keeps only to a seemingly true course, and unless he 
has learned what form of reasoning can be depended upon and 
what form must be held suspect, he cannot attain, by reasoning, 
the imperishable truth of things. 

"Since, therefore, the ancients, having fallen often into many 
errors, came to certain conclusions and arguments which were 
false and contrary to each other; and since it seemed impossible, 
when contrary conclusions had been constructed concerning the 
same matter, either that both the conclusions which mutually 
inconsistent trains of reasoning had established should be true, 
or that there should be ambiguity concerning which train of 
reasoning should be credited, it was apparent that the true and 
whole nature of argument itself should be considered first. 
Once this was known, then they could also know whether the 


results discovered by argument were truly held. Hence, skill 
in the discipline of logic began — that discipline which provides 
ways of distinguishing between modes of argument and the 
trains of reasoning themselves, so that it can be known which 
trains of reasoning are sometimes true, sometimes false, which 
moreover are always false, and which never false." 75 And so 
logic came last in time, but is first in order. It is logic which 
ought to be read first by those beginning the study of philosophy, 
for it teaches the nature of words and concepts, without both of 
which no treatise of philosophy can be explained rationally. 

Logic is so called from the Greek word logos, which has a 
double sense. For logos means either word (sermo) or reason, and 
hence logic can be called either a linguistic {sermocinalis) or a 
rational science. Rational logic, which is called argumentative, 
contains dialectic and rhetoric. Linguistic logic stands as genus 
to grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric, thus containing argumen- 
tative logic as a subdivision. It is linguistic logic that we put 
fourth after the theoretical, practical, and mechanical. It must 
not be supposed, however, that this science is called logical, 
that is, linguistic, because before its discovery there were no 
words, or as if men before its time did not have conversations 
with one another. 76 For both spoken and written words 
existed previously, but the theory of spoken and written 
language was not yet reduced to an art; no rules for speaking or 
arguing correctly had yet been given. All sciences, indeed, were 
matters of use before they became matters of art. But when men 
subsequently considered that use can be transformed into art, 
and what was previously vague and subject to caprice can be 
brought into order by definite rules and precepts, they began, 
we are told, to reduce to art the habits which had arisen partly 
by chance, partly by nature — correcting what was bad in use, 
supplying what was missing, eliminating what was superfluous, 
and furthermore prescribing definite rules and precepts for each 
usage. 77 

Such was the origin of all the arts ; scanning them all, we find 
this true. Before there was grammar, men both wrote and 
spoke; before there was dialectic, they distinguished the true 
from the false by reasoning; before there was rhetoric, they 
discoursed upon civil laws; before there was arithmetic, 


there was knowledge of counting; before there was an art of 
music, they sang; before there was geometry, they measured 
fields ; before there was astronomy, they marked off periods of 
time from the courses of the stars. But then came the arts, 
which, though they took their rise in usage, nonetheless excel 


This would be the place to set forth who were the inventors 
of the separate arts, when these persons flourished and where, 
and how the various disciplines made a start in their hands: 
first, however, I wish to distinguish the individual arts from one 
another by dividing philosophy into its parts, so to say. I 
should therefore briefly recapitulate the things I have said thus 
far, so that the transition to what follows may more easily be 

We have said that there are four branches of knowledge only, 
and that they contain all the rest : they are the theoretical, which 
strives for the contemplation of truth; the practical, which 
considers the regulation of morals; the mechanical, which 
supervises the occupations of this life; and the logical, which 
provides the knowledge necessary for correct speaking and clear 
argumentation. And so, here, we may not incongruously 
understand that number "four" belonging to the soul — that 
"four" which, for reverence of it, the ancients called to witness 
in their oaths, whence we read: 

"By him who gave the quaternary number to our soul!" 79 

How these sciences are comprised under philosophy, and 
again what they themselves comprise we shall now show, 
briefly repeating first the definition of philosophy. 


Chapter One : Concerning the Distinguishing of the Arts 

"Philosophy is the love of that Wisdom which, wanting in 
nothing, is a living Mind and the sole primordial Idea or Pattern 
of things." 1 This definition pays special attention to the etymo- 
logy of the word. For philos in Greek means love, and sophia 
means wisdom, so that from them "philosophy," that is, "love 
of wisdom," was coined. The words "which, wanting in 
nothing, is a living Mind and the sole primordial Idea or 
Pattern of things" signify the divine Wisdom, which is said to 
be wanting in nothing because it contains nothing inadequately, 
but in a single and simultaneous vision beholds all things past, 
present, and future. It is called "living Mind" because what has 
once existed in the divine Mind never is forgotten; and it is 
called "the primordial Idea or Pattern of things" because to its 
likeness all things have been formed. There are those who say 
that what the arts are concerned with remains forever the same. 2 
This, then, is what the arts are concerned with, this is what they 
intend, namely, to restore within us the divine likeness, a like- 
ness which to us is a form but to God is his nature. The more 
we are conformed to the divine nature, the more do we possess 
Wisdom, for then there begins to shine forth again in us what 
has forever existed in the divine Idea or Pattern, coming and 
going in us but standing changeless in God. 3 

"Again, philosophy is the art of arts and the discipline of 
disciplines" 4 — that, namely toward which all arts and disci- 
plines are oriented. Knowledge can be called an art "when it 
comprises the rules and precepts of an art" 5 as it does in the 
study of how to write; knowledge can be called a discipline 
when it is said to be "full" 6 as it is in the "instructional" science, 
or mathematics. 7 Or, it is called art when it treats of matters 
that only resemble the true and are objects of opinion; and 


discipline when, by means of true arguments, it deals with 
matters unable to be other than they are. This last distinction 
between art and discipline is the one which Plato and Aristotle 
wished to establish. 8 Or, that can be called art which takes 
shape in some material medium and is brought out in it through 
manipulation of that material, as is the case in architecture; 
while that is called a discipline which takes shape in thought 
and is brought forth in it through reasoning alone, as is the case 
in logic. 

"Philosophy, furthermore, is a meditating upon death, a 
pursuit of especial fitness for Christians, who, spurning the 
solicitations of this world, live subject to discipline in a manner 
resembling the life of their future home." 9 Yet again, philosophy 
is the discipline which investigates demonstratively the causes of 
all things, human and divine. 10 Thus, the theory of all pursuits 
belongs to philosophy (their administration is not entirely phil- 
osophical), and therefore philosophy is said to include all things 
in some way. 11 

Philosophy is divided into theoretical, practical, mechanical, 
and logical. These four contain all knowledge. 12 The theoreti- 
cal may also be called speculative; the practical may be called 
active, likewise ethical, that is, moral, from the fact that morals 
consist in good action ; the mechanical may be called adulterate 
because it is concerned with the works of human labor 1 3 ; the 
logical may be called linguistic 14 from its concern with words. 
The theoretical is divided into theology, mathematics, and 
physics — a division which Boethius makes in different terms, 
distinguishing the theoretical into the intellectible, the intelli- 
gible, and the natural, where the intellectible is equivalent to 
theology, the intelligible to mathematics, and the natural to 
physics. And the intellectible he defines as follows. 

Chapter Two: Concerning Theology 

"The intellectible is that which, ever enduring of itself, one 
and the same in its own divinity, is not ever apprehended by any 
of the senses, but by the mind and the intellect alone. Its study," 
he says, "the Greeks call theology, and it consists of searching 
into the contemplation of God and the incorporeality of the 


soul and the consideration of true philosophy." 1 s It was called 
theology as meaning discourse concerning the divine, for theos 
means God, and logos discourse or knowledge. It is theology, 
therefore, "when we discuss with deepest penetration some 
aspect either of the inexpressible nature of God or of spiritual 
creatures." 16 

Chapter Three : Concerning Mathematics 

The "instructional" science is called mathematics: 17 mathesis, 
when the "t" is pronounced without the "h," means vanity, and 
it refers to the superstition of those who place the fates of men 
in the stars and who are therefore called "mathematicians"; but 
when the "t" is pronounced with the "h," the word refers to the 
"instructional" science. 18 

This, moreover, is the branch of theoretical knowledge "which 
considers abstract quantity. Now quantity is called abstract 
when, intellectually separating it from matter or from other 
accidents, we treat of it as equal, unequal, and the like, in our 
reasoning alone" 19 — a separation which it receives only in the 
domain of mathematics and not in nature. Boethius calls this 
branch of knowledge the intelligible and finds that "it itself in- 
cludes the first or intellectible part in virtue of its own thought 
and understanding, directed as these are to the celestial works of 
supernal divinity and to whatever sublunary beings enjoy more 
blessed mind and purer substance, and, finally, to human souls. 
All of these things, though they once consisted of that primary 
intellectible substance, have since, by contact with bodies, 
degenerated from the level of intellectibles to that of intelli- 
gibles; as a result, they are less objects of understanding than 
active agents of it, and they find greater happiness by the purity 
of their understanding whenever they apply themselves to the 
study of things intellectible." 20 

For the nature of spirits and souls, because it is incorporeal 
and simple, participates in intellectible substance; but because 
through the sense organs spirit or soul descends in different 
ways to the apprehension of physical objects and draws into 
itself a likeness of them through its imagination, it deserts its 
simplicity somehow by admitting 21 a type of composition. 22 


For nothing that resembles a composite can, strictly speaking, 
be called simple. 

In different respects, therefore, the same thing is at the same 
time intellectible and intelligible — intellectible in being by- 
nature incorporeal and imperceptible to any of the senses; 
intelligible in being a likeness of sensible things, but not itself a 
sensible thing. For the intellectible is neither a sensible thing 
nor a likeness of sensible things. The intelligible, however, is 
itself perceived by intellect alone, yet does not itself perceive 
only by means of intellect. It has imagination and the senses, and 
by these lays hold upon all things subject to sense. Through 
contact with physical objects it degenerates,^ 3 because, while 
through sense impressions it rushes out toward the visible forms 
of bodies 24 and, having made contact with them, draws them 
into itself through imagination, it is cut away from its simplicity 
each time it is penetrated by any qualities entering through 
hostile sense experience. But when, mounting from such dis- 
traction toward pure understanding, it gathers itself into one, it 
becomes more blessed through participating in intellectible 

Chapter Four: Concerning the Number "Four" of the Soul 25 

Number itself teaches us the nature of the going out and the 
return of the soul. Consider: Three times one makes three; three 
times three, nine; three times nine, twenty-seven; and three 
times twenty-seven, eighty-<?^. See how in the fourth multi- 
plication the original "one," or unity, recurs; and you would 
see the same thing happen even if you were to carry the multi- 
plication out towards infinity : always, at every fourth stage of 
the process, the number "one" recurs. 26 Now the soul's simple 
essence is most appropriately expressed by "one," which itself 
is also incorporeal. 27 And the number "three" likewise, because 
of the "one" which is its indivisible constitutent link, is fittingly 
referred to the soul, just as the number "four," because it has 
two constitutent links and is therefore divisible, belongs, 
properly speaking, to the body. 28 

The first progression of the soul, therefore, is that by which 


from its simple essence, symbolized by the monad, it extends 
itself into a virtual threeness, in which it desires one thing 
through concupiscence, detests another through wrath, and 
judges between these two through reason. 29 And we rightly say 
it flows from the monad into threeness, because every essence is 
by nature prior to its powers. Again, the fact that the same 
"one" is found in the number "three," being multiplied in it 
three times, signifies that the soul is not distributed into parts 
but consists wholly in each of its powers : for we may not say 
that reason alone, or wrath alone, or concupiscence alone are 
each a third part of the soul, since reason is neither other than 
nor less than the soul in substance, and wrath is neither other 
than nor less than the soul, and concupiscence is neither other 
than nor less than the soul; but on the contrary, the soul, as 
one and the same substance, receives different names according 
to its different powers. 

Next, the soul, from its being virtually threefold, steps down 
by a second progression to controling the music of the human 
body, 30 which music is constituted in the number "nine", since 
nine are the openings in the human body by which, according to 
natural adjustment, everything by which the body is nourished 
and kept in balance flows in or out. And this is the order (which 
obtains between these first two progressions) because the soul 
by nature possesses its powers before it is compounded with the 

Subsequently, however, in a third progression, the soul, 
having poured itself out through the senses upon all visible 
things — which demand its supervision and which are sym- 
bolized by "twenty-seven," a cube number, extended tri- 
dimensionally after the manner of body — is dissipated in count- 
less actions. 31 

But finally, in a fourth progression, the soul, freed from the 
body, returns to the pureness of its simplicity, and therefore in 
the fourth multiplication, in which three times twenty-seven 
makes eighty-one, the number "one" reappears in the arith- 
metical product in order that it may be glowingly evident that 
the soul, after this life's end, designated by "eighty," returns to 
the unity of its simple state, from which it had previously 
departed when it descended to rule a human body. 32 That the 


measure of human life naturally consists in "eighty" is declared 
b y the Prophet, saying : 

If by reason of strength men live fourscore years, even greater is their 
labor and sorrow. 33 

Some men think that this fourfold progression is to be under- 
stood as being that number "four" of the soul of which we made 
mention above; 34 and they call it the number "four" of the soul 
to distinguish it from the number "four" of the body. 

Chapter Five: Concerning the Number ''Four'" of the Body 

For to the body too do they assign its number "four." As 
the figure "one" fits the soul, so the figure "two" fits the body. 3 5 
Consider: Two times two makes four; two times four, eight; 
two times eight, sixteen; and two times sixteen, thirty-two. 
Here likewise, in the fourth multiplication the same number 
whence the operation began, namely "two," reappears, and the 
same thing would undoubtedly happen if one were to carry the 
process out to infinity : at each fourth stage of the process, the 
number "two" would recur. And this is the number "four" of 
the body, in which it is given to be understood that everything 
which is composed of divisibles, or solubles, is itself also 
divisible, or dissoluble. 36 

And now you see clearly enough, I should think, how souls 
degenerate from being intellectible things to being intelligible 
things when, from the purity of simple understanding clouded 
by no images of bodily things, they descend to the imagination 
of visible objects; and how they once more become more 
blessed when, recollecting themselves from this distracted state 
back toward the simple source of their nature, they, marked as 
it were with the likeness of the most excellent numeral, come to 
rest. Thus, that I may speak more openly, the intellectible in us 
is what understanding is, whereas the intelligible is what 
imagination is. But understanding is pure and certain knowl- 
edge of the sole principles of things — namely, of God, of ideas, 
and of prime matter, and of incorporeal substances. Imagination, 
however, is sensuous memory made up of the traces of corporeal 
objects inhering in the mind; it possesses in itself nothing 


certain as a source of knowledge. Sensation is what the soul 
undergoes in the body as a result of qualities which come to it 
from without. 37 

Chapter Six: Concerning the Quadrivium^ 

Since, as we have said, the proper concern of mathematics is 
abstract quantity, it is necessary to seek the species of mathe- 
matics in the parts into which such quantity falls. Now abstract 
quantity is nothing other than form, visible in its linear dimen- 
sion, impressed upon the mind, and rooted in the mind's 
imaginative part. It is of two kinds: the first is continuous 
quantity, like that of a tree or a stone, and is called magnitude; the 
second is discrete quantity, like that of a flock or of a people, 
and is called multitude. Further, in the latter some quantities 
stand wholly in themselves, for example, "three," "four," or 
any other whole number; others stand in relation to another 
quantity, as "double," "half," "once and a half," "once and a 
third," and the like. One type of magnitude, moreover, is 
mobile ', like the heavenly spheres; another, immobile ', like the 
earth. Now, multitude which stands in itself is the concern of 
arithmetic, while that which stands in relation to another 
multitude is the concern of music. Geometry holds forth 
knowledge of immobile magnitude, while astronomy claims 
knowledge of the mobile. Mathematics, therefore, is divided 
into arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy. 39 

Chapter Seven: Concerning the Term "Arithmetic" 

The Greek word ares means virtus ', or power, in Latin; and 
rithmus means numerus, or number, so that "arithmetic" means 
"the power of number." 40 And the power of number is 
this — that all things have been formed in its likeness. 41 

Chapter Eight: Concerning the Term "Music" 

"Music" takes its name from the word "water," or aqua 
because no euphony, that is, pleasant sound, is possible without 
moisture. 42 


Chapter Nine: Concerning the Term "Geometry"*! 

"Geometry" means "earth-measure," for this discipline was 
first discovered by the Egyptians, who, since the Nile in its 
inundation covered their territories with mud and obscured all 
boundaries, took to measuring the land with rods and lines. 
Subsequently, learned men reapplied and extended it also to the 
measurement of surfaces of the sea, the heaven, the atmosphere, 
and all bodies whatever. 

Chapter Ten : Concerning the Term "Astronomy" 

"Astronomy" and "astrology" differ in the former's taking 
its name from the phrase "law of the stars," while the latter 
takes its from the phrase "discourse concerning the stars" — for 
nomia means law, and logos, discourse. It is astronomy, then, 
which treats the law of the stars and the revolution of the heaven, 
and which investigates the regions, orbits, courses, risings, and 
settings of stars, and why each bears the name assigned it; it is 
astrology, however, which considers the stars in their bearing 
upon birth, death, and all other events, and is only partly 
natural, and for the rest, superstitious ; natural as it concerns the 
temper or "complexion" of physical things, like health, illness, 
storm, calm, productivity, and unproductivity, which vary with 
the mutual alignments of the astral bodies ; but superstitious as it 
concerns chance happenings or things subject to free choice. 44 
And it is the "mathematicians" who traffic in the superstitious 
part. 45 

Chapter Eleven : Concerning Arithmetic 

Arithmetic has for its subject equal, or even, number and 
unequal, or odd, number. Equal number is of three kinds: 
equally equal, equally unequal, and unequally equal. Unequal 
number, too, has three varieties : the first consists of numbers 
which are prime and incomposite; the second consists of 
numbers which are secondary and composite ; the third consists 
of numbers which, when considered in themselves, are secondary 
and composite, but which, when one compares them with other 
numbers [to find a common factor or denominator], are prime 
and incomposite. 46 


Chapter Twelve : Concerning Music 41 

The varieties of music are three : that belonging to the universe, 
that belonging to man, and that which is instrumental. 

Of the music of the universe, some is characteristic of the 
elements, some of the planets, some of the seasons: of the 
elements in their mass, number, and volume; of the planets in 
their situation, motion, and nature ; of the seasons in days (in the 
alternation of day and night), in months (in the waxing and 
waning of the moons), and in years (in the succession of spring, 
summer, autumn, and winter). 

Of the music of man, some is characteristic of the body, some 
of the soul, and some of the bond between the two. It is 
characteristic of the body partly in the vegetative power by 
which it grows — a power belonging to all beings born to bodily 
life; partly in those fluids or humors through the mixture or 
complexion of which the human body subsists — a type of 
mixture belonging to all sensate beings; and partly in those 
activities (the foremost among them are the mechanical) which 
belong above all to rational beings and which are good if they 
do not become inordinate, so that avarice or appetite are not 
fostered by the very things intended to relieve our weakness. 
As Lucan says in Cato's praise: 

He feasted in conquering hunger; 
Any roof from storms served his hall ; 
His dearest garb, the toga coarse, 
Civilian dress of the Roman. 48 

Music is characteristic of the soul partly in its virtues, like 
justice, piety, and temperance; and partly in its powers, like 
reason, wrath, and concupiscence. 49 The music between the 
body and the soul is that natural friendship by which the soul 
is leagued to the body, not in physical bonds, but in certain 
sympathetic relationships for the purpose of imparting motion 
and sensation to the body. Because of this friendship, it is 
written, "No man hates his own flesh."5° This music consists in 
loving one's flesh, but one's spirit more; in cherishing one's 
body, but not in destroying one's virtue. 

Instrumental music consists partly of striking, as upon tym- 
pans and strings; partly in blowing, as upon pipes or organs; 


and partly in giving voice, as in recitals and songs. "There are 
also three kinds of musicians : one that composes songs, another 
that plays instruments, and a third that judges instrumental 
performance and song." 51 

Chapter Thirteen: Concerning Geometry* 1 

Geometry has three parts : planimetry, altimetry, and cosmi- 
metry. Planimetry measures the plane, that is, the long and the 
broad, and, by widening its object, it measures what is before 
and behind and to left and right. Altimetry measures the high, 
and, by widening its object, it measures what reaches above and 
stretches below : for height is predicated both of the sea in the 
sense of depth, and of a tree in the sense of tallness. Cosmos is 
the word for the universe, and from it comes the term "cosmi- 
metry," or "universe-measurement." Cosmimetry measures 
things spherical, that is, globose and rotund, like a ball or an 
egg, 53 and it is therefore called "cosmimetry" from the sphere 
of the universe, on account of the preeminence of this sphere — 
not that cosmimetry is concerned with the measurement of 
the universe alone, but that the universe-sphere excels all other 
spherical things. 

Chapter Fourteen : Concerning Astronomy 

What we have just said does not contradict our previous 
statement that geometry is occupied with immobile magnitude, 
astronomy with mobile: for what we have just said takes into 
account the original discovery of geometry, which led to its 
being called "earth measurement." 54 We can also say that what 
geometry considers in the sphere of the universe — namely, the 
measure of the celestial regions and spheres — is immobile in 
that aspect which belongs to geometrical studies. For geometry 
is not concerned with movement but with space. What 
astronomy considers, however, is the mobile — the courses of the 
stars and the intervals of time and seasons. Thus, we shall say 
that without exception immobile magnitude is the subject of 
geometry, mobile of astronomy, because, although both busy 
themselves with the same thing, the one contemplates the static 
aspect of that thing, the other its moving aspect. 


Chapter Fifteen : Definition of the Quadrivium 

Arithmetic is therefore the science of numbers. Music is the 
distinguishing of sounds and the variance of voices. Or again, 
music or harmony is the concord of a number of dissimilar 
things blended into one. Geometry is the discipline treating 
immobile magnitude, and it is the contemplative delineation of 
forms, by which the limits of every object are shown. Putting 
it differently, geometry is "a fount of perceptions and a source of 
utterances." 55 Astronomy is the discipline which examines the 
spaces, movements, and circuits of the heavenly bodies at 
determined intervals. 

Chapter Sixteen : Concerning Physics 

Physics searches out and considers the causes of things as 
found in their effects, and the effects as derived from certain 
causes : 

Whence the tremblings of earth do rise, or 

from what cause the deep seas swell; 
Whence grasses grow or beasts are moved with 

wayward wrath and will; 
Whence every sort of verdant shrub, or rock, 

or creeping thing. 56 

The word physis means nature, and therefore Boethius places 
natural physics in the higher division of theoretical knowledge. 57 
This science is also called physiology, that is, discourse on the 
natures of things, a term which refers to the same matter as 
physics. Physics is sometimes taken broadly to mean the same 
as theoretical science, and, taking the word in this sense, some 
persons divide philosophy into three parts — into physics, ethics, 
and logic. In this division the mechanical sciences find no place, 
philosophy being restricted to physics, ethics, and logic alone. 58 

Chapter Seventeen : What the Proper Business of Each Art Is 

But although all the arts tend toward the single end of 
philosophy, they do not all take the same road, but have each of 
them their own proper businesses by which they are dis- 
tinguished from one another. 


The business of logic is with things, and it attends to our 
concepts of things, either through the understanding, so that 
our concepts may not be either things or even likenesses of them, 
or through the reason, so that our concepts may still not be 
things but may, however, be likenesses of them. 59 Logic, there- 
fore, is concerned with the species and genera of things. 

Mathematics, on the other hand, has as its business the con- 
sideration of things which, though actually fused, are rationally 
separated by it. For example, in actuality no line is found with- 
out surface and solidity. For no physical entity possesses pure 
length in such a way that it lacks breadth or height, but in every 
physical thing these three are found together. And yet the 
reason, abstracting from surface and from thickness, considers 
pure line, in itself, taking line as a mathematical object not 
because it exists or could exist as such in reality, but because the 
reason often considers actual aspects of things not as they are 
but as they can exist — exist, that is, not in themselves, but with 
respect to reason itself, or, as reason might allow them to be. 
From this consideration derives the axiom that continuous 
quantity is divisible into an infinite number of parts, and discrete 
quantity multipliable into a product of infinite size. For such is 
the vigor of the reason that it divides every length into lengths 
and every breadth into breadths, and the like — and that, to this 
same reason, a continuity lacking interruption continues 

The business of physics, however, is to analyze the com- 
pounded actualities of things into their elements. For the 
actualities of the world's physical objects are not pure but are 
compounded of pure actualities which, although they nowhere 
exist as such, physics nonetheless considers as pure and as such. 
Thus, physics considers the pure actuality of fire, or earth, or 
air, or water, and, from a consideration of the nature of each in 
itself, determines the constitution and operation of something 
compounded of them. 60 

Nor ought we to overlook the fact that physics alone is 
concerned properly with things, while all the other disciplines 
are concerned with concepts of things. Logic treats of concepts 
themselves in their predicamental framework, while mathematics 
treats of them in their numerical composition. Logic, therefore, 


employs pure understanding on occasion; whereas mathematics 
never operates without the imagination, and therefore never 
possesses its object in a simple or non-composite manner. 
Because logic and mathematics are prior to physics in the order 
of learning and serve physics, so to say, as tools — so that every 
person ought to be acquainted with them before he turns his 
attention to physics — it was necessary that these two sciences 
base their considerations not upon the physical actualities of 
things, of which we have deceptive experience, but upon reason 
alone, in which unshakeable truth stands fast, and that then, 
with reason itself to lead them, they descend into the physical 
order. 61 

Having therefore already shown how Boethius's division of 
theoretical science fits in with what I gave just before, I shall 
now briefly repeat both divisions so that we may place their 
terminologies side by side and compare them. 

Chapter Eighteen : Comparison of the Foregoing 

The theoretical is divided into theology, mathematics, and 
physics; or, put differently, into intellectible, intelligible, and 
natural knowledge; or still differently, into divine, "instruc- 
tional," and philological. 62 Thus, theology is the same as the 
intellectible and the divine; mathematics as the intelligible and 
the "instructional"; and physics as the philological and the 

There are those who suppose that these three parts of the 
theoretical are mystically represented in one of the names of 
Pallas, fictional goddess of wisdom. For she is called "Tritona" 
for tritoona, that is, threefold apprehension of God, called in- 
tellectible; of souls, called intelligible; and of bodies, called 
natural. 63 And the name of wisdom by right belongs to these 
three alone: for although we can without impropriety refer to 
the remaining branches (ethics, mechanics, and logic) as wisdom, 
still these are more precisely spoken of as prudence or know- 
ledge — logic because of its concern for eloquence of word, and 
mechanics and ethics because of their concern for works and 
morals. But the theoretical alone, because it studies the truth of 
things, do we call wisdom. 64 


Chapter Nineteen : Continuation of the Previous Chapter 

The practical is divided into solitary, private, and public; 
or, put differently, into ethical, economic, and political ; or, still 
differently, into moral, managerial, and civil. Solitary, ethical, 
and moral are one ; as also are private, economic, and managerial ; 
and public, political, and civil. Oeconomus means manager, 
whence economic science is called managerial. Polis is the Greek 
word for the Latin civitas, or state, whence politics, the civil 
science, derives its name. 65 And when we speak of ethics as a 
subdivision of the practical, we must reserve the word for the 
moral conduct of the individual, so that ethical science and 
solitary science are the same. 

Solitary science, therefore, "is that which, exercising care for 
itself, raises, adorns, and broadens itself with all virtues, allowing 
nothing in life which will not bring joy and doing nothing which 
will cause regret. The private science is that which assigns the 
householder's tasks, setting them in order according to this 
middle type of management. The public science is that which, 
taking over the care of public affairs, serves the welfare of all 
through its concern for provisions, its balancing of justice, its 
maintenance of strength, and its observance of moderation. " 66 
Thus, solitary science concerns individuals; private science, 
heads of families; and political science, governors of states. 
Practical science "is called 'actual' from the fact that it deals 
with its object by way of actions to be performed. The moral 
science is called moral because it seeks a decent custom (mos) of 
life and establishes rules conducing to virtue. The managerial 
science is so-called because it manages a wise order in domestic 
matters. The civil science is so-called because it ministers to the 
common welfare of civil society." 67 

Chapter Twenty : The Division of Mechanical Sciences into Seven 

Mechanical science contains seven sciences: fabric making, 
armament, commerce, agriculture, hunting, medicine, and 
theatrics. Of these, three pertain to external cover for nature, by 
which she protects herself from harms, and four to internal, by 
which she feeds and nourishes herself. In this division we find 


a likeness to the trivium and quadrivium, for the trivium is 
concerned with words, which are external things, and the 
quadrivium with concepts, which are internally conceived. 68 
The mechanical sciences are the seven handmaids which Mercury 
received in dowry from Philology, for every human activity is 
servant to eloquence wed to wisdom. 69 Thus Tully, in his book 
on rhetoricians, says concerning the study of eloquence : 

By it is life made safe, by it fit, by it noble, and by it pleasurable : for from 
it the commonwealth receives abundant benefits, provided that wisdom, 
which regulates all things, keeps it company. From eloquence, to those who 
have acquired it, flow praise, honor, dignity ; from eloquence, to the friends 
of those skilled in it, comes most dependable and sure protection. 70 

These sciences are called mechanical, that is, adulterate, 
because their concern is with the artificer's product, which 
borrows its form from nature. Similarly, the other seven are 
called liberal either because they require minds which are liberal, 
that is, liberated and practiced (for these sciences pursue subtle 
inquiries into the causes of things), or because in antiquity only 
free and noble men were accustomed to study them, while the 
populace and the sons of men not free sought operative skill in 
things mechanical. In all this appears the great diligence of the 
ancients, who would leave nothing untried, but brought all 
things under definite rules and precepts. And mechanics is that 
science to which they declare the manufacture of all articles to 

Chapter Twenty-one : First — Fabric Making 

Fabric making includes all the kinds of weaving, sewing, and 
twisting which are accomplished by hand, needle, spindle, awl, 
skein winder, comb, loom, crisper, iron, or any other instru- 
ments whatever; out of any material made of flax or fleece, or 
any sort of hide, whether scraped or hairy, out of cane as well, or 
cork, or rushes, or hair, or tufts, or any material of this sort 
which can be used for the making of clothes, coverings, drapery, 
blankets, saddles, carpets, curtains, napkins, felts, strings, nets, 
ropes; out of straw too, from which men usually make their 
hats and baskets. All these pursuits belong to fabric making. 


Chapter Twenty-two : Second — Armament 

Armament comes second. Sometimes any tools whatever are 
called "arms," as when we speak of the arms of war, or the arms 
of a ship, meaning the implements used in war or on a ship. For 
the rest, the term "arms" belongs properly to those things under 
which we take cover — like the shield, the breastplate, and the 
helmet — or those by which we strike — like the sword, the two- 
faced axe, and the lance. "Missiles," however, are things we 
can fling, like the spear or arrow. Arms are so called from the 
arm, because they strengthen the arm which we customarily 
hold up against blows. Missiles (tela), however, are named from 
the Greek word telon, meaning "long," because the things so 
named are long; therefore, we use the word protelare, or "make 
long," to mean "protect." Armament, therefore, is called, in a 
sense, an instrumental science, not so much because it uses 
instruments in its activity as because, from some material lying 
shapeless at hand, it makes something into an instrument, if I 
may so name its product. To this science belong all such 
materials as stones, woods, metals, sands, and clays. 

Armament is of two types, the constructional and the craftly. 
The constructional is divided into the building of walls, which 
is the business of the wood- worker and carpenter, and of other 
craftsmen of both these sorts, who work with mattocks and 
hatchets, the file and beam, the saw and auger, planes, vises, the 
trowel and the level, smoothing, hewing, cutting, filing, carving, 
joining, daubing in every sort of material — clay, stone, wood, 
bone, gravel, lime, gypsum, and other materials that may exist of 
this kind. Craftly armament is divided into the malleable branch, 
which forges material into shape by beating upon it, and the 
foundry branch, which reduces material into shape by casting 
it — so that "'founders' is the name for those who know how 
to cast a shapeless mass into the form of an implement." 71 

Chapter Twenty-three : Third — Commerce 

Commerce contains every sort of dealing in the purchase, 
sale, and exchange of domestic or foreign goods. This art is 
beyond all doubt a peculiar sort of rhetoric — strictly of its own 
kind — for eloquence is in the highest degree necessary to it. 


Thus the man who excels others in fluency of speech is called a 
Mercurius, or Mercury, as being a mercatorum kirrius (=kyrios) — a 
very lord among merchants. 72 Commerce penetrates the secret 
places of the world, approaches shores unseen, explores fearful 
wildernesses, and in tongues unknown and with barbaric peoples 
carries on the trade of mankind. The pursuit of commerce 
reconciles nations, calms wars, strengthens peace, 73 and com- 
mutes the private good of individuals into the common benefit 
of all. 

Chapter Twenty-jour : Fourth — Agriculture 

Agriculture deals with four kinds of land : arable, set aside for 
sowing; plantational, reserved for trees, like the vineyard, the 
orchard, and the grove; pastoral, like the meadow, the hillside 
pasture, and the heath; and floral, like the garden and rose- 

Chapter Twenty-five : Fifth — Hunting 

Hunting is divided into gaming, fowling, and fishing. 
Gaming is done in many ways — with nets, foot-traps, snares, 
pits, the bow, javelins, the spear, encircling the game, or 
smoking it out, or pursuing it with dogs or hawks. Fowling is 
done by snares, traps, nets, the bow, birdlime, the hook. 
Fishing is done by drag-nets, lines, hooks, and spears. To this 
discipline belongs the preparation of all foods, seasonings, and 
drinks. Its name, however, is taken from only one part of it 
because in antiquity men used to eat merely by hunting, as they 
still do in certain regions where the use of bread is extremely 
rare, where flesh is the only food and water or mead the drink. 

Food is of two kinds — bread and side dishes. 74 Bread (panis) 
takes its name either from the Latin word for one's laying a 
thing out (poms), or from the Greek word for all {pan), because 
all meals need bread in order to be well provided. There are 
many kinds of bread — unleavened, leavened, that baked under 
ashes, brown bread, sponge-cake, cake, pan-baked, sweet, 
wheaten, bun-shaped, rye, and many other kinds. Side dishes 
consist of all that one eats with bread, and we can call them 
victuals. They are of many sorts — meats, stews, porridges, 


vegetables, fruits. Of meats, some are roasted, others fried, 
others boiled, some fresh, some salted. Some are called loins, 
flitches also or sides, haunches or hams, grease, lard, fat. The 
varieties of meat dishes are likewise numerous — Italian sausage, 
minced meat, patties, Galatian tarts, and all other such things 
that a very prince of cooks has been able to concoct. Porridges 
contain milk, colostrum, butter, cheese, whey. And who can 
enumerate the names of vegetables and fruits? Of seasonings 
some are hot, some cold, some bitter, some sweet, some dry, 
some moist. Of drink, some is merely that : it moistens without 
nourishing, like water; other is both drink and food, for it both 
moistens and nourishes, like wine. Of the nutritious drinks, 
furthermore, some are naturally so, like wine or any other liquor ; 
others accidentally so, like beer and various kinds of mead. 

Hunting, therefore, includes all the duties of bakers, butchers, 
cooks, and tavern keepers. 

Chapter Twenty-six : Sixth — Medicine 

"Medicine is divided into two parts" 75 — "occasions" and 
operations. "The 'occasions' are six: air, motion and quiet, 
emptiness and satiety, food and drink, sleep and wakefulness, 
and the reactions of the soul. These are called 'occasions' 
because, when tempered, they occasion and preserve health," 7 ** 
or, when untempered, ill-health. The reactions of the soul are 
called occasions of health or ill-health because now and again 
they either "raise one's temperature, whether violently as does 
wrath or gently as do pleasures ; or they withdraw and lower the 
temperature, again whether violently as do terror and fear, or 
gently as does worry. And among them are some which, like grief, 
produce their natural effects both internally and externally." 77 

Every medicinal operation is either interior or exterior. "The 
interior are those which are introduced through the mouth, 
nostrils, ears, or anus, such as potions, emetics, and powders, 
which are taken by drinking, chewing, or sucking in. The 
exterior are, for example, lotions, plasters, poultices, and 
surgery, which is twofold: that performed on the flesh, like 
cutting, sewing, burning, and that performed on the bone, like 
setting and joining. " 7 8 


Let no one be disturbed that among the means employed by 
medicine I count food and drink, which earlier I attributed to 
hunting. For these belong to both under different aspects. For 
instance, wine in the grape is the business of agriculture ; in the 
barrel, of the cellarer, and in its consumption, of the doctor. 
Similarly, the preparing of food belongs to the mill, the slaughter- 
house, and the kitchen, but the strength given by its consump- 
tion, to medicine. 

Chapter Twenty-seven : Seventh — Theatrics 19 

The science of entertainments is called "theatrics" from the 
theatre, to which the people once used to gather for the perform- 
ance: not that a theatre was the only place in which entertain- 
ment took place, but it was a more popular place for entertain- 
ment than any other. Some entertainment took place in 
theatres, some in the entrance porches of buildings, some in 
gymnasia, some in amphitheatres, some in arenas, some at feasts, 
some at shrines. In the theatre, epics were presented either by 
recitals or by acting out dramatic roles or using masks or 
puppets; they held choral processions and dances in the porches. 
In the gymnasia they wrestled; in the amphitheatres they raced 
on foot or on horses or in chariots; in the arenas boxers 
performed; at banquets they made music with songs and 
instruments and chants, and they played at dice ; in the temples 
at solemn seasons they sang the praises of the gods. Moreover, 
they numbered these entertainments among legitimate activities 
because by temperate motion natural heat is stimulated in the 
body and by enjoyment the mind is refreshed; or, as is more 
likely, seeing that people necessarily gathered together for 
occasional amusement, they desired that places for such amuse- 
ment might be established to forestall the people's coming 
together at public houses, where they might commit lewd or 
criminal acts. 

Chapter Twenty-eight : Concerning Logic, Which Is the Fourth Part of 

Logic is separated into grammar and the theory of argument. 
The Greek woi&gramma means letter, and from it grammar takes 


its name as the science of letters. 80 Properly speaking, the letter 
is a written figure, while the term "element" is reserved for a 
pronounced sound; here, however, "letter" is to be taken in a 
larger sense as meaning both the spoken and the written symbol, 
for they both belong to grammar. 

There are those who say that grammar is not a part of 
philosophy, but, so to say, an appendage and an instrument in 
the service of philosophy. But concerning the theory of 
argument, Boethius declares that it can be at once a part and an 
instrument in the service of philosophy, just as the foot, hand, 
tongue, eyes, etc., are at once the body's parts and its 
instruments. 81 

Grammar, simply taken, treats of words, with their origin 
formation, combination, inflection, pronunciation, and all things 
else pertaining directly to utterance alone. The theory of 
argument is concerned with the conceptual content of words. 

Chapter Twenty-nine : Concerning Grammar 

Grammar is divided into the letter, the syllable, the phrase, 
and the clause. Or, according to another division, between 
letters or written signs, and vocables or spoken signs. Yet again, 
by another division, among the noun, the verb, the participle, 
the pronoun, the adverb, the preposition, the conjunction, the 
interjection, the articulate word, the letter, the syllable, metric 
feet, accents, pointing, punctuating, spelling, analogy, etymo- 
logy, glosses, differences, the barbarism, the solecism, errors, 
metaplasm, schemata, tropes, prose composition, verse com- 
position, fables, histories. But of all these I shall omit further 
explanation, both because I should otherwise be more lengthy 
than the brevity of my plan would warrant, and because in this 
little work I have designed to inquire only into the divisions and 
the names of things, so that the reader might thereby be 
established in some beginning of knowledge merely. Let him 
who desires to inform himself concerning these things read 
Donatus, 82 Servius, 83 Priscian Concerning Accents ■, Priscian 
Concerning the Twelve Verses of Vergil %* The Barbarism , 85 and 
Isidore's Etymologies. , 86 


Chapter Thirty : Concerning the Theory of Argument 

Invention and judgment are integral parts running through 
the whole theory of argument, whereas demonstration, proba- 
ble argument, and sophistic are its divisive parts, that is, mark 
distinct and separate subdivisions of it. 87 Demonstration consists 
of necessary arguments and belongs to philosophers ; probable 
argument belongs to dialecticians and rhetoricians ; sophistic to 
sophists and quibblers. Probable argument is divided into 
dialectic and rhetoric, both of which contain invention and 
judgment as integral parts: for since invention and judgment 
integrally constitute the whole genus, that is, of argumentative 
logic, they are necessarily found in all of its species at once. 
Invention teaches the discovery of arguments and the drawing 
up of lines of argumentation. The science of judgment teaches 
the judging of such arguments and lines of argumentation. 

Now it may be asked whether invention and judgment are 
contained in philosophy. 88 They do not seem to be contained 
under the theoretical sciences, or under the practical, or under 
the mechanical, or even under the logical, where one would 
most expect them to be. They are not contained under the 
logical because they are not branches either of grammar or of 
argumentative logic. They are not branches of argumentative 
logic because they comprise it integrally, and nothing can at the 
same time constitute an integral and a divisive part of the same 
genus. Philosophy, therefore, seems not to contain all know- 

But what we should realize is that the word "knowledge" is 
customarily used in two senses, namely, for one of the disciplines, 
as when I say that dialectic is knowledge, meaning an art or 
discipline; and for any act of cognition, as when I say that a 
person who knows something has knowledge. Thus, for 
example, if I know dialectic I have knowledge ; if I know how 
to swim I have knowledge; if I know that Socrates was the son 
of Sophroniscus I have knowledge — and so in every instance, 
anyone who knows anything may be said to have knowledge. 
But it is one thing when I say that dialectic is knowledge, that is 
an art or discipline, and another when I say that to know that 
Socrates was the son of Sophroniscus is knowledge, that is, an 


act of cognition. It is always true to say that any knowledge 
which is an art or discipline is a distinct branch of philosophy; 
but it cannot always be said that all knowledge which is an act 
of cognition is a distinct branch of philosophy: and yet it is 
certainly true that all knowledge, whether it be a discipline or 
any act of cognition whatever, is somehow contained in 
philosophy — either as an integral part, or as a divisive part or 

A discipline, moreover, is a branch of knowledge which has 
a denned scope within the range of which the objective of some 
art is perfectly unfolded ; but this is not true of the knowledge of 
invention or of judgment, because neither of these stands in- 
dependently in itself, and therefore they cannot be called 
disciplines but are integral parts of a discipline — namely, of 
argumentative logic. 

Furthermore, the question is raised whether invention and 
judgment are the same thing in dialectic that they are in 
rhetoric. It seems they are not, since then two opposed genera 
would be constituted of identical parts. It can be said, con- 
sequently, that these two words, "invention" and "judgment," 
are equivocally used for the parts of dialectic and rhetoric ; or 
better, perhaps, let us say that invention and judgment are 
properly parts of argumentative logic, and as such are univocally 
signified by these words, but that in the subdivisions of this 
particular genus they are differentiated from one another by 
certain properties — the differentiations are not revealed through 
the terms "invention" and "judgment" because these names, far 
from designating invention and judgment as separate species, 
designate them only as generic parts. 

Grammar is the knowledge of how to speak without error ; 
dialectic is clear-sighted argument which separates the true from 
the false; rhetoric is the discipline of persuading to every suitable 


Chapter One: Concerning the Order and Method of Study and 

Philosophy is divided into the theoretical, the practical, the 
mechanical, and the logical. The theoretical is divided into 
theology, physics, and mathematics ; mathematics is divided into 
arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy. The practical is 
divided into solitary, private, and public. The mechanical is 
divided into fabric making, armament, commerce, agriculture, 
hunting, medicine, and theatrics. Logic is divided into grammar 
and argument: argument is divided into demonstration, proba- 
ble argument, and sophistic : probable argument is divided into 
dialectic and rhetoric. 

In this division only the divisive parts of philosophy are 
contained; there are still other subdivisions of such parts, but 
those given may suffice for now. If you regard but the number of 
distinct sciences, you will find twenty-one; if you should wish to 
count each name mentioned in the scheme, you will find 

We read that different persons were authors of these sciences. 
They originated the arts — some by beginning them, others by 
developing them, and others by perfecting them: and thus for 
the same art a number of authors are frequently cited. Of these I 
shall now list the names of a few. 

Chapter Two : Concerning the Authors of the Arts 

Linus was a theologian among the Greeks; 1 among the 
Romans, Varro; 2 and in our own time, John the Scot, Concerning 
the Ten Categories in Relation to God. 1 "Thales of Miletus, one of 
the seven sages, initiated natural physics among the Greeks," 4 
while among the Romans, Pliny treated it. 5 "Pythagoras of 
Samos was the inventor of arithmetic," 6 and Nichomachus 


wrote on it. "Among the Latins, first Apuleius and then 
Boethius translated this work." 7 The same Pythagoras also 
wrote the Matentetradem, that is, a book concerning the teaching 
of the quadrivium, 8 and he found in the figure "y" a likeness to 
human life. 9 Moses declares that the inventor of music was 
Tubal, who was of the seed of Cain; 10 the Greeks say it was 
Pythagoras, others that it was Mercury, who first introduced the 
tetrachord; others that it was Linus, or Zetus, or Amphio. 11 
Geometry, they say, was first discovered in Egypt: its author 
among the Greeks was the great Euclid. Boethius passed this 
man's art on to us. 12 Eratosthenes too was most learned in 
geometry, and it was he who first found out about the revolution 
of the world. Certain ones say that Cham, son of Noah, first 
discovered astronomy. The Chaldeans first taught astrology as 
connected with the observance of birth, but Josephus asserts 
that Abraham first instructed the Egyptians in astrology. 13 
"Ptolemy, king of Egypt, revived astronomy; he also drew up 
the Canones by which the courses of the stars are found. Some 
say that Nemroth the Giant was the greatest astrologer, and to 
his name astronomy too is ascribed. The Greeks say that this 
art was first thought out by Atlas, and because of this it is also 
said that he held up the very heaven." 14 

The originator of ethics was Socrates, who wrote twenty-four 
books on it from the point of view of positive justice. Then 
Plato, his disciple, wrote the many books of the Republic from 
the point of view of both kinds of justice, natural and positive. 15 
Then Tully set forth in the Latin tongue the books of his own 
Republic. Further, the philosopher Fronto wrote the book 
Strategematon, or Concerning Military Strategy. 

Mechanical science has had many authors. Hesiod Ascraeus 
was the first among the Greeks who applied himself to describing 
farming, and "after him Democritus. A great Carthaginian 
likewise wrote a study of agriculture in twenty-eight volumes. 
Among the Romans, Cato is first with his Concerning agriculture, 
which Marcus Terentius subsequently elaborated. Vergil too 
wrote his Georgics; then Cornelius and Julius Atticus and 
Aemilian or Columella, the famous orator who put together an 
entire corpus on this branch of knowledge." 16 Then there are 
Vitruvius, On Architecture, and Palladius, On Agriculture. 


"They tell that the practice of fabric making was first shown 
the Greeks by Minerva, and they believe too that she designed 
the first loom, dyed fleece, and was the inventress of olive- 
growing and of handicraft." 17 By her Daedalus was taught, and 
he is believed to have practiced handicrafts after her. 18 "In 
Egypt, however, Isis, daughter of Inachus, introduced the 
custom of weaving linen and showed how vesture might be 
made of it." 19 And she also introduced there the use of wool. 
In Lybia the use of linen first began to spread from the temple of 

"Ninus, king of the Assyrians, first set wars in motion. "20 
Vulcan, they tell, was the first smith, but divine history has it 
Tubal. 21 "Prometheus first invented the use of rings when he 
pressed a stone into an iron band." 22 The Pelasgians first 
discovered the use of the boat. At Eleusis in Greece Ceres first 
discovered the use of grain, "as did Isis in Egypt." 23 "To Italy 
Pilumnus brought the use of corn and spelt and the manner of 
grinding and pounding them," 24 while Tagus brought the 
practice of sowing to Spain. 2 $ "Osiris introduced the culture of 
the vine among the Egyptians, Liber among the men of India." 26 
"Daedalus first wrought a table and stool. One Apicius first 
assembled the apparatus of cookery, and in this art died at 
length a willing death from the consumption of delicacies." 27 

"Of medicine the author among the Greeks was Apollo, 
whose son Aesculapius ennobled it with praise and achievement 
and afterwards perished from lightning. Then the care of 
medicine lapsed and lay unknown for a long time, nearly five- 
hundred years, until the days of King Artaxerxes. Then 
Hippocrates brought it forth again to light; he was the son of 
Asclepius and was born on the Isle of Cos." 28 

"Games are thought to have taken start with the men of 
Lydia, who, coming out of Asia, settled in Etruria with Tyrrenus 
as prince, and there, amidst all the rites entailed by their many 
superstitions, held spectacles — a custom copied by the Romans, 
who fetched craftsmen thence to teach them how, and for this 
reason games bear in Latin the name ludi from the Lydi, or 
Lydians." 29 

"The letters of the Hebrews are believed to have taken start 
with Moses through the written Law; and those of the Chaldeans 


and Syrians through Abraham. Isis founded the letters of the 
Egyptians ; the Phoenicians those of the Greeks, when Cadmus 
brought the alphabet from Phoenicia into Greece." 30 "Carmentis, 
mother of Evander, who by her proper name is called Nico- 
strata, invented Latin letters." 31 "Moses first wrote divine 
history, while among the gentiles Dares the Phrygian first 
published the history of Troy — written on leaves of palms, they 
say. After Dares, Herdodotus was considered the first historian 
in Greece, and after him Pherecydes flourished in those times 
when Esdras wrote the Law." 32 Alcmon of Crotona is held the 
first inventor of fables. 33 

Egypt is the mother of the arts, and thence they came to 
Greece, and thence to Italy. 34 In Egypt grammar was first 
founded in the time of Osiris, husband of Isis. "There too 
dialectic was first founded by Parmenides, who, fleeing cities 
and the gatherings of men, dwelt for no short space of time on a 
rock where he thought out the science : hence, it has since been 
called the Rock of Parmenides." 35 "Plato too, upon the death 
of Socrates his master, led by love of learning, emigrated into 
Egypt, whence, having acquired liberal studies, he returned to 
Athens and, taking to himself disciples at the Academy, his 
villa, turned his efforts to studies in philosophy." 3 ^ He, first, 
taught conceptual logic to the Greeks, which afterwards his 
disciple Aristotle expanded, perfected, and reduced to an art. 
Marcus Terentius Varro first translated dialectic from Greek 
into Latin. 37 At a later date Cicero wrote his Topics. Demos- 
thenes, an artisan's son, is believed to have devised rhetoric 
among the Greeks, Tisias among the Latins, Corax among the 
Syracusans. 38 Rhetoric was written in Greek by Aristotle and 
Gorgias and Hermagoras, and brought into Latin by Tully, 
Quintilian, and Titian. 39 

Chapter Three : Which Arts Are Principally to Be Read 

Out of all the sciences 40 above named, however, the ancients, 
in their studies, especially selected seven to be mastered by those 
who were to be educated. These seven they considered so to 
excel all the rest in usefulness that anyone who had been 
thoroughly schooled in them might afterward come to a know- 


ledge of the others by his own inquiry and effort rather than by 
listening to a teacher. For these, one might say, constitute the 
best instruments, the best rudiments, by which the way is 
prepared for the mind's complete knowledge of philosophic 
truth. Therefore they are called by the name tiwium and 
quadrmum, because by them, as by certain ways {viae), a quick 
mind enters into the secret places of wisdom. 

In those days, no one was thought worthy the name of 
master who was unable to claim knowledge of these seven. 
Pythagoras, too, is said to have maintained the following 
practice as a teacher : for seven years, according to the number of 
the seven liberal arts, no one of his pupils dared ask the reason 
behind statements made by him; instead, he was to give credence 
to the words of the master until he had heard him out, and then, 
having done this, he would be able to come at the reason of those 
things himself. 41 We read that some men studied these seven 
with such zeal that they had them completely in memory, so 
that whatever writings they subsequently took in hand or 
whatever questions they proposed for solution or proof, they 
did not thumb the pages of books to hunt for rules and reasons 
which the liberal arts might afford for the resolution of a doubt- 
ful matter, but at once had the particulars ready by heart. 
Hence, it is a fact that in that time there were so many learned 
men that they alone wrote more than we are able to read. But 
the students 42 of our day, whether from ignorance or from 
unwillingness, fail to hold to a fit method of study, and therefore 
we find many who study but few who are wise. Yet it seems to 
me that the student should take no less care not to expend his 
effort in useless studies than he should to avoid a lukewarm 
pursuit of good and useful ones. It is bad to pursue something 
good negligently ; it is worse to expend many labors on an empty 
thing. But because not everyone is mature enough to know 
what is of advantage to him, I shall briefly indicate to the student 
which writings seem to me more useful than others, and then I 
shall add a few words on the method of study. 

Chapter Four: Concerning the Two Kinds of Writings 

There are two kinds of writings. The first kind comprises 
what are properly called the arts; the second, those writings 


which are appendages of the arts. The arts are included in 
philosophy: they have, that is, some definite and established 
part of philosophy for their subject matter — as do grammar, 
dialectic, and others of this sort. The appendages of the arts, 
however, are only tangential to philosophy. What they treat is 
some extra-philosophical matter. Occasionally, it is true, they 
touch in a scattered and confused fashion upon some topics 
lifted out of the arts, or, if their narrative presentation is simple, 
they prepare the way for philosophy. Of this sort are all the 
songs of the poets — tragedies, comedies, satires, heroic verse 
and lyric, iambics, certain didactic poems, fables and histories, 
and also the writings of those fellows whom today we commonly 
call "philosophers" 43 and who are always taking some small 
matter and dragging it out through long verbal detours, 
obscuring a simple meaning in confused discourses — who, 
lumping even dissimilar things together, make, as it were, a 
single "picture" from a multitude of "colors" and forms. Keep 
in mind the two things I have distinguished for you — the arts 
and the appendages of the arts. 44 

Between these two, however, there is in my view such distance 
as the poet describes when he says : 

As much as the wiry willow cedes to the pale olive, 
Or the wild nard to roses of Punic red. 45 

It is a distance such that the man wishing to attain knowledge, 
yet who willingly deserts truth in order to entangle himself in 
these mere by-products of the arts, will find, I shall not say 
infinite, but exceedingly great pains and meagre fruit. Finally, 
the arts themselves, without these things that border on them, 
are able to make the student perfect, while the latter things, 
without the arts, are capable of conferring no perfection : and 
this the more especially since the latter have nothing desirable 
with which to tempt the student except what they have taken 
over and adapted from the arts ; and no one should seek in them 
anything but what is of the arts. For this reason it appears to me 
that our effort should first be given to the arts, in which are the 
foundation stones of all things and in which pure and simple 
truth is revealed — and especially to the seven already mentioned, 
which comprise the tools of all philosophy; afterwards, if time 


affords, let these other things be read, for sometimes we are 
better pleased when entertaining reading is mixed with serious, 
and rarity makes what is good seem precious. Thus, we some- 
times more eagerly take up a thought we come upon in the 
midst of a story. 

It is in the seven liberal arts, however, that the foundation of 
all learning is to be found. Before all others these ought to be 
had at hand, because without them the philosophical discipline 
does not and cannot explain and define anything. These, 
indeed, so hang together and so depend upon one another in 
their ideas that if only one of the arts be lacking, all the rest 
cannot make a man into a philosopher. Therefore, those 
persons seem to me to be in error who, not appreciating the 
coherence among the arts, select certain of them for study, and, 
leaving the rest untouched, think they can become perfect in 
these alone. 46 

Chapter Five : That to Each Art Should be Given What Belongs to It 

There is still another error, hardly less serious than that just 
mentioned, and it must be avoided with the greatest care: 
certain persons, while they omit nothing which ought to be 
read, nonetheless do not know how to give each art what 
belongs to it, but, while treating one, lecture on them all. In 
grammar they discourse about the theory of syllogisms; in 
dialectic they inquire into inflectional cases; and what is still 
more ridiculous, in discussing the title of a book they practically 
cover the whole work, and, by their third lecture, they have 
hardly finished with the incipit. It is not the teaching of others 
that they accomplish in this way, but the showing off of their 
own knowledge. Would that they seemed to everyone as they 
seem to me! Only consider how perverse this practice is. 
Surely the more you collect superfluous details the less you are 
able to grasp or to retain useful matters. 

Two separate concerns, then, are to be recognized and 
distinguished in every art : first, how one ought to treat of the 
art itself, and second, how one ought to apply the principles of 
that art in all other matters whatever. Two distinct things are 
involved here : treating of the art and treating by means of the art. 


Treating of an art is treating, for instance, of grammar; but 
treating by means of that art is treating some matter grammati- 
cally. Note the difference between these two — treating of 
grammar, and treating some matter grammatically. We treat of 
grammar when we set forth the rules given for words and the 
various precepts proper to this art ; we treat grammatically when 
we speak or write according to rule. To treat of grammar, then, 
belongs only to certain books, like Priscian, Donatus, or 
Servius; but to treat grammatically belongs to all books. 

When, therefore, we treat of any art — and especially in 
teaching it, when everything must be reduced to outline and 
presented for easy understanding — we should be content to set 
forth the matter in hand as briefly and as clearly as possible, lest 
by excessively piling up extraneous considerations we distract 
the student more than we instruct him. We must not say every- 
thing we can, lest we say with less effect such things as need 
saying. Seek, therefore, in every art what stands established as 
belonging specifically to it. Later, when you have studied the 
arts and come to know by disputation and comparison what the 
proper concern of each of them is, 47 then, at this stage, it will 
be fitting for you to bring the principles of each to bear upon all 
the others, and, by a comparative and back-and-forth examina- 
tion of the arts, to investigate the things in them which you did 
not well understand before. Do not strike into a lot of by-ways 
until you know the main roads : you will go along securely when 
you are not under the fear of going astray. 48 

Chapter Six: What Is Necessary for Study 

Three things are necessary for those who study: natural 
endowment, practice, and discipline. 49 By natural endowment 
is meant that they must be able to grasp easily what they hear 
and to retain firmly what they grasp; by practice is meant that 
they must cultivate by assiduous effort the natural endowment 
they have; and by discipline is meant that, by leading a praise- 
worthy life, they must combine moral behavior with their 
knowledge. Of these three in turn we shall now set forth a few 
remarks by way of introduction. 


Chapter Seven : Concerning Aptitude as Related to Natural Endowment 

Those who work at learning must be equipped at the same 
time with aptitude and with memory, for these two are so 
closely tied together in every study and discipline that if one of 
them is lacking, the other alone cannot lead anyone to perfection 
— just as earnings are useless if there is no saving of them, and 
storage equipment is useless if there is nothing to preserve. 
Aptitude gathers wisdom, memory preserves it. 

Aptitude is a certain faculty naturally rooted in the mind and 
empowered from within. 50 It arises from nature, is improved by 
use, is blunted by excessive work, and is sharpened by temperate 
practice. 51 As someone has very nicely said: 

Please! Spare yourself for my sake — there's only drudgery in those 
papers! Go run in the open air ! 

Aptitude gets practice from two things — reading and 
meditation. Reading consists of forming our minds upon rules 
and precepts taken from books, and it is of three types : the 
teacher's, the learner's, and the independent reader's. For we 
say, "I am reading the book to him," "I am reading the book 
under him," and "I am reading the book." 52 Order and method 
are what especially deserve attention in the matter of reading. 

Chapter Eight: Concerning Order in Expounding a Text 

One kind of order is observed in the disciplines, when I say, 
for instance, that grammar is more ancient than dialectic, or 
arithmetic comes before music; another kind in codices or 
anthologies, when I declare, for instance, that the Catilinarian 
orations are ahead of the Jugurtha; another kind in narration, 
which moves in continuous series; and another kind in the 
exposition of a text. 

Order in the disciplines is arranged to follow nature. In 
books it is arranged according to the person of the author or the 
nature of the subject matter. 53 In narration it follows an 
arrangement which is of two kinds — either natural, as when 
deeds are recounted in the order of their occurrence, or artificial, 
as when a subsequent event is related first and a prior event is 


told after it. In the exposition of a text, the order followed is 
adapted to inquiry. 

Exposition includes three things: the letter, the sense, and 
the inner meaning. The letter is the fit arrangement of words, 
which we also call construction; the sense is a certain ready and 
obvious meaning which the letter presents on the surface; the 
inner meaning is the deeper understanding which can be found 
only through interpretation and commentary. Among these, 
the order of inquiry is first the letter, then the sense, and finally 
the inner meaning. And when this is done, the exposition is 
complete. 54 

Chapter Nine: Concerning the Method of Expounding a Text 55 

The method of expounding a text consists in analysis. Every 
analysis begins from things which are finite, or defined, and 
proceeds in the direction of things which are infinite, or un- 
defined. Now every finite or defined matter is better known and 
able to be grasped by our knowledge; teaching, moreover, 
begins with those things which are better known and, by 
acquainting us with these, works its way to matters which lie 
hidden. Furthermore, we investigate with our reason (the proper 
function of which is to analyze) when, by analysis and in- 
vestigation of the natures of individual things, we descend from 
universals to particulars. For every universal is more fully 
defined than its particulars : when we learn, therefore, we ought 
to begin with universals, which are better known and determined 
and inclusive; and then, by descending little by little from them 
and by distinguishing individuals through analysis, we ought to 
investigate the nature of the things those universals contain. 

Chapter Ten: Concerning Meditation^ 

Meditation is sustained thought along planned lines: it 
prudently investigates the cause and the source, the manner and 
the utility of each thing. Meditation takes its start from reading 
but is bound by none of reading's rules or precepts. For it 
delights to range along open ground, where it fixes its free gaze 
upon the contemplation of truth, drawing together now these, 
now those causes of things, or now penetrating into profundities, 


leaving nothing doubtful, nothing obscure. The start of 
learning, thus, lies in reading, but its consummation lies in 
meditation ; which, if any man will learn to love it very intimately 
and will desire to be engaged very frequently upon it, renders 
his life pleasant indeed, and provides the greatest consolation to 
him in his trials. This especially it is which takes the soul away 
from the noise of earthly business and makes it have even in this 
life a kind of foretaste of the sweetness of the eternal quiet. 
And when, through the things which God has made, a man has 
learned to seek out and to understand him who has made them 
all, then does he equally instruct his mind with knowledge and 
fill it with joy. From this it follows that in meditation is to be 
found the greatest delight. 

There are three kinds of meditation: one consists in a con- 
sideration of morals, the second in a scrutiny of the command- 
ments, and the third in an investigation of the divine works. 
Morals are found in virtues and vices. The divine command 
either orders, or promises, or threatens. 57 The work of God 
comprises what his power creates, what his wisdom disposes, 
and what his grace co-effects. And the more a man knows how 
great is the admiration which all these things deserve, the more 
intently does he give himself to continual meditation upon the 
wonders of God. 

Chapter Eleven : Concerning Memory 

Concerning memory I do not think one should fail to say here 
that just as aptitude investigates and discovers through analysis, 
so memory retains through gathering. The things which we 
have analyzed in the course of learning and which we must 
commit to memory we ought, therefore, to gather. Now 
"gathering" is reducing to a brief and compendious outline 
things which have been written or discussed at some length. 58 
The ancients called such an outline an "epilogue," that is, a 
short restatement, by headings, of things already said. Now 
every exposition has some principle upon which the entire truth 
of the matter and the force of its thought rest, and to this 
principle everything else is traced back. To look for and 
consider this principle is to "gather." 


The fountainhead is one, but its derivative streams are many : 
why follow the windings of the latter? Lay hold upon the 
source and you have the whole thing. I say this because the 
memory of man is dull and likes brevity, and, if it is dissipated 
upon many things, it has less to bestow upon each of them. We 
ought, therefore, in all that we learn, to gather brief and 
dependable abstracts to be stored in the little chest of the 
memory, so that later on, when need arises, we can derive 
everything else from them. These one must often turn over in 
the mind and regurgitate from the stomach of one's memory to 
taste them, lest by long inattention to them, thev disappear. 59 

I charge you, then, my student, not to rejoice a great deal 
because you may have read many things, but because you have 
been able to retain them. Otherwise there is no profit in having 
read or understood much. And for this reason I call to mind 
again what I said earlier : those who devote themselves to study 
require both aptitude and memory. 60 

Chapter Twelve : Concerning Discipline 

A certain wise man, when asked concerning the method and 
form of study, declared : 

A humble mind, eagerness to inquire, a quiet life, 

Silent scrutiny, poverty, a foreign soil. 

These, for many, unlock the hidden places of learning. 61 

He had heard, I should judge, the saying, "Morals equip 
learning." 62 Therefore he joined rules for living to rules for 
study, in order that the student might know both the standard of 
his life and the nature of his study. Unpraise worthy is learning 
stained bv a shameless life. Therefore, let him who would seek 
learning take care above all that he not neglect discipline. 

Chapter Thirteen : Concerning Humility 

Now the beginning of discipline is humility. Although the 
lessons of humility are many, the three which follow are of 
especial importance for the student: first, that he hold no 
knowledge and no writing in contempt; second, that he blush 



to learn from no man; and third, that when he has attained 
learning himself, he not look down upon everyone else. 

Many are deceived by the desire to appear wise before their 
time. They therefore break out in a certain swollen importance 
and begin to simulate what they are not and to be ashamed of 
what they are; and they slip all the farther from wisdom in 
proportion as they think, not of being wise, but of being thought 
so. I have known many of this sort who, although they still 
lacked the very rudiments of learning, yet deigned to concern 
themselves only with the highest problems, and they supposed 
that they themselves were well on the road to greatness simply 
because they had read the writings or heard the words of great 
and wise men. "We," they say, "have seen them. We have 
studied under them. They often used to talk to us. Those great 
ones, those famous men, they know us." Ah, would that no 
one knew me and that I but knew all things! You glory in 
having seen, not in having understood, Plato. As a matter of 
fact, I should think it not good enough for you to listen to me. 
I am not Plato. I have not deserved to see him. Good for 
you! You have drunk at the very fount of philosophy — but 
would that you thirsted still! "The king, having drunk from a 
goblet of gold, drinks next from a cup of clay!" 63 Why are 
you blushing? You have heard Plato! — may you hear 
Chrysippus too! The proverb says, "What you do not know, 
maybe Ofellus knows." 64 There is no one to whom it is given to 
know all things, no one who has not received his special gift 
from nature. The wise student, therefore, gladly hears all, reads 
all, and looks down upon no writing, no person, no teaching. 
From all indifferently he seeks what he sees he lacks, and he 
considers not how much he knows, but of how much he is 
ignorant. For this reason men repeat Plato's saying: "I would 
rather learn with modesty what another man says than shameless- 
ly push forward my own ideas." 65 Why do you blush to be 
taught, and yet not blush at your ignorance? The latter is a 
greater shame than the former. Or why should you affect the 
heights when you are still lying in the depths? Consider, 
rather, what your powers will at present permit: the man who 
proceeds stage by stage moves along best. Certain fellows, 
wishing to make a great leap of progress, sprawl headlong. Do 


not hurry too much, therefore ; in this way you will come more 
quickly to wisdom. Gladly learn from all what you do not 
know, for humility can make you a sharer in the special gift 
which natural endowment has given to every man. You will 
be wiser than all if you are willing to learn from all. 

Finally, hold no learning in contempt, for all learning is good. 
Do not scorn at least to read a book, if you have the time. If 
you gain nothing from it, neither do you lose anything; 
especially since there is, in my judgment, no book which does 
not set forth something worth looking for, if that book is taken 
up at the right place and time; or which does not possess some- 
thing even special to itself which the diligent scrutineer of its 
contents, having found it nowhere else, seizes upon gladly in 
proportion as it is the more rare. 

Nothing, however, is good if it eliminates a better thing. If 
you are not able to read everything, read those things which are 
more useful. Even if you should be able to read them all, how- 
ever, you should not expend the same labor upon all. Some 
things are to be read that we may know them, but others that we 
may at least have heard of them, for sometimes we think that 
things of which we have not heard are of greater worth than 
they are, and we estimate more readily a thing whose fruit is 
known to us. 

You can now see how necessary to you is that humility which 
will prompt you to hold no knowledge in contempt and to learn 
gladly from all. Similarly, it is fitting for you that when you 
have begun to know something, you not look down upon 
everyone else. For the vice of an inflated ego attacks some men 
because they pay too much fond attention to their own know- 
ledge, and when they seem to themselves to have become some- 
thing, they think that others whom they do not even know can 
neither be nor become as great. So it is that in our days certain 
peddlers of trifles come fuming forth; glorying in I know not 
what, 66 they accuse our forefathers of simplicity and suppose 
that wisdom, having been born with themselves, with them- 
selves will die. 67 They say that the divine utterances have such 
a simple way of speaking that no one has to study them under 
masters, but can sufficiently penetrate to the hidden treasures of 
Truth by his own mental acumen. They wrinkle their noses and 


purse their lips at lecturers in divinity and do not understand 
that they themselves give offense to God, whose words they 
preach — words simple to be sure in their verbal beauty, but 
lacking savor when given a distorted sense. It is not my advice 
that you imitate men of this kind. 68 

The good student, then, ought to be humble and docile, 
free alike from vain cares and from sensual indulgences, diligent 
and zealous to learn willingly from all, to presume never upon 
his own knowledge, to shun the authors of perverse doctrine as 
if they were poison, to consider a matter thoroughly and at 
length before judging of it, to seek to be learned rather than 
merely to seem so, to love such words of the wise as he has 
grasped, and ever to hold those words before his gaze as the 
very mirror of his countenance. And if some things, by chance 
rather obscure, have not allowed him to understand them, let 
him not at once break out in angry condemnation and think that 
nothing is good but what he himself can understand. This is the 
humility proper to a student's discipline. 

Chapter Fourteen : Concerning Eagerness to Inquire 

Eagerness to inquire relates to practice and in it the student 
needs encouragement rather than instruction. Whoever wishes 
to inspect earnestly what the ancients in their love of wisdom 
have handed down to us, and how deserving of posterity's 
remembrance are the monuments which they left of their virtue, 
will see how inferior his own earnestness is to theirs. Some of 
them scorned honors, others cast aside riches, others rejoiced in 
injuries received, others despised hardships, and still others, 
deserting the meeting places of men for the farthest withdrawn 
spots and secret haunts of solitude, gave themselves over to 
philosophy alone, that they might have greater freedom for un- 
disturbed contemplation insofar as they subjected their minds 
to none of the desires which usually obstruct the path of virtue. 
We read that the philosopher Parmenides dwelt on a rock in 
Egypt for fifteen years. 69 And Prometheus, for his unrestrained 
love of thinking, is recorded to have been exposed to the attacks 
of a vulture on Mount Caucasus. For they knew that the true 
good lies not in the esteem of men but is hidden in a pure 


conscience and that those are not truly men who, clinging to 
things destined to perish, do not recognize their own good. 
Therefore, seeing that they differed in mind and understanding 
from all the rest of men, they displayed this fact in the very far- 
removal of their dwelling places, so that one community might 
not hold men not associated by the same objectives. A certain 
man retorted to a philosopher, saying, "Do you not see that men 
are laughing at you?" To which the philosopher replied, "They 
laugh at me, and the asses bray at them." Think if you can how 
much he valued the praise of those men whose vituperation, 
even, he did not fear. Of another man we read that after 
studying all the disciplines and attaining the very peaks of all 
the arts he turned to the potter's trade. Again, the disciples of a 
certain other man, when they exalted their master with praises, 
gloried in the fact that among all his other accomplishments he 
even possessed that of being a shoemaker. 

I could wish that our students possessed such earnestness that 
wisdom would never grow old in them. None but Abisag the 
Sunamitess warmed the aged David, because the love of wisdom, 
though the body decay, will not desert her lover. 70 "Almost all 
the powers of the body are changed in aged men; while wisdom 
alone increases, all the rest fade away." 71 "The old age of those 
who have formed their youth upon creditable pursuits becomes 
wiser with the years, acquires greater polish 72 through ex- 
perience, greater wisdom with the passage of time, and reaps 
the sweetest fruits of former studies. That wise and well-known 
man of Greece, Themistocles, 73 when he had lived a full one- 
hundred seven years and saw that he was about to die, is said to 
have declared that he was sad to depart this life when he had 
just begun to be wise. Plato died writing in his eighty-first 
year. 74 Socrates 75 filled ninety-nine years with the pain and 
labor of teaching and writing. I pass over in silence all the 
other philosophers — Pythagoras, Democritus, Xenocrates, Zeno, 
and the Elean (Parmenides) — who flourished throughout a long 
life spent in the pursuit of wisdom. I come now to the poets — 
Homer, Hesiod, Simonides, and Tersichorus, 76 who, when 
advanced in years, sang, with the approach of death — how shall 
I say it? — a swan-song sweeter than even their former wont. 
When Sophocles, after an exceedingly old age and a long neglect 



of his family affairs, was accused by his sons of madness, he 
declaimed to the judge the story of Oedipus which he had only 
recently composed, and gave such a specimen of his wisdom in 
these already broken years that he moved the austere dignity of 
the courtroom to the applause of the theatre. Nor is this a 
matter for wonder, when even Cato the censor, most erudite of 
the Romans, neither blushed nor despaired to learn Greek when 
he was already an old man. And, indeed, Homer reports that 
from the tongue of Nestor, who was already stooped with age 
and nearly decrepit, flowed speech sweeter than honey." 77 
Consider, then, how much these men loved wisdom when not 
even decrepit age could call them away from its quest. 

The greatness of that love of wisdom, therefore, and the 
abundance of judgment in elderly men is aptly inferred from the 
interpretation of that very name "Abisag" which I mentioned 
above. "For 'Abisag' means 'father mine, superabounding' or 
again 'my father's deep-voiced cry,' whence it is most abundant- 
ly shown that, with the aged, the thunder of divine discourse 
tarries beyond human speech. For the word 'superabounding' 
here signifies fulness, not redundance. And indeed, 'Sunamitess' 
in our language means 'scarlet woman,'" 78 an expression which 
can aptly enough signify zeal for wisdom. 

Chapter Fifteen : Concerning the Four Remaining Precepts 

The four following precepts are so arranged that they alter- 
nately refer first to discipline and next to practice. 

Chapter Sixteen : On Quiet 

Quiet of life — whether interior, so that the mind is not 
distracted with illicit desires, or exterior, so that leisure and 
opportunity are provided for creditable and useful studies — is 
in both senses important to discipline. 

Chapter Seventeen : On Scrutiny 

Now, scrutiny, that is, meditation, has to do with practice. 
Yet it seems that scrutiny belongs under eagerness to inquire, 
and if this is true, we are here repeating ourselves needlessly, 


since we mentioned the latter above. It should, however, be 
recognized that there is a difference between these two. Eager- 
ness to inquire means insistent application to one's work; 
scrutiny means earnestness in considering things. Hard work 
and love make you carry out a task ; concern and alertness make 
you well-advised. Through hard work you keep matters going; 
through love you bring them to perfection. Through concern 
you look ahead; through alertness you pay close attention. 
These are the four footmen who carry the chair of Philology, 
for they give practice to the mind over which Wisdom sits ruler. 
The chair of Philology is the throne of Wisdom, and it is said to 
be carried by these bearers because it is carried forward when 
one practices these things. Therefore, the two front bearers, 
because of their power, are neatly designated as the youths 
Philos and Kophos, that is Love and Hard Work, because they 
bring a task to external perfection ; the two rear bearers are with 
equal neatness designated as the maidens Philemia and Agrimnia 
(Epimeleia and Agrypnia), that is Concern and Alertness, 
because they inspire interior and secret reflection. 79 There are 
some who suppose that by the Chair of Philology is meant the 
human body, over which the rational soul presides, and which 
four footmen carry — that is, the four elements of which the two 
upper ones, namely fire and air, are masculine in function and in 
gender, and the two lower, earth and water, feminine. 80 

Chapter Eighteen: On Parsimony 

Men have wished to persuade students to be content with 
slender means, that is, not to hanker after superfluities. This is 
a matter of especial importance for their discipline. "A fat 
belly," as the saying goes, "does not produce a fine perception." 8 * 
But what will the students of our time be able to say for them- 
selves on this point? Not only do they despise frugality in the 
course of their studies, but they even labor to appear rich beyond 
what they are. Each one boasts not of what he has learned but 
of what he has spent. But perhaps the explanation of this lies in 
their wish to imitate their masters, 82 concerning whom I can 
find nothing worthy enough to say! 


Chapter Nineteen: On a Foreign Soil* 3 

Finally, a foreign soil is proposed, since it too gives a man 
practice. All the world is a foreign soil to those who philoso- 
phize. 84 However, as a certain poet says : 

I know not by what sweetness native soil attracts a man 
And suffers not that he should e'er forget. 85 

It is, therefore, a great source of virtue for the practiced mind 
to learn, bit by bit, first to change about in visible and transitory 
things, so that afterwards it may be able to leave them behind 
altogether. The man who finds his homeland sweet is still a 
tender beginner; he to whom every soil is as his native one is 
already strong ; but he is perfect to whom the entire world is as 
a foreign land. The tender soul has fixed his love on one spot in 
the world; the strong man has extended his love to all places; 
the perfect man has extinguished his. From boyhood I have 
dwelt on foreign soil, and I know with what grief sometimes the 
mind takes leave of the narrow hearth of a peasant's hut, 86 and I 
know, too, how frankly it afterwards disdains marble firesides 87 
and panelled halls. 88 


Chapter One : Concerning the Study of the Sacred Scriptures 

Neither all nor only those writings which treat of God or of 
invisible goods are to be called sacred. In the books of pagans 
we find many things quite plausibly argued about the eternity of 
God and the immortality of souls, about eternal rewards owing 
to the virtues, and about eternal punishments owing to evils, 
and yet no one supposes that these books merit the term 
"sacred." Again, as we run through the series of books in the 
Old Testament and the New, we see that the collection is 
devoted almost entirely to the state of this present life and to 
deeds done in time, while rarely is anything clearly to be drawn 1 
from them concerning the sweetness of eternal goods or the joys 
of the heavenly life. And yet these writings the catholic faith 
traditionally calls Sacred Scriptures. 

The writings of philosophers, like a whitewashed wall of clay, 
boast an attractive surface all shining with eloquence; but if 
sometimes they hold forth to us a semblance of truth, never- 
theless, by mixing falsehoods with it, they conceal the clay of 
error, as it were, under an over-spread coat of color. The 
Sacred Scriptures, on the other hand, are most fittingly likened 
to a honeycomb, for while in the simplicity of their language 
they seem dry, within they are filled with sweetness. And thus it 
is that they have deservedly come by the name sacred, for they 
alone are found so free from the infection of falsehood that they 
are proved to contain nothing contrary to truth. 

Sacred Scriptures are those which were produced by men who 
cultivated the catholic faith and which the authority of the 
universal church has taken over to be included among the 
Sacred Books and preserved to be read for the strengthening of 
that same faith. Besides these, there exists an exceedingly large 
number of short works which holy and wise men have written at 


various times and which, although they are not approved by the 
authority of the universal church, nevertheless pass for Sacred 
Scriptures, both because they do not depart from the catholic 
faith and because they teach many useful matters. But very likely 
more can be shown by enumerating these writings than by 
denning them. 

Chapter Two : Concerning the Order and Number of the Books 

The whole of Sacred Scripture is contained in two Testaments, 
namely, in the Old and in the New. The books in each Testament 
are divided into three groups. The Old Testament contains the 
Law, the Prophets, and the Hagiographers ; the New contains 
the Gospel, the Apostles, and the Fathers. 2 

The first group in the Old Testament — that is, the Law, 
which the Hebrews call the Torafo — contains the Pentateuch, or 
the five books of Moses. First in this group is Bresith, or 
Genesis; second Hellesmoth, or Exodus; third, Vaiecra, or 
Leviticus, fourth Vaiedaber, or Numbers; fifth, Adabarim, or 

The second group is that of the Prophets. It contains eight 
books. The first is called Josue ben Nun, which means "Son of 
Nun" — also called simply Josue or Jesus or Jesu Nave. The 
second is called Sophtim, and it is the book of Judges; the third, 
Samuel, and it is the first and second books of Kings; the fourth, 
Malachim, and it is the third and fourth books of Kings; the 
fifth, Isaias; the sixth, Jeremias; the seventh, Ezechiel; the 
eighth, Thareasra, and it consists of the Twelve [Minor] Prophets. 

Next, the third group has nine books. The first is Job; the 
second, David; the third, Mas/oth, which in Greek is called 
Parables and in Latin, Proverbs — and these are Solomon's ; the 
fourth, Coe/eth, which is Ecclesiastes ; the fifth, Sira Syrin, that is, 
the Canticle of Canticles; the sixth, Daniel; the seventh, 
Dabrehiamin, which is Paralipomenon ; the eighth, Esdras; the 
ninth, Esther. All these total twenty-two. 

Besides all these there are five other books — The Wisdom of 
Solomon, the Book of Jesus Son of Sirach, the Book of Judith, 
the Book of Tobias, and the Books of the Machabees — which 
are read, to be sure, but which are not included in the canon. 4 


The first group of the New Testament contains four books : 
Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John. The second likewise contains 
four : the fourteen letters of Paul collected in one book ; then the 
Canonical Epistles; the Apocalypse; and the Acts of the 
Apostles. In the third group, first place is held by the Decretals, 
which we call canons, or rules; the second, by the writings of the 
holy Fathers and Doctors of the Church — Jerome, Augustine, 
Gregory, Ambrose, Isidore, Origen, Bede, and many other 
orthodox authors. Their works are so limitless that they cannot 
be numbered — which makes strikingly clear how much fervor 
they had in that Christian faith for the assertion of which they 
left so many and such great remembrances to posterity. Indeed, 
we stand convicted of indolence by our inability to read all that 
they could manage to dictate. 

In these groups most strikingly appears the likeness between 
the two Testaments. For just as after the Law come the 
Prophets, and after the Prophets, the Hagiographers, so after the 
Gospel come the Apostles, and after the Apostles the long line 
of Doctors. And by a wonderful ordering of the divine dispen- 
sation, it has been brought about that although the truth stands 
full and perfect in each of the books, yet none of them is super- 
fluous. These few things we have condensed concerning the 
order and number of the Sacred Books, that the student may 
know what his required reading is. 

Chapter Three : Concerning the Authors of the Sacred Books 

"Moses w T rote the five books of the Law. Of the Book of 
Josue, that same Josue whose name it bears is believed to have 
been the author. The Book of Judges, they say, was produced 
by Samuel. The first part of the Book of Samuel he himself 
wrote, but the rest to the very end, David. Malachim, Jeremias 
first brought together into a single book, for previously 
this material had been scattered in histories of the individual 

Isaias, Jeremias, and Ezechiel each wrote the books inscribed 
with their names. "The Book of the Twelve Prophets is 
inscribed with the names of its authors, whose names are: Osee, 
Joel, Amos, Abdias, Jonas, Michaeas, Nahum, Habacuc, 


Sophonias, Aggeus, Zacharias, and Malachias. These are called 
the Minor Prophets because their discourses are short and are 
therefore included in a single book." 6 As for Isaias and Jeremias 
and Ezechiel and Daniel, these four are the Major Prophets, each 
set apart in a separate book. 

"The Book of Job some believe was written by Moses; others 
hold it to have been written by one of the Prophets, while a 
number suppose it the work of Job himself." 7 The Book of 
Psalms David produced, though afterwards Esdras gave the 
psalms their present order and added the titles. Parables, 
Ecclesiastes, and the Canticle of Canticles Solomon composed. 
Daniel was the author of his own book. "The Book of Esdras 
bears its author's name in its title, though in it the discourses of 
Esdras and of Nehemias are equally contained. The Book of 
Esther is believed to have been written by Esdras. The Book of 
Wisdom is nowhere found among the Hebrews, and indeed its 
very title bespeaks a Greek origin for it. Certain Jews affirm 
that the book was produced by Philo. The Book of Ecclesias- 
ticus was most certainly the work of Jesus son of Sirach of 
Jerusalem, nephew of Jesus the high priest, whom Zacharias 
mentions. This book is found among the Hebrews, but is 
placed among the Apocrypha. As for Judith and Tobias and the 
Books of the Machabees, of which, as Jerome says, the second 
proves rather to be Greek, it is by no means certain who wrote 

Chapter Four: What a " Bibliotheca" Is 

"A bibliotheca (library) takes its name from the Greek, because 
in it books are preserved. For biblio- is to be understood as 
meaning 'of books' and -theca as 'repository.' After the Law 
had been burned by the Chaldeans and when the Jews had 
returned to Jerusalem, Esdras the scribe, inspired by the Divine 
Spirit, restored the books of the Old Testament, corrected all 
the volumes of the Law and the Prophets which had been 
corrupted by the gentiles, and arranged the whole of the Old 
Testament into twenty-two books, so that there might be just 
as many books of Law as there were letters in the alphabet." 9 
"Five letters of the Hebrew alphabet, however, are doubles — 


caph, mem, nun, phe, and sade : these five are written in one form 
at the beginning or middle of a word, and in another at the end. 
For this reason, many think, five of the books are double: 
Samuel, Malachim, Debrehiamin, Esdras, and Jeremias with its 
Cynoth, or Lamentations." 10 

Chapter Five : Concerning Translators 

"The translators of the Old Testament: first, those seventy 
translators whom Ptolemy Philadelphus, king of Egypt, had 
translate the Old Testament out of Hebrew into the Greek 
tongue. Well versed in all letters, he rivaled Pisistratus, tyrant 
of the Athenians (who, first, founded a library among the 
Greeks), and Seleucus Nicanor, and Alexander, and all the 
other ancients who cultivated wisdom, in his zeal for libraries. 
Into his library he gathered together not only the writings of all 
peoples but also the Sacred Scriptures, with the result that in his 
time seventy thousand books were to be found at Alexandria. 
To get the writings of the Old Testament he approached Eleazar 
the High Priest. Although the seventy translators had been 
isolated, each in his own cell, nevertheless, through the operation 
of the Holy Spirit it fell out that nothing in the translation of any 
one of them was found to differ, either in word order or in any 
other matter, from that of the rest." 11 They produced, there- 
fore, but one translation. But Jerome says that this is a tale 
undeserving of belief. 12 

"The second, third, and fourth translations were made 
respectively by Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion, of whom 
Aquila was a Jew while Symmachus and Theodotion were 
Ebionite heretics. The practice of the Greek churches, how- 
ever, has been to adopt and read texts which follow the seventy 
translators. The fifth translation is the popular one, whose 
author is unknown, so that it has to be called simply 'the Fifth.' 
The sixth and seventh derive from Origen, whose works were 
popularized by Eusebius and Pamphilus. The eighth is Jerome's, 
which is deservedly preferred to the others because it adheres 
more closely to the original words and is clearer in its insight into 
meanings." 13 


Chapter Six: Concerning the Authors of the New Testament 

Several persons have written Gospels, but some among these, 
lacking the Holy Spirit, were bent more upon arranging a good 
story than upon weaving together the truth of history. For this 
reason, our holy Fathers, instructed by the Holy Spirit, accepted 
only four as authoritative, rejecting the rest. These four are 
those of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, after the likeness of 
the four rivers of Paradise, the four carrying-poles of the Ark, 14 
and the four animals in Ezechiel. "The first, Matthew, wrote 
his Gospel in Hebrew. The second, Mark, wrote in Greek. The 
third, Luke, better instructed in the Greek tongue than the 
other Evangelists — he was, in fact, a doctor in Greece — wrote 
his Gospel for Bishop Theophilus, for whom he likewise com- 
posed the Acts of the Apostles. Fourth and last, John wrote his 

"Paul wrote fourteen Epistles — ten to the churches, four to 
individuals. Most, however, say that the last one, the Epistle to 
the Hebrews, is not Paul's; some hold that Barnabas wrote it, 
others surmise it was Clement. The Canonical Epistles are seven : 
one by James, two by Peter, three by John, one by Jude. John 
the Apostle wrote the Apocalypse when in exile on the island of 
Patmos." 16 

Chapter Seven : That All the Other Scriptures Are Apocryphal^ and 
What an Apocryphal Scripture Is 

"These, then, are the writers of the Sacred Books, who, 
speaking through the Holy Spirit for our instruction, have set 
forth the precepts and rules of life. Apart from these, all the 
other works are called apocryphal. They are called apocryphal, 
that is, 'hidden,' because they have come into doubt. For their 
origin is obscure, unknown even to the Fathers, from whose 
day unto our own the authority of the true Scriptures has come 
down by a most certain and well-known tradition. Though 
some truth is to be found in these apocryphal writings, still, 
because of their numerous errors, no canonical authority is 
allowed them; and they are rightly judged not to be by those 
authors to whom they are ascribed. For heretics have published 
many things under the names of the Prophets — and later things 


under the names of the Apostles. All of these accounts, after 
diligent examination, have been deprived of canonical authority 
and given the name of Apocrypha." 17 

Chapter Eight: The Sense of the Names of the Sacred Books 

"The Pentateuch is so called from its five books : for penta in 
Greek means 'five,' and teucus, 'book.' Genesis is so called from 
its treating the generation of the universe; Exodus, from its 
treating the exit of the sons of Israel from Egypt; Leviticus, 
from its treating the duties of the levites and the various kinds of 
sacrificial victims ; the Book of Numbers from the fact that in it 
the tribes, once out of Egypt, are numbered, and also from the 
forty-two halting-places in the desert." 18 "The Greek word 
deutrns is disyllabic and means 'second,' while nomia means 'law.' 
Deuteronomy may therefore be construed as 'second law,' for in 
this book are recapitulated those things said at greater length in 
the preceding three. 

"In the Book of Josue, which the Hebrews call Josue ben Nun y 
the land of the promise is divided among the people. The Book 
of Judges is so called from the leaders who judged the people 
of Israel before there were kings among them." 19 To this book 
some persons join the history of Ruth so as to form a single 
work. "The Book of Samuel is so called because it describes the 
birth, priesthood, and deeds of that leader; although it also 
contains the histories of Saul and of David, both these men are 
connected with Samuel, since he annointed them both. The 
Hebrew word malach means 'of kings.' Hence the book called 
Malachim from the fact that it arranges in order the kings of 
Juda and of the Israelite nation, together with their deeds." 20 

"Isaias, more Evangelist than Prophet, produced his own 
book, whose every utterance is replete with eloquent prose. 
His canticles, however, move along in hexameter and penta- 
meter measure. Jeremias, too, produced his book, together 
with its Threnodies, which we call Lamentations, because they 
are used on very sad occasions and at rites for the dead. He has 
constructed them along the Hebrew alphabet four times repeat- 
ed, using different meters. The first two alphabets are written 
in something resembling Sapphic verse, because three short 


lines of verse, closely conjoined and beginning each with the 
same letter, are concluded with a heroic line. The third alphabet 
is written in trimeter, and in it sets of three stanzas begin with 
the same Hebrew letter. The fourth alphabet is like the first and 
second." 21 "Ezechiel has a very obscure beginning and end. 
The Twelve [Minor] Prophets occupy a single book." 22 

"The beginning and final portions of the Hebrew Book of 
Job are prose narrative interspersed with direct discourse, but 
the middle portions (from the words 'Let the day perish wherein 
I was born' [3 : 3] to 'Therefore I reprehend myself and do 
penance' [42:6]) are in heroic verse. The Book of Psalms is 
called the Psalter in Greek, the Nab/a in Hebrew, and the 
Organum, or musical instrument, in Latin. It is called the Psalter 
in Greek because while one, as prophet, sang at the psaltery 
or harp, a chorus answered in unison. " 2 3 "They commonly 
group the psalms into five divisions but assemble them in one 
book." 24 David wrote the psalms, but Esdras afterwards 
arranged them. "That all the psalms and the Lamentations of 
Jeremias and fully all the canticles of the Hebrews are metrical 
compositions is attested by Jerome, Origen, Josephus, and 
Eusebius of Caesarea. They resemble the work of the Roman 
Flaccus or the Greek Pindar, now running to iambics, now 
brilliantly Sapphic, and falling into trimeter or tetrameter." 25 

"Scripture most clearly teaches that Solomon was called by 
three names : Idida, or Beloved of the Lord, for the Lord loved 
him; Coeleth, or Ecclesiastes (the Greek word ecclesiastes names a 
man who convokes an ecclesia, or assembly, a man whom we 
should call a preacher, and who speaks not to a particular 
individual, but to an entire assemblage of people) ; finally, he is 
called 'the Pacific,' because in his reign peace obtained. He 
produced books equal in number to his names ; the first inscribed 
Masloth in Hebrew, Parabolae in Greek, Proverbia in Latin, 
because by means of comparison and similitude it sets forth 
senses of words and symbols of truth. From the place where the 
text reads, 'Who shall find a valiant woman?' (3 1:10), each verse 
begins with a succeeding letter of the Hebrew alphabet, like the 
Lamentations of Jeremias and certain of the other scriptural 
canticles. The second is that which is called Coeleth in Hebrew, 
Ecclesiastes in Greek, and Contionator (The Preacher) in Latin, 


from the fact that its discourse is addressed not specially to an 
individual, as in the case of Proverbs, but generally, to all men, 
as if to a whole assembly and the whole church. The third is the 
Sira Syrin, or Canticle of Canticles, which is, as it were, the 
epithalamium or marriage song of Christ and the church. In 
Proverbs he teaches a youth, and, by means of aphorisms, he 
instructs him in his duties; for this reason, the instruction is 
often repeated to him as to a son. In Ecclesiastes, however, he 
instructs a man of mature age that he must think nothing in the 
world to be lasting, but that all we see is frail and short-lived. 
Finally, in the Canticle of Canticles, he joins to the embraces of 
the Spouse a man already perfected, a man fully prepared because 
he has turned his back upon the world. Not far different from 
this order of teaching is the instruction which philosophers give 
their disciples. First they instruct them in ethics, next they 
explain physics to them, and, when they see that a student has 
become well advanced in these, they lead him to theology it- 

"Daniel, among the Hebrews, is placed not among the 
Prophets but among the Hagiographers. The catholic church 
does not read his book in the version of the seventy translators, 
because this version is much at variance with the truth. Daniel, 
in largest part, and also the Prophet Esdras and a portion of 
Jeremias are written in the Chaldaic tongue, though in Hebrew 
letters. The Book of Job, moreover, shows a very great affinity 
with the Arabic. In the Hebrew text, Daniel lacks the story of 
Susanna, the Hymn of the Three Young Men, and the tales 
about Bel and the Dragon." 27 

"Paralipomenon is the Greek word for what we might call 'of 
things omitted' or 'of things left over.' In it are summarily and 
briefly explained those things which were either omitted or not 
fully set forth either in the Law or in the Books of Kings." 28 
"In Hebrew it bears the name Dabrebiamin, which means 'words 
of days,' or, as we might more meaningfully say, 'chronicle of 
the entire divine history.'" 29 

"There is but one Book of Esdras, and in it the discourses of 
that same Esdras and of Nehemias are contained. The second, 
third, and fourth Books of Esdras are apocryphal." 30 

"The book entitled The Wisdom of Solomon is called Wisdom 


because in it the coming of Christ, the Wisdom of the Father,is 
clearly set forth, together with his passion." 31 The Book of 
Jesus Son of Sirach is called Ecclesiasticus "because, dealing 
with the discipline of the entire church, it was put out with great 
care and attention to the religious way of life." 32 Of these last 
two books Jerome speaks as follows : 

"There are also in circulation Panaretus, or the Book of Jesus 
Son of Sirach, and another inauthentic book entitled The 
Wisdom of Solomon. Of the first of these I have found the 
Hebrew text, called Parables, not Ecclesiasticus as among the 
Latins. To it had been joined Ecclesiastes and the Canticle of 
Canticles, to establish its kinship with Solomon not only through 
the number of books but also through the nature of the 
materials. The second of these is nowhere found among the 
Hebrews, because even its very style has the ring of Greek 
eloquence. Some of the ancient writers affirm that it is a work of 
Philo the Jew. Therefore, just as the church reads, to be sure, 
the Books of Judith and Tobias and of the Machabees, but does 
not adopt them into the canonical Scriptures, so let her read 
these two books to edify the people, but not to confirm the 
truth of ecclesiastical dogmas." 33 

"In sum, as there are twenty-two letters through which, in 
Hebrew, we write whatever we have to say, and the range of the 
human voice is defined by their initial sounds, so too there are 
counted up twenty-two books by whose words and principles 
the still weak and nursling infancy of the just man is nurtured in 
the teachings of God." 34 

"Certain persons, counting the history of Ruth and the 
Lamentations of Jeremias as separate and distinct books among 
the hagiographical writings, and adding these two to the 
twenty-two already mentioned, total twenty-four books of the 
Old Law — a number which symbolizes the twenty-four elders 
who, in the Apocalypse, adore the Lamb." 35 

Chapter Nine : Concerning the New Testament 

Just as the entire body of the Old Testament writings can, 
broadly speaking, be called the Law, while the five books of 
Moses are called the Law in a special sense, so too, generally 


speaking, the entire New Testament can be called the Gospel, 
even though those four books — namely, Matthew, Mark, Luke, 
and John — in which the deeds and words of the Savior are fully 
set forth, deserve to be called the Gospel in a special sense. 
"Gospel" means "good news," because the Gospel promises 
eternal goods, not earthly happiness as the Old Testament does 
if one takes its literal meaning. 

Chapter Ten : Concerning the Tables, or Canons, of the Gospels 

"Ammonius of Alexandria was the first to set up the Gospel 
tables ; afterwards, Eusebius of Caesarea, following him, worked 
them out more fully. They were set up in order that by their 
means we might discover and know which of the Evangelists 
said things similar to those found in the others, and unique 
things as well. These tables are ten in number : the first contains 
numbers indicating places in which Matthew, Mark, Luke, and 
John have said the same things; the second, numbers of places 
in which three Evangelists — Matthew, Mark, and Luke — have 
done so; the third, in which three — Matthew, Luke, and John; 
the fourth, in which three — Matthew, Mark, and John; the fifth, 
in which two — Mark and Luke; the sixth, in which two — 
Matthew and Mark; the seventh, in which two — Matthew and 
John; the eighth, in which two — Luke and Mark; the ninth, in 
which two — Luke and John; and the tenth, in which individual 
Evangelists have said things peculiar to themselves alone. 

"This is how these tables are used: throughout each 
Evangelist, a certain number is fixed in the margin beside small 
sections of text, and under such numbers is placed a certain 
space marked in red and indicating in which of the ten tables one 
will find the section number to which that space is subjoined. 
For example, if the space indicated is the first, this number will 
be found in the first table; if the second, in the second; if the 
third, in the third; and so through the series till one comes to 
the tenth. If, therefore, with any one of the Gospels open before 
one, one should wish to know which of the other Evangelists 
has spoken similarly, one would take the number placed beside 
the section of text and look for that same number in the table 
indicated for it, and there one would find who has said what. 


Finally, looking up in the body of the text the places indicated 
by the numbers listed in the tables, one would find passages on 
the same subject in the individual Gospels." 36 

Chapter Eleven : Concerning the Canons of the Councils 

"The Greek word canon is translated by the Latin regula (rule). 
A rule is so called because it leads one straight, and does not 
now and then draw one astray. Others say that a rule is so called 
either because it rules, or because it offers a norm for right 
living, or because it sets straight what is distorted and corrupted. 

"The canons of the general councils, however, took their 
start in the time of Constantine. In the years before this time, 
when persecution was aflame, license to teach the people was 
certainly not granted. Therefore, Christianity was torn asunder 
by heresy for the very reason that permission was not given the 
bishops to meet together in a body until the time of the emperor 
just named. For he it was who gave Christians the right to 
congregate freely. Under him, also, the holy Fathers, gathering 
together from all the lands of the earth, gave us, in the Nicene 
council, a creed which accords with the evangelical and apostolic 
faith, the second such creed since the Apostles." 37 

Chapter Twelve : That the Principal Synods Are Four 

"But among all the other councils, there are four holy synods 
which comprise the bases of our entire faith, being four in 
number like the Gospels or the rivers of Paradise. 38 Of these, 
the first is the Nicene synod of 3 1 8 bishops, held in the reign of 
Constantine Augustus. In it was condemned the blasphemy of 
the Arian heresy, asserted by Arius himself concerning in- 
equality in the blessed Trinity. That same holy synod,. through 
the creed, defined the consubstantiality of God the Son with 
God the Father. The second synod of 1 5 o Fathers was convoked 
at Constantinople under Theodosius the elder, and, condemning 
Macedonius, who denied that the Holy Spirit was God, it 
demonstrated that the Holy Spirit was consubstantial with the 
Father and the Son and gave us the form of the creed which the 
entire confession of the Greeks and the Latins declares in the 
churches. The third synod, the first of Ephesus, was of 200 


bishops and took place under the younger Theodosius Augustus ; 
it condemned, with just anathema, Nestorius, who was asserting 
that there were two persons in Christ, and it showed that the 
one person of our Lord Jesus Christ possesses two natures. The 
fourth synod, that of Chalcedon, was held with 630 priests under 
the Emperor Marcian, and in it the unanimous judgment of the 
Fathers condemned Abbot Eutyches of Constantinople who 
was announcing that the Divine Word and the flesh formed one 
nature — and also his defender, a certain Dioscorus, bishop of 
Alexandria, and Nestorius once more, with all the rest of the 
heretics. The same synod declared that Christ as God was born 
of the Virgin in such a way that in him we confess a substance of 
both divine and human nature. 

"These are the four principal synods, most fully declaring the 
doctrine of the faith. But if there are, besides, any councils which 
the holy Fathers, filled with the Spirit of God, sanctioned, it is 
from the authority of these four, whose acts are set down in this 
work, that they derive their permanence and all their force. 

"The word 'synod,' which is from the Greek, means a 
fellowship or assembly. The name 'council,' however, is taken 
from Roman practice. For in the season when suits were being 
tried, all used to come together and deal with one another by 
common consent. From the idea of common consent, we speak 
of council' (concilium) as if for 'counsel' {consilium) — because a 
cilium (lash or lid) is something belonging to the eyes. Hence 
too, considium (session) is also a consilium (counsel) by the change 
of the 'd' to an '1.' An assembly {coetus)^ however, is a convention 
or congregation, from the verb 'to assemble' (coire), that is, to 
convene {convenire) in one body, and hence it is also called 
'convention' [conventus)-. 'convention,' 'assembly,' or 'council,' 
then, from the association of many persons for one purpose." 39 

"The Greek word 'epistle' means missa (message) in Latin. 
We have the Canonical, that is, the regular, Epistles, which are 
also called 'catholic,' that is, universal, because they have been 
written not to one people or city only, but to all nations 
generally." 40 "The Acts of the Apostles discuss the beginnings 
of the Christian faith among the nations and the history of the 
nascent church, and they narrate the deeds of the Apostles, 
which is the reason why they are called The Acts of the Apostles. 


The Greek word apocalypsis is translated by the Latin word 
revelatio, or revelation. Thus, John says: 'The Apocalypse of 
Jesus Christ, which God has given him to make known to his 
servant John.'" 41 

Chapter Thirteen: Who Have Made Libraries 

"Among us, the martyr Pamphilus, whose life Eusebius of 
Caesarea wrote, sought to equal Pisistratus in zeal for a sacred 
library. Pamphilus had in his library nearly thirty thousand 
volumes. Jerome, too, and Gennadius, hunted for ecclesiastical 
writers throughout the whole world, set them forth in order, 
and listed their works in a one-volume catalogue." 42 

Chapter Fourteen: Which Writings Are Authentic** 

"Of our fellow Christians among the Greeks, Origen, 
laboring upon his writings, surpassed both Greeks and Latins 
in the number of his works. Jerome says that he has read six 
thousand of his books. But Augustine, in mental ability or in 
self-knowledge, surpasses the studious efforts of all these men. 
He wrote so many things that no one finds enough days and 
nights in which to write or indeed even to read his books." 44 
"Other catholic men, too, have written many and outstanding 
books: Athanasius, bishop of Alexandria; Hilary, bishop of 
Poitiers; Basil, bishop of Cappadocia; Gregory the theologian 
(Gregory of Nyssa) and Gregory, bishop of Nazianzen 
Ambrose, bishop of Milan; Theophilus, bishop of Alexandria 
John, bishop of Constantinople ; Cyril of Alexandria; Pope Leo 
Proculus; Isidore of Spain; Bede; Cyprian, martyr and bishop of 
Carthage; Jerome the priest; Prosper; Origen, whose writings 
the Church neither altogether repudiates nor accepts as a whole; 
Orosius; Sedulius; Prudentius; Juvencus; Arator." 45 Rufinus, 
too, composed many books and he translated certain writings, 
"but because the blessed Jerome condemned him in some matters 
concerning freedom of the will, we should follow what Jerome 
teaches on those things." 46 "Gelasius also composed five books 
against Nestorius and Eutyches, and tracts after the manner of 
Ambrose; likewise he wrote two books against Arius, and 


composed liturgical prefaces and orations and epistles on the 
faith." 47 Dionysius the Areopagite, ordained bishop of the 
Corinthians, has left many volumes as testimony of his mental 
ability. "Also, as to the Chronicles of Eusebius of Caesarea and 
the books of his Ecclesiastical History \ although he was lukewarm 
in the first book of his narrative and afterwards wrote a book 
praising and apologizing for Origen the schismatic, nevertheless, 
on account of the unusual learning shown in the contents — 
learning which serves our instruction — the catholic church does 
not altogether repress it." 48 There is Cassiodorus, too, who 
wrote quite a useful work in explanation of the Psalms. There 
are still others whose names I shall not mention here. 

Chapter Fifteen : Which Are the Apocryphal Writings^ 

"The Itinerary called that of Peter the Apostle and said to be 
by Saint Clement; eight books: apocryphal. 

"The Acts called those of Andrew the Apostle: apocryphal. 

"The Acts called those of Thomas: apocryphal. 

"The Gospels which go under the name of Thaddeus: 

"The Gospels which go under the name of the Apostle 
Barnabas: apocryphal. 

"The Gospels which go under the name of the Apostle 
Thomas: apocryphal. 

"The Gospels which go under the name of the Apostle 
Andrew: apocryphal. 

"The Gospels which Lucian falsified: apocryphal. 

"The Gospels which Ytius falsified: apocryphal. 

"The Book concerning the Infancy of the Savior : apocryphal. 

"The Book concerning the Birth of the Savior and concerning 
Holy Mary, or, concerning the Savior's Midwife: apocryphal. 

"The book which is called, 'Of the Shepherd' : apocryphal. 

"All the books made by Leucius the Devil's disciple: 

"The books which are called 'The Foundation': apocryphal. 

"The book which is called 'The Treasure' : apocryphal. 

"The book which is called 'On the Daughters of Adam, or 
Genesis': apocryphal. 


"The Hundred-verse Poem concerning Christ, Composed of 
Verses out of Vergil: apocryphal. 

"The book which is called 'The Acts of Thecla and Paul' : 

"The so-called 'Book of the Nephew' : apocryphal. 

"The 'Book of Proverbs' written by heretics and signed with 
the name of Saint Sixtus : apocryphal. 

"The Revelation which is called that of Paul: apocryphal. 

"The Revelation which is called that of Thomas the Apostle: 

"The Revelation which is called that of Stephen: apocryphal. 

"The Book which is called 'The Passing of Holy Mary': 

"The Book which is called 'The Repentance of Adam': 

"The Book of Diogias, surnamed the Giant, who heretics say 
fought with the dragon after the flood: apocryphal. 

"The book which is called 'The Testament of Job': 

"The book which is called 'The Repentance of Origen': 

"The book which is called 'The Repentance of Cyprian': 

"The book which is called that of lamne and Mambre: 

"The book which is called 'The Fate of the Apostles': 

"The book of Lusan: apocryphal. 

"The Book of the Canons of the Apostles : apocryphal. 

"The book 'Physiologus,' written by heretics and signed with 
the name of the blessed Ambrose: apocryphal. 

"The History of Eusebius Pamphilus : apocryphal. 

"The Opuscula of Tertullian or Africanus : apocryphal. 

"The Opuscula of Posthumianus and Gallus: apocryphal. 

"The Opuscula of Montanus and Priscilla and Maximilla: 

"All the Opuscula of Faustus the Manichean: apocryphal. 

"The Opuscula of Clement II of Alexandria : apocryphal. 

"The Opuscula of Cassian, Priest of the Gauls: apocryphal. 


"The Opuscula of Victorinus of Poitiers : apocryphal. 

"The Opuscula of Faustus of Riez in the Gauls : apocryphal. 

"The Opuscula of Frumentus: apocryphal. 

"The Epistle of Jesus to Abgar: apocryphal. 

"The Passion of Cyricus and Julitta: apocryphal. 

"The Passion of George: apocryphal. 

"The writings which are called 'The Contradiction of 
Solomon': apocryphal. 

"All the phylacteries, which were written not, as they pretend, 
by an angel but more likely by a demon: apocryphal. 

"These and things like them, which Simon Magus, Nicholas, 
Cerinthus, Marcion, Basilides, Ebion, also Paul of Samosata, 
Photius and Bonosus (who fell away through a like error), 
Montanus likewise with his most immoral followers, Apollinaris, 
Valentine or Manichaeus, Faustus, Sabellius, Arius, Macedonius, 
Eunomius, Novatus, Sabatius, Calixtus, Donatus and Eustachius, 
Nibianus, Pelagius, Julian and Laciensis, Celestine, Maximian, 
Priscillian of Spain, Lampedius, Dioscorus, Euticius, Peter and a 
second Peter (of whom one was a blot upon Alexandria, the 
other upon Antioch), Achatius of Constantinople and his 
fellows — and indeed all heresies which these very men, or their 
disciples, or schismatics, have taught or written — men whose 
names we have by no means recorded — we declare to be not 
only rejected but also destroyed by the whole catholic and 
Roman Church, and, together with their authors and the 
followers of their authors, damned under anathemas by an 
indissoluble bond unto eternity." 

Chapter Sixteen : Some Etymologies of Things Pertaining to Reading 

"A codex is composed of many books, a book is composed of 
one volume. And a codex is so called, by transference, from the 
trunks [codicibus) of trees or vines, as if it were a trunk because it 
contains a multitude of books coming out of itself like so many 
branches; a volume {yolumeri) is so called from 'to roll up' 
(yolvere). Liber is the inner rind of a tree, upon which the ancients 
used to write before the use of paper or parchment. For this 
reason they used to call writers librarii, and a volume a liber." 50 
"Scheda (a leaf of paper), whose dimimutive form is schedula^ is a 



Greek word. What is still being corrected and has not yet been 
bound in books is properly called a scheda." 51 "The use of paper 
was discovered first at Memphis, a city of Egypt . Paper (chartd) 
is so called because the stripped (decerptum) plant membrane of 
the papyrus is glued together at various points (carptim), and 
thus the charta is made. It is of several kinds. Parchment 
(pergamenum) is so called from Pergamum, where it was invented. 
The word 'skins' (membrand) is also used because these are drawn 
off from the members {membra) of cattle. Skins were first made 
yellow in color; later, at Rome, they learned how to make 
white skins." 52 

"The word 'homily' is used to mean a popular sermon, as 
when one makes an address before the people. A 'tractate' is the 
exposition of a single matter in its many aspects. A 'dialogue' is 
a conversation (collatio) between two or among several persons ; 
the Latins call it sermo. Sermo, or talk, moreover, is so called 
because it is interwoven (sen fur) among each of the speakers. 
Commentaries (com-mentaria) are so named as from cum mente 
(with the mind) or from comminiscor (call to mind) ; for they are 
interpretations, as, for example, commentaries on the Law or on 
the Gospel." 53 Certain persons say that the word "comments" 
should be restricted to books of the pagans, while "expositions" 54 
should be kept for the Sacred Books. "The word 'gloss' is 
Greek, and it means tongue (lingua), because, in a way, it 
bespeaks (loquitur) the meaning of the word under it. 55 Philoso- 
phers call this an ad-verbum (upon the word) because, with one 
single word, it explains that word concerning the meaning of 
which there is question, as, for example, when conticescere (to 
become silent) is explained by the word tacere (to be still)." 56 


Chapter One: Concerning Properties of Sacred Scripture and the 
Manner of Reading It 

It should not be burdensome to the eager student that we set 
forth the number and order and names of the Sacred Books in 
such a variety and number of ways, for it often happens that 
these least matters, when unknown, obscure one's knowledge of 
great and useful things. Therefore, let the student prepare him- 
self once and for all by fixing these matters in the forefront of his 
mind, in certain little formulae, so to say, so that thereafter he 
will be able to run the course before him with free step and will 
not have to search out new elementary facts as he comes to 
individual books. With these matters set in order, we shall treat 
successively all the other things which will seem of value for the 
task before us. 

Chapter Two : Concerning the Threefold Understanding} 

First of all, it ought to be known that Sacred Scripture has 
three ways of conveying meaning — namely, history, allegory, 
and tropology. To be sure, all things in the divine utterance 
must not be wrenched to an interpretation such that each of 
them is held to contain history, allegory, and tropology all at 
once. Even if a triple meaning can appropriately be assigned in 
many passages, nevertheless it is either difficult or impossible to 
see it everywhere. "On the zither and musical instruments of 
this type not all the parts which are handled ring out with 
musical sounds; only the strings do this. All the other things on 
the whole body of the zither are made as a frame to which may 
be attached, and across which may be stretched, those parts 
which the artist plays to produce sweetness of song." 2 Similarly, 
in the divine utterances are placed certain things which are 


intended to be understood spiritually only, certain things that 
emphasize the importance of moral conduct, and certain things 
said according to the simple sense of history. And yet, there are 
some things which can suitably be expounded not only histori- 
cally but allegorically and tropologically as well. Thus is it that, 
in a wonderful manner, all of Sacred Scripture is so suitably 
adjusted and arranged in all its parts through the Wisdom of 
God that whatever is contained in it either resounds with the 
sweetness of spiritual understanding in the manner of strings ; 
or, containing utterances of mysteries set here and there in the 
course of a historical narrative or in the substance of a literal 
context, and, as it were, connecting these up into one object, it 
binds them together all at once as the wood does which curves 
under the taut strings; and, receiving their sound into itself, it 
reflects it more sweetly to our ears — a sound which the string 
alone has not yielded, but which the wood too has formed by 
the shape of its body. Thus also is honey more pleasing because 
enclosed in the comb, and whatever is sought with greater effort 
is also found with greater desire. 3 It is necessary, therefore, so 
to handle the Sacred Scripture that we do not try to find 
history everywhere, nor allegory everywhere, nor tropology 
everywhere but rather that we assign individual things fittingly 
in their own places, as reason demands. Often, however, in one 
and the same literal context, all may be found together, as when 
a truth of history both hints at some mystical meaning by way of 
allegory, and equally shows by way of tropology how we ought 
to behave. 

Chapter Three : That Things, Too, Have a Meaning in Sacred Scripture 

It ought also to be known that in the divine utterance not only 
words but even things have a meaning 4 — a way of communica- 
ting not usually found to such an extent in other writings. The 
philosopher knows only the significance of words, but the 
significance of things is far more excellent than that of words, 
because the latter was established by usage, but Nature dictated 
the former. 5 The latter is the voice of men, the former the voice 
of God speaking to men. The latter, once uttered, perishes ; the 
former, once created, subsists. The unsubstantial word is the 


sign of man's perceptions; the thing is a resemblance of the 
divine Idea. What, therefore, the sound of the mouth, which all 
in the same moment begins to subsist and fades away, is to the 
idea in the mind, that the whole extent of time is to eternity. The 
idea in the mind is the internal word, which is shown forth by 
the sound of the voice, that is, by the external word. And the 
divine Wisdom, which the Father has uttered out of his heart, 
invisible in Itself, is recognized through creatures and in them. 6 
From this is most surely gathered how profound is the under- 
standing to be sought in the Sacred Writings, in which we come 
through the word to a concept, through the concept to a thing, 
through the thing to its idea, and through its idea arrive at 
Truth. 7 Because certain less well instructed persons do not take 
account of this, they suppose that there is nothing subtle in 
these matters on which to exercise their mental abilities, and 
they turn their attention to the writings of philosophers precisely 
because, not knowing the power of Truth, they do not under- 
stand that in Scripture there is anything beyond the bare surface 
of the letter. 

That the sacred utterances employ the meaning of things, 
moreover, we shall demonstrate by a particular short and clear 
example. The Scripture says: "Watch, because your adversary 
the Devil goeth about as a roaring lion." 8 Here, if we should 
say that the lion stands for the Devil, we should mean by "lion" 
not the word but the thing. For if the two words "devil" and 
"lion" mean one and the same thing, the likeness of that same 
thing to itself is not adequate. It remains, therefore, that the 
word "lion" signifies the animal, but that the animal in turn 
designates the Devil. And all other things are to be taken after 
this fashion, as when we say that worm, calf, stone, serpent, and 
other things of this sort signify Christ. 

Chapter Four : Concerning the Seven Rules 

This, too, ought to be taken diligent note of, namely, "certain 
learned men have said that among all other rules, seven pertain 
to the utterance of the Sacred Scriptures. 

"The first rule is about the Lord and his Body and expressions 
which move from the one to the other and, in one person, show 


now the Head, now the Body — as when Isaias says, 'The Lord 
hath clothed me with the garment of salvation, as a bridegroom 
decked with a crown and as a bride adorned with her jewels.' 9 
For in one person named with two words, he has shown both 
the Head, that is, the bridegroom, and the church, that is, the 
bride. Therefore, in the Scriptures it must be observed when 
the Head specifically is being written of, when both Head and 
Body, when a double exchange takes place between the two 
terms, or when there is a single switch from one to the other. 
In this way may the intelligent reader know what pertains to the 
Head and what to the Body. 

"The second rule concerns the true and the mixed Body of the 
Lord. For certain things seem to apply to a single person 
though in reality they do not all apply to that one person, as in 
the following case: 'Thou art my servant, O Israel, behold I have 
blotted out thy iniquities as a cloud and thy sins as a mist. Be 
converted to me and I shall redeem thee.' 10 This passage does 
not apply to a single entity, for the first part applies to him 
whose sins God has blotted out and to whom he says, 'Thou art 
mine,' and the second part applies to him to whom he says, 
'Be converted to me and I shall redeem thee.' These, if they are 
converted, have their sins blotted out. According to this rule, 
Scripture speaks to all in such a way that the good are censured 
with the evil and the evil are praised for the good : but he who 
reads intelligently will learn what pertains to whom. 

"The third rule concerns the letter and the spirit, that is, the 
Law and grace: the Law, through which we are admonished 
about precepts to be observed; grace, through which we are 
aided to act. The Law ought to be understood not only in a 
historical but also in a spiritual sense : for it is necessary both to 
remain faithful to the historical sense and to understand the Law 
in a spiritual way. 

"The fourth rule concerns 'species' and 'genus' in cases when 
the part is taken for the whole and the whole for the part, as, 
for example, if God should speak to one people or city and yet 
his utterance is understood to be addressed to the whole world. 
For although the Lord threatened the one city of Babylon 
through the prophet Isaias, nevertheless, while speaking against 
that city he passed from this 'species,' or specific group of 


mankind, to the 'genus,' or mankind in general, and turned his 
speech against the whole world. Surely, if he were not speaking 
against the entire world he would not have added later the 
following general remark: 'And I will destroy all the earth and 
will visit the evils of the world,' 11 and all the other remarks 
which follow, pertaining to the destruction of the world. For 
this reason he also added: 'This is the counsel that I have 
purposed upon all the earth, and this is the hand that is stretched 
out upon all nations.' 12 In the same way, after he has charged 
the whole world in the person of Babylon, he once more turns 
back to that city as from the 'genus' to the 'species,' telling the 
things that have happened specifically to it: "Behold I will stir 
up the Medes against them.' 13 For while Balthasar was reigning, 
Babylon was taken by the Medes. Thus, too, in the person of 
Egypt alone he wishes us to understand the whole world when 
he says: 'And I will set the Egyptians to fight against the 
Egyptians, kingdom against kingdom'; 14 because Egypt is 
described as having had not many kingdoms but one kingdom. 

"The fifth rule is about times, and by its means either the 
largest period of time is represented through the smallest, or the 
smallest period of time is understood through the largest. Thus 
is it with the three days of the Lord's burial, since he did not lie 
in the tomb three full days and nights, but nevertheless the total 
of three days is understood from a part of them. Or again, there 
is the fact that God predicted the sons of Israel would be servants 
in Egypt for four hundred years and then depart from the 
country, whereas, while Joseph ruled, they were lords of Egypt, 
nor did they depart from it at once after four hundred years as 
had been promised, but they left Egypt after four hundred 
thirty years had been accomplished. 

"There is still another figure relating to times, through which 
certain things belonging to future time are recounted as if 
already done, as in the passage: 'They have pierced my hands 
and my feet, they have numbered all my bones, they have parted 
my garments amongst them,' 15 and words similar to these, in 
which future events are spoken of as if they had already occurred. 
But why are things which must yet be done spoken of as already 
having occurred? Because those things which, from our point 
of view lie in the future, have, from the standpoint of God's 


eternity, already been done. For this reason, when anything is 
announced as having yet to be done, this is said from our point 
of view. But when things in the future are spoken of as already 
done, these must be taken from the standpoint of the eternity 
of God, with whom all things belonging to the future have 
already been accomplished. 

"The sixth rule is about recapitulation. Recapitulation exists 
when Scripture turns back to a subject the telling of which has 
already gone by, as when Scripture, in speaking of the sons of 
Noah's sons, said that they dwelt 'according to their kindreds 
and their tongues'; 16 yet afterwards, as if this is found in the 
same sequence of time, it says : 'All the earth was of one tongue 
and of the same speech.' 17 But how did the sons of Noah exist 
according to their kindreds and according to their tongues if 
there was one tongue for all, unless here, the narration, by 
recapitulating, has turned back to that which had already 

"The seventh rule is about the Devil and his body, and, 
according to it, things are often said of the very head of this body 
which belong more to the body. But often the things said seem 
to belong to its members and yet are not suitable except to the 
head. Indeed, under the name of the body, the head is to be 
understood, as in that passage from the Gospel concerning the 
cockle mixed with the grain, where the Lord says : 'A man who 
is an enemy hath done this,' 18 calling the Devil himself by the 
name 'man,' and designating the head by the name of the body. 
Likewise the body is signified under the name of the head, as 
when it is said in the Gospel: 'Have I not chosen you twelve? 
And one of you is a devil,' 19 referring to Judas, to be sure, 
because he was a body of the Devil. For the apostate angel is 
the head of all who are evil, and all who are evil are the body of 
this head. So much is he one with his members that often what 
is said of his body is rather extended to him, and again, what is 
said of him is referred back to his members. So in Isaias, where, 
after the prophetic discourse has said many things against 
Babylon, that is, against the Devil's body, it once more deflects 
the thought of the oracle to the head and says : 'How art thou 
fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, who didst rise in the morning,' 20 
and so on." 21 


Chapter Five : What Interferes with Study 

Now that we have prescribed definite material for the student 
and, by giving the names, have determined what writings 
especially belong to sacred reading, the next step seems to be 
that we say something about the manner and order of reading, 
so that from things already said one may know upon what 
material he ought to spend his effort, while from those which 
must still be said he may gather the method and plan of that 
same study of his. But because we more easily understand what 
ought to be done if, earlier, we have grasped what ought not to 
be done, the student should first of all be taught what he should 
avoid, and then informed how he may accomplish the things he 
should get done. 

We must say why it is that from such a throng of students, 
of whom many are both strong in natural talent and energetic in 
applying themselves, so few, easily counted, are found who 
manage to reach knowledge. And, leaving out of our con- 
sideration those who are naturally dull and slow in under- 
standing things, it seems especially important and worthwhile 
to ask why it is that two persons who have equal talent and 
exert equal effort and who are intent upon the same study, 
nevertheless do not attain a similar result in their understanding 
of it. The one penetrates it quickly, quickly seizes upon what he 
is looking for. The other labors long and makes little progress. 
But what one should know is that in every business, no matter 
what it is, two things are necessary, namely work and a method 
for that work, and these two are so connected that one without 
the other is either useless or less effective. And yet, as it is said, 
"Wisdom is better than strength," 22 for sometimes even weights 
which we cannot budge by force, we raise through cleverness. 
Thus it is, to be sure, in all our study. He who works along 
without discretion works, it is true, but he does not make 
progress, and just as if he were beating the air, he pours out his 
strength upon wind. Consider two men both traveling through 
a wood, one of them struggling around in bypaths but the other 
picking the short cuts of a direct route : they move along their 
ways with the same amount of motion, but they do not reach 
the goal at the same time. But what shall I call Scripture if not a 


wood? Its thoughts, like so many sweetest fruits, we pick as we 
read and chew as we consider them. Therefore, whoever does 
not keep to an order and a method in the reading of so great a 
collection of books wanders as it were into the very thick of the 
forest and loses the path of the direct route; he is, as it is said, 
"always learning yet never reaching knowledge." For discretion 
is of such importance that without it every rest from work is 
disgraceful and work itself is useless. May we all draw our own 
conclusion ! 

There are three things above all which ordinarily provide 
obstacles for the studies of students : carelessness, imprudence, 
and bad luck (for tuna). Carelessness arises when we simply omit, 
or when we learn less carefully, those things which are there 
to be learned. Imprudence arises when we do not keep to a 
suitable order and method in the things we are learning. Bad 
luck shows up in a development, a chance happening, or a 
natural occurrence, when we are kept back from our objective 
either by poverty, or by illness, or by some non-natural slowness, 
or even by a scarcity of professors, because either none can be 
found to teach us, or none can be found to teach us well. But 
as to these three matters, in the first of them — carelessness, that 
is — the student needs to be admonished; in the second — im- 
prudence, that is — he needs to be instructed; while in the 
third — bad luck, that is — he needs to be assisted. 

Chapter Six: What the Fruit of Sacred Reading Is 

Let whoever comes to sacred reading for instruction first 
know what kind of fruit it yields. For nothing ought to be 
sought without a cause, nor does a thing which promises no 
usefulness attract our desires. 

Twofold is the fruit of sacred reading, because it either 
instructs the mind with knowledge or it equips it with morals. 
It teaches what it delights us to know and what it behooves us 
to imitate. Of these, the first, namely knowledge, has more to 
do with history and allegory, the other, namely instruction in 
morals, has more to do with tropology. The whole of sacred 
Scripture is directed to this end. 

Although it is clearly more important for us to be just than 


to be wise, I nevertheless know that many seek knowledge 
rather than virtue in the study of the Sacred Word. However, 
since I judge that neither of these should be disapproved of but 
that both are necessary and praiseworthy, I will briefly expound 
what belongs to the aim of each. And first of all I shall speak 
about the man who embraces the beauty of morality. 23 

Chapter Seven : Hon> Scripture Is to Be Studied for the Correction of 

The man who seeks knowledge of the virtues and a way of 
life from the Sacred Word ought to study especially those books 
which urge contemDt for this world and inflame the mind with 
love for its creator; which teach the straight road of life and 
show how virtues may be acquired and vices turned aside. For, 
"First of all," so Scripture says, "seek the kingdom of God and 
his justice." 24 It is as if it plainly said: "Both desire the joys of 
the heavenly kingdom, and skillfully seek out those merits of 
justice by which one may come to these joys. Love and look 
for every good thing, every necessary thing. If there is love, a 
man cannot take his ease. Do you desire to reach your goal? 
Then learn how a man reaches the goal you are after." 

This knowledge, however, is got in two ways, namely, by 
example and by instruction : by example, when we read the deeds 
of the saints, by instruction when we learn what they have said 
that pertains to our disciplining. Among the deeds and sayings 
of the saints, those marvelously written down by the most 
blessed Gregory should, I think, be taken to heart. Because 
those have seemed to me sweet beyond all others and full of the 
love of eternal life, I did not want to pass them over in silence. 25 

It is necessary, however, that one who has started out on this 
road should learn, in the books that he reads, to be stirred not 
only by the art of their literary composition 26 but by a desire to 
imitate the virtues set forth, so that it is not so much the state- 
liness or arrangement of words as the beauty of truth which 
delights him. Let him know too, that it is not conducive to his 
aim that, carried away by an empty desire for knowledge, he 
should delve into writings which are obscure or of deep meaning, 
in which the mind is busied rather than edified, lest mere study 


take such a hold upon him that he is forced to give up good 
works. For the Christian philosopher, 27 reading ought to be a 
source of encouragement, not a preoccupation, 28 and to feed 
good desires, not to kill them. I remember that I was once told 
of a man of praiseworthy life who so burned with love of Holy 
Scripture that he studied it ceaselessly. And when, with the 
growth of his knowledge day by day, his desire for knowledge 
also grew, finally, consumed with imprudent zeal for it and 
scorning the simpler Scriptures, he began to pry into every 
single profound and obscure thing and vehemently to insist 
upon untangling the enigmas of the Prophets and the mystical 
meanings of sacred symbols {sacramentonwi). But the human 
mind, unable to sustain such a burden, soon began to tire from 
the greatness of the task and the constancy of the tension, and to 
be confused by such a great concern for this troubling occupa- 
tion that the man stopped performing not only useful but even 
necessary acts. When once the matter had taken this contrary 
turn, the person who had begun to study the Scriptures for the 
edification of his life now found them an occasion of error to 
him because he did not know how to bring into play the 
moderating influence of discretion. But at length, through the 
divine compassion, he was admonished by a revelation that he 
should not devote himself to the study of these writings any 
more but should make a habit of going instead to the lives of 
the holy fathers and the triumphs of the martyrs and other such 
writings dictated in a simple style; and so, restored in a short 
while to his original condition, he merited to receive so great a 
grace of internal peace that you might truly say in him was 
fulfilled that word of our Lord's — that word by which, after 
himself considering our labor and our sorrow, he wished 
devotedly to console us, saying: "Come to me, all of you who 
labor and are heavily burdened, and I will refresh you," and 
afterwards he says, "You will find rest for your souls." 29 

I brought forth this example to show those who are bent 
upon the discipline, not of literature, but of the virtues, that 
their study should not be an affliction but a delight. For even 
the Prophet says: "I have not known literature," or business; 
"I will enter into the power of the Lord; Lord, I will be mindful 
of thy justice alone. Thou hast taught me, O God, from my 


youth." 30 For whoever studies the Scriptures as a pre- 
occupation and, if I may say so, as an affliction to his spirit, is 
not philosophizing but is making a business out of them, and so 
impetuous and unwise a purpose can hardly avoid the vice of 
pride. But what shall I say of the study of the simple Paul, who 
wished to fulfill the Law before he learned it? 31 Surely this can 
be a good enough example for us, so that we may be not hearers 
nor students of the Law, but rather doers of it 32 before God. 

It must be considered, moreover, that study customarily fills 
the mind with loathing and afflicts the spirit in two ways, 
namely, through its quality, if the material has been too obscure, 
and through its quantity, if there has been too much of it. In 
both these matters it is necessary to use great discretion lest 
what has been sought for our recovery may be found to stifle us. 
There are those who wish to read everything. Don't vie with 
them. Leave well enough alone. It is nothing to you whether 
you read all the books there are or not. The number of books is 
infinite; don't pursue infinity! Where no end is in sight, there 
can be no rest. Where there is no rest, there is no peace. Where 
there is no peace, God cannot dwell. "His place," says the 
Prophet, "is in peace, and his abode in Sion." 33 "In Sion," but 
"in peace" ; it behooves us to be Sion, but not to lose our peace. 
Consider, but refuse to be preoccupied. Do not be a hoarder 
lest perhaps you always be in want. Give ear to Solomon, give 
ear to the Wise Man and learn prudence. "My son," he says, 
"more than these require not. Of making many books there is 
no end: and much study is an affliction of the flesh." Where, 
then, does all this lead to? "Let us all hear together the con- 
clusion of the discourse. Fear God, and keep His command- 
ments : for this is all man." 34 

Chapter Eight: That Study Is for Beginners, Action for the Perfect 

Let no one suppose, in view of what I said above, that I do 
not favor diligence in students, because, on the contrary, I 
intend to encourage diligent students toward their objective and 
to show that those who learn willingly are worthy of praise. 
But above I was speaking for the educated, now however for 


those who have yet to be educated and are beginning the 
instruction which is the source of discipline. For the educated 
it is the pursuit of virtues, but for beginners, at the moment, it 
is the practice of study which is their objective — both pursuits 
to be conducted in such a way, however, that beginners may not 
pass up virtue, nor educated persons omit study, either. For 
frequently a task which has not been preceded by study is less 
prepared for, and instruction which is not followed up by good 
application of it is less useful. But it is of highest importance 
both that those already educated should watch out lest perhaps 
they cast their eyes back upon things behind them, and that 
beginners should console themselves if sometimes they long to 
reach the place where the others are. It is fitting, therefore, 
that both of these should keep at work and that both of them 
should move ahead. Let no one turn backward. You may 
climb ahead, not go back down. If, however, you are not yet 
able to climb ahead, keep to your own place. 

The man who takes over someone else's job is not without 
fault. If you are a monk, what are you doing in a crowd? If you 
love silence, why does it delight you to be constantly in attend- 
ance upon declaimers? You ought always to be taken up with 
fastings and with prayers, yet you seek to play the philosopher, 
do you? The simplicity of the monk is his philosophy. "But I 
aspire to teach others," you say. Yours is not to teach but to 
weep. 35 If, however, you desire to be the learned teacher, hear 
what you shall do. The inexpensiveness of your dress and the 
simplicity expressed in your countenance, the innocence of your 
life and the holiness of your behavior ought to teach men. You 
teach better by fleeing the world than by following after it. 
But perhaps you persist, saying, "Well, what then? If I want to, 
may I not learn, at least?" I have told you above: "Study, but 
do not be preoccupied with it." Study can be a practice for 
you; it is not your objective. Instruction is good, but it is for 
beginners. You, however, have dedicated yourself to perfection, 
and therefore it is not enough for you if you put yourself on a 
level with beginners. It is fitting for you to manage more than 
this. Think, then, where you are, and you will easily recognize 
what you ought to do. 


Chapter Nine : Concerning the Four Steps 

There are four things in which the life of just men is now 
practiced and raised, as it were by certain steps, to its future 
perfection— namely, study or instruction, meditation, prayer, 
and performance. Then follows a fifth, contemplation, in which, 
as by a sort of fruit of the preceding steps, one has a foretaste, 
even in this life, of what the future reward of good work is. It is 
because of this foretaste that the Psalmist, when speaking of the 
judgments of God and commending them, immediately adds: 
"In keeping these there is a great reward." 36 

Of these five steps, the first, that is, study, belongs to be- 
ginners; the highest, that is, contemplation, to those who are 
perfect. As to the middle steps, the more of these one ascends, 
the more perfect he will be. For example : the first, study, gives 
understanding; the second, meditation, provides counsel; the 
third, prayer, makes petition; the fourth, performance, goes 
seeking; the fifth, contemplation, finds. If, therefore, you are 
studying and you have understanding and you already know 
what must be done, this is the beginning of the good for you, 
but it is not yet enough; you are not yet perfect. And so, mount 
into the ark of counsel 37 and meditate on how you may be able 
to fulfill what you have learned must be done. For there are 
many who have knowledge, but few who know in the way it 
behooves them to know. Further, since the counsel of man is 
weak and ineffective without divine aid, arouse yourself to 
prayer and ask the help of him without whom you can ac- 
complish no good thing, so that by his grace, which, going 
before you has enlightened you, he may guide your feet, as you 
follow, onto the road of peace ; and so that he may bring that 
which as yet is in your will alone, to concrete effect in good 
performance. It then remains for you to gird yourself for good 
work, so that what you have sought in prayer you may merit to 
receive in your practice. God wishes to work with you; you 
are not forced, but you are helped. If you are alone, you 
accomplish nothing; if God alone works, you have no merit. 
Therefore, may God work in order that you may be able to 
work; and do you also work in order that you may have some 
merit. Good performance is the road by which one travels 


toward life. He who travels this road is in quest of life. "Take 
thou courage and do manfully." 38 This road has its reward. 
As often as we become fatigued by the journey's labor, we are 
enlightened by the grace of a solicitude from on high, and we 
"taste and see that the Lord is sweet." 39 And thus comes to 
pass what was said above — what prayer asks, contemplation 

You see, then, how perfection comes to those ascending by 
means of these steps, so that he who has remained below cannot 
be perfect. Our objective, therefore, ought to be always to 
keep ascending; but, because the instability of our life is such 
that we are not able to hold fast in one place, we are forced 
often to review the things we have done, and, in order not to 
lose the condition in which we now stand, we now and again 
repeat what we have been over before. For example: the man 
who is vigorous in his practice prays lest he grow weak; the 
man who is constant in his prayers meditates on what should be 
prayed for, lest he offend in prayer; and the man who sometimes 
feels less confidence in his own counsel, seeks advice in his 
reading. And thus it turns out that though we always have the 
will to ascend, nevertheless we are sometimes forced by 
necessity to descend — in such a way, however, that our goal 
lies in that will and not in this necessity. That we ascend is our 
goal; that we descend is for the sake of this goal. Not the latter, 
therefore, but the former ought to be the principal thing. 

Chapter Ten : Concerning the Three Types of Students 

It has, I think, been clearly enough shown that the same task 
does not lie before advanced persons and those who propose 
something more for themselves, as lies before beginners. But 
just as something has properly been allowed to the former 
(those who are advanced) which these beginners may by no 
means indulge in without committing a fault, so also from the 
beginners something is required to which the advanced are no 
longer obliged. Now, therefore, I come back to the promise 
still to be fulfilled, namely, that I show how the Sacred Scripture 
ought to be read by those who are still seeking in it for 
knowledge alone. 


There are some who seek knowledge of the Sacred Scripture 
either in order that they may gather riches or in order that they 
may obtain honors or acquire fame. Their purpose ought to be 
commiserated in equal proportion to its perversity. There are 
still others who delight to hear the words of God and to learn 
of His works not because these bring them salvation but because 
they are marvels. They wish to search into hidden matters and 
to know about unheard-of things — to know much and to do 
nothing. In vain do they gape at God's power when they do not 
love his mercy. What else can I call their conduct than a 
turning of the divine announcements into tales? It is for this 
that we are accustomed to turn to theatrical performances, for 
this to dramatic recitations — namely, that we may feed our ears, 
not our mind. But persons of this sort I think should not so 
much be brought to confusion as helped. Their will is not evil, 
only senseless. 

There are others, however, who study the Sacred Scriptures 
precisely so that they may be ready, in accordance with the 
Apostle's teaching, to "give the reason of that faith" 40 in which 
they have been placed to everyone who asks it of them, so that, 
for example, they may forthrightly demolish enemies of the 
truth, teach those less well informed, recognize the path of 
truth more perfectly themselves, and, understanding the hidden 
things of God more deeply, love them more intently. Surely the 
devotion of these persons deserves praise and is worthy of 

Three, therefore, are the classes of men who study the 
Sacred Scripture, and of them the first are to be pitied, the second 
to be helped, the third to be praised. 41 But we, because we 
intend to give advice to all, desire that what is good should be 
increased in all, and what is perverted, changed. We wish that 
all should understand what we say and that all should do what 
we urge. 


Chapter One: How the Sacred Scripture Should Be Read by Those 
Who Seek Knowledge in It 

Two things I propose to you, my student — namely, order and 
method — and if you pay careful attention to them, the pathway 
of study will easily open up before you. In my consideration of 
these, however, I shall neither leave all things to your own 
natural ability nor promise that from my own diligence you 
will get everything you need. Instead, by way of foretaste for 
you, I shall briefly run over certain matters in such a way that 
you may find some things set forth to provide instruction and 
some things skipped over to allow scope for your own effort. 

I have mentioned that order in study is a fourfold matter: 
one thing in the disciplines, another in books, another in 
narrative, and another in exposition. 1 How these are to be 
applied in the Divine Scripture I have not yet shown. 

Chapter Tivo : Concerning the Order Which Exists in the Disciplines 

First of all, the student of Sacred Scripture ought to look 
among history, allegory, and tropology for that order sought in 
the disciplines — that is, he should ask which of these three 
precedes the others in the order of study. 2 

In this question it is not without value to call to mind what 
we see happen in the construction of buildings, where first the 
foundation is laid, then the structure is raised upon it, and 
finally, when the work is all finished, the house is decorated by 
the laying on of color. 3 

Chapter Three : Concerning History 

So too, in fact, must it be in your instruction. First you learn 
history and diligently commit to memory the truth of the deeds 


that have been performed, reviewing from beginning to end 
what has been done, when it has been done, where it has been 
done, and by whom it has been done. For these are the four 
things which are especially to be sought for in history — the 
person, the business done, the time, and the place. 4 Nor do I 
think that you will be able to become perfectly sensitive to 
allegory unless you have first been grounded in history. Do not 
look down upon these least things. The man who looks down 
on such smallest things slips little by little. If, in the beginning, 
you had looked down on learning the alphabet, now you would 
not even find your names listed with those of the grammar 
students. I know that there are certain fellows who want to 
play the philosopher right away. They say that stories should 
be left to pseudo apostles. The knowledge of these fellows is 
like that of an ass. Don't imitate persons of this kind. 

"Once grounded in things small, you may safely strive for 
all." 5 I dare to affirm before you that I myself never looked 
down on anything which had to do with education, but that I 
often learned many things which seemed to others to be a sort 
of joke or just nonsense. I recall that when I was still a school- 
boy I worked hard to know the names of all things that my 
eyes fell upon or that came into my use, frankly concluding that 
a man cannot come to know the natures of things if he is still 
ignorant of their names. How many times each day would I 
make myself pay out the debt of my little bits of wisdom, which, 
thanks to their shortness, I had noted down in one or two words 
on a page, so that I might keep a mindful hold on the solutions, 
and even the number, of practically all the thoughts, questions, 
and objections which I had learned. Often I proposed cases and, 
when the opposing contentions were lined up against one 
another, I diligently distinguished what would be the business 
of the rhetorician, what of the orator, what of the sophist. I laid 
out pebbles for numbers, and I marked the pavement with black 
coals and, by a model placed right before my eyes, I plainly showed 
what difference there is between an obtuse-angled, a right- 
angled, and an acute-angled triangle. Whether or not an 
equilateral parallelogram would yield the same area as a square 
when two of its sides were multiplied together, I learned by 
walking both figures and measuring them with my feet. Often I 


kept watch outdoors through the winter nights like one of the 
fixed stars by which we measure time. 6 Often I used to bring 
out my strings, stretched to their number on the wooden frame, 
both that I might note with my ear the difference among the 
tones and that I might at the same time delight my soul with the 
sweetness of the sound. These were boyish pursuits, to be sure, 
yet not without their utility for me, nor does my present 
knowledge of them lie heavy upon my stomach. But I do not 
reveal these things to you in order to parade my knowledge, 
which is either nothing at all or very little, but in order to show 
you that the man who moves along step by step is the one who 
moves along best, not like some who fall head over heels when 
they wish to make a great leap ahead. 

As in the virtues, so in the sciences, there are certain steps. 
But, you say, "I find many things in the histories which seem 
to be of no utility : why should I be kept busy with this sort of 
thing?" Well said. There are indeed many things in the 
Scriptures which, considered in themselves, seem to have 
nothing worth looking for, but if you look at them in the light 
of the other things to which they are joined, and if you begin to 
weigh them in their whole context, you will see that they are as 
necessary as they are fitting. Some things are to be known for 
their own sakes, but others, although for their own sakes they 
do not seem worthy of our labor, nevertheless, because without 
them the former class of things cannot be known with complete 
clarity, must by no means be carelessly skipped. Learn every- 
thing; you will see afterwards that nothing is superfluous. A 
skimpy knowledge is not a pleasing thing. 

But you ask if I have any opinion about the books which are 
useful for this study. I think the ones to be studied most are: 
Genesis, Exodus, Josue, the Book of Judges, and that of Kings, 
and Paralipomenon; of the New Testament, first the four 
Gospels, then the Acts of the Apostles. These eleven seem to 
me to have more to do with history than do the others — with 
the exception of those which we properly call historiographical. 

But if we take the meaning of the word more broadly, it is 
not unfitting that we call by the name "history" not only the 
recounting of actual deeds but also the first meaning of any 
narrative which uses words according to their proper nature. 7 


And in this sense of the word, I think that all the books of either 
Testament, in the order in which they were listed earlier, belong 
to this study in their literal meaning. 

Possibly, if it did not seem childish, I should interject in this 
place a few instructions on the manner of construing sentences, 
because I know that the Divine Scripture, more than all other 
books, is compressed in its text: but these matters I wish to 
refrain from, lest I protract the task before me by excessive 
digression. There are certain places in the divine page which 
cannot be read literally and which it is necessary that we 
construe with great judgment, so that we may not either over- 
look some things through negligence or, through misplaced 
diligence, violently twist them into something they were not 
written to say. 

This, then, my student, is what we propose to you. This field 
of your labor, well cultivated by your plough, will bear you a 
manifold harvest. All things were brought forth in order: 
move along in order yourself. Following the shadow, one comes 
to the body : learn the figure, and you will come to the truth. 
I am not now saying that you should first struggle to unfold the 
figures of the Old Testament and penetrate its mystical sayings 
before you come to the Gospel streams you must drink from. 
But just as you see that every building lacking a foundation 
cannot stand firm, so also is it in learning. The foundation and 
principle of sacred learning, however, is history, from which, 
like honey from the honeycomb, the truth of allegory is 
extracted. 8 As you are about to build, therefore, "lay first the 
foundation of history; next, by pursuing the 'typical' meaning, 
build up a structure in your mind to be a fortress of faith. Last 
of all, however, through the loveliness of morality, paint the 
structure over as with the most beautiful of colors." 9 

You have in history the means through which to admire 
God's deeds, in allegory the means through which to believe his 
mysteries, in morality the means through which to imitate his 
perfection. Read, therefore, and learn that "in the beginning 
God created heaven and earth." 10 Read that in the beginning 
he planted "a paradise of pleasure wherein he placed man whom 
he had formed." 11 Him sinning God expelled and thrust out 
into the trials of this life. Read how the entire offspring of the 


human race descended from one man; how, subsequently, flood 
destroyed sinners ; how, in the midst of the waters, the divine 
mercy preserved the just man Noah with his sons; next, how 
Abraham received the mark of the faith, but afterwards Israel 
went down into Egypt; how God thereafter led the sons of 
Israel out of Egypt by the hand of Moses and Aaron, brought 
them through the Red Sea and through the desert, gave them 
the Law, and settled them in the land of promise ; how often he 
delivered them as sinners into the hands of their enemies and 
afterwards freed them again when they were penitent; how first 
through judges, then through kings, he rules his people: "He 
took his servant David from following the ewes great with 
young." 12 Solomon he enlightened with wisdom. For the 
weeping Ezechiel he added on fifteen years. Thereafter he sent 
the straying people captive into Babylon by the hand of 
Nabuchodonosor. After seventy years he brought them back, 
through Cyrus. At last, however, when that time was already 
declining, he sent his Son into our flesh, and he, having sent 
his apostles into all the world, promised eternal life to those 
who were repentant. He foretold that he would come at the end 
of the ages to judge us, to make a return to each man according 
to his deeds — namely, eternal fire for sinners, but for the just, 
eternal life and the kingdom of which there shall be no end. 
See how, from the time when the world began until the end of 
the ages, the mercies of God do not slacken. 

Chapter Four: Concerning Allegory 

After the reading of history, it remains for you to investigate 
the mysteries of allegories, in which I do not think there is any 
need of exhortation from me, since this matter itself appears 
worthy enough in its own right. Yet I wish you to know, good 
student, that this pursuit demands not slow and dull perceptions 
but matured mental abilities which, in the course of their 
searching, may so restrain their subtlety as not to lose good 
judgment in what they discern. Such food is solid stuff, and, 
unless it be well chewed, it cannot be swallowed. You must 
therefore employ such restraint that, while you are subtle in 
your seeking, you may not be found rash in what you presume ; 


remembering that the Psalmist says : "He hath bent his bow and 
made it ready. And in it he hath prepared the instruments of 

You remember, I suppose, that I said above that Divine 
Scripture is like a building, in which, after the foundation has 
first been laid, the structure itself is raised up ; it is altogether 
like a building, for it too has its structure. For this reason, let it 
not irk us if we follow out this similitude a little more carefully. 

Take a look at what the mason does. 14 When the foundation 
has been laid, he stretches out his string in a straight line, he 
drops his perpendicular, and then, one by one, he lays the 
diligently polished stones in a row. Then he asks for other 
stones, and still others, and if by chance he finds some that do 
not fit with the fixed course he has laid, he takes his file, smooths 
off the protruding parts, files down the rough spots, and the 
places that do not fit, reduces to form, and so at last joins them 
to the rest of the stones set into the row. But if he finds some 
to be such that they cannot either be made smaller or be fitly 
shaped, he does not use these lest perhaps while he labors to 
grind down the stone he should break his file. 

Pay attention now! I have proposed to you something 
contemptible to gapers but worthy of imitation to those who 
understand. The foundation is in the earth, and it does not 
always have smoothly fitted stones. The superstructure rises 
above the earth, and it demands a smoothly proportioned 
construction. Even so the Divine Page, in its literal sense, 
contains many things which seem both to be opposed to each 
other and, sometimes, to impart something which smacks of the 
absurd or the impossible. But the spiritual meaning admits no 
opposition ; in it, many things can be different from one another, 
but none can be opposed. The fact, also, that the first course of 
stones to be laid upon the foundation is placed flush with a 
taut cord — and these are the stones upon which the entire 
weight of the others rests and to which they are fitted — is not 
without its meaning. For this is like a sort of second foundation 
and is the basis of the entire superstructure. This foundation 
both carries what is placed upon it and is itself carried by the 
first foundation. All things rest upon the first foundation but 
are not fitted to it in every way. As to the latter foundation, 


everything else both rests upon it and is fitted to it. The first one 
carries the superstructure and underlies the superstructure. The 
second one carries the superstructure and is not only under the 
superstructure but part of it. The foundation which is under the 
earth we have said stands for history, and the superstructure 
which is built upon it we have said suggests allegory. Therefore, 
that basis of this superstructure ought also to relate to allegory. 
The superstructure rises in many courses of stones, and each 
course has its basis. Even so, many mysteries are contained in 
the Divine Page and they each have their bases from which they 
spring. Do you wish to know what these courses are? The first 
course is the mystery of the Trinity, because this, too, Scripture 
contains, since God, Three and One, existed before every 
creature. He, from nothing, made every creature — visible, 
namely, and invisible. Behold in these the second course. To 
the rational creature he gave free judgment, and he prepared 
grace for it that it might be able to merit eternal beatitude. 
Then, when men fell of their own will he punished them, and 
when they continued to fall he strengthened them that they 
might not fall further. What the origin of sin, what sin, and 
what the punishment for sin may be : these constitute the third 
course. What mysteries he first instituted for man's restoration 
under the natural law: these are the fourth course. What 
things were written under the Law : these, the fifth course. The 
mystery of the incarnation of the Lord: this, the sixth course. 
The mysteries of the New Testament: these, the seventh course. 
Finally, the mysteries of man's own resurrection: these, the 
eighth course. 15 

Here is the whole of divinity, this is that spiritual structure 
which is raised on high, built, as it were, with as many courses of 
stones as it contains mysteries. You wish also to know the very 
bases themselves. The bases of the courses are the principles of 
the mysteries. See now, you have come to your study, you 
are about to construct the spiritual building. Already the 
foundations of history have been laid in you : it remains now 
that you found the bases of the superstructure. You stretch out 
your cord, you line it up precisely, you place the square stones 
into the course, and, moving around the course, you lay the 
track, so to say, of the future walls. The taut cord shows the 


path of the true faith. The very bases of your spiritual structure 
are certain principles of the faith — principles which form your 
starting point. Truly, the judicious student ought to be sure 
that, before he makes his way through extensive volumes, he is 
so instructed in the particulars which bear upon his task and 
upon his profession of the true faith, that he may safely be able 
to build onto his structure whatever he afterwards finds. For 
in such a great sea of books and in the manifold intricacies of 
opinions which often confound the mind of the student both 
by their number and their obscurity, the man who does not 
know briefly in advance, in every category so to say, some 
definite principle which is supported by firm faith and to which all 
may be referred, will scarcely be able to conclude any single thing. 
Do you wish that I should teach you how such bases ought to 
be laid? Look back at those things which I listed for you a 
moment ago. There is the mystery of the Trinity. Many books 
have already been composed on this mystery, many opinions 
given which are difficult to understand and complicated to 
resolve. It would be too long and too burdensome for you to 
work through absolutely all of them and possibly you would 
find many by which you were more muddled than edified. Do 
not insist on doing this: you will never have done. First learn 
briefly and clearly what is to be believed about the Trinity, what 
you ought unquestionably to profess and truthfully to believe. 
Afterwards, however, when you have begun to read books and 
have found many things obscurely, many things clearly, and 
many things doubtfully written, take those things which you 
find clear and, if it should be that they conform, add them to 
their proper base. The doubtful things interpret in such a way 
that they may not be out of harmony. But those things that are 
obscure, elucidate if you can. But if you cannot penetrate to an 
understanding of them, pass over them so that you may not 
run into the danger of error by presuming to attempt what you 
are not equal to doing. Do not be contemptuous of such things, 
but rather be reverent toward them, for you have heard that it 
is written: "He made darkness his hiding-place." 16 But even if 
you find that something contrary to what you have already 
learned, should be held with the firmest faith, still it is not well 
for you to change your opinion daily, unless first you have 


sought the advice of men more learned than yourself and, 
especially, unless you have learned what the universal faith, 
which can never be false, orders to be believed about it. Thus 
should you do concerning the mystery of the altar, thus 
concerning the mystery of baptism, that of confirmation, that of 
marriage, and all which were enumerated for you above. You 
see that many who read the Scriptures, because they do not have 
a foundation of truth, fall into various errors and change their 
views almost as often as they sit down to read. But you see 
others who, in accordance with that knowledge of the truth 
upon which, interiorly, they are solidly based, know how to 
bend all Scriptural passages whatever into fitting interpretations 
and to judge both what is out of keeping with sound faith and 
what is consonant with it. In Ezechiel you read that the wheels 
follow the living creatures, not the living creatures the wheels ; 
it says : "When the living creatures went, the wheels also went 
together by them: and when the living creatures were lifted up 
from the earth, the wheels also were lifted up with them." 17 
So it is with the minds of holy men : the more they advance in 
virtues or in knowledge, the more they see that the hidden 
places of the Scriptures are profound, so that those places which 
to simple minds and minds still tied to earth seem worthless, to 
minds which have been raised aloft seem sublime. For the text 
continues : "Whithersoever the spirit went, thither as the spirit 
went the wheels also were lifted up withal, and followed it : for 
the spirit of life was in the wheels." 18 You see that these wheels 
follow the living creatures and follow the spirit. 

Still elsewhere it is said: "The letter killeth, but the spirit 
quickeneth," 19 because it is certainly necessary that the student 
of the Scripture adhere staunchly to the truth of the spiritual 
meaning and that the high points of the literal meaning, which 
itself can sometimes be wrongly understood too, should not 
lead him away from the central concern in any way whatever. 
Why was that former people who received the Law of life 
reproved, except that they followed the death-dealing letter in 
such a way that they did not have the life-giving Spirit? But I 
do not say these things in order to offer anyone the chance to 
interpret the Scriptures according to his own will, but in order 
to show the man who follows the letter alone that he cannot 


long continue without error. For this reason it is necessary 
both that we follow the letter in such a way as not to prefer our 
own sense to the divine authors, and that we do not follow it 
in such a way as to deny that the entire pronouncement of truth 
is rendered in it. Not the man devoted to the letter "but the 
spiritual man judgeth all things." 20 

In order, therefore, that you may be able to interpret the 
letter safely, it is necessary that you not presume upon your own 
opinion, but that first you be educated and informed, and that 
you lay, so to speak, a certain foundation of unshaken truth 
upon which the entire superstructure may rest; and you should 
not presume to teach yourself, lest perhaps when you think you 
are introducing you are rather seducing yourself. This intro- 
duction must be sought from learned teachers and men who have 
wisdom, who are able to produce and unfold the matter to you 
both through the authorities of the holy fathers and the evi- 
dences of the Scriptures, as is needful; and, once you have 
already had this introduction, to confirm the particulars they 
have taught you by reading from the evidences of the Scriptures. 

So the matter appears to me. Whoever is pleased to follow 
me in this, I accept with pleasure. Whoever thinks things ought 
not to be done in this way, let him do what he pleases : I shall 
not argue with him. For I know that a number of people do not 
follow this pattern in learning. But how certain of these advance, 
this too I am not unaware of. 

If you ask what books are best for this study, I think the 
beginning of Genesis on the works of the six days; the three 
last books of Moses on the mysteries of the Law; Isaias; the 
beginning and end of Ezechiel; Job; the Psalter; the Canticle of 
Canticles ; two Gospels in particular, namely those of Matthew 
and John; the Epistles of Paul; the Canonical Epistles; and the 
Apocalypse; but especially the Epistles of Paul, which even by 
their very number show that they contain the perfection of the 
two Testaments. 21 

Chapter Five : Concerning Tropolog y, That Is, Morality 

Concerning tropology I shall not at present say anything more 
than what was said above, except that it is more the meaning of 


things than the meaning of words which seems to pertain to it. 
For in the meaning of things lies natural justice, out of which 
the discipline of our own morals, that is, positive justice, 
arises. 22 By contemplating what God has made we realize what 
we ourselves ought to do. Every nature tells of God; every 
nature teaches man; every nature reproduces its essential form, 
and nothing in the universe is infecund. 23 

Chapter Six : Concerning the Order of Books 

The same order of books is not to be kept in historical and 
allegorical study. History follows the order of time; to allegory 
belongs more the order of knowledge, because, as was said 
above, learning ought to take its beginning not from obscure 
but from clear things, and from things which are better known. 
The consequence of this is that the New Testament, in which 
the evident truth is preached, is, in this study, placed before the 
Old, in which the same truth is announced in a hidden manner, 
shrouded in figures. It is the same truth in both places, but 
hidden there, open here, promised there, shown here. You 
have heard, in the reading from the Apocalypse (5:5), that the 
book was sealed and no one could be found who should loose 
its seals save only the Lion of the tribe of Judah. The Law was 
sealed, sealed were the prophecies, because the times of the 
redemption to come were announced in a hidden manner. Does 
it not seem to you that that book had been sealed which said: 
"Behold a virgin shall conceive and bear a son: and his name 
shall be called Emmanuel"? 24 And another book which says: 
"Thou, Bethlehem Ephrata, art a little one among the thousands 
of Juda : out of thee shall he come forth unto me that is to be 
the ruler in Israel: and his going forth is from the beginning, 
from the days of eternity." 25 And the Psalmist: "Shall not Sion 
say: This man and that man is born in her? and the Highest 
himself hath founded her." 26 And again: "And of the Lord, 
of the Lord are the issues from death." 27 And yet again he 
says: "The Lord said to my Lord: Sit thou at my right hand." 28 
And a little later in the same place : "With thee is the principality 
in the day of thy strength, in the brightness of the saints ; from 
the womb before the day-star I begot thee." 29 And Daniel says : 


"I beheld therefore in the vision of the night, and lo, one like 
the son of man came with the clouds of heaven, and he came 
even to the Ancient of days . . . And he gave him power, and 
glory, and a kingdom: and all peoples, tribes, and tongues shall 
serve him: his power is an everlasting power that shall not be 
taken away." 30 

Who do you think could understand these things before they 
were fulfilled? They were sealed, and none could loose their 
seals but the Lion of the tribe of Judah. There came, therefore, 
the Son of God, and he put on our nature, was born of the 
Virgin, was crucified, buried; he rose again, ascended to the 
skies, and by fulfilling the things which had been promised, he 
opened up what lay hidden. I read in the Gospel that the angel 
Gabriel is sent to the Virgin Mary and announces the coming 
birth: 31 I remember the prophecy which says, "Behold, a virgin 
shall conceive." 32 I read that when Joseph was in Bethlehem 
with Mary, his pregnant wife, the time for her to give birth 
arrived "and she brought forth her firstborn son," 33 who the 
angel had foretold would reign on the throne of David his 
father: I remember the prophecy, "Thou, Bethlehem Ephrata, 
art a little one among the thousands of Judah : out of thee shall 
he come forth to me that is to be the ruler of Israel." 34 Again I 
read: "In the beginning was the Word; and the Word was with 
God: and the Word was God": 35 I remember the prophecy 
which says, "His going forth is from the beginning, from the 
days of eternity." 36 I read: "The Word was made flesh and 
dwelt among us" : 37 I remember the prophecy which says, "You 
shall call his name Emmanuel, that is, God with us." 38 And in 
order not to risk making this tedious to you by following 
through each item : unless you know beforehand the nativity of 
Christ, his teaching, his suffering, his resurrection and ascension, 
and all the other things which he did in the flesh and through 
the flesh, you will not be able to penetrate the mysteries of the 
old figures. 

Chapter Seven : Concerning Order of Narration 

Concerning order of narration it ought especially to be re- 
marked in this place that the text of the Divine Page keeps 


neither to a natural nor to a continuous order of speech, both 
because it often places later things before early ones — for 
instance, after it has listed a number of items, suddenly the line 
of discourse turns back to previous ones, as if narrating sub- 
sequent ones; and because it often connects even things which 
are separated from each other by an interval of time, as if one 
followed right on the heels of the other, so that it seems as if no 
lapse of time stood between those events which are set apart 
by no pause in the discourse. 

Chapter Eight: Concerning the Order of Exposition 

Exposition includes three things : the letter, the sense, and the 
deeper meaning {sententid). The letter is found in every dis- 
course, for the very sounds are letters; but sense and a deeper 
meaning are not found together in every discourse. Some 
discourses contain only the letter and sense, some only the letter 
and a deeper meaning, some all these three together. But every 
discourse ought to contain at least two. That discourse in which 
something is so clearly signified by the mere telling that nothing 
else is left to be supplied for its understanding contains only 
letter and sense. But that discourse in which the hearer can 
conceive nothing from the mere telling unless an exposition is 
added thereto contains only the letter and a deeper meaning in 
which, on the one hand, something is plainly signified and, 
on the other, something else is left which must be supplied for 
its understanding and which is made clear by exposition. 

Chapter Nine : Concerning the Letter 

Sometimes the letter is perfect, when, in order to signify 
what is said, nothing more than what has been set down needs 
to be added or taken away — as, "All wisdom is from the Lord 
God"; 39 sometimes it is compressed, when something is left 
which must be supplied — as, "The Ancient to the lady Elect"; 40 
sometimes it is in excess, when, either in order to inculcate an 
idea or because of a long parenthetical remark, the same thought 
is repeated or another and unnecessary one is added, as Paul, at 
the end of his Epistle to the Romans, says: "Now to him..." 


and then, after many parenthetical remarks, concludes, "to 
whom is honor and glory." 41 The other part of this passage 
seems to be in excess. I say "in excess," that is, not necessary 
for making the particular statement. Sometimes the literal text 
is such that unless it is stated in another form it seems to mean 
nothing or not to fit, as in the following : "The Lord, in heaven 
the throne of him," 42 that is, "the throne of the Lord in heaven" ; 
"the sons of men, the teeth of those are weapons and arrows," 43 
that is, "the teeth of the sons of men"; and "man, like grass the 
days of him," 44 that is, "man's days": in these examples the 
nominative case of the noun and the genitive case of the pronoun 
are put for a single genitive of the noun; and there are many 
other things which are similar. To the letter belong construction 
and continuity. 

Chapter Ten : Concerning the Sense 

Some sense is fitting, other unfitting. Of unfitting sense, 
some is incredible, some impossible, some absurd, some false. 
You find many things of this kind in the Scriptures, like the 
following: "They have devoured Jacob." 45 And the following: 
"Under whom they stoop that bear up the world." 46 And the 
following: "My soul hath chosen hanging." 47 And there are 
many others. 

There are certain places in Divine Scripture in which, al- 
though there is a clear meaning to the words, there nevertheless 
seems to be no sense, either because of an unaccustomed 
manner of expression or because of some circumstance which 
impedes the understanding of the reader, as is the case, for 
example, in that passage in which Isaias says : "In that day seven 
women shall take hold of one man, saying : We will eat our own 
bread, and wear our own apparel: only let us be called by thy 
name. Take away our reproach." 48 The words are plain and 
open. You understand well enough, "Seven women shall take 
hold of one man." You understand, "We will eat our own 
bread." You understand, "We will wear our own apparel." 
You understand, "Only let us be called by thy name." You 
understand, "Take away our reproach." But possibly you cannot 
understand what the sense of the whole thing together is. You 


do not know what the Prophet wanted to say, whether he 
promised good or threatened evil. For this reason it comes 
about that you think the passage, whose literal sense you do not 
see, has to be understood spiritually only. Therefore, you say 
that the seven women are the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, and 
that these take hold of one man, that is, Christ, in whom it 
pleased all fulness of grace to dwell because he alone received 
these gifts without measure; and that he alone takes away their 
reproach so that they may find someone with whom to rest, 
because no one else alive asked for the gifts of the Holy Spirit. 

See now, you have given a spiritual interpretation, and what 
the passage may mean to say literally you do not understand. 
But the Prophet could also mean something literal by these 
words. 49 For, since he had spoken above about the slaughter of 
the transgressing people, he now adds that so great would be 
the destruction of that same people and to such an extent were 
their men to be wiped out that seven women will hardly find 
one husband, for only one woman usually has one man; and, 
while now women are usually sought after by men, then, in 
contrary fashion, women will seek after men; and, so that one 
man may not hesitate to marry seven women at the same time, 
since he might not have the wherewithal to feed and clothe 
them, they say to him: "We will eat our own bread, and wear 
our own apparel." It will not be necessary for you to be 
concerned about our well-being, "only let us be called by thy 
name," so that you may be called our husband and be our 
husband so that we may not be heralded as rejected women, and 
die sterile, without children — which at that time was a great 
disgrace. And that is why they say, "Take away our reproach." 

You find many things of this sort in the Scriptures, and 
especially in the Old Testament — things said according to the 
idiom of that language and which, although they are clear in 
that tongue, seem to mean nothing in our own. 

Chapter Eleven : Concerning the Deeper Meaning 

The divine deeper meaning can never be absurd, never false. 
Although in the sense, as has been said, many things are found 
to disagree, the deeper meaning admits no contradiction, is 


always harmonious, always true. Sometimes there is a single 
deeper meaning for a single expression; sometimes there are 
several deeper meanings for a single expression; sometimes 
there is a single deeper meaning for several expressions ; some- 
times there are several deeper meanings for several expressions. 
"When, therefore, we read the Divine Books, in such a great 
multitude of true concepts elicited from a few words and 
fortified by the sound rule of the catholic faith, let us prefer 
above all what it seems certain that the man we are reading 
thought. But if this is not evident, let us certainly prefer what 
the circumstances of the writing do not disallow and what is 
consonant with sound faith. But if even the circumstances of 
the writing cannot be explored and examined, let us at least 
prefer only what sound faith prescribes. For it is one thing not 
to see what the writer himself thought, another to stray from 
the rule of piety. If both these things are avoided, the harvest 
of the reader is a perfect one. But if both cannot be avoided, 
then, even though the will of the writer may be doubtful, it is 
not useless to have elicited a deeper meaning consonant with 
sound faith." 50 "So too, if, regarding matters which are obscure 
and farthest removed from our comprehension, we read some 
of the Divine Writings and find them susceptible, in sound faith, 
to many different meanings, let us not plunge ourselves into 
headlong assertion of any one of these meanings, so that if the 
truth is perhaps more carefully opened up and destroys that 
meaning, we are overthrown; for so we should be battling not 
for the thought of the Divine Scriptures but for our own thought, 
and this in such a way that we wished the thought of the 
Scriptures to be identical with our own, whereas we ought 
rather to wish our thought identical with that of the Scriptures." 51 

Chapter Twelve : Concerning the Method of Expounding a Text 52 

The method of expounding a text consists of analysis. 
Analysis takes place through separating into parts or through 
examination. We analyze through separation into parts when 
we distinguish from one another things which are mingled 
together. We analyze by examination when we open up things 
which are hidden. 


Chapter Thirteen: That We Are Not Here Going to Speak of 
Meditation 5 * 

And now those things which pertain to reading have been 
explained as lucidly and briefly as we know how. But as for the 
remaining part of learning, namely meditation, I omit saying 
anything about it in the present work because so great a matter 
requires a special treatise, and it is more worthy to be altogether 
silent about a matter of this sort than to say anything about it 
imperfectly. For it is a thing truly subtle and at the same time 
delightful, one which both educates beginners and exercises the 
perfect, one which has not yet been treated in writing and which 
therefore deserves all the more to be followed up. 

Now therefore, let us ask Wisdom that it may deign to shine 
in our hearts and to cast light upon its paths for us, that it may 
bring us "to its pure and fleshless feast." 54 


Appendices A and B represent authentic additions made by Hugh to the 
text of the Didascalkon (see Buttimer, pp. xv-xvi). They appear in a small 
but superior class of manuscripts and were perhaps intended for more 
perfect integration into the text in a subsequent edition. Because chapter 
xiii of Book vi was clearly meant to stand as the conclusion of the Didascali- 
con, these two chapters are placed in an appendix, even though Buttimer 
treats them as chapters xiv and xv of Book vi. 

Appendix C, equally authentic, occupies an even more obviously in- 
appropriate place in most manuscripts of the delta family, which, as if it 
were an introduction to the entire work, prefix it to the D i das cali con's true 
preface, (see Buttimer, pp. xvi and xxxi). It may have been intended for 
insertion after chapter vi of Book i , since it clarifies certain obscurities in 
that chapter (see, e.g., i, vi. n. 42 on ousiai; appendix C makes clear where, if 
not in the divine Mind as John the Scot had held, the ousiai exist — namely, 
in the angelic intellect). Because Hugh's intention regarding it is not certain, 
however, it is here placed in an appendix, following Buttimer. 

Appendix A: Division of the Contents of Philosophy (Buttimer, 
vi. xiv) 

Consider these three: wisdom, virtue, and need. Wisdom is 
the understanding of things as they are. 1 "Virtue is a habit of the 
mind — a habit adapted to the reason like a nature." 2 A need is 
something without which we cannot live, but [with which, i.e., 
when supplied] we would live more happily. The following 
three are remedies against three evils to which human life is 
subject: wisdom against ignorance, virtue against vice, and 
needs against life's weakness. In order to do away with the 
three evils, we seek after the three remedies, and in order to find 
the three remedies, every art and every discipline was dis- 
covered. 3 

For the sake of wisdom the theoretical arts were discovered; 
for the sake of virtue the practical arts were discovered; for the 
sake of our needs the mechanical arts were discovered. These 
three were first in practice, but afterwards, for the sake of 


eloquence, logic was discovered. Logic, though last to be 
discovered, ought to be the first learned. Four, then, are the 
principal sciences, from which all the others descend; these are 
the theoretical, the practical, the mechanical, and the logical. 

The theoretical is divided into theology, physics, and mathe- 
matics. Theology treats of invisible substances, physics of the 
invisible causes of visible things, mathematics of the visible 
forms of visible things. And this mathematics is divided into 
four sciences. The first is arithmetic, which treats of number, 
that is, of discrete quantity in itself. The second is music, which 
treats of proportion, that is, of discrete quantity in relation to 
something else. The third is geometry, which treats of space, 
that is, of immobile continuous quantity. The fourth is 
astronomy, which treats of motion, that is, of mobile continuous 
quantity. The element of arithmetic is the number "one." The 
element of music is the single tone. The element of geometry is 
the point. The element of astronomy is the moment of time. 

The practical is divided into solitary, private, and public. The 
solitary teaches how each man can found his own life upon 
upright habits and furnish it out with virtues. The private 
teaches how to regulate one's domestics and those bound to one 
by ties of flesh. The public teaches how a whole people and 
nation ought to be governed by their rulers. The solitary 
pertains to individuals, the private to the heads of families, and 
the public to the governors of states. 

The mechanical treats of the manual occupations of men and 
is divided into seven arts. The first is fabric making, the second 
armament, the third commerce, the fourth agriculture, the fifth 
hunting, the sixth medicine, and the seventh theatrics. 

The logical is divided into grammar and the theory of 
argument. The theory of argument is divided into probable 
argument, necessary argument, and sophistical argument. 
Probable argument is divided into dialectic and rhetoric. 
Necessary argument belongs to philosophers, sophistical to 

In these four parts of philosophy such order ought to be 
preserved in learning as will place logic first, ethics second, the 
theoretical arts third, and the mechanical arts fourth. For 
eloquence ought to be attained first ; then, as Socrates says in the 


Ethics, the eye of the heart must be cleansed by the study of 
virtue, so that it may thereafter see clearly for the investigation 
of truth in the theoretical arts. Last of all, the mechanical arts 
follow, which, by themselves, are altogether ineffective unless 
supported by knowledge of the foregoing. 

Appendix B: Concerning Magic and Its Parts (Buttimer, vi. xv) 1 

The first discoverer of magic is believed to have been 
Zoroaster, king of the Bactrians, whom some say is none other 
than Cham the son of Noah with his name changed. He was 
afterwards killed by Ninus, king of the Assyrians, who had 
conquered him in war and who also caused his books, filled 
with the arts of evil-doing, to be destroyed by fire. Aristotle 
writes of this man that his books had preserved for the re- 
membrance of posterity as many as two million two hundred 
thousand verses on the art of magic, dictated by himself. Sub- 
sequently, Democritus elaborated this art at the time when 
Hippocrates was enjoying fame in his practice of medicine. 

Magic is not accepted as a part of philosophy, but stands 
with a false claim outside it: the mistress of every form of 
iniquity and malice, lying about the truth and truly infecting 
men's minds, it seduces them from divine religion, prompts them 
to the cult of demons, fosters corruption of morals, and impels 
the minds of its devotees to every wicked and criminal in- 
dulgence. As generally received, it embraces five kinds of 
sorcery: mantike — which means divination, vain mathematics, 
fortunetelling, enchantments, and illusions. Mantike, moreover, 
contains five sub-species, of which the first is necromancy, 
which means divination by means of the dead; for "necros" in 
Greek means "dead," and "necromancy" is derived from it. 
Divination in this case is achieved through the sacrifice of 
human blood, for which the demons thirst and in which they 
delight when it is spilled. The second is geomancy, or divination 
by means of earth; the third, hydromancy, or divination by 
means of water; the fourth, aeromancy, is divination by means 
of air ; and the fifth is divination by fire, which is called pyro- 
mancy. For Varro declared that four were the elements in 
which divination consisted — earth, water, fire, and air. The 


first, therefore, namely necromancy, would seem to belong to 
hell — the second to earth, the third to water, the fourth to air, 
and the fifth to fire. 

[False] mathematics is divided into three types : soothsaying, 
augury, and horoscopy. Aruspices (soothsayers) are so called as 
being horuspices, that is, inspectors of times (horarum inspectores), 
who observe the times in which things should be done ; or they 
are called aruspices as being examiners of altars (aras inspicientes), 
who observe the future from the entrails and viscera of sacrificial 
animals. Augury, or auspicium, sometimes pertains to the eye, 
and is called auspicium as being avispicium (the watching of birds) 
because it concerns itself with the movement and flight of birds ; 
sometimes it pertains to the ears, and then it is called augurium 
ioigarritus avium (the chattering of birds), which is heard by ear. 
Horoscopy, which is also called constellation, consists in seeking 
the fates of men in the stars, as do the genethliaci, who observe 
births and were once especially called magi, of whom we read in 
the Gospel. 

Fortunetellers are those who seek divinations by lots. 
Sorcerers are those who, with demonic incantations or amulets 
or any other execrable types of remedies, by the cooperation 
of devils and by evil instinct, perform wicked things. Performers 
of illusions are those who with their demonic art make sport of 
human senses through imaginative illusions about one thing's 
being turned into another. 

All in all, therefore, there are eleven parts of magic: under 
mantike, five — necromancy, geomancy, hydromancy, aeromancy, 
and pyromancy; under [false] mathematics, three — soothsaying, 
augury, and horoscopy; then there are three others — fortune- 
telling, sorcery, and performing illusions. 

Mercury is reported the first discoverer of illusions; the 
Phrygians discovered auguries ; Tages first gave soothsaying to 
the Etruscans; hydromancy first came from the Persians. 

Appendix C : Concerning the Three Subsistences of Things (Buttimer, 
PP- 134-5) 

Things are able to subsist in three ways: in actuality, in the 
intellect, in the divine Mind — that is, in the divine Idea, in man's 


idea, and in themselves. In themselves they pass away without 
subsistence; in the intellect of man they subsist, to be sure, but 
are not immutable; in the divine Mind they subsist without 
change. Likewise, what exists in actuality is an image of what 
exists in the mind of man, and what exists in the mind of man is 
an image of what exists in the divine Mind. The rational creature 
was made according to the divine Mind; the visible creature was 
made according to the rational creature. Therefore, the whole 
movement and orientation of the rational creature ought to be 
toward the divine Mind, just as the whole movement and 
orientation of the visible creature is toward the rational creature. 1 

Just as a man, when he has conceived something in his mind, 
draws an example of it externally, so that what was known only 
to him may be seen plainly by others, and afterwards, to make 
it still more evident, explains in words how the thing drawn as 
an example matches his idea of it; so, too, God, wishing to 
show his invisible Wisdom, drew its example in the mind of the 
rational creature, and next, by making the corporeal creature, 
showed the rational creature an external example of what it 
itself contained within. 2 Thus, the rational creature was made 
in first place and in the likeness of the divine Idea, with nothing 
mediating between them. The corporeal creature, however, 
was made in the likeness of the divine Idea through the media- 
tion of the rational creature. 3 

For this reason, the book of Genesis, speaking of the angels 
under the appellation "light," says: "God said: Let there be 
light. And the light came to be." 4 Concerning all the other 
works of God, however, it says: "God said: Let it be. And it 
was so" — and then it adds, "And God made it." 5 For the 
angelic nature first existed in the divine Idea as a plan, and then 
afterwards it began to subsist in itself through creation. The 
other creatures, however, first existed in the Idea of God; next, 
they were made in the knowledge of the angels ; and finally they 
began to subsist in themselves. When, therefore, Genesis says, 
"God said: Let it be," this refers to the divine Mind. When it 
says, "And it was so," this refers to the angelic intellect. And 
when it says, "And God made," it refers to the actuality of 
things. 6 


AHDL Archives d'histoire doctrinak et litteraire du moyen age 

BGPM Beitrage %ur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters 

CM Classica et mediaevalia 

CP Classical Philology 

CSEL Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum 

DTC Dictionnaire de theologie catholique 

ETL Ephemerides theologicae lovanienses 

GCFI Giornale critico della filosofia italiana 

JTS Journal of Theological Studies 

MGH Monumenta Germaniae historica 

MH Mediaevalia et humanistica 

MP Modern Philology 

MRS Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies 

MS Mediaeval Studies 

MSR Melanges de science religieuse 

NS The New Scholasticism 

PL Patrologiae cursus completus; series latina (ed. J. P. Migne) 

RB Revue benedictine 

RHE Revue d'histoire ecclesiastique 

RMAL Revue du moyen age latin 

RSPT Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques 

RSR Recherches de science religieuse 

RTAM Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale 




Sacris erudiri 


Studi e testi 





i. The Didascalicon can be dated only with reference to Hugh's De 
sacra went is christianae fidei, of the structure of which it contains a preliminary 
sketch (see Didascalicon vi. iv). The De sacramentis, begun after February, 
1 1 30 (see Roger Baron, Science et sagesse che^ Hugues de Saint-Victor [Paris: 
P. Lethielleux, 1957], p. xlv) was brought to practical completion sometime 
in 1 1 33 (cf. Jos. de Ghellinck, Mouvement theologique du Xlle siecle [Bruges: 
Editions "de Tempel" 1948], pp. 189-90, esp. p. 189, n. 6; p. 193, n. 5). 
A date in the late 1 1 20's is thus possible for the Didascalicon. A much earlier 
date seems unlikely. Hugh did not arrive at Saint Victor until 1 1 1 5-1 8. He 
would not have begun teaching at once. By the time he composed the 
Didascalicon, however, it is probable that he had been teaching some time 
and had written his De grammatica, Practica geometriae, possibly a lost De 
astronomia, the De ponderibus, the Epitome Dindimi in philosophiam, the De 
scripturis et scriptoribus sacris, and the De sacramentis legis naturalis et scriptae 
dialogus, which last Baron {Science et sagesse, p. xlvi) ranks among Hugh's 
earliest productions. By 11 27 Hugh was clearly a person of importance in 
the Abbey, for his name appears after those of Abbot Gilduin and Prior 
Thomas in a charter of this date (Jean de Toulouse, Annates, Bibliotheque 
Nationale, MS Latin 14368, anno 11 27; cf. Fourier Bonnard, Histoire de 
Pabbaye rojale et de Pordre des chanoines reguliers de St-Victor de Paris [2 vols.; 
Paris : Arthur Savaete, n.d.], I, 89, n. 1). This is a fair date to suggest for the 

2. The school, at least during Hugh's lifetime, remained public. See 
Bernhard Bischoff, "Aus der Schule Hugos von St. Viktor," Aus der 
Geisteswelt des Mittelalters, ed., Albert Lang, Joseph Lechner, and Michael 
Schmaus, BGPM, Supplementband III, Halfband I (Minister, 1935), 
pp. 246—50. Abaelard is witness to its public character under William of 
Champeaux, who founded the community in 1 108 ; see His tor ia calamitatum 
mearum, J. T. Muckle, ed. MS, XII (1950), 177—78. 

3. Treatments of various aspects of the early didascalic tradition will be 
found in Werner Jaeger, Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture, tr. Gilbert 
Highet (Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1939); Henri-Irenee Marrou, Histoire de 
P education dans P 'an ti quite (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1948); Aubrey Gwynn, 
Roman Education from Cicero to Quintilian (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926); 
H.-I. Marrou, Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique (Paris : E. de Boccard, 
1949); and Pierre Courcelle, Les Lettres grecques en Occident de Macrobe a 
Cassiodore (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1948). For the later didascalic tradition, 
see refs. listed in n. 6—10. 

4. See Charles Henry Buttimer, ed., Hugonis de Sancto Victore Didascalicon 


de studio legendi : a Critical Text(" Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Latin," 
X; Washington, D. C. : Catholic University of America Press, 1939), 
pp. xv-xliii. A few additional manuscripts are noted by Buttimer's reviewers ; 
see Bibliotheque de V Ecole des chartes CIII (1942), 236; and Etudes classiques, 
VIII (1939), 432733- 

5 . See G. Pare, A. Brunet, P. Tremblay, La Renaissance du Xlle siecle : les 
e'coles et V enseignement (Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1933), ch. i, 
pp. 17-55. On secularist adaptations of learning, see further M.-D. Chenu, 
"L'Homrae et la nature: perspectives sur la renaissance du Xlle siecle," 
AHDL, XIX (1952), 39-66; reprinted with alterations in M.-D. Chenu, 
La Theologie au Xlle siecle (Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1957), 
pp. 19-51. 

6. Ludwig Baur has done this for the work of Gundissalinus. See his 
Dominicus Gundissalinus: De divisione philosophiae, BGPM, IV (Miinster, 
1906), 164-316; broad sketch of the transmission of didascalic materials 
from hellenistic through late scholastic writers (pp. 316-97); Hugh of St. 
Victor discussed (pp. 358-63). 

7. See, for example, Jos. Marietan, Le Probleme de la classification des 
sciences d'Aristote a Saint-Thomas (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1901) and Martin 
Grabmann, Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode, II (Freiburg im Breisgau : 
Herder'sche Verlagshandlung, 191 1 ; reprinted, Graz: Akademische Druck- 
und Verlagsanstalt, 1957), 28-54, 23 5—49. 

8. See de Ghellinck, Motive tnent theologique and Beryl Smalley, The Study of 
the Bible in the Middle Ages (New York: Philosophical Library, 1952), 
pp. 1— in. 

9. See Pare, Brunet, Tremblay, Renaissance du Xlle siecle, pp. 94-137, 
213-39, an d 0« Schmidt, Hugo von St. Victor als Pddagog (Meissen, 1893). 

10. Richard P. McKeon has written this kind of history for rhetoric, 
"Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," Spec, XVII (1942), 1-32; for dialectic, 
"Dialectic and Political Thought and Action," Ethics, LXV (1954-5 5), esp. 
pp. 3-16; and for poetic, "Poetry and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century: 
the Renaissance of Rhetoric," MP, XLIII (1945-46), 217-34. The first and 
last of these are reprinted with some alterations in R. S. Crane, ed., Critics 
and Criticism, Ancient and Modern (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1952), pp. 260-96 and 297-318. 

1 1 . Thus Ludwig Baur, noting the rise to prominence of the Aristotelian 
schematization of knowledge in the twelfth century, names only Hugh, 
Richard of St. Victor, Gundissalinus, and Michael Scot as its proponents, 
and, regarding the latter two as directly inspired by Arabic sources, treats 
principally Hugh, and very briefly Richard, as springing from the Latin 
encyclopedic tradition; see Baur, Gundissalinus, pp. 358 ff. 

12. Notably by Grabmann, who, dating Radulfus Ardens a century too 
early and hence regarding his four-part division of the arts in the Speculum 
universale as antecedent to Hugh, denies, but on false grounds, Baur's 
implication that Hugh was the first proponent of this division (Grabmann, 
Geschichte der scholastischen Methode, I, 252); at the same time he adduces the 
schematization of knowledge found in Bamberg MS Q.VI.30 as further 


evidence that the fourfold division of the arts "findet sich nicht allein bei 
Hugo von St. Viktor" (Vol. II, p. 238), not recognizing that the Bamberg 
classification represents a conflation, not without its crudities, of the 
divergent schemas of William of Conches and Hugh. Max Manitius 
apparently follows Grabmann in speaking of Hugh's fourfold division 
"wie bei Radulfus Ardens" {Geschichte der lateinischen Literatur des Mittel- 
alters, II [Miinchen, 193 1], 114). 

1 3 . Thus Marietan praises Hugh's classification because, since Aristotle, 
"aucun auteur n'etait entre dans autant et de si minutieux details. II offre 
meme sur ce point plus de renseignements que le Philosophe de Stagire" 
{Probleme de la classification, p. 131); at the same time, he reserves to Thomas 
"une solution qui eclaircit tous les doutes constates, soit chez Aristote soit 
chez les ecrivains des ages suivants" (p. 176) and observes that Thomas 
"donne a ce probleme la solution la plus logique et la plus parfaite qu'il ait 
recue" (p. 194). So, too, A. Mignon, Les Origines de la scolastique et Hugues de 
Saint-Victor, I (Paris, 1896), 65-66, places Hugh in the "true" stream of 
scholastic philosophy on the ground that he distinguishes clearly between 
philosophy and theology as to object and method — so clearly that "la 
distinction des deux ordres de science est etablie dans ses traites aussi 
nettement qu'elle le sera plus tard dans les ouvrages du docteur angeli- 

14. See Pare, Brunet, Tremblay, Renaissance du Xlle siecle, pp. 100-1. 
The three causes are apparently taken over from Baur, Gundissalinus, 
pp. 357-58, who, however, advances them not to explain Hugh but the 
Aristotelianism of the twelfth century at large. 

1 5 . Pare, Brunet, Tremblay, Renaissance du Xlle siecle, pp. 97 ff. for general 
bracketing of Thierry and Hugh; pp. 169-73 for comparison of Hugh and 
John of Salisbury; pp. 173-210 for discussion of twelfth-century "human- 
ists," utilitarians, scientists, etc. 

16. Thus, Tullio Gregory, in the latest work to appear on William of 
Conches {Anima mundi: lafilosofia di Guglielmo di Conches e la scuola di Chartres 
[Publicazioni dell'Universita di Roma, III; Florence: Sansoni, 1955]) — 
though he discusses in detail (pp. 29-40) the relative contributions of 
William and Hugh to the brano published by Ottaviano (Carmelo Ottaviano, 
ed., Un brano inedito della "Philosophia" di Guglielmo di Conches [Naples: 
Alberto Morano, 1935]; though he notes the different approaches of 
William and Hugh to natura (p. 181, n. 3) and their different views on the 
problem of initial chaos (pp. 197-98 and p. 198, n. 1); and though he notes 
the "angoli di vista diversissimi" with which they approach sermo (p. 269) 
and the differences between their schematizations of knowledge (pp. 270- 
78) — nowhere does he bring these differences into relation with the form 
taken by the Didascalicon. The same failure is to be found in Heinrich 
Flatten, Die Philosophie des Wilhelm von Conches (Coblenz : Gorres-Druckerei, 
1929), pp. 20-32. Baron, Science et sagesse, makes only two references to 
William, and these most general (pp. 5 5 and 80). Admitting that "Hugues 
a parfaitement pris conscience de la nouveaute qu'il apportait par son tableau 
de la philosophie et que cette innovation devait se justifier" (p. 79), Baron 


fails to make clear wherein precisely that novelty lay, or as against whom it 
required particular justification. 

17. Smalley, Study of the Bible, p. 86. 

18. Pare, Brunet, Tremblay, Renaissance du Xlle specie, pp. 94-95. 

19. Baron provides no help here. He observes that the "celebre tableau 
[de la division de la philosophic] qu'en propose Hugues est au point 
d'aboutissement d'une longue evolution et ne prend toute sa signification 
que par l'expose de la longue serie d'essais qui l'ont precede" {Science et 
sagesse, p. 38), but, while providing a sketch of this evolution (pp. 38-47), 
he does not make such contrasts between the Didascalicon and selected earlier 
works as might have thrown the distinctive quality of the Disdascalicon into 
sharp relief. 

20. It is ascribed to the entire first book in the Indiculum of Hugh's works 
found in Merton MS 49 and drawn up for the Victorine edition of 11 52. 
See Buttimer, p. xvii, and de Ghellinck, "La Table des matieres de la 
premiere edition des oeuvres de Hugues de Saint- Victor," RSR, I (19 10), 
270-79. Titles ascribed to the first chapters of the remaining five books in 
the Buttimer edition also apply unmistakably to the whole books rather than 
to the chapters, although, to avoid confusing discrepancies with Buttimer, 
the present translation does not change the location of the titles. Hugh's 
demonstrative intention is expressed in the opening words of Didascalicon 
i.xi: "Having therefore demonstrated the origin of the theoretical, the 
practical, and the mechanical arts, we must investigate as well the derivation 
of the logical..." The reasoned derivation of the arts in Didascalicon 1 
contrasts with their historical and human derivation treated briefly in 
Didascalicon in.ii, "Concerning the Authors of the Arts." 

21. Ultimately underlying Hugh's scheme is Aristotle's division of the 
sciences into theoretical and practical, as in Topics vn.i and Metaphysics n.i, 
with a further productive subdivision specified in Topics vi.iii and vin.ii, and 
Metaphysics vi.i, vi.ii, and xi.vii. Augustine mentions a twofold division of 
philosophy into action and contemplation {De civitate Dei vin.iv), but only 
to assert its consistency with his preferred Platonic division (cf. ibid., xi.xxv) 
and without associating it with Aristotle. Cassiodorus, more explicit, 
reports even the Greek names for the theoretical and practical sciences and 
the three subdivisions of each, but, making independent use of the Greek 
source common to him and Boethius (Ammonius of Alexandria's comment- 
ary on Porphyry's Isagoge), invents a Latin terminology which, unlike that of 
Boethius, does not come into general use (see Courcelle, Lettres grecques, 
pp. 323-25). It is Boethius who transmits the distinction to the medieval 
West, not only through the -n and 6 described as woven into the garment of 
Philosophia in the De consolatione philosophiae 1. pr. i, and consistently 
associated with practica and theoretica by commentators, but more explicitly 
in the schema of the theoretical and practical sciences introduced into his 
first commentary on the Isagoge (entitled In Porphyrium dialogi duo in PL, 
XLIV, 1 1 A f. ; cf. CSEL, XL VIII, 8-9) and of the theoretical sciences in his 
De trinitate ii. Authority for the addition of the logical arts is found in his 
second commentary which, resolving the noncommital reserve of the first, 


recognizes logic as both instrument and part of philosophy (second com- 
mentary, entitled Commentaria in Porphyrium a se translatum, in PL, XLIV, 
71-158; see ibid., 73B-75A; cf. CSEL, XLVIII, 138-143). A certain basis, 
though not the direct inspiration, for the addition of the mechanical arts 
exists in Boethius's translation of Aristotle's Topics, esp. vi.iii, and vm, ii 
{PL, XLIV, 978B and 996B), where, however, Aristotle's productive 
category is called effectiva. Hugh's term mechanica derives from late Caro- 
lingian masters, whose peculiar etymology for it he adopts (see Didascalicon 
i.ix). The mechanical arts are mentioned, but under different names and 
without being considered parts of philosophy, by the Latin Asclepius i.iii 
(A. D. Nock, ed. Corpus Hermeticum, II [Paris, 1945], 306); Augustine De 
doctrina christiana 47 and n.xxxix. 58 {PL, XXXIV, 57 and 62); 
Chalcidius, commentary on the Timaeus (Johannes Wrobel, ed. Platonis 
Timaeus interprete Chakidio cum eiusdem commentario [Leipzig : B. G. Teubner, 
1876]; or F. Mullach, ed., Fragmenta philosophorum graecorum, II [Paris: 
Firmin-Didot, n.d.], 237); Cassiodorus Inst, i.xxviii. 5-7 (R. A. B. Mynors, 
ed., Cassiodori Senatoris institutiones [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937], pp. 71- 
72; or Leslie Webber Jones, tr. An Introduction to Divine and Human Readings 
by Cassiodorus Senator [New York: Columbia University Press, 1946], pp. 129- 
31); and Isidore of Seville Etymologiae n.xxiv. 3-16. Rhabanus groups 
mechanica with the quadrivium and medicine as comprising the Platonic 
physica, and he limits mechanica to "peritia fabricae artis et in metallis et in 
lignis et lapidibus" {De universo xv.i; {PL, CXI, 41 3C). Gerbert defends the 
twofold Aristotelian division as "the division of Vitruvius and Boethius" 
against proponents of the Platonic scheme in a debate before the emperor 
(see Richer Historiarum libri ni.lvii-lxv; PL, CXXXVIII, 106-9). The 
Platonic division is followed by Bede, Alcuin, Rhabanus, and John the Scot. 

22. "Alter Augustinus," "secundus Augustinus," "lingua Augustini," 
"anima Augustini": reported as epithets given Hugh by his contemporaries. 
See PL, CLXXV, cxxxvinA and clxviiiA-B. Cf. de Ghellinck, Mouvement 
theologique, p. 185, n. 2. 

23. On 1 1 27 as the probable date of the Didascalicon 's composition, see 
n. 1 . It is true that no division of philosophy appears in the commentary on 
the Timaeus found by Schmid at Uppsala and alleged by him to be a copy of 
William's earlier version of this work (see Toni Schmid, "Ein Timaios- 
kommentar in Sigtuna," CM, X [1949], 220-26), but Schmid's attribution 
of the work to WilHam has been questioned by Edouard Jeauneau, "L'Usage 
de la notion d'integumentum a travers les gloses de Guillaume de Conches," 
AHDL, XXIV (1957), 35-100. The schema does appear in the version of 
William's commentary on the Timaeus printed in PL, CLXXII, 246 ff. On 
evidence for two versions of William's commentary on the Timaeus, see 
Gregory, Anima mundi, pp. 12 ff., and J. M. Parent, La Doctrine de la 
creation dans Te'cole de Chartres (Paris : Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1938), 
p. 120. William's glosses on the De consolatione philosophiae are excerpted in 
Charles Jourdain, "Des commentaires inedits de Guillaume de Conches etde 
Nicolas Triveth sur 'La Consolation de la philosophic' de Boece," Notices et 
extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliotheque Imperiale, XX (1862), 40-82, and in the 


same author's Excursions historiques et philosopbiques a travers le moyen-dge 
(Paris, 1888), pp. 31-68. 

24. Baur, Gundissalinus, pp. 358-59. Of Gundissalinus, by contrast, Baur 
notes that his material is "durch lose und sehr ausserliche Uberganze her- 
gestellt" {ibid., p. 164). 

25. See Didascalicon i.vii, ad fin. 

26. Ibid., i.ii, n. 21. 

27. Ibid., n. 22. 

28. Ibid., i.iii, n. 24. 

29. Ibid., i.xi, n. 75. 

30. Ibid., i.ii. Augustinian view underlying the Boethian passage quoted 
by Hugh is cited, ibid., n. 21. 

31. Ibid., i.i, ad fin. With Hugh's adaptation of the Platonic doctrine of 
reminiscence here and in the passage from the Epitome (see n. 33), cf. 
William of Conches' claim that both Plato and Boethius, far from teaching 
the pre-existence of souls, which would be heresy, speak per integumenta on 
this subject: "Certain persons wish to condemn Plato and his follower, 
Boethius, and foist upon Plato the doctrine that souls, before coming into 
bodies, knew all things, but, upon being joined to flesh, forgot all things 

and recovered them afterwards through study Such persons do not 

know Plato's mode of speaking, for in philosophy he speaks in parables 
(per integumenta)." William's dispute with an unidentified contemporary on 
the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence suggests a possible motive for Hugh's 
adaptive allusions to it. Texts and discussion of the dispute in Pierre 
Courcelle, "Etude critique sur les commentaires de la Consolation de Boece 
(IX-XVe siecles)," AHDL, XII (1939), 87-9. Cf. Hugh's view, borrowed 
verbatim from Boethius, of the degeneration of intellectible substance upon 
its descent to the physical world, Didascalicon n.iii. 

32. See Didascalicon n.i. 

33. Roger Baron, ed., "Hugonis de Sancto Victore Epitome Dindimi in 
philosophiam : introduction, texte critique, et notes," Trad., XI (1955), 109- 
10. That Hugh may have intended to incorporate in the Didascalicon a 
schematized account of the origin of the four parts of philosophy, resembling 
that in the Epitome, is suggested by my Appendix A. Richard of St. Victor 
incorporates such a schematic account in his condensation of the Didascalicon 
in the Excerptiones priores; so, too, does the revision of William of Conches' 
Philosophia mundi (refs. cited, Appendix A, n. 3). Cf. De area Noe morali, Pro- 
logus^-L, CLXXVI, 619), where, in a more familiar doctrinal formulation 
of the Fall, Hugh teaches that the radical good lost by the first man was a 
cognitive one. Man had known his Creator. From that knowledge had come 
love, from love adherence, from adherence physical immortality. When the 
knowledge was lost, the goods dependent on it deteriorated. Love, ad- 
herence, immortality, and physical well-being were lost as well. Comparable 
analysis of the Fall in In Ecclesiasten homiliae (PL, CLXXIV, 227D-228B). 

34. Augustine wrote four separate commentaries on it: Books xi-xiii of 
the Confessiones, the De Genesi liber imperfectus, the lengthy De Genesi 
secundum litteram, and the De Genesi contra Manichaeos. 


3 5 . Chenu argues that the great twelfth-century problem was not merely, 
as has been said, the relation between faith and reason, but more broadly, 
the relation between nature and the divine, nature and grace. For detailed 
discussion and documentation of this thesis, see Chenu, "L'Homme et la 
nature," AHDL, XIX (1952), 39-66; Theologie au Xlle siecle, pp. 19-51; 
and "Moines, clercs et laics au carrefour de la vie evangelique (Xlle siecle)," 
RHB, XLIX (1954), 59 ff. 

36. For William's and Hugh's exchange of views on this point, see 
Appendix C, n. 3. Similar difference between William and Hugh on the 
creation of Eve ; cf. De philosophia mundi i.xxiii {PL, CLXXII, 5 6A-B) and 
De sacramentis 35-37 {PL, CLXXVI, 284C-88A; Roy J. Deferrari, tr. 
Hugh of Saint Victor On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith [Publication 
No. 58 of The Mediaeval Academy of America; Cambridge, Mass.: The 
Mediaeval Academy of America, 195 1], pp. 117-20). On the unformed 
condition of the rational creature and the source of its acquired form, see 
Didascalicon i.ii, n. 21. 

37. See Dionysius Lasic, Hugonis de S. Victore theologia perfectiva: eius 
jundamentum philosophicum ac theologicum (Romae: Pontificium Athenaeum 
Antonianum, 1956), pp. 8 ff. 

38. See Didascalicon i.x. n. 69, where texts in the complicated history and 
varied twelfth-century use of this conception are cited in connection with 
Hugh's first definition of natura. 

39. The De sapientia animae Christi {PL, CLXXVI, 845-56), though 
written in response to a question put by Walter of Mortagne, suggests by 
the very length and detail of the answer, the importance Hugh attached to 
the point. For Augustine's treatment, see esp. De libero arbitrio n.ix ("Quid 
sapientia sine qua nemo beatus; an una sit in omnibus sapientibus"), x ("Una 
est sapientiae lux omnibus sapientibus communis"), xii ("Una et incommut- 
abilis in omnibus intelligentibus Veritas, eaque nostra mente superior"), 
and xiii ("Exhortatio ad amplexum veritatis quae una beatos fecit"); PL, 
XXXII, 125 3-1263. See, further, Didascalicon, i.i. n. 1, 2. 

40. See Didascalicon n. 42, with explanation and texts cited. 

41. For ref., see Didascalicon i.i. n. 5, ad fin. Cf. texts cited in connection 
with Hugh's first definition of "natura" (i.x. n. 69); note particularly the 
passage from De sacramentis i.v. 3 quoted in extenso ( n. 42). 

42. See Didascalicon i.i. n. 5. Discussion of the figure and of the general 
influence of pseudo-Dionysius on Hugh in Heinrich Weisweiler, "Sakra- 
ment als Symbol und Teilhabe : Der Einfluss des Pseudo-Dionysius auf die 
allgemeine Sakramentlehre Hugos von Sankt- Viktor, "Schol., XXVII (1952), 
321-43. The late date of Hugh's commentary on the Celestial Hierarchy 
makes it uncertain what influence the latter might have exercised on the 
Didascalicon by, for example, the celebrated definition of "hierarchy" ("a 
divine order, both knowledge and action, conforming as far as possible to 
the Form of God and rising toward likeness to God in direct proportion to 
the illuminations divinely conferred upon it" [PL, CLXXV, 989-90]), of 
which Hugh observes {ibid., 992B) that it applies only to angels and men. 
The concept of a hierarchy of participation in the divine ideas, however, is 


suggested in Augustine De diversis quaestionibus i.xlvi, "De ideis" {PL, XL, 
31), where the rational soul's participation in the divine ideas is said to 
surpass the participation of all the rest of created reality; cf. Enarratio in 
Ps. CIII, sermo iv.ii {PL, XXXVII, 1379): "Thus says the Lord: I do not 
exact participation in the divine Wisdom from creatures not made in my 
image; but of those so made, I do exact it"; Confessiones vn.ix: "by particip- 
ation in that divine Wisdom which ever remains One in itself are souls 
renewed and made wise" ; De consensu evangelistarum i.xxiii. 3 5 {PL, XXXIV, 
1058): "we do not merely admit, we especially preach that highest Wisdom 
of God which, through participation in Itself, makes wise whatever soul 
becomes truly wise." In the last three texts, participation in the divine 
Wisdom as a whole is restricted to the rational soul; the rest of created 
reality participates in some pattern or idea within the divine Wisdom. 

43. See Appendix A. 

44. See Didascalicon n.xviii. 

45. See Didascalicon Preface, third paragraph. 

46. See Didascalicon v.ix. 

47. For John the Scot's view that religion and philosophy are convert- 
ible, see De praedestinatione 1 {PL, CXXII, 3 5 6-8) and De divisione naturae 
i.lxix {PL, CXXII, 5 1 3). Augustine's view in De vera religione v.viii {PL, 
XXXIV, 126) and De ordine n.ix. 26 {PL, XXXII, 1007). With Augustine's 
statement {ibid., 11. v. 14) that philosophy has "no other function than to 
teach what is the First Principle of all things, great an Intellect 
dwells therein, and what has proceeded from it for our welfare," cf. Hugh's 
Epitome (Baron, ed., p. 107): "The end of all philosophy is apprehension of 
the highest Good, which lies in the Maker of things alone," and the 
opening sentence of Didascalicon i.i. On essential differences between Hugh 
and John the Scot, see Didascalicon i.i. n. 16; n. 42; i.ii. n. 21. 

48. Ref. to Epitome cited, Didascalicon i.ii. n. 19. 

49. Baron, ed., pp. 1 14-15. 

50. Reading abiudicaverunt, as in two of Baron's MSS, in place of his 
adiudicaverunt, which does not make sense; ibid., p. 115. 

5 1 . Ibid. 

52. Literally, "where they should admit," reading ammiserint in place of 
Baron's amiserint, which makes no sense. 

53. Ibid., p. 116. 

54. De philosophia mundi 1, Praefatio {PL, CLXXII, 41 D ff.). The work 
appeared 1125-30, or about the same time as the Didascalicon. 

55. Metalogicon; C. C. J. Webb ed., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), 
p. 21 ; Daniel D. McGarry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955), 
p. 25. 

56. Ibid., i.v (Webb, p. 19; McGarry, p. 23). 

57. Ibid., i.i (Webb, p. 7; McGarry, p. 11). 

58. Jourdain, ed., "Commentaires inedits," p. 72. 

59. Ottaviano, ed., Un brano, pp. 27, 28, 34. For summary of Hugh's 
position on the mechanical arts and a close paraphrase of Didascalicon i.viii, 
see Ottaviano, Un brano, p. 25. 


60. Epitome, Baron, ed., p. 116. 

61. See William's commentary on the De consolatione philosophiae, Jour- 
dain, ed., "Commentaires inedits," pp. 72-3. 

62. De scripturis et scriptoribus sacris i {PL, CLXXV, 9D). 

63. De area Noe morali, Prologus {PL, CLXXVI, 619). 

64. Barthelemy Haureau, Histoire de la philosophie scolastique, I (Paris, 
1872), 424, and Ueberweg-Heinze, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, II 
(9th ed., 1905), 223. Cited in Baron, Science et sagesse, p. 7, n. 30; p. 11, n. 46. 

65. See Didascalicon vi.iii. 

66. See Didascalicon v.viii and vii; note his discussion of occupatio in the 
passage from In Ecclesiasten homiliae cited, Didascalicon v. vii. n. 28. 

67. Historia calamitatum, Muckle, ed., pp. 19 1-2. 

68. In Ecclesiasten homiliae {PL, CLXXVI, 15 2D). 

69. De philosophia mundi i.xxiii {PL, CLXXII, 56B f.). The irritableness 
of William's words in this entire passage suggests caricature rather than a 
fair picture of his opponents' position, and it is not impossible to see Hugh 
of St. Victor as among those intended. 

70. De animae exsilio et patria {PL, CLXXII, 1 241-6). 

71. Hans Willner, ed., Des Adelard von Bath Traktat De eodem et diver so, 
BGPM, IV (Minister, 1904), p. 16. 

72. See Didascalicon i.i. n. 10, for documentation of the disputes. Despite 
the differences between Abaelard and the Chartrians in their approach to 
these materials, the former interpreting them per involucrum, the latter with a 
literalness related to their scientific purpose, Chenu notes of Abaelard that 
"sans qu'il soit, loin de la, le seul a user de ce parallelisme (cf. Guillaume de 
Conches et les Chartrains), il en est bien le patron au Xlle siecle" ("Involu- 
crum: le mythe selon les theologiens medievaux," AHDL. XXII [1955] 
77); same view in Parent, Doctrine de la creation, pp. 70 ff., esp. pp. 74-5 

73. Frequently the subject of commentaries apart from the rest of the text 
(see Courcelle, "Etude critique," AHDL, XII [1939], pp. 119 fi°.), the metre 
was recognized as a summary of the Timaeus, or even as a "summa totius 
philosophiae," according to one enthusiastic gloss reported by Courcelle 
{ibid., p. 10, n. 4). 

74. Ibid., pp. 77-94. 

75. See, e.g., Didascalicon n. 34, 35, 38, 45; i.vii. n. 56; i.ix. n. 59; 
i.x. n. 69; n.i. n. 7; n.iii. n. 18; 11. iv. n. 26, 27, 28; 11. vi. n. 39; n. vii. n. 40, 
41; n.xviii. n. 63. 

76. Quoted in the final sentence of the Didascalicon vi.xiii. 

77. For discussion and edition of the work, see Theodore Silverstein, ed., 
"Liber Hermetis Triplicis de VI rerum principiis," AHDL, XXII (1955), 

78. See Didascalicon i.vii. n. 53, 55; in.ii. n. 8. 

79. For examples, see Didascalicon i.i. n. 1, 4, 8, 9, 10, 13, 17; i.iv. n. 25. 

80. So Courcelle, "Etude critique," AHDL, XII (1939), p. 65. 

81. So Parent, Doctrine de la creation, p. 19. 

82. His commentaries are on the Pentateuch, the Books of Kings, 
Ecclesiastes, the Lamentations of Jeremiah, the Magnificat, the Lord's 


Prayer, the Ark of Noah, the Celestial Hierarchy of pseudo-Dionysius, and 
the rule of St. Augustine and occupy some 6 5 o columns in the PL. 

83. See On the contrast between Hugh and the Char- 
trians on the use of poetry and literary prose in teaching the arts, see ibid., 
n. 44; ni.v. n. 48; n.xxix. n. 84. 

84. See Didascalicon iv.i. Cf. Abaelard, for whom the author of the Latin 
Asclepius is "that most ancient of philosophers, great of name, Mercury, 
whom, on account of his excellence, men called a god" (Theologia Christiana 
i.v [PL, CLXXVIII, 1 141 A]); Plato, "that greatest of philosophers" (ibid., 
1 144A) ; and Macrobius, "himself no mean philosopher, and the expositor of 
the great philosopher Cicero" (ibid., 115 3C). 

85. " many men of letters we now see who wish to be called 
Christians, who enter the church with the rest of the faithful, who there 
partake of the sacraments of Christ, yet in whose hearts the memory of 
Saturn and Jove, of Hercules and Mars, of Achilles and Hector, of Pollux 
and Castor, of Socrates and Plato and Aristotle is more often found than 
that of Christ and his saints ! They love the frivolities of the poets, and they 
neglect or (what is worse) deride and contemn the truth of the Divine 
Scriptures. Let them now reflect what good it does them to enter the church 
exteriorly, while interiorly, in their hearts, they commit fornication far from 
the true faith. . . . What good does it do to know the truth if one loves false- 
hood?" De area Noe morali(PL, CLXXVI, 674B-C). On the mythological 
as well as cosmological lore found in the glosses of William of Conches, as 
in those of Remigius of Auxerre before him, see Jeauneau, "La Notion 
d'integumentum," AHDL, XXIV (1957), 35-100. 

86. In Ecclesiasten homiliae (PL, CLXXV, 238A-B). The first opinion, 
that nature is self-caused and cyclically self-renewing, is reported in Augustine 
De civ. Dei xn.xiii; cf. the account of the pre-Socratics, ibid., vin.ii. Cf. 
Hugh's gloss on Ecclesiastes 1:10 ("Nothing under the sun is new. . . it hath 
already gone before in the ages that were before us"), which forms an 
extended treatment of those "philosophers of the gentiles" who "with 
amazing madness tried to assert the eternity of time," who held that the 
universe of changeable things has neither beginning nor end but repeats it- 
self every 1 5,000 years, and who taught that all nature, all men, all events, all 
fates and fortunes, all fathers and sons were identically repeated in each such 
cycle. Cf. Macrobius In somnium Scipionis n.xi (Franciscus Eyssenhardt ed., 
[Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1893], pp. 620-3; tr. William Harris Stahl, 
Macrobius' Commentary on the Dream ofScipio [New York: Columbia Univer- 
sity Press, 1952], pp. 219-22), where the Great Year is given as 15,000 years, 
and Timaeus 39D, with Chalcidius's commentary (Wrobel, pp. 183-4; 
Mullach, p. 208) with its reference to an "annorum innumerabilem seriem." 
Cf. Cicero De finibus n.xxxi. 102 and De natura deorum 11. 51; see P. R. 
Coleman-Norton, "Cicero's Doctrine of the Great Year," Laval theologique et 
philosophique, III (1947), 293-302. 

87. In Ecclesiasten homiliae (PL, CLXXV, 28 3 C). 

88. In addition to the references cited above, n. 86-7, see In Pentateuchon 
iv (PL, CLXXV, 33B): "Our authors differ from the philosophers in that 


the latter treat God as nothing but an artisan. They hold that there are three 
creative principles — God, matter, and the archetypal ideas — whereas our 
authors hold that there is a single creative principle and that this is God 
alone." Cf. De sacramentis i.i. i {PL, CLXXVI, 187B): "The philosophers 
of the gentiles hold to three uncaused principles : an artisan, matter, and 
form. They say that creation was brought from matter into its present form 
by the artisan, and they believe God to be a mere shaper, not a creator. But 
the true faith confesses only one uncaused and eternal first principle, and 
confesses that by him alone was non-existent creation created." 

89. In Ecclesiasten homiliae {PL, CLXXV, 239D). 

90. Ibid., 177A-B. 

91. In Hierarchiam Coelestem i.i {PL, CLXXV, 92 5 -D): "...and this 
truth had to be served by them [the ancients] : it was not the truth which 
leads to Life, and they were not the sons of Life. Their task, therefore, was 
given them for our sakes. To us the consummation of truth was reserved, 
for us its beginning prepared. They found that truth which it behooved the 
sons of Life to use in the service of the highest truth. The labor of it was 
given to them, the fruit to us." 

92. Above, p. 10. 

93. For specific texts, see Didascalicon i.i, n. 1. On heresies risked by 
John the Scot and Remigius, see further Courcelle, "Etude critique," 
pp. 59-65; new details on the dependence of Remigius on John the Scot 
available from the Scotian commentary, unknown to Courcelle, on De cons, 
phi/, in. m.ix, in H. Silvestre, "Le Commentaire inedit de Jean Scot Erigene 
au metre IX du livre III du 'De consolatione philosophiae' de Boece," 
RHE, XL VII (1952), 44-122. Remigius 's approach was merely extended 
by Adalbold of Utrecht, but the latter's lengthy discussion of how the 
Summum Bonum can be forma without being formatum has independent 
importance for the history of this term; see R. C. B. Huygens, "Mittelalter- 
liche Kommentare zum O qui perpetua," SE, VI (1954), 410-413. On 
Hugh's knowledge of the writings of Remigius, see Didascalicon i.x. n. 74; 
n.iv. n. 29; n.xviii. n. 63 ; n.xxiv. n. 72; in.ii. n. 6, 8, 9, 14, 19, 24, 26, 31, 36. 

94. See Didascalicon i.ix. n. 69. 

95. On Hugh's adaptation of the homo erectus theme, see Didascalicon i.i. 

n - 3- 

96. Hugh so interprets it in the De contemplatione; see Didascalicon i.i. n. 4. 

97. See Didascalicon n. 42. 

98. See Parent, Doctrine de la creation, pp. 48 ff. 

99. See refs. to his De sex dierum operibus, Didascalicon 11. i. n. 7; n.iv. n. 28 ; 
and esp. n.vii. n. 41. 

100. See section 11 of the Introduction. On the mind as patterned, like 
the angelic intellect, after the entire "contents" of the divine Mind, see 
Didascalicon n. 42. 

101. See p. 46. 

102. Ibid. 

103. Ibid., cf. n. 9. 

104. Ibid., cf. n. 11. 


105. Ibid., cf. n. 10. 

106. Ibid. 

107. In his glosses on the De cons. phi/, and the earlier glosses on the 
Timaeus, both probably in existence before the Didascalicon; not, however, 
in the De philosophia mundi or the later glosses on the Timaeus, where he 
reports the identification, but no longer as his own view. See also Didas- 
calicon i.i. n. 10. 

108. Glosses on the Timaeus; see Parent, Doctrine de la creation, p. 170. 
Variant interpretation oiidem, diver sum, dividuum, individuum, in his glosses on 
the De cons, phil., Jourdain, ed., "Commentaires inedits," pp. 75-6. 

109. See Parent, Doctrine de la creation, p. 169. 

1 10. Glosses on the De cons, phil., Jourdain, ed., "Commentaires inedits," 
pp. 76-7. 

in. See Didascalicon i.i. n. 7. 

112. Ibid. 

113. Ibid. 

114. See Didascalicon i.i. n. 10, ad fin. 

115. Cf. William of Conches, commentary on De cons, phil., ed. Jourdain, 
"Commentaires inedits," p. 76: "I call the [world-]soul threefold in nature, 
that is, in power and property, because it is vegetable in grasses and trees, 
sensible in brute animals, rational in men." 

116. De tribus diebus xviii {PL, CLXXVI, 828B-C): "One must not in 
any way suppose that, as the intelligence of man is personally joined with 
the body which it activates, so too the Creator Spirit is personally joined 
with the body of this sense-perceptible world ; for God fills the world in a 
manner quite different from that in which the soul fills the body." 

117. For details, see below, Didascalicon i.i. n. 8. 

118. The De septem septenis vii {PL, CXCIX, 961D-962A) speaks of "that 
created spirit" or "natural movement" "which is called 'nature' by Hermes 
Mercury, 'world-soul' by Plato, 'fate' by certain other men, and 'the divine 
dispensation' by theologians"; Herman of Carinthia De essentiis (Manuel 
Alonso, ed. [Comilles: Universidad Pontificia, 1946], p. 63) declares: 
"[Naturam] eodem nomine vocare possumus quo Plato significans mundi 
animam vocat." Adelard of Bath parallels natura and anima in De eodem et 
diverso (Willner, ed., p. 15 ; see Winner's interpretation of the passage, ibid., 
p. 77). Sources of the identification of natura and world-soul are Chalcidius, 
for whom the "works of nature" are the works of the world-soul (see 
Didascalicon i.ix. n. 59), and the Latin Asclepius (Nock, ed., II, 299). 

119. See Didascalicon, and esp. n. 38. Though to name God in 
Didascalicon, Hugh uses the Timaean Genitor et Artifex naturae, he care- 
fully defines God in the orthodox terminology of Boethius' De hebdomadibus. 

120. See Didascalicon i.vii. n. 53; cf. i.x. n. 69. Note particularly the 
striking contrast provided by the different uses to which Hugh and the 
"Liber Hermetis" author put the phrase "unicuique rei non solum esse sed 
etiam tale esse constituit." 

121. See Didascalicon i.x. n. 71. To the refs. there cited as precedents for 
Hugh's rejection of the world-soul in favor of solar fire, add Jerome In 


Ecclesiasten i {PL, XXIII, 1017A), clearly Hugh's authority. Cf. Isidore De 
natura rerum xxvu.ii {PL, LXXXIII, 1001A), and Rupert of Deut2 In 
Ecclesiasten v {PL CLXVIII, 1201). Though in the Didascalicon Hugh 
reserves to the archetypal Exemplar the distribution of each thing's esse and 
esse talis, in the homilies on Ecclesiastes he considers that the fiery spiritus or 
occulta naturae vis of the sun "unicuique secundum suae naturae capacitatem 
propriam qualitatem distribuit" (homilia ii [VL, CLXXV, 1 3 7 A]). The two 
positions suggest the Nous qualificans and natura qualificata of the" Liber 
Hermetis." Note further homilia xi {PL, CLXXV, 185A-186C), where the 
divine Wisdom, stretching from end to end of the universe, "comitatur ac 
fovet cuncta quae operata est, ut non subsistat sine ipsa quae facta et creata 
sunt ab ipsa" — an attending and nourishing function reserved to the world- 
soul in writers of different stamp. The divine Wisdom "pursues" genera in 
their "degeneration" or "flight" down the hierarchical ladder of being, and, 
deserting none, gives to each a beauty suited to its genus — "unicuique quod 
suum est tribuit" {ibid.). 

122. See Didascalicon i.ix. n. 59. 

123. See Didascalicon n. 34, 35. 

124. See concluding paragraph of Didascalicon i.v; cf. concluding para- 
graph of i.vii and the considerations which form the bulk of i.ix. 

125. See Appendix C. 

126. See remarks introductory to Appendices A, B, and C. 

127. William of Conches attempts to reconcile the Platonic {Timaean) and 
scriptural (Pauline and pseudo-Dionysian) hierarchies of daimons and angels, 
De philosophia mundi i.xvi-xx {PL, CLXXII, 47A-48D). Honorius Augusto- 
dunensis cites scriptural warrant for declaring that angels possess bodies of 
fire and locates them above the aqueum coelum next over the firmament, 
Libellus octo quaestionum iii {PL, CLXXII, 1189A-B); cf. De imagine mundi 
i.lxvii {PL, CLXXII, 138A) and i.cxxxix {ibid., 146C). See further the 
anonymous twelfth-century commentary on Genesis mistakenly printed 
among the works of Remigius of Auxerre {PL, CXXXI, 54D-55A); 
Clarenbaldus of Arras Liber de eodem secundus (Nicholas Haring, ed., A.HDL, 
XXII [1955], 212); and esp. Summa sententiarum tractatus n.i {PL, CLXXVI, 
81), a distinctly un-Hugonian passage despite the mistaken claim of Baron 
{Science et sagesse, p. 5 6, n. 11 6) that its tenor is identical with Hugh's In 
Pentateuchon viii {PL, CLXXV, 34-35). Once and tentatively {ibid., vii [PL, 
CLXXV, 37B]), Hugh concedes that man's body may have been made 
through the ministry of angels ("'Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et 
simiUtudinem nostram'... ipse [Deus] ad angelos ita loquatur, quorum 
ministerio forsitan formatum est corpus hominis"). Such a function is not 
mentioned in the tract on the angels in De sacramentis i.v. 

128. To the refs. given in Appendix C, n. 1, add Hugh's Expositio in 
Hierarchiam coelestem i.iii {PL, CLXXV, 929-930). 

129. Theologie au XI Ie siecle, p. 20. 

130. Section 1 of Introduction, concluding two paragraphs. 

131. It is necessary to distinguish between works which are "encyclo- 
pedic" in virtue of speculating on the nature of the 'syxoxXioi; raaSeioc, the 


cycle of arts by which education can best be accomplished, and those that 
are "encyclopedic" in the modern sense, that is, as repositories of informa- 
tion on a wide variety of subjects. Isidore's Etymologiae is encyclopedic in 
the latter sense, the DidascaUcon in the former. Cf. Baur, Gundissalinus, 
pp. 317-318, for further discussion of the distinction as applied to works in 
the didascalic tradition. 

132. De area Noe morali iv.i {PL, CLXXVI, 66 3 B): "Let no man excuse 
himself. Let no man say, 'I am not able to build a house for the Lord ; my 
poverty does suffice for such an expensive project; I have no place in which 
to build it.'... You shall build a house for the Lord out of your own self. 
He himself will be the builder ; your heart will be the place ; your thoughts 
will supply the material." 

133. See DidascaUcon n.i. 

134. De Trinitate xiv.xvii {PL, XLII, 1054-5). 

135. De ordine i.viii {PL, XXXII, 988). Cf. Augustine's criticism of the 
De ordine in the Retractationes i.iii. 2 {PL, XXXII, 588): "In these books I 
am displeased . . . because I attributed a great deal to the liberal arts, of which 
many saintly men are much in ignorance, and with which many who are not 
saintly are thoroughly conversant." 

136. Cf. Henri-Irenee Marrou, Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique 
(Paris: E. de Boccard, 1949), pp. 356-85. 

137. De doctrina Christiana n.xlii. 63 {PL, XXXIV, 65). 

138. Ibid., i.xxxv. 39 {PL, XXXIV, 34); cf. n.vii. 10 {PL, XXXIV, 39): 
"Everyone who studies the divine Scriptures will find nothing in them but 
the insistence that God be loved for God's sake and that one's neighbor be 
loved for God's sake." 

139. Ibid., n.vii. 9-1 1 {PL, XXXIV, 39-40). 

140. See DidascaUcon m.i. 

141. See DidascaUcon in.iii. 

142. De doctrina Christiana n.xix. 29 {PL, XXXIV, 50). The survey 
extends to n.xxxix. 5 8 {ibid., 62). 

143. The looseness of the classification is suggested, for example, by the 
double appearance of astronomy in it: in II. A. 3 by name, in II. B. 3 as number 
applied to motion. Augustine's more conventional formulation of the arts, 
as in De ordine n.xii ff. {PL, XXXII, 10 1 1 ff.) should not be forgotten. The 
point at issue here, however, is the difference between the formulations of 
the De doctrina Christiana and the DidascaUcon. Baron {Science etsagesse, p. 46, 
n. 57) follows de Bruyne in attributing the above scheme to Rhabanus 
Maurus as a sign of his independence and originality. 

144. See DidascaUcon n.xxvii. 

145. Ibid., in.iv. 

146. See Appendix B. 

147. De doctrina Christiana n.xxix. 46 {PL, XXXIV, 57). 

148. Ibid., iv.iii. 4-5 {PL, XXXIV, 90-1). 

149. Ibid., n.xxxix. 58 {PL, XXXIV, 62). 

150. Ibid., 59 {PL, XXXIV, 62). 

151. De sacramentis 1. Prologus. 6 {PL, CLXXVI, 185 ; Deferrari, p. 5). 


152. Henry Osborn Taylor, The Mediaeval Mind, II (London: Macmillan 
and Co., 1938), 387, n. 2; cf. L. W. Jones, "The Influence of Cassiodorus on 
Medieval Culture," Spec, XX (1945), 438. 

153. Institutiones i.xxi (Mynors, p. 60; Jones, p. 120). 

154. Ibid., 1. xxi, xxvii, xxviii (Mynors, pp. 60, 68, 69-71 ; Jones, pp. 120, 
127, 128-9). 

155. Ibid., n.iii (Mynors, p. no; Jones, p. 159). 

156. See Introduction, n. 21. 

157. Institutiones 1. xxviii, xxix, xxxi (Mynors, pp. 71-3, 78-9; Jones, pp. 
1 30-1, 135-6). 

158. See Didascalicon 11. ii. n. 16. 

159. Ibid., i.iv. n. 27. 

160. So Hugonin in his introductory essay to Hugh's works {PL 
CLXXV, cols. l-li). Mignon, Origines de la scolastique, I, 65-6, would have 
Hugh's distinction between philosophy and theology "as perfect" as that 
of St. Thomas. Marietan, Probleme de la classification, pp. 134-5, believes that 
the "theology" of Hugh's first three books is Aristotle's "first philosophy," 
or metaphysics, while the last three books treat revealed theology. The 
same interpretation is found in Manitius, Geschichte der lateinischen Literatur, 
III, 113; in John P. Kleinz, The Theory of Knoiv ledge of Hugh of Saint Victor 
(Washington, D. C. : Catholic University of America Press, 1944), pp. 8-12; 
and in F. Vernet, "Hugues de Saint-Victor," DTC, VII, part 1 (Paris, 1927), 
258-60, who also summarizes the views of several others on the point. 
Against these, the anachronism of approaching twelfth-century authors, 
particularly William of Conches and Hugh of St. Victor, with the modern 
distinction between philosophy and theology in mind has been pointed out 
by Parent, Doctrine de la creation, pp. 20-1, and the unity of natural and super- 
natural knowledge in Hugh's thought has been demonstrated by Jakob 
Kilgenstein, Die Gotteslehre des Hugo von St. Viktor (Wurzburg, 1898), 
esp. pp. 51-7. 

161. See Didascalicon i.ii. 

162. In Ecclesiasten homiliae {PL, CLXXV, 197B): "This is man's wisdom 
in this life, namely, to seek and search out the divine Wisdom." 

163. See Didascalicon i.v. 

164. Ibid.,, third paragraph {ad fin.); cf. n.i, third paragraph. 

165. In the sense that the intellectual creature remains unformed unless it 
turns toward the divine Wisdom which forms and informs it. See Didascali- 
con i.ii. n. 21. 

166. Cf. Hugh's statement in Didascalicon, Preface: "The book instructs 
the reader as well of secular writings as of the Divine Writings." Vernet 
(see n. 160) cites this statement but takes scripturae as if it were scientiae; 
Hugonin (see n. 160) does the same. The distinction between the works of 
creation {opera conditionis) and the works of man's restoration or salvation 
{opera restaurationis) is basic to Hugh's thought and recurs constantly in his 
works : cf. De area Noe morali iv.iii {PL, CLXXVI, 667) ; De vanitate mundi n 
{ibid., 716-17); Expositio in Hierarchiam coelestem i.i {PL, CLXXV, 926-7); 
and De sacramentis 1. Prologus. ii {PL, CLXXVI, 183 ; Deferrari, pp. 3-4), 


which also adds the qualification, "The worldly or secular writings have the 
works of creation as their material; the Divine Writings, the works of 

167. Expositio in Hierarchiam coelestem i.i {PL, CLXXV, 923-8). 

168. Ibid. (esp. cols. 926D-928B). Cf. De area Noe morali {PL, 
CLXXVI, 672B): "Because, with superstitious curiosity, the philosophers 
of the gentiles investigated the natures of things, that is, the works of 
creation, they came to nothingness and vanity in their thoughts. Because 
the philosophers of the Christians ceaselessly ponder the works of salvation, 
they drive away all vanity from their thoughts." 

169. "naturalibus quoque pro modo subjunctis, ut in illis eruditionem 
conformaret." Expositio in Hierarchiam coelestem i.i {PL, CLXXV, 927A). 

170. The De tribus diebus {PL, CLXXVI, 811-38) is entirely devoted to 
such demonstrations, combining them, significantly, with scriptural 
evidences. Cf. De sacramentis i.iii.i ff. {PL, CLXXVI, 217 ff. ; Deferrari, 
pp. 41 ff.), which presents an abbreviated version of the De tribus diebus on 
man's knowledge of the Trinity. 

171. De sacramentis I. Prologus. 5 {PL, CLXXVI, 185C; Deferrari, p. 5). 

172. Ibid. Significantly, the restoration of man in truth and virtue is 
attributed alike to the allegorical (doctrinal) and tropological (moral) inter- 
pretation of Scripture in the De sacramentis and to the theoretical and prac- 
tical arts in the Didascalicon (see esp. i.v and i.viii). Scripture is the primary 
source for such arts. 

173. Expositio in Hierarchiam coelestem i.i {PL, CLXXV, 927A). 

174. Philippe Delhaye, "La Place de l'ethique parmi les disciplines 
scientifiques au Xlle siecle," in Miscellanea moralia in honor em eximii do mini 
Arthur Janssen (Gembloux: Editions J. Duculot, 1948), pp. 29-44, argues 
that two ethics, one theological and one philosophical or natural, were 
recognized in the Middle Ages, even among the Victorines and by Hugh in 
particular {ibid., pp. 3 1-4). Delhaye's thesis requires modification in the case 
of Hugh, who recognized one ethical science subserved in part by pagan 
writings, but finally and perfectly by Scripture. Cf. Delhaye's "L'Enseigne- 
ment de la philosophic morale au Xlle siecle," MS, XI (1949), 77-99, which, 
repeating the argument that "les classifications scientifiques du Xlle siecle 
font place a Yethica comme une science morale distincte de la theologie," 
finds that this natural ethics was attached to the study of the trivium, especi- 
ally to commentaries made by the teacher of grammar upon literary texts in 
the manner prescribed by Quintilian, to moralizations of the ancient poets 
like those of Bernardus Silvestris on the Aeneid or Arnulph of Orleans on 
Ovid, and to the study of Cicero's De inventione, with its appended treatment 
of the virtues necessary to deliberative and demonstrative oratory. Prac- 
ticed, to be sure, by men of Chartrian connection, such an approach to 
grammar was foreign to Hugh's thinking. See Didascalicon n.xxix. n. 84; 
in.iv. n. 44; iii.v. n. 48. Cf. In Ecclesiasten homiliae {PL, CLXXV, 177D- 
78B), where Hugh, admitting the existence of a natural ethics among pagan 
philosophers, blames its inadequacies as in part responsible for the failure of 
these philosophers to attain to the true Wisdom. Note that Godfrey of St. 


Victor Fons philosophiae (ed. Pierre Michaud-Quentin, Analecta Mediaeva- 
lia Namurcensia, VIII [Namur: Editions Godenne, 1956]), lines 483 and 
485-96, divides the tropological interpretation of Scripture into ethics, 
economics, and politics— arts enumerated in the first half of the Didascalicon. 

175. Monvement theologique, ip. 186. 

176. See Didascalicon in.xix. n. 86-8. 

177. Ibid., vi.iii. 

178. PL, CLXXVI, 951, or Karl Miiller, ed., Hugo von St. Victor: 
Soliloquium de arrha animae und De vanitate mundi ("Kleine Texte fur 
Vorlesungen und Ubungen," Hans Lietzmann, ed., Heft CXXIII; Bonn, 
1913), p. 3. 

179. PL, CLXXV, cols, clxi-clxiii. 

180. First denied by Mabillon ( Vete ra analecta [Paris, 1675], I, 326) on the 
basis of two notes in twelfth-century MSS from the monasteries of Anchin 
and Marchienne which say that Hugh was from the territory of Ypres, the 
story has been further attacked in recent years by F. E. Croydon, "Notes on 
the Life of Hugh of St. Victor," JTS, XL (1939), 232-53, and most recently 
by Roger Baron, "Notes biographiques sur Hugues de Saint- Victor," RHE, 
LI (1956), 920-34. For defense of the story, see Jerome Taylor, The Origin 
and Early Life of Hugh of St. Victor: An Evaluation of the Tradition ("Texts 
and Studies in the History of Mediaeval Education," V, A. L. Gabriel and 
J. N. Garvin ed., Notre Dame, Indiana: The Mediaeval Institute, 1957). Cri- 
tical review of the arguments of Baron and of Taylor in Robert Javelet, 
"Les Origines de Hugues de Saint -Victor," Revue des sciences religieuses 
{Strasbourg), XXXIV (i960), 74-83. 

181. On this movement in general, and particularly on its development 
in the twelfth century, see Chenu, "Moins, clercs, et laics," RHE, XLIX 
(1954), 59-94. Cf. J. C. Dickinson, Origins of the Austin Canons and Their 
Introduction into England (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1950). 


1. Ps. 35:4. 

2. Cf. Matt. 25:18. 

3. Cf. Isidore of Seville Sententiarum libri in.ix. 5-8 {PL, LXXXIII, 
681B-82A) for comparable discussion of quick and slow students. 
The preceding two paragraphs of the preface are found in only one class of 
MSS (see Buttimer, pp. xv-xvii). It is not improbable that Hugh added 
them against the temporarily influential Cornificians, who preached that 
study was futile for those lacking natural ability, superfluous for those 
possessing it. On the career of this academic sect, see John of Salisbury 
Metalogicon i.i-x (Webb, pp. 5-28; McGarry, pp. 9-33). On the scant 
reverence of the Cornificians for Hugh, ibid., i.v (Webb, p. 19, McGarry, 
p. 23). 

4. With Didascalicon i-iii, cf. Hugh's Epitome (Baron, ed.), a briefer and 
earlier treatment of the same materials in dialogue form; with Didascalicon 
iv- vi, cf. Hugh's earlier and briefer De scripturis et scriptoribus sacris praenota- 
tiunculae {PL, CLXXV, 9-28). On Hugh's method of producing opuscula 


on limited questions, then absorbing these into more comprehensive treat- 
ments, see De sacramentis Praefatio {PL, CLXXVI, 173-4; Defarrari, p. 1), 
and Heinrich Weisweiler, "Die Arbeitsmethode Hugos von St. Viktor, ein 
Beitrag zum Entstehen seines Hauptwerkes De sacramentis" Schol., XX- 
XXIV (1949), 59-87, 232-67. That Hugh was still contemplating additions 
to the text of the Didascalicon is evident from Appendices A, B, and C. 


1. This keynote sentence of the Didascalicon is adapted from Boethius 
De consolatione philosophiae in. pr. x: " have seen what the form of the 
perfect and imperfect good is. ... Of all things to be sought, the highest and 
cause why the others are sought is the Good. that Good lies the sub- 
stance of God." The commentary tradition on the De consolatione identifies 
the Boethian "Form of the Good" with the Second Person of the Trinity, to 
whom is assigned the role of formal cause or exemplar of creation. So, e.g., 
in the ninth century by Remigius of Auxerre, on whose work Hugh relies 
elsewhere in the Didascalicon. See Remigius's commentary on De consolatione 
in.m.9: "By 'form' he [Boethius] means the Son of God, who is the Wisdom 
of God and through whom all things have been made. . . . Or, again, he calls 
'form' that Exemplar and Idea which was in the mind of God and according 
to whose likeness the world was afterwards made. . . . Saint John gives this 
very Idea and Pattern of God the name 'Life'; Plato calls it 'the ideas'" 
(Latin text in H. F. Stewart, "A Commentary of Remigius Autissiodorensis 
on the De consolatione philosophiae of Boethius," JTS, XVII [19 16], 31; 
improved text of Remigius in parallel columns with John the Scot's earlier 
handling of the same ideas in Silvestre, "Le Commentaire inedit de Jean 
Scot," RHE, LXVII [1952], 44-122, esp. 5 3-4). Comparable interpretation 
of forma in the twelfth century by William of Conches (cf. Parent, Doctrine de 
la creation, p. 130). Use of the term "form" in connection with Christ has 
Pauline and patristic sanction, as in Phil. 2 : 6, Augustine De civ. Dei vn.ix 
and Sermo cxvii: De verbis evangelii Johannis 1 : 1-3 {PL, XXXVIII, 662-3). 
With the terms and effects associated with Wisdom in this opening chapter, 
cf. Hugh's paraphrase of the Father's words about the Son in De tribus 
diebus xxiv (improperly printed as Didascalicon vn; PL, CLXXVI, 834): 
"He is the Wisdom through whom I have made all things. ...As God 
together with me, he created you ; as man together with you, he came down 
alone to you. . . . He is the Form, he the Medicine, he the Exemplar, he your 
Remedy." The need of fallen man for reunion with the divine Wisdom lies 
at the basis of Hugh's thinking on education. Treatments of Hugh's concept 
of Wisdom in Baron, Science et sagesse, pp. 147-66, and Jorgen Pedersen, 
"La Recherche de la sagesse d'apres Hugues de Saint- Victor," CM, XVI 
(1955), 91-133. Allusion to the opening sentence of the Didascalicon is found 
as early as 1 1 59 in John of Salisbury Metalogicon n.i (Webb, p. 61 ; McGarry, 
p. 74), and earlier in the opening words of William of Conches' revised 
Philosophia mundi (Ottaviano, ed., Un brano, p. 19; on the authorship of the 
brano, see Tullio Gregory, "Sull'attribuzione a Guglielmo di Conches di un 


rimaneggiamento della Philosophia mundi," GCFI, XXX [195 1], 119-25). 
The form of the many borrowings from the Didascalkon found in the revised 
form of the Philosophia mundi suggests that the Didascalicon circulated 
originally in student reportationes and that these, rather than the Didascalicon 
as we have it now, were used in the revision. 

2. Cf. John 1:9 and Hugh's commentary on this verse in De sapientia 
animae Christi {PL, CLXXVI, 848C-848D): '"He [the Word] was the true 
Light which illuminates every man who comes into this world.' What is the 
Word if not the divine Wisdom? For what John calls the Word, Paul calls 
'the Wisdom of God' (I Cor. 1 : 24). . . . Wisdom is the Word because T, 
Wisdom, came forth from the mouth of God, the Firstborn before every 
creature' (Eccli. 24: 5). ...And so Wisdom itself is Light, and God is Light, 
for God is Wisdom. And when God illuminates, he illuminates with Wis- 
dom and Light. Nor does he illuminate with any other light but that Light 
which he himself is. ..." The power of the divine Word or Wisdom to cure, 
before illuminating, man's eyes for the perception of itself is contrasted to 
the powerlessness of natural or worldly knowledge to do the same, in 
Hugh's Expositio in hierarchiam coelestem i.i {PL, CLXXV, 923B-6D). That 
Hugh is not an extreme illuminationist, however, is clear from his empiricist 
analysis of knowledge {scientia) as the product of sensus, itnaginatio, and ratio, 
in De unione corporis et spiritus {PL, CLXXVII, 287B-9A). To knowledge 
he contrasts v/isdom or understanding {intelligentia), an informing of the 
pure reason from within by the divine presence operating concurrently with 
reason as a man's soul moves upward toward God (ibid., 289A). Cf. Desacra- 
mentis i.iii. 3, 30 {PL, CLXXVI, 217C, 234C; Deferrari, pp. 42, 60-1), 
where even man's knowledge of God is said to be partly natural (through 
self-knowledge and knowledge of the physical universe) and only partly the 
effect of grace (through internal inspiration and external teaching confirmed 
by miracles). 

3. Cf. Boethius De consolatione philosophiae "In all other animals 
it is natural that they should not know themselves; in man it is a defect;" 
and Hugh In Ecclesiasten homiliae {PL, CLXXV, 174C) : "What more foolish 
than always to look to the lowest things and to hold one's face toward 
earth? This is the lot of the beasts, who are granted to seek nothing higher. 
But Wisdom dwells in things of heaven, and those unwilling to rise erect 
and be lifted toward it are like the beasts and gaze at earth." Further dis- 
cussion {ibid., 248D-5 iC), where Hugh glosses the text, "I said in my heart 
concerning the sons of men, that God would prove them, and show them to 
be like beasts" (Eccl. 3:18). Involved is the medieval commonplace, 
derived ultimately from Ovid Metamorphoses 1.83-6, which took the prone 
posture of beasts and the erect posture of man, his head toward the stars, as a 
symbol of the former's bondage to earth and the latter's relationship to the 
divine. For texts and studies in the transmission of this theme, see Theodore 
Silverstein, "The Fabulous Cosmogony of Bernardus Silvestris,' 'MP, 
XL VI (1948-9), 97, n. 28. To the references listed by Silverstein, add the 
striking use of the theme by Augustine De Trinitate xn.i {PL, XLII, 998). 
Full collection of ancient and earlier Christian references in S. O. Dickerman, 


De argumentis quibusdam apud Xenophontem, Platonem, Aristotelem obviis e 
structura hominis et animalium petitis (Halle, 1909), pp. 92-101. 

4. Ultimate source, Xenophon Memorabilia iv.ii.24-25. Of frequent 
Latin allusions to this famous epigram, that most commonly cited in the 
twelfth century was Macrobius Commentarium in somnium Scipionis i.ix. 1-2 
(Eyssenhardt, p. 521; Stahl, p. 124). However, cf. Macrobius Saturnalia; Ausonius Ludus de VII sapientibus exxxvii-ix; Ambrose Sermo 11 in Ps. 
cxviii xiii-iv {PL, XV, 1214-5) and Sermo x.x-xvi {ibid., \^^z-^). Location 
of the inscription precisely on the tripod seems to be reminiscence of 
Priscian Institutions grammaticae i.iv (Heinrich Keil, ed. Grammatici latini, II 
[Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1858], 17). For general discussion of the signific- 
ance of the Delphic inscription in medieval thought, see Etienne Gilson, 
The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy (Now York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), 
ch. xi, pp. 209-28. In De contemplatione et eius speciebus ii (Barthelemy 
Haureau, ed., Hugues de Saint-Victor: nouvel examen de P edition de ses oeuvres 
[Paris, 1859], pp. 177-8), Hugh identifies Wisdom's "tripod" as the threefold 
sense of Sacred Scripture, source of man's self-knowledge; the identification 
helps emphasize the fact that, for Hugh, "philosophy" makes use of 
Scripture. On self-awareness as the indispensible condition of man's move- 
ment toward the divine Wisdom, see De tribus diebus xvii {PL, CLXXVI, 
825 A) : "No man is truly wise who does not see that he himself exists." The 
basis of this condition is man's nature as a mysterious projection of the divine 
Wisdom: "The first and principal mystery [sacramentum] of the divine 
Wisdom, therefore, is the created wisdom, that is, the rational creature, 
which, partly visible, partly invisible, has been made its own gateway and 
road to contemplation" {ibid., 824D). 

5 . With the opening paragraph of the Didascalicon, cf. Hugh's Epitome 
(Baron, ed., p. 107) : "Philosophy rightly spends every effort on three things. 
The first is the investigation of man; this is necessary that man may know 
himself and recognize that he has been created. Next, when he has begun 
to know himself, let him investigate what that is by which he was made. 
Last, let him, as his practice, begin to meditate on the marvelous works of 
his Maker, so that he may equally understand what it is that was made with 
him and for his sake. By this triple way the search for Wisdom runs toward 
its end. The end of all philosophy is apprehension of the highest Good, 
which lies in the Maker of all things alone." The threefold task of philo- 
sophy Hugh derives from the "three eyes" man possessed before the fall 
(see De sacramentis i.x.2 and 12-15 [PL, CLXXVI, 329C-30A, 270C- 
2C; Deferrari, pp. 167, 102-4] '■> c£- Expositio in Hierarchiam coelestem in [PL, 
CLXXV, 976A ff.]). These are the eye of flesh, through which man saw the 
physical world ; the eye of reason, through which he saw himself and what 
he contained ; the eye of contemplation, through which he saw within him- 
self God and "the things which are within God." These last are the 
exemplary causes in the divine Wisdom, shared originally by the intellectual 
creature, but lost to him through his fall. The first stage of philosophy, 
lectio (study, reading), with which alone the Didascalicon is concerned, begins 
to restore man's lost participation in the divine Wisdom through opening 


his mind to that "apprehension of Truth and perfect knowledge" originally 
received by man "not by study or any teaching over periods of time, but 
simultaneously and immediately from the very beginning of his creation by 
a single and simple illumination of divine imparting"; see De sacramentis (PL, CLXXVI, 270D; Deferrari, p. 102). For the succeeding stages 
by which philosophy completes man's restoration — meditation, prayer, 
performance, and contemplation — see Didascalicon v.ix. 

6. The Middle Ages had direct knowledge of Plato primarily through the 
incomplete translation of the Timaeus by Chalcidius. The passage to which 
Hugh alludes concerns the world-soul (see Wrobel, pp. 32, 92-3; Mullach, 
pp. 162-3, 186-7). O n Hugh's transference of these materials to the human 
soul, see n. 8, 10. 

7. "Entelechy" is said to be Plato's term for the world-soul in Remigius 
of Auxerre, commentary on Martianus Capella (Bibliotheque Nationale, 
MS latin 14754, fol. 3 r ) ("Plato tamen endelichiam animam mundi dicit"), 
and John the Scot on the same text (Cora E. Lutz, ed., Iohannis Scotti annota- 
tiones in Marcianum [Cambridge, Mass. : Mediaeval Academy of America, 
1939], p. 10); for a twelfth-century use of "entelechy" to designate the world 
soul, see Bernardus Silvestris De mundi universitate (Carl Sigmund Barach 
and Johann Wrobel, ed. [Innsbruck, 1876]), passim, and Silverstein, 
"Fabulous Cosmogony," MP, XLVI (1948-9), 94, 1 14-6. That "entelechy" 
was not Plato's but Aristotle's term and was used by him to name "the first 
perfection of a natural organic body" is made clear, however, by Chalcidius 
(Wrobel, pp. 262 ff. ; Mullach, pp. 227-9), who employs the term with 

; particular reference to man. Hugh, while seemingly associating the term 
with Plato, employs it here with reference to man's soul, not the world-soul. 

8. Several interpretations of "dividual and individual substance" and 
"same and diverse nature" current in the twelfth century are summarized in 
the brano revision of William of Conches' Philosophia mundi (Ottaviano, ed., 
Un brano, pp. 48-5 1). One interpretation, applying these terms to the human 
soul and agreeing in several particulars with the Didascalicon, may safely be 
inferred to be Hugh's (ibid., pp. 49-50): "The soul is said to consist of 
'dividual' and 'individual' substance because, to speak first of the human 
soul, it is an i ndividual thing, lacking parts [cf. Didascalicon i.i, where the 
soul is called "simple essence (not) in any way distended in quantitative 
parts"] ; but it is said to be 'dividual' because of its diverse effects, namely, 
vegetative life, sense-endowed life, and rational life [cf. Didascalicon i.iii, 
where the threefold vivifying effects of the soul are treated], or because it is 
irascible, concupiscent, and rational [cf. Didascalicon n.iv, for the soul's 
extension to virtual threeness in irascible, concupiscent, and rational powers]. 
...Its being composed of the 'same' and 'diverse' is similarly evident in the 
human soul, for, according to Plato, it consists of the rational and irrational, 
that is, of reason and sensuality ; reason always moves the soul toward self- 
sameness or unity through the virtues, sensuality toward external earthly 
things through the vices [cf. Didascalicon 11. iv, for the soul's distraction when 
it moves toward the world of sense, its recovery of unity when it returns to 
the source of its nature]." The wide variety of interpretations of this 


Timaean passage in the twelfth century is suggested, in addition to those 
noted by the brano author, by Adelard of Bath's association of the "same" 
with philosophia, the "diverse" with philocosmia (pursuit of the world) (see 
De eodem et diverso, Willner, ed., pp. 3-4) and by Abaelard's association of 
both terms with the Holy Spirit, "same" in substance and nature in relation 
to Father and Son, but "diverse" from them in person and gifts (see n. 10). 

9. Adapted from Chalcidius (Wrobel, p. 120; Mullach, p. 193): "And 
Plato himself. . . composes the soul of all the elements so that it may have 
knowledge both of the elements and of the things which are made from 

them " The "soul" involved in Chalcidius is the world soul; the 

"elements" are fire, air, water, and earth, invisible in their pure state. 

10. Adapted from Boethius De consolatione philosophiae in.m.ix: "When, 
divided, it has gathered movement into two spheres, it passes along on its 
way back to itself and circles the deep design and turns the heaven in like 
image." Boethius, echoing the doctrine of the Timaeus, speaks of the world- 
soul. Hugh's adaptation of world-soul materials to the soul of man had 
pointed contemporary significance. The passages from the Timaeus and 
De consolatione to which Hugh alludes figured, along with others, in Abael- 
ard's contention that the Platonic nous and world-soul designated allegori- 
cally (per involucrum) the Son and Holy Spirit. The passages received a 
certain notoriety both on Abaelard's condemnation at Soissons, in 1 121, for 
this and other "novelties" (see Remigius Stolzle, ed., Abaelard's 1121 %u 
Soissons verurtheilter Tractatus de unitate et trinitate divina [Freiburg im Breisgau, 
1 891] pp. xxii-xxvi and pp. 9 ff. ; cf. H. Ostlender, ed., Theologia Sum mi Boni, 
BGPM, XXV, 2-3 [1939], pp. xxii-xxiii) and again on his reaffirmation of 
his views in 11 24 (Theologia Christiana i.v [PL, CLXXVIII, 1139C-66C], and 
in 1 125 (Introductio in theologiam i.xv-xxv [PL, CLXXVIII, 1 104D-34D] ; on 
the dating of these works see J. G. Sikes, Peter Abailard [Cambridge : Cam- 
bridge University Press, 1932], Appendix I, pp. 258-71). He abandoned his 
identification of the Holy Spirit and the world soul in De dialectica (Victor 
Cousin, ed., Ouvrages inedits d'Abelard [Paris, 1836], pp. 475-6; newly ed. by 
L. M. De Rijk, Petrus Abaelardus : Dialectica [Assen, 1956], pp. 558-9), at 
least part of which was written after the appearance of the Didascalicon, i.e., 
after 1 127 (Sikes, p. 271 ; De Rijk, pp. xxii-iii), but concern for his use of the 
world-soul materials persisted as late as 1 1 39, when William of St. Thierry's 
Disputatio adversus Abaelardum (see esp. ch. v [PL, CLXXX, 265 A-6D] ; cf. 
Disputatio altera adversus Abaelardum [ibid., 321C-D]) led to Abaelard's 
second condemnation, at Sens. Identification of the Platonic world soul 
with the Holy Spirit appeared also in William of Conches' early gloss on the 
Timaeus passage (Schmid, "Ein Timaeoskommentar," CM, X [1949], 239) 
and on De consolatione in.m.ix (Jourdain, "Commentaires inedits," p. 75), as 
also in Thierry of Chartres De sex dierum operibus (B. Haureau ed., Notices et 
extraits de quelques manuscrits latins de la Bibliotheque Nationale, I [Paris, 1890], 
61; newly ed. by N. Haring, AHDL, XXII [1955], 193). Like Abaelard, 
William of Conches abandoned the identification (see his later glosses on the 
Timaeus, in Parent, Doctrine de la creation, p. 1 66). For convenient summary 
of the controversy, in which the Didascalicon may have played an incidental 


part hitherto unremarked, see, in addition to Parent, Doctrine de la creation, 
pp. 69-81, Tullio Gregory, "L"anima mundi' nella filosofia del XII secolo," 
GCFI, XXX (195 1), 494-508, and, by the same author, Anima mundi, pp. 
1 23-74. Hugh's adaptation of the materials to the human soul seems to point 
to their more proper use; it goes back to an older commentary tradition 
found, e.g., in Remigius of Auxerre, commentary on De consolatione in.m.ix 
(Stewart, ed., p. 33; Silvestre, ed., p. 60): "To men of better judgment, 
however, it seems that in this place we should understand rather the rational 
soul, which has great likeness to the world, so that in Greek man is called a 
'microcosm,' that is, a lesser world" (comparable observation by John the 
Scot [Silvestre, p. 61]). Remigius takes the "twin spheres" of the Boethian 
text as literally the two eyes, but John the Scot writes: "The soul is not 
called 'divided' because divided in its very nature, but because its access to 
the contemplation of external things is divided into two eyes, here simply 
called 'two spheres'. ...For as spiritual things are beheld by the mind, so 
corporeal things are seen by eyes of flesh" (Silvestre, p. 63). Cf. Hugh's 
De sacramentis 5 {PL, CLXXVI, 266B; Deferrari, p. 97): "The rational 
soul was equipped with a double sense in order that it might grasp visible 
things without through the flesh and invisible things within through the 
reason ... so that it might enter within to contemplate and go outside itself 
to contemplate — within, contemplating Wisdom; without, the works of 
Wisdom." Hugh's use of these materials is reflected in Alanus de Insulis 
De planctu naturae {PL, CCX, 443C), where the "circling" of man's reason 
from heavenly things to earthly and back to heavenly is mentioned. 

11. Quoted from Chalcidius, who ascribes the verses to Empedocles 
(Wrobel, p. 120; cf. p. 254; Mullach, p. 193 ; cf. p. 226). William of Conches 
also cites the verses (Parent, Doctrine de la creation, p. 169). The principle of 
knowledge of like by like underlies Hugh's conception of man's progressive 
assimilation to the divine Wisdom. On the history of the principle, see 
A. Schneider, "Der Gedanke der Erkenntnis des Gleichen durch Gleiches in 
antiker und patristischer Zeit," Abhandlungen t(ur Geschichte der Philosophie des 
Mittelalters, BGPM, Supplementband II (Miinster, 1923), 49-77. 

12. Cf. Macrobius In somnium Scipionis i.xiv. 19-20 (Eyssenhardt, pp. 
542-3; Stahl, pp. 146-7) for a listing of the opinions of twenty-one Greek 
philosophers who agree on the soul's incorporeality. 

13. "non secundum compositionem sed secundum compositionis ratio- 
nem." Adapted from Chalcidius (Wrobel, pp. 265-6; Mullach, p. 229). 

14. No such work by Varro is now known. Manitius (III, Geschichte der 
lateinischen Litteratur, 1 1 5, n. 1) claims Hugh is here citing John the Scot, but 
Manitius does not give the source. P. G. Meyer ("Hugo von Sankt Viktors 
Lehrbuch," Ausgexvahlte Schriften [Freiburg im Breisgau, 1890], p. 159, n. 1) 
suggests Hugh means John the Scot's De divisione naturae, or I1EPI OTSHN, 
but the quotation, if it is such, is not to be found in this work. On Varro's 
belief in the soul's incorporeality, see Claudianus Mamertus De statu 
animae n.viii {CSEL, XI, 130). The Premnon physicon of Nemesius, trans- 
lated by Alfanus in 1085 (Carolus Burkhard, ed. [Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 
1917]), contains no passage similar to that cited here by Hugh. 



1 5 . Detailed exposition of the psychology of knowledge in Hugh's De 
unione corporis et spirt tus {PL, CLXXVII, 28 5-94). Contrast between types of 
change undergone by body as opposed to soul in De sacramentis i.iii. 15-16 
{PL, CLXXVI, 221C-3A; Deferrari, pp. 46-7). 

16. Cf. John the Scot De divisione naturae 11. iv {PL, CXXII, 531): "Man, 
as we have said and shall most often say again, has been created of such a 
dignity of nature that there is no created thing, visible or invisible, that 
cannot be found in him." John here expounds Maximus the Confessor on 
man as the "laboratory" {officina) of all created things, through whom crea- 
tion will achieve reunion {adunatid) with the Creator {ibid., m.xxxvi; PL, 
CXXII, 733). Hugh, by contrast, teaches that the soul's being composed of 
all things is the psychological basis of man's own return to the divine 
Wisdom, Exemplar of all. The passage is good for illustrating the radical 
difference that underlies superficial points of contact between the Hugonian 
and Scotian systems. 

1 7. "summum in vita solamen". The phrase occurs in the opening words 
of Boethius De syllogismo hypothetic {PL, LXIV, 83 iB). Cf. the address to 
Philosophy in De consolatione philosophiae "O summum lassorum 
solamen animorum." 

18. Cf. Augustine De libero arbitrio 11.ix.26 {PL, XXXII, 1254): "No one 
is blessed except in that highest Good which is seen and possessed in the 
Truth we call Wisdom." 

19. Quoted from Boethius De musica n.ii {PL, LXIII, 1195D). Cf. 
Augustine De civitate Dei vm.ii; Isidore Etymologiae Hugh, in 
the Epitome (Raton, ed., p. 106), remarks that the etymology of "philosophy" 
is "a question not to be passed over simply because the interpretation is 
common knowledge, for not all men understand the force of the terms in 
the same way." The Epitome's explanation of the terms, while differing in 
detail from that of the present chapter, involves the same noetic mysticism. 
The "love" implied by philosophy is "not that love by which the perfectly 
known is loved, but that by which Truth, tasted, is more fully desired." 
Wisdom is "the unwavering comprehension of the true." The "true," while 
defined as a transcendental relationship ("that what is, is, is true; and that 
what is not, is not, similarly"), is said to exist "in That which is," i.e., in "the 
divine Wisdom itself, in which is every 'true' that is true." With Baron's 
imperceptive remark {Epitome, p. 121), "II [Hugues] nous presente seule- 
ment la sagesse comme le lieu de toutes les verites et de toute verite. Rien 
n'indique qu'il puisse s'agir de la Sagesse divine," cf. Pedersen, "Recherche 
de la sagesse," CM, XVI (1955), no: "...pour Hugues... la verite est une 
realite ontologique a la valeur religieuse, en vertu de l'appropriation de la 
sagesse a la seconde personne de la Trinite..." Cf. De tribus diebus xxvi 
{PL, CLXXVI, 837A). 

20. Quoted from Boethius De arithmetica i.i {PL, LXIII, 1079D). 

21. Quoted from Boethius In Porphyrium dialogi i.iii. {PL, LXIV, 10D- 
11 A; CSEL, XLVIII, 7). With the Boethian source, cf. Augustine De 
Genesi ad litteram i.v {PL, XXXIV, 249-50): "But the spiritual, intellectual, 
or rational creature, which is seen to be closer to the divine W'ord, can have 


a formless life. ...For turned from the unchangeable Wisdom, it lives in 
folly and perfidy, and such a life is its formlessness. But when it has turned 
toward the unchangable Light of Wisdom, the Word of God, it is formed. . . 
so that it may live wisely and blessedly. The source of the intellectual 
creature is the eternal Wisdom, which, remaining unchangeable in itself, 
never ceases by hidden inspiration to call to that creature whose source it is, 
inviting him to turn to his source, because otherwise he cannot be formed 
and perfected." See also John the Scot De divisione naturae n.xvi {PL, 
CXXII, 548B) : "But the invisible, that is, intellectual and rational creature is 
said to be without form before it turns to its form, namely to its Creator. 
For it is not sufficient for it to subsist composed of an essence and an 
essential differentia... unless it is perfected by having turned to the sole- 
begotten Word, I mean the Son of God, who is the form of all intellectual 
life. Without him, it remains imperfect and unformed." Cf. Wisdom 7:21, 
where the divine Wisdom is said to make those who pursue it sharers in the 
friendship of God. Boethius, in the passage here quoted by Hugh, proceeds 
immediately to divide philosophy into the theoretical and the practical, 
noting the triple subdivisions of each and declining to say whether logic is a 
part of philosophy. Suppressing this part of his source, Hugh instead 
prepares for the inclusion in philosophy of the mechanical arts (ch. viii) and 
of logic (ch. xi) by a five-chapter development of points relating to human 
psychology, cosmology, and the effects of the fall. 

22. Quoted from Boethius Commentaria in Porphyrium a se translatum i.i 
{PL, LXIV, 71 A ffi; CSEL, XL VIII, 135 ff.). 

23. On the meaning of this Boethian term and its modification by twelfth- 
and thirteenth-century authors, including Hugh of St. Victor, see M.-D. 
Chenu, "Imaginatio: note de lexicographic philosophique medievale," ST, 
CXXII (1946), 593-602. On the relations among sensus, imaginatio, affectio 
imaginaria, ratio in imaginationem agens, and ratio pura supra imaginationem, see 
Hugh's De unione corporis et spiritus {PL, CLXXVII, esp. 288D-9A). 

24. Entire chapter quoted from Boethius Commentaria in Porphyrium a se 
translatum i.i {PL, LXIV, 71 A ff.; CSEL, XLVIII, 135 ff). Another trans- 
lation, differing slightly in detail, by Richard P. McKeon, Selections from 
Medieval Philosophers, I (Chicago: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), 70-3. The 
chapter advances Hugh's argument for a fourfold division of philosophy by 
proposing that the rational soul: (1) includes vegetative and sensual 
functions (province of the mechanical arts) ; (2) is concerned with words and 
their arrangements and with reasoning (province of the logical arts) ; and 
(3) spends every effort to acquire the natures of things (theoretical arts) and 
moral instruction (practical arts). 

25. "inextricabilem labyrinthum" A Boethian phrase; cf. De consolatione 
philosophiae "me inextricabilem labyrinthum rationibus texens." 

26. Hugh's expression "involved words" {perplexus sermd) may refer to the 
deliberate concealment of an inner meaning beneath an ambiguous or alle- 
gorical verbal surface {involucrum, integumentum, cortex), a concealment which 
Abaelard, William of Conches, Thierry of Chartres, Clarenbald of Arras, 
Bernardus Silvestris, and Arnulph of Orleans claimed to find inPlato, Vergil, 


Ovid, Priscian, Martianus Capella, Macrobius, and Boethius, and which was 
practiced by Bernardus Silvestris and by Alanus de Insulis in their own 
poetry. See Jeauneau, "La Notion d'integumentum," AHDL, XXIV (1957), 
35-100; M.-D. Chenu, " Tnvolucrum : le mythe selon les theologiens medie- 
vaux," AHDL, XXII (195 5), 75-9; and Pierre Courcelle, "Les Peres devant 
les enfers virgiliens," AHDL, XXII (1955), 5-74. Reserving allegory to 
Scripture, Hugh demands scientific clarity in the arts. Cf. Didascalicon 
in.iv, where he rejects fables, histories, didactic poems, and ornamental 
prose as tangential to philosophy. His position prepares the way for the 
insistence, later in the century, of Alanus de Insulis that the language of 
theology be "intellectu perceptibilis," i.e., avoid "involucra verborum"; 
see Alanus de Insulis Theologiae regulae xxxiv {PL, CCX, 637). 

27. "Philosophia est disciplina omnium rerum humanarum atque divina- 
rum rationes plene investigans." Hugh repeats this definition (, 
substituting probabi liter for plene. The closest parallel is in Cassiodorus 
Institutiones n.iii.5 (Mynors, ed., p. no) : "Philosophia est divinarum human- 
arumque rerum in quantum homini possibile est, probabilis scientia," where 
the force of probabilis must be "demonstrable," not "probable" as rendered 
by Jones, Divine and Human Readings, p. 160. Further analogues of the 
definition occur in Cicero De oratore i.xlix. 212; De officiis n.ii. 5 ; in Augustine 
Contra academicos {PL, XXXII, 914); in Alcuin De diabetica i {PL, CI, 
952); in Rhabanus Maurus De universo xv.i {PL, CXI, 41 6A, 41 3B); in 
Isidore of Seville Etymologiae n.xxiv.1,9. Note, however, that Hugh gives 
the terms of the definition a meaning original with him. His "human 
things" are specifically the matters served by the mechanical arts, his "divine 
things" are the truth and virtue served respectively by the theoretical and 
practical arts (cf. Didascalicon i.viii). For Cicero, on the other hand, "human 
things" comprise ethics and physics; for Augustine, the four cardinal 
virtues (see Contra academicos i.vii {PL, XXXII, 916] : "Knowledge of human 
things is that knowledge which comprises the light of prudence, the 
propriety of temperance, the strength of fortitude, and the holiness of 
justice"; cf., however, De trinitate xiv.i and xn.xiv [PL, XLII, 1037C, 
1009D], where the term receives somewhat broader extension); for Alcuin 
and Rhabanus, ethics alone. Isidore merely repeats the definitions of Cicero 
and Cassiodorus. Even for the latter, whose words Hugh closely follows, 
"human things" correspond to the practical {actuales) arts, "divine" to the 
theoretical {inspectivae). 

28. A Chalcidian idea. See n. 59. 

29. "tot esse philosophiae partes quot sunt rerum diversitates ad quas 
ipsam pertinere constiterit" On the originality of this principle, see Baur, 
Gundissalinus, p. 359. 

30. "Rise" refers to the historical origin of the arts in the needs suffered 
by man in the fall. More schematized treatment of the same topic in Hugh's 
Epitome (Baron, ed., pp. 109-10); to three evils (ignorance of the good, 
desire of evil, and mortal weakness) correspond three goods (knowledge of 
truth, love of virtue, and the pursuit of conveniences), promoted by three 
categories of arts (theoretical arts, practical arts, and mechanical arts). The 


schematization of the Epitome is reproduced in Richard of Saint Victor 
Excerptiones prior es i.ii-v {PL, CLXXVI, 194A-6) and in the brano revision 
of William of Conches' Philosophia mundi (Ottaviano, Un brano, pp. 22-5). 

31. That is, to angels and God. 

32. The twofold nature of man is stressed in the Latin Asckpius, which 
infers from it man's twofold task of imitating the divine ratio and diligentia in 
his immortal part, and, in his mortal, of tending and managing the earth 
through "agriculture, care of herds, architecture, maintenance of harbors, 
navigation, social relationships, commerce"; the earthly part of the universe 
is said to be maintained "by the knowledge and use of those arts and disci- 
plines without which God willed the world should not be perfect"; see 
Asckpius i.viii (Nock, ed., p. 306). The importance given man's earthly 
tasks in the Asckpius suggests the importance to which Hugh elevates the 
mechanical arts, though with certain essential differences. Hugh relates 
these arts to the alleviation of fallen man, not to the perfecting of the world 
by God's original plan; he makes theoretical knowledge of them part of 
man's pursuit of the divine Wisdom, hence not completely dissociated from 
man's spiritual part as in the Asckpius; he notes that their execution, while 
not properly part of philosophy, has on occasion been praiseworthily under- 
taken by philosophers {Didascalicon m.xiv), whereas in Asckpius i.ix (Nock, 
ed., p. 307) attendance on the lower world is assigned to "all who, through 
the conflict of their double nature, have sunk under the body's weight to a 
lower grade of intelligence" ; he fills them out to the number seven in 
schematic parallel with the liberal arts and, to name them, employs terms 
found scattered in Isidore of Seville. Hugh quotes the Asckpius in the con- 
cluding words of the Didascalicon (vi.xiii) and may allude to it in his elabora- 
tion of "the number Tour' of the soul" {Didascalicon 11. iv). On the soul as 
that which man truly is, see Macrobius In somnium Scipionis n.xii.9-10 
(Eyssenhardt, ed., p. 625; Stahl, p. 224), and Nemesius Premnon physicon (Burkhard, ed., p. 6), where, however, there is no question of mechani- 
cal arts. Cf. De sacramentis {PL, CLXXVI, 264C-D; Deferrari, p. 95). 

33. Cf. Asckpius i.xii (Nock, ed., p. 311). 

34. With the title of the present chapter ("De tribus rerum maneriis"), cf. 
the passage beginning, "Cum igitur tres sunt maneries operum," in the 
commentary on the Timaeus published by Schmid ("Ein Timaioskommen- 
tar," CM, X [1948], 220-66) and thought by him and by Gregory {Anima 
mundi, pp. 15-7) to reproduce the earliest form of William of Conches' 
glosses on the Timaeus, composed in the first years of William's teaching, or 
between 1 120-5 ( on dating, see Gregory, Anima mundi, pp. 3, 7), and referred 
to in his Philosophia mundi as "glossulae nostrae super Platonem" {PL, 
CLXXII, 47A). The phrase as it occurs in these "glossulae" refers properly 
to "the work of God, the work of nature, and the work of the artificer, who 
imitates nature" (cf. Didascalicon i.ix) but forms part of a larger discussion of 
that being "which exists eternally, ungenerated," of that which "is generated 
and does not always exist," and of the relations between the world and time; 
cf. Chalcidius' translation of the Timaeus 27D-8C (Wrobel, pp. 23-4; 
Mullach, p. 157). 



35. These distinctions among "eternal," "perpetual," and "temporal" 
occur in William of Conches' commentary on the De consolatione philosophiae 
in.m.ix (see Parent, Doctrine de la creation, pp. 125-36). Absent from the 
commentaries of John the Scot, Remigius, Bovo of Corvey, and Adalbald 
of Utrecht, they appear to be original with William in this formulation, 
though perhaps suggested to him by the discussion of time and eternity in 
De consolatione, or by cognate distinctions among time, "sempitern- 
ity," and eternity in Boethius De Trinitate iv, or the eternal, "sempiternal," 
and perpetual, as inspired by Timaeus 28C (Wrobel, p. 24; Mullach, p. 157) 
and defined by William in his later glosses on the text (Parent, Doctrine de la 
creation, pp. 152-3). 

36. Buttimer's text for this sentence and for the first sentence of the next 
paragraph should be repunctuated as follows: "In primo ordine id consti- 
tuimus cui non est aliud 'esse' et 'id quod est,' id est, cuius causa et effectus 
diversa non sunt. ...Illud vero cui aliud est 'esse' et 'id quod est,' id est, 
quod aliunde ad esse venit," etc. Cf. Boethius De hebdomadibus (PL, LXIV, 
1311B), which, as Buttimer does not observe, is the source of the termino- 

37. See preceding note for correction of Buttimer's punctuation of this 
sentence to this point. 

38. "Nature" and "world" in this passage are coextensive with the whole 
of creation, not merely with the physical universe. Nature's two parts are 
(1) the incorporeal, invisible, rational creation or created wisdom (angels and 
human souls), made in the likeness not of a single exemplar in the Mind of 
God, but of the entire Mind of God with all the exemplary causes it contains 
(see n. 42) ; and (2) the corporeal, visible creation, which, as initially created 
(primordial matter) was changeless because unformed, and out of which God 
made the immutable bodies of the superlunary world and the changing 
bodies of the sublunary world. Cf. In Ecclesiasten homiliae (PL, CLXXV, 
128D), where Hugh says that the angelic nature and the primordially un- 
formed matter of visible creation were made together with time in the 
beginning. Like Hugh, William of Conches teaches the equal perpetuity of 
spiritual and material creation ; cf. his commentary on the Timaeus (Parent, 
Doctrine de la creation, p. 148): "The work of the Creator is perpetual, 
lacking dissolution, for neither the physical world nor spirit is dissolved." 
Cf. Hugh's De sacramentis i.v.2-5 (PL, CLXXVI, 246-9; Deferrari, pp. 
75-7), in which Hugh, basing his doctrine on Eccli., 1:4 ("wisdom hath 
been created before all things"), closely follows Augustine's teaching, as 
e.g., in Confessiones xn.ii.7-9, II- 3> J 5> where the two parts of creation 
("heaven and earth") of Gen. 1 : 1 are said to be (1) the "heaven of heavens," 
that spiritual, unchanging wisdom, mind, or nature made by God before 
time, yet not coeternal with himself nor identical with the divine Wisdom, 
and (2) the originally formless and hence unchanging matter (on the un- 
changeableness of primordial matter, see esp. Confessiones xn.xii) underlying 
the physical universe, itself now subdivided into the superior "heaven" and 
the inferior earth. Though Augustine, and Hugh following him, speak of 
the "created wisdom" in Neoplatonic terms, they have in mind primarily 


the angels, secondarily rational souls (see n. 42). Note that though John the 
Scot divides "nature" into two parts (De divisione naturae m.i [PL, CXXII, 
621A]: "The first and greatest division of all nature is into that Nature 
which creates the established universe and that nature which is created in the 
established universe") and teaches that the former part "encompasses all 
things" (ibid., 620C), the resemblance to Hugh is only superficial. The parts 
of John's "nature" are Creator and creation; Hugh's "nature", in the present 
context, that is, is like Augustine's, entirely created. 

39. The primordial causes are the uncreated exemplars of creation sub- 
sisting in the divine Wisdom, or Mind. See De sacramentis i.iv.26 (PL, 
CLXXVI, 246C; Deferrari, p. 74). Hugh's use of the term parallels that of 
John the Scot, who, however, regards the primordial causes, or ousiai, as 
created (see n. 42). For discussion of the manner in which created nature 
proceeds from the primordial causes, see De sacramentis i.ii.3 (PL, CLXXVI, 
207; Deferrari, p. 30): "Now these effect without movement and produce 
without transference, since eternity did not lose anything of its own state by 
ordaining time, nor did it minister substance from its own store by creating 
corruptible things, but remaining what it was, it made what was not. 
. . . For it did not degenerate by creating lower things ; it did not by nature 
descend into those very things to which it had given beginning; rather, 
without using its own nature, it created that nature by which things that 
were not might take beginning, since the work and the Maker could not be 
the same by nature." 

40. Only the rational creature came forth from the primordial causes 
nullo mediante; the corporeal creation was made mediante rationali creatura. 
See De sacramentis i.iv.26 (PL, CLXXVI, 246B-C; Deferrari, pp. 73-4) and 
Appendix C. 

41. Taking constitit, the reading of MS N, rather than Buttimer's consistit, 
which provides an awkward shift in tense. For another instance in which 
MS N supplies a better reading, see Didascaiicon iv.i.n.i. 

42. In certain of Hugh's contemporaries, the term ousiai typically suggests 
the influence of John the Scot ; see, e.g., Etienne Gilson, "La Cosmogonie de 
Bernardus Silvestris," AHDL, III (1928), 10, n. 4, and G. Raynaud de Lage, 
Alain de Lille (Montreal: Institut d'etudes medievales, 195 1), p. 60. Note, 
however, that John regularly translates the term as essentia (to the refs. cited 
by Gilson, loc. cit., add the striking passage in De divisione naturae i.lxiii [PL, 
CXXII, 62 1 A], where ousiai is used specifically for the primordial causes or 
archetypal essences); it is rather Augustine De Trinitate v.viii (PL, XLII, 
917D), quoted, moreover, in De sacramentis 11.1.4 (PL, CLXXVI, 376D; 
Deferrari, p. 211), who proposes "substance," Hugh's term here, as a 
translation for the Greek word. Hugh is clearly alluding to John the Scot, 
but the allusion takes the form of a correction rather than of a borrowing. 
In John the Scot, as in his twelfth-century follower Bernard of Chartres, the 
ousiai, though created and, hence, it would seem, distinct from God, are held 
to subsist in the Mind of God, to be one with the Mind of God, and even 
coeternal (though "not quite") with it (De divisione naturae n.xv-xxvii [PL, 
CXXII, 545C-66D]; summary of John's and Bernard's teaching in Parent, 


Doctrine de la creation, pp. 45-8). Hugh removes the ambiguity and paradox 
of the Scot's teaching by admitting the existence of uncreated exemplars in 
the Mind of God (see first definition of "nature," Didascalicon i.x), to be 
sure, but by exalting the "intellectual creature" to a place of prior importance 
in creation and ascribing the "ousiai" to this creature's mind. See De 
sacramentis i.iv.26 {PL, CLXXVI, 246B-C; Deferrari, pp. 73-4); De tribus 
diebus xxv {PL, CLXXVI, 8 3 5 B) ; and Appendix C, which, loosely appended 
to a whole class of Didascalicon MSS, may have been intended for revisionary 
insertion after the present chapter, the meaning of which it clarifies. On 
prelapsarian man as included in the term "rational creature" and as sharing 
knowledge of the "substances" of things, see De sacramentis, 12 {PL, 
CLXXVI, 263B-4C, 270C-D; Deferrari, pp. 93-5, 102). Hugh's alteration 
of John the Scot emphasizes the two postulates on which Hugh's educational 
theory rests — the rational creature's exclusive assimilation to the divine 
Wisdom, and its natural capacity to contain the rest of creation (cf. Didascal- 
icon i.i). In a highly significant passage in De sacramentis 1. v. 3 {PL, CLXXVI, 
247-8C; Deferrari, pp. 75-6) Hugh explains as follows (Deferrari's trans- 
lation altered): "We read that only the rational creature was made in the 
likeness of God; it is not said that any other creature beside this one was so 
made, even though every creature has in the divine Idea and eternal Provi- 
dence the cause and likeness out of which and according to which it is per- 
fected in subsistence. But there is a great difference, a gap, between having 
a likeness in God and having God himself as one's likeness. ... It could not 
suffice for the rational creature to have in the divine Idea some one thing, 
this or that, for the exemplar to whose likeness it would be formed. Rather, 
the rational creature claimed all of God, so to speak, in order to be made in 
his image, and it was sent forth striving for God's total perfection. 
...Through its striving and imitation, through its being an image and 
likeness, this second being contained all things that were in the First — ideas 
and causes and likenesses and forms, the dispositions and foreseeings of all 
future things which were to be made. And when the corporeal things to be 
made were actually made, they were made to the likeness of those things 
made in this second being, just as the latter was made in the likeness of the 
unmade things in the First. Thus, the corporeal creature is in third place, 
after the second or rational creature, because made with reference to the 
rational creature, just as the rational creature was made with reference to the 
First and uncreated Nature." The source of Hugh's teaching is Augustine 
De Genesi ad litteram n.viii {PL, XXXIV, 269-70); cf. De civitate Dei 
xn.xvi {PL, XLI, 363-5, where the chapter is numbered "15"; CSEL, XL, 
591-5). Cf. Chalcidius on the divine intelligences of the fixed stars and the 
aetherial daimons, "whom the Hebrews call holy angels" and in whom the 
divine Mind promulgates "Fate," or divine law for the governance of all 
things (Wrobel, pp. 195 ff.; Mullach, pp. 290 fF.). 

43. Buttimer's punctuation of this sentence has been revised as follows: 
"... natura est, quae mundum continet omnem, idque in gemina secatur : est 
quiddam quod a causis suis primordialibus, ut esse incipiat, nullo movente, 
ad actum prodit solo divinae voluntatis arbitrio, ibique immutabile omnis 


finis atque vicissitudinis expers consistit (ejusmodi sunt rerum substantiae 
quas Graeci ousias dicunt); et cuncta superlunaris mundi corpora, quae 
etiam ideo quod non mutentur divina appellata sunt." For key distinctions 
which make this punctuation of the passage necessary, see n. 38, 40, 42. 
On the heavenly bodies as divine, see, e.g., Mabrobius In somnium Scipionis 
i.xi.6 (Eyssenhardt, p. 528; Stahl, p. 131), and Chalcidius's commentary on 
the Timaeus (Wrobel, p. 195 ; Mullach, p. 209). Cf. Augustine De civitate Dei 
iv.xi and vn.xv {PL, XLI, 12 1-3, 206-7). 

44. See Hugh's third definition of "nature," Didascalkon i.x.n.71. Cf. 
Didascalicon 11.x. 

45 . "Nihil in mundo moritur" The "world," for Hugh, means more than 
the physical universe ; it means all of creation (see n. 3 8). The source of the 
quotation may be Adelard of Bath Quaes Hones naturales (Martin Miiller, ed., 
BGPM, XXI [Miinster, 1934], 9): "in hoc sensibile mundo nil omnino 
moritur," where, however, sensibilis indicates Adelard's restriction of 
"world" to the physical cosmos. Similarly restricted are William of Conches 
Dragmaticon philosophiae (G. Gratarolus ed. [Strasbourg, 1567], p. 233): 
"Nihil in mundo perire physica sententia est"; Macrobius In somnium 
Scipionis 11.xii.13 (Eyssenhardt, p. 626; Stahl, p. 224): "nihil intra vivum 
mundum perire, sed ...solam mutare speciem"; and Servius Comm. in Verg. 
Georg. iv.ccxxvi (Georg Thilo, ed. [Leipzig, 1887], p. 337): "nihil enim est 
quod perire funditus possit." 

46. Buttimer mistakenly places this explanatory clause within the pre- 
ceding quotation. 

47. On the stability of essences (and of forms "in their genera"), see 
further Hugh's In Ecclesiasten homiliae {PL, CLXXV, 215). On the passing 
away of forms, cf. Bernardus Silvestris De mundi universitate n.viii (Barach 
and Wrobel, p. 5 2). 

48. Sallust Bellum Jugurthinum n.iii. 

49. Ultimate source, Petsius Saturae in. 84. Probably taken by Hugh from 
Remigius of Auxerre's commentary on the De consolatione philosophiae (ed. 
Stewart, p. 39), where the line is quoted and correctly attributed to Persius. 

50. Maximianus Elegiae 1.222. 

51. The reference is specifically to the contrast between perpetual and 
temporal being, developed in the last paragraph of the preceding chapter. 

5 2. Chalcidius reports agreement of mathematici on the lunar sphere as the 
lowest among the heavenly spheres and notes the dependence of the sub- 
lunary world upon moon, sun, and planets for the regulation of time, 
seasons, climates, birth and death, growth and decay, and "every variety of 
interchange and local motion" (Wrobel, pp. 143-4; Mullach, p. 198). The 
special power of the moon over terrestrial bodies is discussed by Firmicus 
Maternus Matheseos libri VIII iv.i.1-10 (W. Kroll and F. Skutsch, ed., 
[Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1897], pp. 16-7), a work quoted extensively in the 
"Liber Hermetis Mercurii Triplicis de VI rerum principiis," a twelfth- 
century compilation which seems to have more than one source in common 
with Hugh (see n. 5 3). Closest as a whole to Hugh is Macrobius's division 
of the universe into fiery aether, where all is eternal, incorrupt, and divine, 


and the sublunary region of earth, water, and air, where all is changing, 
corruptible, and mortal (In somnium Scipionis i.xxi.33; cf. S omnium iv.3 
[Eyssenhardt, pp. 657, 577; Stahl, pp. 180-1, 73]), a division which both 
suggests the terms Hugh applies to the two regions in the present chapter 
and appears to underlie, in part, the special role he later assigns to aetherial 
fire (third definition of "nature," Didascalicon i.x.n.71). Cf. Hugh's con- 
stant, though corrective, refs. to Macrobius in the discussion of cosmimetry 
in his Practica geometriae (Roger Baron, ed., "Hugonis de Sancto Victore 
Practica geometriae: introduction, texte," Osiris, XII [1956], 212-24), 
where, moreover, he alludes (ibid., p. 224) to an intended treatment of 
astronomy, either never written or since lost. 

53. Contrasting with Hugh's use of the term "nature" (n. 38), the present 
use, taken from "astronomers," shows unmistakable relationship to the 
"Liber Hermetis MercuriiTriplicis" (Silverstein, ed., AHDL, XXII [1955], 
217-302), which, citing the De electionibus of Zahel ben Bischr as saying that 
planets and signs of the zodiac "in naturalibus operantur," says further that 
this quality of the heavenly bodies "a philosophis natura dicitur, que iuxta 
varias vires suas in universis et singulis sub lunari globo variatur" {ibid., 
p. 282). It is from it that the quality of temporal things is also called their 
"nature" (ibid.); proceeding from the divine Cause or Good (Tugaton) and 
the Nous or Ratio, the celestial "Nature" distributes to the inferior world of 
generation the essences of which Nous is the source, and in this sense 
establishes each thing's being and nature (''unicuique rei non solum esse sed 
etiam tale esse constituit") (ibid., pp. 248-9). Not only Zahel but a pseudo- 
Pythagorean Matentetraden or Tiber quadrivii may have been common sources 
for Hugh and the author of the "Liber Hermetis" (see n. 55). Found also in 
the Latin Asclepius i.iii (Nock, ed. p. 299, lines 3-15), the conception of a 
generating celestial Nature was assimilated in various ways to the Timaean 
world-soul by twelfth-century writers of Chartrian connection or spirit, as, 
e.g., Adelard of Bath De eodem et diverso (Willner, ed., pp. 15, 77-8) ; William 
of Conches and Thierry of Chartres (refs. cited in n. 10); Bernardus Sil- 
vestris (see Silverstein, "Fabulous Cosmogony," MP, XLVI [1948-9], 
104-7 an d notes); Alanus de Insulis (see de Lage, Alain de Tille, pp. 59-80). 
For occurrence of the conception in vernacular poetry, see Gerard Pare, Tes 
Idees et les lettres au Xlle specie: Te Roman de la rose (Montreal: Institut 
d'etudes medievales Albert-le-Grand, 1947), ch.V, "La Confession de 
Nature," pp. 202-78. The doctrine of the world-soul Hugh explicitly rejects, 
interpreting the superlunary "nature" as an aetherial fire emanating princi- 
pally from the sun (see n. 71) and attributing the distribution as well as the 
source of each thing's being and nature exclusively to the divine Mind or 
Wisdom (see n. 69; contrast Hugh's use of the phrase "non solum esse sed 
etiam talis esse" with that of the "Liber Hermetis.") 

54. The phrase is from Chalcidius, where it is associated with the gener- 
ative function of the world-soul (see n. 59). 

55. Cf. "Liber Hermetis" (Silverstein, ed., AHDT, XXII [1955]), 268): 
"In the Matentetrade, mathematicians call the superlunary world 'time' be- 
cause of the course and motion of the heavenly bodies; but they call the sub- 


lunary world 'temporal' because the mutability of things below is directed 
according to the perpetual order of the things above." Striking coincidence 
in phraseology suggests either that the author of the "Liber Hermetis," 
dated by Silverstein tentatively between 1135-47, borrowed from Hugh or 
that both used the same source. In Didascalicon m.ii, Hugh speaks of 
Pythagoras as the author of "the Matentetradem, a book concerning the 
teaching of the quadrivium"; cf. the gloss on Silverstein's MS Di (Bodleian, 
Digby 67, fol. 72 r ): "i.e. liber de doctrina quadruvii [sic]." While this piece 
of information may represent an inference from a passage in Remigius of 
Auxerre's commentary on Martianus Capella (see Didascalicon in.ii.n.8), one 
cannot exclude the possibility that a book with this title and attributed to 
Pythagoras existed in Hugh's time and supplied both him and the "Liber 
Hermetis" author with the passage in question. See Silverstein's discussion 
("Liber Hermetis," AHDL, XXII [1955], 224-5). 

56. On the sublunary world as "underworld" and the superlunary world 
as "elysium," see Macrobius In somnium Scipionis i.xi,4-8 (Eyssenhardt, 
pp. 5 27-9; Stahl, pp. 1 3 1-2); Cf. Abaelard Theologia i.xvii {PL, CLXXVIII, 
1018A-B) and Bernardus Silvestris Commentum super VI libros Eneidos 
Virgilii vi (Guilielmus Riedel ed., [Greifswald: Typis Julii Abel, 1924], 
p. 29), who in turn follows William of Conches' commentary on the De 
consolatione philosophise: "Philosophers have called this sublunary region 
'infernum' because the lower part of the world is full of misery and sorrow" 
(cited in Jeauneau, "La Notion diintegitmentum" AHDL, XXIV [1957], 42). 

57. The distinction between intelligentia and scientia derives from Hugh's 
view of the knowledge process. Twofold in nature, man descends to the 
world of corporeal objects through his wholly corporeal senses and imagina- 
tion; he ascends to spiritual objects through the internal operation of his 
purely spiritual reason. When the reason turns "below" to examine sense 
impressions {imaginationes) critically, it is "informed" though clouded over 
by them, and the result is knowledge; when it turns "upward" toward 
spiritual objects and God, it operates with the concurrent aid of divine in- 
spiration and revelation and is "illuminated" with "understanding." Further 
detail on the faculties and their objects, see n. 2; cf. refs. cited in n. 15, 23. 
See Augustine De Trinitate xn and xiv.i {PL, XLII, 997 ff.), where consider- 
ation of the exterior and interior operations of man leads to distinction 
between scientia as "actio qua bene utimur temporalibus rebus" (1009D) or 
"temporalium rerum cognitio intellectualis" (1012B), and sapientia as 
"aeternarum rerum cognitio intellectualis" (1012B), and where the distinc- 
tion between scientia and sapientia is further related to a definition of wisdom 
as "knowledge of human and divine things." 

58. On mechanical as "adulterate," see n. 64. 

59. Adapted from Chalcidius's commentary on the Timaeus (Wrobel, 
p. 88; Mullach, p. 185). Hugh makes radical changes in the meaning of his 
source. In Chalcidius, the opera Dei are ascribed to the summus Deus, who 
founds all things according to the exemplary causes existing in his eternal 
Providence (7tp6voia) or Mind (vou<;), and promulgates the law or "fate" of 
natural things in created intelligences subsisting visibly in the fixed stars of 


the outer ignis ('aTCXavrj) and invisibly in the daemones or blessed angels of the 
aether. The opera naturae are the province of the anima mundi, a secunda mens 
and the substantial projection of God's law of "fate"; ruling all things 
according to their proper natures, the anima mundi may be called their 
"law." The opera artificis — human arts, disciplines, and the things effected 
with their aid — are regular and fruitful because, imitating nature, they too 
are ruled by the law, idea, and order of the anima mundi '(for summary of these 
ideas, see Wrobel, pp. 225-7; Mullach, p. 219; for details, see antecedent dis- 
cussion in Wrobel, pp. 195-225; Mullach, pp. 209-18). Hugh accepts the 
Chalcidian idea of the exemplary causes (see first definition of "nature", 
Didascalicon i.x.n.69) and their communication to the angelic intellect (see 
discussion of ousiai, n. 42), rejecting, however, the identification of angels 
with the heavenly bodies (ibid.). Among the opera Dei he includes the 
ordering and disposition of the movements of all things, which, in Chalci- 
dius, were opera naturae ; the anima mundi, in which certain of his contempo- 
aries saw reference to the Holy Spirit (see n. 10), he altogether rejects, 
limiting the opera naturae to the sun's superintendence of growth and decay 
in terrestrial life (see third definition of "nature," Didascalicon i.x.n.71, and 
In Ecclesiasten homiliae[PL, CLXXV, 215-71]). The opera artificis imitantis 
naturam are associated not, as in Chalcidius, with the anima mundi, but with 
man's efforts, through the mechanical arts, to supply both the internal and 
external needs of his body (see Didascalicon 11. xx). Somewhat more elaborate 
division of the opera artificis in In Ecclesiasten homiliae (PL, CLXXV, 215-7). 
An interpretation of the "three works," differing in detail from both 
Chalcidius and Hugh, is found in William of Conches' commentaries on the 
Timaeus (Parent, Doctrine de la creation, p. 147) and on the De consolatione 
philosophiae (ibid., pp. 127-8). 

60. Gen. 1:1. 

61. Gen. 1 : 11. 

62. Gen. 3 : 7. 

63. Luke 12:25. 

64. Hugh associates "mechanical" with the Greek \j.oijoc„ Latin moechus, 
adulterer, rather than with (r/jjcay/), machine. Cf. Martin of Laon Scholica 
graecarum glossarum (M. L. W. Laistner, ed., "Notes on Greek from the 
Lectures of a Ninth Century Monastery Teacher," Bulletin of the John 
Rylands Library, VII [1922-3], 439): "'Moechus' means adulterer, a man 
who secretly pollutes the marriage bed of another. From 'moechus' we call 
'mechanical art' any object which is clever and most delicate and which, in its 
making or operation, is beyond detection, so that beholders find their power 
of vision stolen from them when they cannot penetrate the ingenuity of the 
thing." Martin of Laon was a pupil of John the Scot and a teacher of 
Remigius of Auxerre, with whose works Hugh shows familiarity elsewhere 
in the Didascalicon. Sallust Bellum Jugurthinum xn.iii, uses the term claves 
adulterinae; see n. 48, for direct quotation of this work. 

65. Ps. 103 : 10. 

66. Comparable discussion of man's unarmed state in Adelard of Bath 
Quaestiones naturales (Miiller, ed., BGPM, XXXI [1934], 19-21). 


67. Cicero De inventione i.xxiv.34. 

68. The passage which follows is a good example of the generalizing and 
schematizing habit of Hugh's mind. With his reduction of numerous current 
definitions of "nature" to three basic senses, cf. the more diffuse survey in 
John of Salisbury Metalogkon i.viii (Webb, pp. 23-4; McGarry, pp. 28-9). 

69. This conception of nature, associated by Augustine with the teaching 
of Socrates {De civitate Dei vin.iii; note esp. the reference to "the Nature 
which is unchangeable Light, where live the causes of all created natures"), 
is recognizable also in the eternal pattern of the world in Timaeus 28, and in 
subsequent Neoplatonic discussions of Nous (e.g. in Macrobius In somnium 
Scipionis i.ii.14-17, i.xiv.5-15 [Eyssenhardt, pp. 482-3, 539-42; Stahl, 
pp. 85-6, 143-5], and in Chalcidius [Wrobel, pp. 27, 90-1, 534; Mullach, 
pp. 159, 186, 251]); it found its biblical counterpart in the concept of 
sapientia set forth in Wisd. 7 : 22-8 : 1 ; Eccli. 1:1-10, 24 15-14; Prov. 8 : 22- 
30; and in scattered places in the Psalms (see O. S. Rankin, Israel's Wisdom 
Literature [Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1954], ii, 222-64 an d notes). 
Neoplatonic literature and the sapiential books of the Old Testament are the 
two principal sources from which the idea enters the writings of the Christi- 
an Fathers, who employ it in their interpretations of the biblical Hexaemeron 
and the Joannine prologue especially. Thus, in their exegesis of Gen. 1 : 1 
("In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram"), principium was frequently 
identified with the divine Son, Wisdom, or Mind, and caelum et terram with 
the archetypal exemplars of spiritual and corporeal nature produced from all 
eternity within the Son (so, e.g., Augustine De diversis quaestionibus i.i, "De 
ideis," {PL, XL, 30-1] ; cf. the discussion of Gen. 1 : 1 in Chalcidius [Wrobel, 
pp. 306-10; Mullach, pp. 240-1]). This interpretation of Genesis was re- 
inforced not only by the passages from the sapiential books cited above but 
by John 1 : 1-4, in which the reading preferred by Augustine and given 
currency in the West by his authority ("In principio erat Verbum. ... Quod 
factum est in ipso vita erat"), led to the interpretation of vita as that formal 
principle, within the living Wisdom, according to which all things were 
created (see Augustine Injoannis evangelium tractatus i.xvi-xvii [PL, XXXV, 
1387]; see also n. 1). Occurring also in the commentary tradition on 
Boethius De consolatione philosophiae in.m.ix (in addition to the commentaries 
of Remigius of Auxerre and John the Scot cited in n. 1, see that of Adalbold 
of Utrecht in E. T. Silk, "Pseudo-Johannes Scottus, Adalbold of Utrecht, 
and the Early Commentaries on Boethius," MRS, III [1954], 17, or in 
R. B. C. Huygens, "Mittelalterliche Kommentare zum O qui perpetua," SE, 
VI [1954], 414: "Et quid est mens Dei nisi Films Dei, per quem et a quo 
facta sunt omnia, et in quo omnia quae facta sunt, sunt et vivunt, sicut 
scriptum est, 'Quod factum est in ipso vita erat'?"; and of William of 
Conches, in Parent, Doctrine de la creation, 128-30), the concept found 
lengthy theoretical elaboration in the ninth century in John the Scot's dis- 
cussion of "universalis natura quae et creatur et creat et in primordialibus 
causis constituta est" {De divisione naturae n.xv-xxii [PL, CXXII, 545C- 
66D]; see n. 42). On the concept as transmitted from John the Scot to 
Bernard and Thierry of Chartres and William of Conches, see Parent, 


Doctrine de la creation, pp. 44-58. Interspersed in Abaelard's controversial 
account of pre-Christian allusions to the Trinity in the Law, the Prophets, 
and the pagan philosophers are references to this concept which form a 
convenient catalogue of loci cited repeatedly throughout the twelfth 
century; see Theologia christiana i.iii-v and Theologia i.xiii-xxiv {PL, 
CLXXVIII, 1126D-66B, 998C-1034D). Hugh's "whence each thing takes 
not only its being but its 'being such or such a thing'" is found also in the 
"Liber Hermetis," where, however, the "nature" meant is a cosmic or 
astronomical agency mediating between the divine Mind and the world 
(see n. 53). 

70. Adapted from Boethius Contra Eutychen i {PL, LXIV, 1342B). 

71. "Natura est ignis artifex, ex quadam vi procedens in res sensibiles 
procreandas." Ultimate source, Cicero De natura deorum n.xxii: "Zeno 
igitur naturam ita definit ut earn dicat ignem esse artificiosum, ad gignendum 
progredientem via. non artificiosa solum sed plane artifex ab 
eodem Zenone dicitur." For an instance of direct knowledge of the De 
natura deorum in the twelfth century, see Theodore Silverstein, "Adelard, 
Aristotle, and the De natura deorum." CP, XLVII (1952), 82-6. Hugh's 
phrasing, however, suggests that he drew from Victorinus Expositio in 
librum De inventione ad i.xxiv: "natura est ignis artifex quadam via vadens in 
res sensibiles procreandas" (in Carolus Halm, ed., Rhetores latini minores 
[Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1863], p. 215, or J. C. Orellius, ed., M. Tullii 
Ciceronis opera, V [Turici, 1833], p. 70). Cf. John of Salisbury Metalogicon 
i.viii (Webb, p. 24; McGarry, p. 29), where a further variation of the passage 
appears. Citing the definition in his exegesis of Eccl. 1 : 5-6 ("Oritur sol et 
occidit. ...Pergit spiritus et in circulos suos revertitur"; In Ecclesiasten 
homiliae [PL, CLXXV, 136C-7C]), Hugh locates the ignis artifex in the sun, 
ascribing to its emanations the fostering of vegetative and sense-endowed 
life; for discussion of the quasi-spiritual nature of aetherial fire and its 
special mediating function between senses and reason (via imagination) in 
man, see Hugh's De unione corporis et spiritus {PL, CLXXVII, 286A-C); cf. 
Kleinz, Theory of Knowledge of Hugh of St. Victor, pp. 37-9. Hugh rejects 
explicitly the "opinion of those erring persons" who regard the cosmos as 
animated by a world-soul {In Ecclesiasten homiliae, loc. cit.), alluding parti- 
cularly, it seems, to his contemporaries Adelard of Bath (see De eodem et 
diverso [Willner, ed. p. 15]) and William of Conches (see commentary on the 
Timaeus [Parent, Doctrine de la creation, p. 166] and on the De consolatione 

philosophiae [Jourdain, "Commentaires inedits," pp. 75-61]), where William 
argues that it is false to locate the animating principle of the cosmos in the 
sun. Note Remigius of Auxerre's commentary on De consolatione in.m.ix 
(Stewart, p. 32 ; Silvestre, p. 58): "Philosophers say that the sun is the world- 
soul because, just as the soul gives heat to the body, so the sun's heat vivifies 
all things and, suffused through all creatures, brings them into being; in 
fact, physicists claim that by this heat, in conjunction with moisture, all 
things both beget and are begotten, God so disposing." Antecedents of 
Hugh's and Remigius's position in the Latin Asclepius i.ii (Nock, p. 298, 
lines 5-1 1), which presents fire as the generating agency by which the caelum 


or natura vivifies the air, water, and earth below; Macrobius In somnium 
Scipionis i.xxi.35 (Eyssenhardt, p. 578; Stahl, p. 181), which declares that 
"earth, water, and air, lying beneath the moon, are unable to produce a body 
capable of sustaining life but need the help of aetherial fire, which supplies to 
earthly members their power to support life and soul" ; similarly, Macrobius, 
ibid., i.xx.7 (Eyssenhardt, p. 565; Stahl, p. 169) speaks of the sun as the 
source of aetherial fire, mind of the universe, and heart of heaven, a passage 
to which Chalcidius apparently refers when reporting that some persons 
regard the sun as the vital source of the world soul (Wrobel, p. 170; 
Mullach, p. 240). In rejecting the world soul in favor of solar fire, Hugh 
belongs, in one sense, to the conservative tradition represented by the ninth- 
century Bovo of Corvey, who was scandalized to find the world-soul in 
Boethius (see In Boethii De consolatione in.m.ix commentarius [PL, LXIV, 
1239 ff.]); and the eleventh-century Manegold of Lautenbach, connected 
with the Victorines as teacher of William of Champeaux, and who regarded 
Chalcidius and Macrobius as fertile sources of heresy {Opusculum contra 
Wolfelmum coloniensem {PL, CLV, 149 ff.]). In another sense, Hugh went 
beyond their conservatism by using the very texts and authorities to which 
they object, but giving them a different meaning (see Introduction, sec. in). 
Hugh goes farther than Augustine, who suspended judgment on the world- 
soul for lack of knowledge {Retractationes i.xi.4; cf. De or dine n. xi; De im- 
mortalitate animae xv.xxiv; De musica vi.xiv.44), and Jerome, who is non- 
commital (Commentariorum in Isaiam prophetam libri XV III xvi {PL, XXIV, 
5 5 8 A-B]) ; he also departs from the cosmology of Victorinus himself, 
though using his words, and resembles John the Scot (cf. E. and R. von 
Erhardt-Siebold, Cosmology in the Annotationes in Marcianum : More Light on 
Erigena's Astronomy [Baltimore, 1940], p. 41 : "...the sun holds in Erigena's 
system of cosmogonic powers a position similar to that of the Lower Logos, 
the Anima Mundi, in the Christian-neoplatonic theology of Marius Victor- 
inus Afer"). Hugh's position may have been influenced by pseudo-Diony- 
sius, who describes fire as "having power over all things and ability to move 
to its proper action whatever comes to be in them" (see Hugh Expositio in 
Hierarchiam coelestem [PL, CLXXV, 133 1 A]). 

72. Hugh discusses the generating properties of heat and moisture at some 
length in In Ecclesiasten homiliae {PL, CLXXV, 1 37C-8D). See also Macro- 
bius In somnium Scipionis n.x.10-2 (Eyssenhardt, pp. 618-9; Stahl, p. 218), 
where aetherial fire is said to feed upon moisture. 

73. Vergil Georgica iv.382. Cited also by Thierry of Chartres De sex 
dierum operibus (Haring, ed., p. 194). 

74. Hugh's source appears to be Remigius of Auxerre's commentary on 
Martianus Capella, Bibliotheque Nationale, MS Latin 14754, fol. iov-nr; 
"[Iupiter] unus idemque non solum diversis nominibus sed et vario sexu 
appellatur, iuxta ilium versiculum Valerii Sorani: Iuppiter omnipotens 
rerum regumque creator, Progenitor genitrixque deum, deus unus et idem. 
...Ipse est enim ignis aethereus qui nunquam de sede aetheris descendit." 
In Augustine De civitate Dei vi.ix, xi, xiii the same verses are quoted and 
Varro's interpretation of them given, but without relating Jupiter to 


aetherial fire. In the Latin Asclepius m.xx-xxi (Nock, pp. 321-2), the "god 
and father of all things" is said to be "filled with the fertility of both 

75. Quoted from Boethius Commentaria in Porphjrium a se translatum 11 
{PL, LXIV, 73A-B; CSEL, XL VIII, 139). Another translation of the 
Boethius passage by Richard P. McKeon, Selections from Medieval Philo- 
sophers, I (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), 73 f. 

76. By contrast, Adelard of Bath De eodem et diverso (Willner, ed., p. 18) 
credits grammar with making speech possible for men, who "at first roamed 
the fields like beasts, without mutual intercourse and with their reason 

77. Another translation of the previous paragraph in Ernest A. Moody, 
Truth and Consequence in Modern Logic (Amsterdam, 1953), pp. 13-4. 

78. Cf. Cicero De oratore i.xlii. 187-8: "Almost all things now compre- 
hended in the arts were once scattered and disordered. So in music, ... in 
geometry, ... in astronomy, ... in grammar, all these things seemed unknown 
and without order. A certain art was therefore imposed on them from with- 
out ... to tie together the disconnected and fragmentary material and delimit 
it in some kind of rational order." 

79. This verse, comprising fine 47 of the Pythagorean Aureum carmen, is 
quoted in Porphyry's Life of Pythagoras, whence, according to Courcelle, 
Lettres grecques, p. 25, n. 4, it was taken by Macrobius In somnium Scipionis 
vi.xli (Eyssenhardt, p. 504; Stahl, p. 107), whose Latin and whose associa- 
tion of the number with the soul Hugh follows. Text of the Aureum carmen 
in F. Mullach, Fragmenta philosophorum graecorum, I, 416-84, together with the 
fifth-century commentary of Hierocles of Alexandria, which, however, sheds 
no light on Hugh's further elaboration of the quaternarium animae and 
quaternarium corporis in Didascalicon n.iv-v. 


1. Quoted from Boethius In Porphjrium dialogi i.iii {PL, LXIV, 10D; 
CSEL, XLVIII, 7). See Didascalicon i.ii.n.21. 

2. On permanence in the things studied by the arts, see Boethius De 
arithmetica i.i {PL, LXIII, 1079D): "Wisdom is the grasp of the truth of 
those things which truly exist and are of themselves endowed with un- 
changeable substance" (see Didascalicon i.ii.n.20); cf. Remigius of Auxerre, 
commentary on De consolatione philosophiae (Stewart, p. 26): "...the 
seven liberal arts . . . will never perish in any way, for even if knowledge 
should fail, the knowable will always exist." On permanence in the arts 
themselves, see Cassiodorus Institutiones 11.iii.22 (Mynors, p. 131; Jones, 
p. 179): "They [the sciences] are neither increased by expansion nor dimin- 
ished by contraction nor modified by any changes but abide in their own 
proper nature and observe their own rules with indisputable constancy"; 
and Adelard of Bath De eodem et diverso (Willner, ed., p. 4 and p. 39, n. 1), 
where Philosophia and her arts are identified with the Platonic idem, Philo- 


cosmia (love of the world) with the diversum. For Hugh, the ultimate 
concern of the arts is with the changeless archetypal patterns in the divine 
Wisdom, to whose likeness the arts restore man. 

3. The arts intend restoration of the radical cognitive good lost to man 
through the fall — knowledge of his Creator, of himself, of things created 
with and for himself, and of things he is to make with these last. See De area 
Noe morali prologus {PL, CLXXVI, 619). Cf. In Ecclesiasten homiliae {PL, 
CLXXV, 197A-B), where man's lost contemplation of the divine Wisdom 
is said to make its pursuit in this life incumbent on all, and De sacramentis, "On man's knowledge before sin" {PL, CLXXVI, 270D; Deferrari, 
p. 102). 

4. Quoted from Cassiodorus Institutiones n.iii.5 (Mynors, p. no; Jones, 
p. 160) or Isidore Etymologiae n.xxiv.9. 

5. Quoted from Isidore Etymologiae i.i.2. 

6. "disciplina, quae dicitur plena" Hugh's text changes the sense of the 
source, Cassiodorus Institutiones 11.ii.17 (Mynors, p. 109; Jones, p. 158): 
"Disciplina enim dicta est quae dijvritur plena"; cf. Isidore Etymologiae i.i.i : 
"Disciplina a discendo nomen accepit. ...Nam scire dictum a discere, quia 
nemo nostrum scit nisi qui discit. Aliter dicta disciplina quia dijritur plena." 
Cf. Hugh's definition of philosophy, Didascalicon i.iv, as "disciplina... plene 

7. "ut est in doctrina" Cf. Didascalicon 11. hi: "Mathematica autem doctri- 
nalis scientia dicitur." Following Boethius, doctrina became the traditional 
name for mathematics, its sense being variously explained. See, e.g., Hugh 
Epitome (Baron, ed., p. 112): "The first theoretical art is mathematics, which 
is called 'instructional' because, by the start it makes, it forms contemplation 
and constitutes the approach to instruction concerning hidden things, or, 
because it accompanies its arguments with visible figures set forth for in- 
struction." Cf. William of Conches' commentary on the Timaeus {PL, 
CLXXII, 250), on the De consolatione philosophiae (Jourdain, "Commentaires 
inedits," p. 73), and the brano (Ottaviano, p. 26), the latter of which adds: 
"Mathematics is 'instructional'... because through instruction in numbers, 
proportions, and other matters taught in the quadrivium, knowledge of the 
Creator and his creatures is prepared for us, or because this science is the 
way to physics and theology, since it treats the exemplary numbers of things 
and the invisible forms of visible things, whereas physics treats the invisible 
causes of visible things, and theology invisible essences." For an arith- 
mological treatment of the procession of the divine Wisdom from the Father 
and of creation, see Thierry of Chartres De sex dierum operibus (Haring, ed 
pp. 137-216). Underlying the view that mathematics and theology are 
closely related are such texts as Boethius De arithmetica n.ii {PL, LXIII, 
1 08 3D): "Whatever things were constructed by the primeval Nature of 
things were formed according to the pattern of numbers"; and Macrobius 
In somnium Scipionis i.v.3 (Stahl, p. 95; translation altered): "Not without 
reason did he attribute fulness to numbers, for fulness properly belongs only 
to things divine and heavenly. . . . This, therefore, is the common fulness of 
all numbers, that to our thought as it passes from ourselves to heavenly 


things, they represent the first degree of abstraction belonging to incorporeal 

8. Adapted from Isidore Etymologiae i.i.3; ff. Cassiodorus Institutiones 
n.ii.17 (Mynors, p. 108; Jones, p. 158). 

9. Quoted from Isidore Etymologiae n.xxiv.9 or Cassiodorus Institutiones 
n.iii. 5 (Mynors, p. no; Jones, p. 160), and particularly apposite to Hugh's 
thought when taken in conjunction with Macrobius's explanation, In 
somnium Scipionis i.xiii.5-7 (Stahl, pp. 138-9): "...Plato... in his Phaedo 
(64A, 67D) lays down the rule that a man must not die of his own volition. 
And yet in the same dialogue he also says that philosophers ought to seek 
after death, and that philosophy is itself a meditation upon dying. These 
statements seem to be contradictory but are really not so, for Plato acknow- 
ledged two deaths in a man. . . . Man dies when the soul leaves the body in 
accordance with the laws of nature; he is also said to die when the soul, still 
residing in his body, spurns all bodily allurements under the guidance of 
philosophy, and frees itself from the tempting devices of the lusts and all the 
other passions. This is the death which, as we pointed out above, proceeds 
from the second type of those virtues which befit only philosophers." The 
virtues alluded to are the "cleansing virtues ... found in the man who is 
capable of attaining the divine. They release the minds only of those who 
have resolved to cleanse themselves from any contamination with the body, 
and by an escape from mortal things, as it were, to mingle solely with the 
divine" {ibid., i.viii.8 [Stahl, p. 122]). Cf. Abaelard Theologia Christiana 11 
{PL, CLXXVIII, 1 185). 

10. Cf. Didascalicon i.iv.n.27. 

11. Buttimer's punctuation altered. 

12. Cf. William of Conches' commentary on De consolatione philosophiae 
(Jourdain, "Commentaires inedits," pp. 72-3): "There are two species of 
knowledge : wisdom and eloquence. . . . These two are called the species of 
knowledge because in them is all knowledge." When explained, this 
contrast between Hugh and William sets their respective mysticism and 
naturalism in strong relief. See Introduction, sec. 11. 

13. See Didascalicon i.ix.n.64. 

14. See Didascalicon i.xi. 

15. Quoted from Boethius In Porphyrium dialogi i.iii {PL, LXIV, 11C; 

16. Quoted from Isidore Etymologiae 11.xxiv.13 or from Isidore's source, 
Cassiodorus Institutiones n.iii.6 (Mynors, p. in; Jones, p. 160, where, how- 
ever, the passage is incorrectly translated). 

17. See n. 7. 

18. At the basis of the distinction are the Greek |xa67)ai<;, knowledge, and 
[i.aTaioT7]?, vanity. For refs. and discussion, see Lynn Thorndyke, A. History 
of Magic and Experimental Science, II (New York: Macmillan, 1929), n, n. 3 ; 
and Pare, Brunet, Tremblay, Renaissance du XI Ie siecle, p. 177, n. 1. To the 
refs. cited in these sources, add Augustine De doctrina Christiana n.xxi, where 
superstitious mathematici are explicitly named. On the distinction in William 
of Conches, see Heinrich Flatten, Die Philosophie des Wilhelm von Conches 


(Coblenz: Gorres-Druckerei, 1929), p. 23 ; and in Clarenbaldus of Arras, see 
Wilhelm Jansen, Der Kommentar des Clarenbaldus von Arras ^u Boethius de 
Trinitate ("Breslauer Studien zur historischen Theologie," III; Breslau: 
Kommissionsverlag Miiller u. SeifTert, 1926), p. 38. 

19. Quoted from Cassiodorus Institutiones 11. Praefatio. 4; n.iii.6; or 
11.iii.21 (Mynors,pp. 92, in, or 130; Jones, pp. 160 and 179, where, how- 
ever, the passage is mistranslated). Cf. Isidore Etjmologiae 11.xxiv.14; and 
in. Praefatio. 

20. Quoted from Boethius In Porphjrium dialogi i.iii (PL,, LXIV, 11C; 

21. "quo amittit" in both Buttimer's text and Migne's. The sense, how- 
ever, requires admittit (ammittit). 

22. "compositionis rationem" See Didascalicon i.i.n.i 3. 

23. Cf. Macrobius In somnium Scipionis i.xiv.7-9 (Eyssenhardt, p. 540; 
Stahl, pp. 143-4, where, however, patrem is mistakenly read for partem; 
translation here corrected): "The soul acquires that part to which it gives its 
attention, and, when its attention little by little retreats toward the bodily 
structure, the soul, itself incorporeal, degenerates. ...Degenerating toward 
lower and earthly things, it discovers that the weakness of perishable bodies 
cannot sustain the pure divinity of mind." Though Macrobius here treats 
the world soul's descent from contemplation of Nous to the animation of the 
physical universe, Hugh, as before with passages from the Timaeus and De 
consolatione philosophiae (see Didascalicon i.i.n.8, 10), adapts the material to the 
human soul in its dual relationship to the divine Mind and the body. Cf. 
In Ecclesiasten homiliae {PL, CLXXV, 1 5 6C-7A), and Boethius De consola- 
tione philosophiae "Human souls are necessarily more free when they 
preserve themselves in contemplating the divine Mind, less so when they 
lapse toward the bodily, still less when they are bound down by earthly 

24. Buttimer's invisibiles corporum jormas corrected to in visibiles corporum 
jormas, as required by sense. 

25. With this chapter's arithmological conception of the quaternarium 
animae, clearly attributed by Hugh to others (see concluding sentence of this 
chapter: "some men think"), cf. his own interpretation of the quaternarium 
as the four major categories of the arts in Didascalicon i.xi, an interpretation 
also found in his earlier Epitome (Baron, ed., p. 108): "Ancient authority 
defined the first and principal parts of philosophy as four, and therefore 
ordained that the number 'four' be venerated in an oath; from this 'four' 
rises the shrine of Wisdom, built by philosophy in the recesses of the rational 
soul, and every building is obviously constructed with a four-sided plan." 
Despite the reminiscence of Vitruvius De architectura m.i in the last part of 
the statement and the resemblances to Macrobius and others indicated in the 
notes to this chapter, neither the Epitome's "ancient authority" for the four- 
fold division of philosophy nor the present chapter's "some men," pro- 
ponents of the arithmological interpretation of the quaternarium, can be 
identified. They are not to be found in the published commentaries of 
Dunchad, John the Scot, Remigius of Auxerre, Bovo of Corvey, Adalbold 



of Utrecht, or William of Conches on the Timaeus or De consolatione philo- 
sophiae, nor in Hugh's own copy of the Remigius commentary on Martianus 
Capella (Bibliotheque Nationale, MS Latin 14754). Most likely source would 
seem to be an as yet unknown Carolingian commentary on one of the above, 
or perhaps more likely, on Macrobius In somnium Scipionis i.v-vi, which treat 
the numbers of the Pythagorean decade and cite the oath to which Hugh 
refers, or i.ix-xiv, which treat the heavenly origin, descent into the body, 
and reascension of man's soul, sections repeatedly quoted during the Middle 
Ages. Ignoring the latter section, M.-D. Chenu, "Platon a Citeaux," 
AHDL, XXI (1954), 99-106, suggests only Macrobius i.v-vi as ultimate 
source of Hugh's arithmology and calls attention to the use, ca. 11 51, of 
Didascalicon 11. iv by Nicholas of Clairvaux, whose interest in the material, 
like Hugh's, he characterizes as "a la faveur et pour le besoin de perceptions 
religieuses," in contrast to the Chartrian interest in arithmology, which he 
calls "une studiosite scolaire, avec le caractere objectif et technique que 
procure la lecture des textes" {ibid., p. 104). Chartrian arithmology, while it 
affords certain striking parallels with the present chapter, as suggested in the 
notes immediately following, is concerned not with man but with the world- 
soul (as in William of Conches) or with the arithmetical rationalization of the 
relations of Father and the divine Wisdom, or Son (as in Thierry of Chartres). 
By the different contexts in which the ideas common to Hugh and the 
Chartrians appear, the distinctiveness of the Victorine and Chartrian schools 
is emphasized. On Hugh's interpolation of this chapter on the soul into the 
discussion of mathematics, cf. Macrobius In somnium Scipionis 1. vi. 5 (Eyssen- 
hardt, p. 496; Stahl, p. 100): "wise men have not hesitated to proclaim... 
that the soul is a number moving itself." 

26. The arithmetical series which, in this and the following chapter, re- 
present the progressions of soul (1-3-9-27-8 1) and body (2-4-8-16-32) 
suggest extensions of the so-called lambda diagram commonly found in 

1 commentaries on the Timaeus 3 5 A ff., a passage which, 

23 as interpreted by Macrobius (Eyssenhardt, p. 

4 9 495; Stahl, p. 99), teaches "that God, who made the 

8 27 world-soul, intertwined odd and even in its makeup: 

that is, used the numbers 'two' and 'three' as a basis, alternating the odd and 
even numbers from two to eight and from three to twenty-seven." The 
diagram is described further in Macrobius (Eyssenhardt, p. 505; 
Stahl, pp. 108-9) and Chalcidius (Wrobel, pp. 98-9; Mullach, p. 188); it is 
reproduced by William of Conches in his commentary on the Timaeus (see 
Jeauneau, "La Notion d'integumentum" AHDL, XXIV [1957], 89), where 
the linear, square, and cube numbers in both series are regarded as symbol- 
izing the world-soul's power to move body in all three dimensions. 

27. Cf. William of Conches' commentary on the Timaeus 35B (see 
Jeauneau, "La Notion dCintegumentum," AHDL, XXIV [1957], 89): "The 
number 'one' appears in the composition of the [world] soul in order, by its 
own indivisibleness, to symbolize the indivisibleness of the soul's essence." 
See also Macrobius In somnium Scipionis (Eyssenhardt, pp. 496-7; 
Stahl, pp. 100-1), who, referring the number "one," or monad, primarily to 


the supreme God and the divine Mind, attributes it as well to the [world] 
soul, "free from contamination with anything material . . .and endowed with 
a simple nature," and man's soul {ibid., i.xii.5 [Eyssenhardt, p. 531; Stahl, 
p. 134]); cf. ibid., 1. xii. 6 (Eyssenhardt, p. 531; Stahl, p. 135): "Souls, whether 
of the world or of the individual, will be found to be now unacquainted with 
division if they are reflecting on the singleness of their divine state, and 
again susceptible to it when that singleness is being dispersed through the 
parts of the world or of man." Cf. Boethius De imitate et uno {PL, LXIII, 
1075D f.): "'One' descends from the first One which created it. ...For the 
nearer each 'one' is to that first and true One, the more one and simple will 
be the matter it forms ; conversely, the farther it is from that first One, the 
more multiplied and complex it will be... so that as a 'one' descends from 
higher to lower, degeneration takes place." 

28. Cf. William of Conches' commentary on Timaeus (in Jeauneau, "La 
Notion Rintegumentum" AHDL, XXIV [1957], 90): "Even number, which 
can be divided into two equal parts, refers to dissoluble things, while odd 
number, which cannot be divided into equal parts, refers to indissoluble 
things"; and Thierry of Chartres De sex dierum operibus xxx (Haring, ed., 
p. 194) and Librum hunc (Jansen, ed., p. 12), where the number "two" is said 
to be the principle of all otherness and mutability and to represent matter, 
according to Plato and Pythagoras. 

29. The term "monad" is found in Macrobius, who, applying it both to 
the world-soul and to the human soul (see ref. in preceding note), declares 
further {ibid., [Eyssenhardt, p. 504; Stahl, p. 108]) that the number 
"three" marks the three divisions of soul into cupiditas, animositas, and ratio. 
Cf. Chalcidius (Wrobel, pp. 230-3; Mullach, pp. 220-1), whose cupiditas, 
iracundia, and ratio are closer to Hugh's concupiscentia, ira, and ratio. Identical 
with Hugh, however, in terminology and in transference of world-soul 
materials to man is Remigius of Auxerre, commentary on De consolatione 
philosophiae in.m.ix (Stewart, p. 33; Silvestre, p. 61): "This smaller world 

man], then, has a soul of threefold nature. It is wrathful, concupiscible, and 
rational — wrathful that it may be filled with wrath by the vices and pleasures 
of the body; concupiscible that it may love God and seek the virtues; 
rational that it may be able to distinguish between Creator and creature, good 
and evil." 

30. See Didascalicon 11. xii. 

31. Cf. Hugh's exegesis of Eccl. 1:13 in In Ecclesiasten homiliae {PL, 
CLXXV, 155D, 156C-7A): "Because the sons of men were unwilling to 
stand fast in the Truth, they now become distended and divided into a 
multiplicity of parts and occupied with vanity. . . . For since the mind of man 
would not remain in that one Good in whom it could rest happily and 
possess the fulness of the highest Truth without being pulled asunder and 
without dissipation, it was cast outside itself and scattered abroad upon the 
multiplicity of visible things." 

32. Cf. Macrobius In somnium Scipionis i.xii.17 (Eyssenhardt, p. 538; 
Stahl, p. 137): "Be not disturbed that in reference to the soul, which we say 
is immortal, we so often use the term 'death'... for when it has rid itself 


completely of all taint of evil and has deserved to be sublimated, it again 
leaves the body and, fully recovering its former state, returns to the splendor 
of everlasting life." 

33. Ps. 89: 10. 

34. See Didascalicon i.xi.n.79. 

35. See n. 28. 

36. Ibid. 

3 7. Cf. De unione corporis et spiritus {PL, CLXXVII, 287B ff.), where Hugh 
explains that the forms of sensible things, drawn into the eyes by the rays of 
vision and passing through the seven tunicae and three humor es of the eyes, 
enter the cerebrum, or cella phantastica, of the brain, where they become 
imaginationes. The other senses, similarly "informed" by physical objects, 
introduce the forms of those objects "by hidden channels" into the cella 
phantastica. The imaginationes so formed are purely corporeal and are possess- 
ed by brute animals as well as man. In man, however, passing into the middle 
part of the brain, they are sufficiently purified and spiritualized by the reason 
to "touch the very substance of the rational soul." Reason, like a light, 
makes clear and well defined what an "imagination" presents to it; an 
"imagination," on the other hand, darkens and cloaks the reason — "insofar 
as it comes upon it, it clouds, and overshadows, and enwraps, and covers 
over the reason." If reason merely contemplates its "imaginations" in order 
to form knowledge {scientid) from them, it wears them like garments easily 
cast off. If, however, it clings to them with love, then they adhere to it like a 
skin which cannot be stripped off without pain, so that even souls separated 
from the body can be held in the grip of corporeal impressions {passiones) 
because not yet cleansed from affection for them. But the primary movement 
of the reason should be upward toward God, who, working along with the 
reason and informing it from above and within, produces understanding 
within it, in contrast with "imaginations," which, informing the reason 
from below and without, produce knowledge. To the physiology of sense 
perception, emanating from Constantine the African and found also, e.g., 
in William of Conches Philosophia mundi 1 v.xxiv-xxvi {PL, CLXXII, 9 5 A- 
6C), Hugh characteristically adds the concluding emphasis on the upward 
orientation of the reason toward God. For identification of "knowledge" 
with the mechanical arts and "understanding" with the theoretical and 
practical arts, see Didascalicon i.viii. n. 57. 

38. Compare this entire chapter with Boethius De arithmetica i.i {PL, 
LXIII, esp. 1081A-B), with which it has many verbal parallels. 

39. Cf. William of Conches' commentary on De consolatione philosophiae (Jourdain, "Commentaires inedits," p. 73) for a closely comparable 
discussion of the four branches of mathematics. It is characteristic that 
William's discussion of mathematics should be interpolated into a literary 
commentary, while Hugh's appears in a textbook on the arts. 

40. See Cora E. Lutz, ed., Iohannis Scotti Annotations in Marcianum 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1939), pp. 89, 152, for 
translation of apy]? as virtus and 'pu0[i.6? as numerus. Cf. William of Conches' 
commentary on De consolatione philosophiae (Jourdain, "Commentaires 


inedits," p. 73): "arithmetic treats multitude in itself, that is, the power of 

41. Cf. Boethius De arithmetica i.ii {PL, LXIII, 1083B): "Whatever 
things were constructed by the primeval Nature of things were formed 
according to the pattern of numbers. For this was the principal exemplar in 
the Mind of the Creator." Cf. Thierry of Chartres De sex dierum operibus 
xxxvi (Haring, ed., p. 196): "But the creation of numbers is the creation of 
things" ; and xliii {ibid., p. 198) : "Just as all things derive their existence from 
the One, so from the One Equal to the One [the divine Mind or Wisdom] 
proceed the form, mode, and measure of each thing. . . . Therefore, as the 
One Equal to the One contains within himself and generates from himself 
the ideas of all things, so does he contain within himself and bring forth 
from himself the very forms of all things . . . [together with] all proportions 
and inequalities. And all things resolve themselves into him." Cf. Haring's 
discussion of the passage and speculation on its relation to a possible medie- 
val translation of Plato's Parmenides {ibid., pp. 160-9). 

42. Cf. Georgius Henricus Bode, ed., Scriptores rerum mythicarum latini tres 
(Cellis, 1834), p. 213: "Sane moys Graece aqua dicitur; inde Musa quasi 
aquatica. Aer enim per arterias canentis egrediens, humore aspergitur, nee 
umquam per gutturis fistulam nisi humoris adjutorio canitur. Secundum 
Varronem etiam ipsae sunt Musae quae et Nymphae; nee, ut ait Servius, 
immerito. Nam aquae, inquit, sonus musicen efficit, ut in hydraulis, id est 
aquaticis organis, videmus." Completely different derivation of "music" in 
Cassiodorus Institutiones 11. v. 1 (Mynors, p. 142; Jones, pp. 189-90) and 
Isidore Etymologiae iii.xv.i. 

43. Entire chapter related to Cassiodorus Institutiones (Mynors 
pp. 1 50-1; Jones, pp. 197-8), or Isidore Etymologiae m.x.1-3. 

44. Cf. Isidore Etymologiae m.xxvii, which, however, is too brief to be the 
source of Hugh's chapter. Same distinction between the natural and super- 
stitious aspects of astrology in Abaelard Expositio in Hexaemeron (Victor 
Cousin, ed., Petri Abaelardi opera, I [Paris, 1849], 649-51). Cf. Augustine 
De diversis quaestionibus, "Contra mathematicos" {PL, XL, 28D-9A). 

45. Cf. the distinction between true and superstitious mathematics in 
Didascalicon n.iii; see also i.viii, where Hugh attributes to "mathematicians" 
the distinction between superlunary and sublunary worlds. 

46. The terminology of this chapter is explained and illustrated briefly in 
Isidore Etymologiae v.i-viii, and in detail in Boethius De arithmetica i.iii-xvii 
{PL, LXIII, 1083-96). 

47. Entire chapter digested from Boethius De musica i.ii {PL, LXIII, 
1171D f.) Adelard of Bath seems to have drawn on the same source in the 
De eodem et diverso (Willner, ed., p. 27). 

48. Lucan Pharsalia 11. 3 84-7. Cf. In Ecclesiasten homiliae {PL, CLXXV, 
1 5 7B-C), where inordinate concern with supplying the needs of this life, 
identified with the "evil" of Matt. 6:34 ("Sufficient for the day is the evil 
thereof") and associated, therefore, with the vain solicitudes for food, drink, 
and clothing of the Sermon on the Mount, is said to be second only to in- 
ordinate zeal for knowledge as an occupatio, that is, "a distraction and binding 


down of minds, diverting, dissipating, and trapping souls, so that they can- 
not think the things of salvation." 

49. See n. 29. 

50. Eph. 5 129. 

j 1. Quoted, with slight changes, from Boethius De musica i.xxxiv (PL, 
LXIII, 1196B). 

52. The chapter is digested from the praenotanda of Hugh's Practica 
geometriae (Baron, ed., pp. 187-8). 

53. The allusion to the ball and egg in connection with cosmimetry, 
missing from the Practica geometriae, suggests the comparison of the universe 
to a ball and egg found, e.g., in Honorius Augustodunensis De imagine 
mundi i.i (PL, CLXXII, 121 A), but also in Hildegarde of Bingen and 
William of Conches and deriving from Macrobius Saturnalia vii, though in 
William of Conches, from Arabic tradition as well. The details which link 
William to Arabic tradition are missing from Hugh. 

5 4. The reference is to the reputed origin of geometry in Egypt, where 
periodic inundations of the Nile required continual remeasurement of fields. 

55. "fons sensuum et origo dictionum" The phrase, though attested to 
in its present position by the authority of all MSS of the Didascalicon, is 
actually part of the traditional definition of topica. Cf. Cassiodorus Instituti- 
0#£.rii.iii.i4(Mynors, p. 124; Jones, p. 172): "Nunc ad topica veniamus, quae 
sunt argumentorum sedes, fontes sensuum, [et] origines dictionum"; re- 
produced in Isidore Etymologiae 11.xxix.16. Application of this phrase to 
geometry may be related to the view of mathematics, geometry in particular, 
as concerned with visible form, and to the view that form, in turn, is the 
source of a thing's species or genus and name. See n. 41. Cf. Richard of St. 
Victor Excerptiones priores i.viii (PL, CLXXVII, 197A): "Arithmetic treats 
the visible forms of visible objects. . . . But every visible form is quantitative- 
ely determined," and Cassiodorus Institutiones ii.v.i 1 (Mynors, p. 1 50; Jones, 
p. 197), where the Holy Trinity is said to employ geometry in granting 
various species and forms to creatures. 

56. Vergil Georgica 11.479 & Muller, ed., Adelard of Bath Quaestiones 
naturales, p. 89, apparently ignoring the Vergilian source of these lines 
and pointing out that they read like a table of contents for Adelard's 
work, concludes that Hugh has read and is here summarizing the. Quaestiones 

5 7. Boethius In Porphyrium dialogi n.iii (PL, LXIV, 1 iC; CSEL, XLVIII, 
8). On physis as nature, cf. William of Conches' commentary on De consol- 
atione philosophiae (Jourdain, ed. "Commentaires inedits," p. 73): "Physics 
treats the properties and qualities of bodies, whence it is called physics, that 
is, natural"; cf. his commentary on the Timaeus (PL, CLXXII, 247): 
"Physics treats the natures and complexions of bodies, for 'physis' means 

58. The division of philosophy into physics, ethics, and logic, attributed 
by Augustine to Plato, was commonly accepted before the twelfth century 
on the authority of Augustine. See Introduction, ii. 

59. On the mind's formal, not physical, inclusion of reality, see Didascali- 


con i.i; on the reason's formation of knowledge from sense perception of 
things, and on "understanding" as formed, not from sense perception of 
things, but from above and within, see ibid, n.v.n.37. 

60. Cf. Adelard of Bath Quaestiones naturaks i (Miiller, ed., p. 6); also 
William of Conches De philosophia miindi i.xxi {PL, CLXXII, 48D), where, 
against the ignorant who cite philosophers to maintain "that the elements 
are properties and qualities of things we see," William cites Constantinus 
Afer, a physicist, "according to whom none of those four we see, and which 
some persons think are elements, is an element — not earth, not water, not air, 
not fire." 

61. Hugh's effort, throughout this chapter, is to establish the necessary 
interrelationship of logic, mathematics, and physics as dealing, all of them, 
with things (res), though on different levels — physics dealing with actualities 
as analyzable into elements, mathematics dealing with arithmetical concepts 
abstracted from actual entities, logic dealing with concepts on the totally 
abstract level of understanding or on the lower level of knowledge. On the 
distinction between res and verba as applied by the Chartrians, especially 
William of Conches, to exclude the logical arts from philosophy, see Pare, 
Brunet, Tremblay, Renaissance du Xlle siecle, p. 103, n. 1, and pp. 194-7. 

62. Instead of "philological" one would expect "physiological" in the 
sense defined in n.xvi. Richard of St. Victor, excerpting the present chapter, 
writes physiologiam, not philologiam [Excerptiones prior es i.vii [PL, CLXXVII, 
197A]). "Philological," however, has the support of all MSS, and that the 
term was used for physics appears from Dunchad's commentary on Marti- 
anus (Cora E. Lutz, ed., Glossae in Martianum [Lancaster, Pa. : Lancaster 
Press, Inc., 1944], p. 13): "Phylologia vero inferior intelligentia per quam 
intelligimus res visibiles et invisibiles significatur. " 

63. Cf. Remigius of Auxerre's commentary on Martianus Capella 
(Bibliotheque Nationale, MS Latin 14754, fol. 3 r ): "Pallas, id est Tritonia. 
...Tritonia dicta quasi trito nota noticia. Scire videlicet deum, animam, 
corpoream creaturam." John the Scot on Martianus (Lutz, ed., p. 11) has a 
comparable gloss but assigns the threefold knowledge to the three parts of 
rational nature, " dacr07)cri<;, Xoyo?, vou?, hoc est sensus, ratio, animus." Cf. 
William of Conches, who, drawing upon Fulgentius (see Fabii Planciadis 
[Fu/geniii] opera, Rudolfus Helm, ed., [Leipzig: B. C. Teubner, 1898], 
pp. 36-9), associates the interpretation of Pallas as the theoretical arts with 
the myth of the judgment of Paris: " the fables one finds that three 
goddesses, Juno, Pallas, and Venus, sought to discover from the judgment 
of Paris which of them was the worthiest. . . . The fable concerns nothing 
other than the three kinds of life: the theoretical or contemplative, the 
practical or active, and the philargic or sensual. Pallas stands for the con- 
templative, Juno for the active, Venus for the sensual. This can be proved 
by the gifts the goddesses promised Paris. Pallas promised him wisdom, 
because by contemplation does a man become wise." Cited in Jeauneau, 
"Notion dLtntegumentum" AHDL, XXIV (1957), 52. 

64. With the restriction of wisdom to arts studying the truth of things 


(res), see Appendix A, where Hugh, quoting Boethius De arithmetica i.i, 
defines wisdom as "the comprehension of things as they exist." The present 
exclusion of logic, ethics, and mechanics from wisdom is at variance with 
Didascalkon n.xvii, where Hugh associates logic with mathematics and 
physics as concerned, though on different levels, with things, and with 
Didascalicon i.viii, where Hugh, arguing from premises carefully laid down 
in earlier chapters of Bk. 1, demonstrates that both practical and mechanical 
arts must be taken as parts of wisdom. In the Epitome (Baron, ed., pp. 1 1 5— 
6), Hugh rejects the view which "by too severe a test" excludes logic and 
the mechanical arts from philosophy ; he argues that logic and the mechanical 
arts are proper parts, though admittedly not the first parts, of philosophy. 
See Introduction, ii. 

65. Cf. William of Conches' commentary on the De consolatione philosophiae 
(Jourdain, "Commentaires inedits," p. 73): "Economics teaches how each 
man should manage his own family, whence it is called 'economics' or 
managerial, for an economicus is a manager. Politics concerns the governance 
of a state, for polis is a civitas, or state." 

66. Quoted, with slight changes, from Boethius In Porphyrium dialogi i.iii 
{PL, LXIV, nDf.; CSEL, XLVIII, 8). 

67. Quoted from Isidore Etymologiae 11.xxiv.16, or from Isidore's source, 
Cassiodorus Institutiones n.iii.7 (Mynors, p. 112; Jones, p. 161). 

68. Cf. the hrano revision of William of Conches De philosophia mundi 
(Ottaviano, ed., p. 34) : "It is to be noted that as in the liberal arts there is the 
trivium concerned with eloquence and the quadrivium concerned with 
wisdom, so in the mechanical arts, the first three are called a trivium because 
they pertain to extrinsic goods — to fabric making, armament, and commerce ; 
while four are a quadrivium because related to internal remedies or foods. 
It is asked how dramatics pertains to interior things. Two things are 
vitally necessary to man . . . movement to keep the mind from languishing, 
joy to keep the body from exhaustion by too much work. So, plays and 
diversions were established " 

69. Cf. John the Scot on Martianus (Lutz, ed., p. 74): "After Mercury 
gives her the seven liberal arts, then the virgin gives him the seven mechan- 
ical arts." Cf. also ibid., p. 59. 

70. Quoted from Cicero De inventione i.iv.5. 

71. Quoted from Augustine Enarrationes in psalmos Ps. 67:39 (PL, 
XXXVI, 836D). 

72. So Remigius of Auxerre on Martianus Capella (Bibliotheque Natio- 
nale, MS 14754, fol. i r ): "Mercurius dictus est quasi... mercatorum kyrios, 
id est dominus, quia sermo maxime inter mercatores viget. . . . Mercurius in 
similitudine facundie et sermonis." Cf. Dunchad on Martianus (Lutz, ed., 
p. 5). The third Vatican mythographer, drawing on Fulgentius, supplies a 
variant etymology (Bode, Scriptores rerum mythicarum, pp. 214-5): "Fulgen- 
tius Mercurium negotiis praeesse dicit; ideo Mercurium dictum quasi 
merces curantem, quod negotiatores, quibus praeest, mercibus semper in- 
vigilent; sive ab 'Ep[iY)<; Graeco, quod disserere interpretatur, eo quod 


negotiatori maxime linguarum dissertio sit necessaria." Cf. Helm, Fabii 
Planciadis [Fulgentii] opera, pp. 29-30. 

73 . Cf. the third Vatican mythographer (Bode, Scrip tores rerum mythicarum, 
p. 215), where medius currens, alternate etymology for Mercurius, supplies 
pacific symbolism for Mercury's caduceus: "Ideo serpentibus innexam et 
caduceum dictum, quod rhetoris sermo inter venenosas adversariorum 
litigationes medius currens, omnem rixam cadere cogat, eosque sibi adinvicem 
reconciliet. Nam bellantes disertorum oratione sedantur." 

74. The following paragraph adapted from Isidore Etymologiae xx.iii. 

75. The phrase is the incipit of the Isagoge Joannitii ad Tegni Galiegni (see 
Articella [Venice: Baptista de Tortes, 1487], fol. 2 r - a ), which supplies the 
often widely separated excerpts joined in this chapter. Thus, the "two parts" 
of the incipit refer in the original to theorica etpractica, but Hugh, telescoping 
the intervening material, makes them refer to "occasions" and operations. 
On Johannitius and the Tegni of Galen in particular, see, e.g., Pierre Duhem, 
he Systeme du monde, III (Paris, 191 6), 88-9, and C. H. Haskins, Studies in the 
History of Mediaeval Science (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 
1927), p. 374, n. 18, and refs. there cited. 

76. Isagoge Joannitii {Articella, fol. 3 va : "Occasiones... aut faciunt 
sanitatem aut conservant. modi sunt: quorum unus est aer qui 
humanum corpus circumdat, cibus et potus, motus et quies, somnus et 
vigiliae, inanitio et repletio, et accidentia animae." 

77. Ibid., fol. 3 r_a : "Sunt quaedam accidentia animae quae... commovent 
naturalem calorem . . . aut impetuose ut ira . . . aut leviter cum suavitate, ut 
deliciae et gaudium. Sunt alia quae . . . contrahunt et celant aut impetuose 
ut terror vel timor, aut leviter ut angustia, et sunt quae commovent natura- 
lem virtutem intus et extra, ut est tristitia." 

78. Ibid., fo. 4 v " a : "Operatio medicinae habet triplicem effectum: intus 
ut ea quae ore aut naribus, auribus, sive ano sive vulva intromittamus ; 

fores ut epithima, cataplasma, emplaustra, et similia, quae foris operantur 

Cyrurgia duplex est: in carne et in osse: in carne ut incidere, suere, coquere; 
in osse ut solidare aut innectere aut reddere." 

79. With Hugh's favorable attitude toward theatrica, perhaps not un- 
connected with the rise of liturgical drama in the twelfth century, cf. the shift 
in the late thirteenth-century view of Robert Kilwardby, who, otherwise 
importantly influenced by Hugh, condemns theatrica as unsuitable for 
believers; see Kilwardby 's De ortu et divisione philosophiae xi, as outlined 
in Baur, Gundissalinus, p. 373. 

80. Cf. Isidore Etymologiae i.v.i. 

81. Cf. the brano revision of William of Conches De philosophia mundi 
(Ottaviano, ed., p. 28): "These three [grammar, the theory of argument, and 
rhetoric] are the appendages and instruments of philosophy, and therefore 
are not part of philosophy itself but are oriented toward it. Boethius, 
however, seems to say that logic is both instrument and part, so that nothing 
stands in the way of the opinion of certain persons that logic is contained in 
philosophy." Cf. Boethius Commentaria in Porphyrium a se translatum i.ii-iii 
(PL, LXIV, 73B-75A; CSEL, XLVIII, 138-43). 


82. Probably the Ars minor, a brief dialogue on the eight parts of speech, 
generally memorized by medieval students. Text in Keil, IV Grammatici 
latini, 355-66. 

83. Probably his commentary on Donatus is meant. See Keil, ibid., 
pp. 405-48, 

84. Keil prints these two opuscula, ibid., Ill, 519-28 and 459-515. The 
first is not actually Priscian's (ibid., pp. 400-10, for discussion of authorship), 
the second only partially his (ibid., p. 398). Note that Hugh makes no 
mention of Priscian's lengthy and detailed Institutionum grammaticarum libri 
XVIII (ibid., II and III), which was studied at Chartres and embodied 
verbatim in Thierry of Chartres' Heptateuchon. In De philosophia mundi iv.xli 
(PL, CLXXII, 100D f.) William of Conches announces his intention to 
comment on Priscian ; commentary contained, according to Parent (Doctrine 
de la creation, p. 117), in Bibliotheque Nationale, MS Latin 14065 . On the use 
of Priscian (and Donatus) in the twelfth century, see C. H. Haskins, The 
Renaissance of the Twelfth Century (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University 
Press, 1927), pp. 129-31, and Pare, Brunet, Tremblay, Renaissance du Xlle 
siecle, pp. 1 5 1-2 and notes. Hugh, unwilling to allow students a protracted 
concern with one or a few arts, prepared a compendium of grammar; see 
Jean Leclercq, ed., "Le 'De grammatica' de Hugues de Saint- Victor," 
AHDL, XV (1943-5), 263-322. 

8 5 . The third part of Donatus Ars major (Keil, IV Grammatici latini, 392- 
402), deriving its title from the incipit of that part. 

86. See Etymologiae 1. 

87. Cf. Didascalicon i.xi. par. 3. Hugh's division of "linguistic logic," the 
fourth part of philosophy, derives from the double sense of logos as word or 
reason and is as follows : 


< demonstration 

/ dialectic 

rational, or argumen- £ — probable argument <^f 
tative, logic; also called \ ^rhetoric 

the theory of argument sophistic 

The terms "genus" and "species," which tend to be restricted in modern 
times to biological classifications, are quite properly used by Hugh to name 
class and sub-class in any order of being. Thus, linguistic logic stands as 
genus, or class, to grammar and rational logic, its species or sub-classes; 
rational logic stands as genus, or class, to demonstration, probable argument, 
and sophistic, its species or sub-classes. By "divisive part" Hugh means a 
separable part, like the limbs of a body; by "integral part" he means an 
inseparable constituent found throughout the whole, like soul and body, 
which comprise the whole of a living man and cannot be separated without 
loss of existence to the whole as such. 

88. Hugh's problem in this and the next two paragraphs is to determine 
the precise sense in which invention and judgment, as treated, e.g., in Cicero 
De inventione and Aristotle De interpretatione (translated into Latin and twice 


commented upon by Boethius), are included in philosophy. He concludes 
that these two studies are "integral parts," but not "divisive parts," of 
philosophy. See preceding footnote for meaning of these terms. On in- 
vention and judgment as parts of logic, see also Boethius Commentaria in 
Porphyrium a se translatum i.ii {PL, LXIV, 73 B; CSEL, XL VIII, 139); In 
Topica Ciceronis commentaria 1 {PL, LXIV, 1044C); Cicero Topica 11. vi; 
Abaelard Logica ingredientibus{B. Geyer, ed., "Peter Abaelards philosophische 
Schriften," BGPM, XXI [1919-33], 1-3)- Division of logic into demonstra- 
tion, probable argument, and sophistic, in John of Salisbury Metalogicon 
n.iii (Webb, pp. 64-5 ; McGarry, p. 79). On the term ratio disserendi, here 
translated "theory of argument," see Cicero De fato i.i. 


1. Cf. Augustine De civitate Dei xvm.xiv and xxxvii, where Linus is 
listed with Orpheus and Musaeus as a theologian-poet among the Greeks. 
He is mentioned with Homer and Vergil in Martianus Capella De nuptiis 
philologiae et Mercurii n.ccxii (Adolphus Dick, ed. [Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 

1925], p. 78), and is identified with Homer by Dunchad commenting on 
Martianus (Lutz, ed., p. 12). On the meaning of "theologus" and "theo- 
logia" in this context, see Pare, Brunet, Tremblay, Renaissance du XII 
siecle, pp. 308-9, n. 3 ; cf. Isidore Etymologiae, vin.vii.9. On Hugh's 
euhemerism throughout the chapter, cf. Augustine De consensu evangelistarum 
i.xxiii.32 {PL, XXXIV, 1056-7), who explains the teaching of Euhemerus 
and reports Cicero's discussion of euhemerism in De natura deorutn 1. 

2. Cf. Augustine De civitate Dei vi.ii. 

3. See Maieul Cappuyns, Jean Scot Erigene, sa vie, son oeuvre, sa pensee 
(Louvain: Abbaye de Mont Cesare, 1933), p. 71, n. 2, for identification of 
this work as the first part of John the Scot's De divisione naturae, where the 
applicability to God of the Aristotelian categories is examined. 

4. Adapted from Isidore Etymologiae n.xxiv.4. 

5 . Pliny's Historia naturalis is meant. 

6. Quoted from Remigius on Martianus Capella (Bibliotheque Nationale, 
MS Latin 14754, fol. i8 r : "Hie enim arithmeticae repertor fuit." Cf. John 
the Scot on Martianus (Lutz, ed., pp. 57, 74) and Isidore Etymologiae in.ii.i. 

7. Quoted from Isidore Etymologiae m.i. 1 ; cf. Cassiodorus Institutiones 
ii.iv.7 (Mynors, p. 140; Jones, p. 187). 

8. On the "Matentetradem," cf. Remigius on Martianus Capella, Biblio- 
theque Nationale, MS 14754, fol. i8 r : "Qui [Pythagoras] non tacuit mathen 
tetradem, id est doctrinam quaternariam. Omnis enim doctrinae perfectio in 
iiii artibus continetur, Arithmetica, Geometria, musica, astronomia. Hoc 
est illud quadruvium [sic] sine quo nulli proponitur philosophandum." 
Cf. Martianus Capella De nuptiis n.cvii (Dick, ed., p. 44) and John the Scot's 
gloss (Lutz, ed., p. 5 7). That an actual book with this title existed in Hugh's 
time is suggested not only by Hugh's statement but by the "Liber Hermetis 
Mercurii Triplicis de VI rerum principiis," Silverstein, ed., AHDL, XXII 


(1955), 217-302; see esp. p. 268, and Silverstein's discussion, pp. 224-5. 
It is possible, however, that the anonymous author of the "Liber Hermetis" 
is merely drawing on Hugh's statements in the Didascalicon, and that Hugh 
is making a mistaken inference from Remigius. See Didascalicon i.vii. n. 5 2, 

53> 55- 

9. Cf. Remigius on Martianus Capella (Bibliotheque Nationale, MS Latin 
14754, fol. i7 r " v ): "Pytagoras [sic] namque .y. litteram ad similitudinem 
humanae vitae adinvenit. ...Nam .y. litteram ab una virgula incipit et in 
quoddam bivium finditur; sic et natura humana in puericia simplex est nee 
facile apparet an bonum an malum item apprehendat. In adolescentia vero 
iam aut virtutes eligit que per dextram virgulam breviorem et angustiorem 
significantur, aut ad vitia deflectit quae notantur per sinistram virgulam 
latiorem." Briefer ref. to this figure in Isidore Etymologiae i.iii.7. 

10. See Paul E. Beichner, The Medieval Representative of Music, Jubal or 
Tubalcain? ("Texts and Studies in the History of Mediaeval Education," A. 
L. Gabriel and J. N. Garvin, ed., II; Notre Dame, Ind. : The Mediaeval In- 
stitute, 1954). 

11. Cf. Isidore Etymologiae m.xvi.i, xxii.6. 

12. Cf. Cassiodorus Institutiones (Mynors, p. 152; Jones, p. 198); 
for Boethius's translation, see PL, LXIII, 1307 ff. 

13. See n. 34. 

14. Adapted from Isidore Etymologiae iii.xxv.i, iii.26; Cf. Cassiodorus 
Institutiones n.vii.3 (Mynors, pp. 1 5 5-6; Jones, pp. 201-2). On the figure of 
Nimrod, see Haskins, Studies in the History of Mediaeval Science, ch. xvi, 
The early twelfth-century Victorine codex (Bibliotheque Nationale, MS 
Latin 14754), contains the "Astronomie de Nemrod" (fols. 202 v -229 v ) and 
the "Canones Ptolomei" (fols. Z33 r — 25 5 v ). Despite dependence on Isidore 
or Cassiodorus in the present passage, Hugh could have known both 
astronomical works; so A. van de Vyver, "Les plus anciennes Traductions 
latines medievales (Xe-XIe siecles) de traites d'astronomie et d'astrologie," 
Osiris, I (1937), 658-91, who without qualification speaks of the MS as "la 
copie du maitre victorin" {ibid., p. 688). Further discussion of the MS in 
relation to Hugh by van de Vyver in "Les premieres Traductions latines 
(Xe-XIe siecles) de traites arabes sur l'astrolabe," Premier Congres Inter- 
nationale de geographie historique, II Memoires (Brussels, 193 1), 278, n. 47. 

1 5 . On Socrates as the originator of ethics, cf. Isidore Etymologiae n.xxiv. 5 
and Augustine De civitate Dei vin.iii. On the writings of Socrates and Plato 
on positive and natural justice, cf. William of Conches' commentary on the 
Timaeus {PL, CLXXII, 246): "Because Socrates delivered so perfect an 
opinion regarding justice [in the state], his disciples asked him to compose a 
treatise on it, and he, satisfying their wish, treated this part of justice, namely 
positive. For justice is partly positive, partly natural. The positive is in- 
vented by men, like the hanging of a thief; the natural, like love of parents, 
is not. . . . Then Plato, his disciple, when he had composed ten books of the 
Republic and wished to perfect what his master Socrates had slighted, comp- 
osed this work [the Timaeus] on natural justice." Cf. Chalcidius on Timaeus 
(Wrobel, p. 72; Mullach, p. 181). 


1 6. Quoted from Isidore Etymologiae xvni.i. i . 

17. Adapted, ibid., xix.xx.1-2. 

18. Ibid., xix.viii.i. 

19. Adapted from Martianus Capella De nuptiis n.xlviii (Dick, ed., p. 67), 
and Remigius's commentary on Martianus (Bibliotheque Nationale, MS 
14754, fol. 25 r ): "apud egyptios... Isis... monstravit sementem lini, id est 
quomodo sereretur et usum quomodo inde vestes fierent." 

20. Adapted from Isidore Etymologiae xvni.i. I. 

21. Ibid.,; Gen. 4:22. 

22. Adapted from Isidore Etymologiae xix.xxxii.i. 

23. Quoted from Martianus Capella De nuptiis n.clviii (Dick, ed., p. 67). 

24. Adapted from Martianus, ibid., and Remigius's gloss (Bibliotheque 
Nationale, MS Latin 14754, fol. 25 r ): "Italia signat, id est attribuit Pilumno 
fragmenta frugis et farris. Ipse enim invenit usum molendi et pinsendi 

25. Cf. Martianus Capella De nuptiis n.xlvii (Dick, ed., p. 66). 

26. Quoted from Remigius on Martianus Capella, as cited in Karl 
Schulte, ed., Das Verhdltnis von N others Nuptiae Philologiae et Mercurii %um 
Kommentar des Remigius Autissiodorensis (Miinster, 191 1), p. 66: "Osyris... 
apud Aegyptios cultum vinearum repperit," to which the third Vatican 
mythographer (Bode, Scriptores rerum mythicarum, p. 244): "...sicut apud 
Aegyptios Osiris... sic apud Indos Liber... usum invenerit vinearum." 
Cf. John the Scot on Martianus (Lutz. ed. p. 63). 

27. Quoted from Isidore Etymologiae xx.i.i. 

28. Adapted, ibid., iv.iii.1-2. 

29. Adapted, ibid., xvin.xvi.2. 

30. Adapted, ibid., i.iii.5-6. 

3 1 . Closely adapted from Remigius on Martianus Capella (Bibliotheque 
Nationale, MS Latin 14754, fol. 2 5 r ): "Carmentis ipsa est Nicostrata . . . 
mater Evandri... haec primum latinas litteras repperit." Cf. Schulte, Das 
Verhdltnis, p. 76 ; Isidore Etymologiae in.iv. 1 ; and John the Scot on Martianus 
(Lutz, ed., p. 69). 

32. Adapted from Isidore Etymologiae i.xlii.1-2. 

33. Ibid., i.xxxix.i. 

34. Cf. Hugh's statement (first paragraph of the present chapter): "Certain 
ones say that Cham, son of Noah, first discovered astronomy. The Chaldeans 

first taught astrology Josephus asserts that Abraham first instructed the 

Egyptians in astrology." Back of the contradiction between Hugh's 
previous and present remarks lie two conflicting traditions attributing the 
origin of the arts variously to the Egyptians or to the Chaldeans (Noah, his 
sons, Abraham). Martianus Capella reports that the arts, discovered in 
Egypt by Thoth, otherwise known as Mercury or Trismegistus, and hidden 
there for a time, were unknown in Europe till after the flood. Cicero De 
natura deorum ni.xxii, Lactantius, and Arnobius speak of Mercury as the dis- 
coverer of the arts, and Macrobius In somnium Scipionis i.xix.2, credits Egypt 
with the discovery "omnium philosophiae disciplinarum." Cassiodorus, 
Isidore, and Rhabanus Maurus, on the other hand, credit the Hebrews, 


especially Abraham, with having taught the arts to the Egyptians, and take 
this view from Josephus Antiquitates i.viii.2. Josephus recounts that the 
arts survived the flood because the sons of Seth, warned by Adam's pre- 
diction of the world's destruction in fire and water, erected two pillars, one 
stone, one clay, on which they inscribed all that was known of the arts. In a 
unique gloss in one of the oldest MSS of the Remigius commentary on 
Martianus, a gloss not improbably by Remigius, the sons of Noah are 
credited with having set up the two columns preserving the arts. "By means 
of this, when Abraham was in exile in Egypt, he taught astronomy, and 
from this all the other arts were originally discovered in Egypt and taken 
from there to Greece." In the Remigius commentary on Donatus Ars maior 
only Cham is credited with having erected the two pillars. For full dis- 
cussion, see Cora E. Lutz, "Remigius' Ideas on the Origin of the Seven 
Liberal Arts," MH, X (1956), 32-49. 

35. Adapted from Martianus Capella De nuptiis iv.cccxxx (Dick, ed., 
p. 153) and a Remigius gloss on the text reported by Raymond Klibansky, 
"The Rock of Parmenides: Mediaeval Views on the Origin of Dialectic," 
MRS, I (1941-3), 182: "Hie [Parmenides] philosophus fuit et primus apud 
Aegyptios artem dialecticam repperit. Erat autem solitus deserere divitates 
et conventus publicos et in hac rupe solus residere, ut liberius posset 
dialecticam meditari. Unde et a Parmenide rupes Parmenidis vocata est. 
Claret autem et hanc et alias artes apud Aegyptum repertas et ab his ad 
Graecos deductas." Hugh refers again to Parmenides and his rock, Dida- 
scalicon in.xiv. 

36 Closely adapted from Remigius on Martianus (cited in Klibansky, op. 
cit. in previous note, p. 182): "Socrates Platonis magister fuit, post cuius 
mortem Plato amore sapientiae Aegyptum demigravit ibique perceptis 
liberalibus studiis Athenas rediit et apud Achedemiam villam coadunatis 
studiis operam dedit." 

37. Cf. Dunchad on Martianus (Lutz, ed., p. 19): "Varro primum dialec- 
ticam Romanis tradidisset... protulit primo a Greca in Latinam linguam." 

38. Cf. John the Scot on Martianus (Lutz, ed., p. no): "Corax fuit in- 
ventor rhetoricae artis, Tisias usitator." Cf. Cicero De oratore i.xx.91. 

39. Adapted from Isidore Etymologiae n.ii.i. 

40. That Hugh uses the terms "art" and "science" interchangeably is 
evident from a comparison of the title and opening sentence of this chapter. 

41. Cf. Aulus Gellius Nodes atticae i.ix.1-7 for a comparable account of 
Pythagoras's teaching method. 

42. "scholares" So Buttimer, p. 53, but "scholastici" in PL, CLXXVI, 
76 8 C. Clearly, students, not scholars in the sense of masters, are meant. On 
the history and meanings of schola, scholaris, see Pare, Brunet, Tremblay, 
Renaissance du Xlle Steele, p. 59, n. 3 ; on scholasticus, ibid., pp. 70-1 ; on the 
meaning of scholares in Hugh in particular, ibid., p. 71, n. 1. 

43 . Apparently an allusion to the terminology of medieval florilegia, which 
typically classified excerpts under auctores, or poets, and philosophi, or prose 
writers. See Pare, Brunet, Tremblay, Renaissance du Xlle siecle, p. 1 5 3, n. 21. 

44. Hugh's views of literature in relation to grammar and the other arts 


are flatly opposed to those of the school of Chartres — an opposition not 
without its paradoxical elements, however. Thus, Hugh, who, as against 
the Chartrians, insists on the rightful place in philosophy of the logical arts, 
including grammar (see DidascaBcon n.xvii.n.6i ; xix.n.64; xxviii.n.81; and 
Introduction, sec. ii), nonetheless excludes from philosophy the songs 
of poets, fables, and histories which he earlier reported as parts of grammar 
{Didascalicon n.xxix). On the other hand, the Chartrians, much given to 
elaborate commentary on poets, fables, and histories, exclude from philos- 
ophy the entire trivium, including the literary commentary which they 
practice in connection with grammar and other arts. With Hugh's views in 
this chapter, cf. John of Salisbury Metalogicon i.xxiv (Webb, p. 53 ff. ; 
McGarry, pp. 65 ff.), where Bernard of Chartres is described as "the most 
copious fount of literary study in Gaul in modern times," his teaching of 
grammar by means of commentary on poetry and prose is praised, and his 
admonition to students that histories and poems were to be read with utmost 
diligence is recorded. See also John of Salisbury's own view, formed by 
William of Conches, his teacher in grammar and described by John as "the 
richest teacher of letters after Bernard of Chartres" {ibid., i.v [Webb, pp. 
16—7; McGarry, p. 21]), that a grammarian, in commenting upon a poem, 
should explain whatever the auctor has borrowed from the arts and woven by 
picturatio into "a sort of image of all the arts" {ibid., i.xxiv [Webb, p. 54; 
McGarry, pp. 66-7]). The phrase "appendages of the arts" occurs also in 
the brano revision of William of Conches' De pbilosopbia mundi (Ottaviano, 
ed., p. 28), where, however, as one would expect in a work of Chartrian 
inspiration, it applies to grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric, which are there 
excluded from philosophy. 

45. Vergil Eclogae v. 16-7. Of Hugh's interpolation of poetry at this 
point, Pare, Brunet, Tremblay {Renaissance du XI Ie siecle, p. 171) remark: 
"heureux dementi a son dedain pour la verbosite des poetes." 

46. Cf. Vitruvius De architectura i.i.12: "...they easily believe it possible 
that all the disciplines are linked together in subject matter and have a 
common bond. The curriculum of the disciplines {encyclios disciplina), like a 
single body, is composed of the disciplines as so many members." Contrast 
Adelard of Bath De eodem et diverso (Willner, ed., p. 17), where Philosophia 
requires Adelard to choose among the liberal arts one which will be his 
special reward for assiduity, "for to embrace them all together would be 
beyond your capacity." 

47. "quid uniuscuiusque sit proprium" Cf. Cicero De oratore 11.ix.38. 

48. Hugh's recommendations throughout this chapter run counter to 
Bernard of Chartres' method of teaching grammar by reading not technical 
treatments "of the art" but poets and historians who treat "by means <?/the 
art," and by explaining to beginning students not only "what was simple 
and according to rule" but "grammatical figures, rhetorical embellishment, 
and sophistical quibbling, as well as the relation of given passages to other 
studies" (said in praise of Bernard by John of Salisbury Metalogicon i.xxiv 
[Webb, p. 5 5 ; McGarry, p. 67] ; see n. 44). Cf. John's view that the works of 
the auc tores, especially Vergil and Lucan, are "seasoned with every part of 


philosophy" — grammar and poetics "flood the entire composition"; logic 
"interpolates its reasonings, agleam with gold"; rhetoric, "when persuasion 
is in order, supplies the silver luster of its resplendent eloquence": mathem- 
atics "is drawn in the footsteps of the other arts in the four-wheeled car of 
the quadrivium, interweaving its 'colors' and pleasing ornaments with 
manifold variety"; physics, "from its store," does the same; and ethics 
"exceeds all the other arts by the loveliness of the beauty it brings" {ibid.; 
McGarry's translation altered). With Bernard's literary approach to teaching 
the arts, especially grammar, cf. Hugh's De grammatica (Leclercq, ed., 
AHDL, XV [1943-4], 263-322), which follows his principle that in teaching 
an art, "when everything must be reduced to outline and presented for easy 
understanding, we should be content to set forth the matter in hand as 
briefly and clearly as possible, lest by excessively piling up extraneous 
considerations we distract the student more than we instruct him" (see third 
paragraph of present chapter). William of Conches' commentary on the 
Timaeus, an exercise which involves excursions into the "by-ways" of many 
arts (cf. PL, CLXXII, 247: "Something of all the arts is contained in this 
work. In the summary of positive justice, there is something from the 
practical arts. In the discussion of the formal and final cause of the universe 
and of the world soul, there is something from theology. In the discussion 
of numbers and proportions, there is something from mathematics. In the 
discussion of the four elements, the creation of animals, and primordial 
matter, there is something from physics") exemplifies the "comparative and 
back-and-forth examination of the arts" which Hugh allows to proficients 
but disapproves as a means of learning the arts. 

49. Hugh draws here upon traditional discussion of the relative value, in 
the educational process, oiingenium (or naturd) and exercitium on the one hand, 
and ars or disciplina on the other. See, e.g., Cicero De oratore i.iv.14 and 
passim; Quintilian Institutiones oratoriae iii.v.i; Augustine De civitate Dei 
xi.xxv; Boethius In Topica Ciceronis commentaria vi {PL, LXIV, 1168C). 
Note, however, that in the words which follow Hugh gives his own defini- 
tion to each term, altering particularly the sense of disciplina from "art" to 
moral excellence. 

50. Quoted by John of Salisbury Metalogicon i.xi (Webb, p. 28 ; McGarry, 
p. 34, where the translation is "an immanent power infused into one's soul 
by nature"), and wrongly attributed by him to Isidore, (see Webb's note, 
p. 28, 1. 27). 

51. Quoted by John of Salisbury Metalogicon i.xi (Webb, p. 29; McGarry, 
p. 36), who attributes it to "a certain wise man," evidently Hugh, as neither 
Webb nor McGarry recognizes. 

52. Cf. John of Salisbury Metalogicon i.xxiv (Webb, p. 53; McGarry, 
p. 65): "The word 'reading' is equivocal. It may refer either to the activity 
of teaching and being taught, or to the occupation of studying written 
things by oneself." 

53. That is, works may be selected for inclusion in a single codex either 
because they belong to a single author or connected group of authors, or 
because they treat a common subject. 


54. The four types of order set forth in this chapter form the structure of 
Didascalkon vi, where they are applied to Sacred Scripture (see Didascalicon 
vi. i: "I have mentioned that order in study is a fourfold matter: one thing in 
the disciplines, another in books, another in narrative, and another in 
exposition. How these are to be applied to Sacred Scripture I have not yet 
shown"). An order like that among disciplines is sought among history, 
allegory, and tropology (chs. ii, iii, iv, v); then, the order of biblical books in 
relation to Scripture study (ch. vi), the order of narration observed in Script- 
ure (ch. vii), and the order to be observed in expounding Scripture (chs. 
viii, ix, x, xi) are discussed. The problems of order, then, are one, though 
they bear upon two distinct classes of writing, secular and scriptural. 

5 5 . Didascalicon vi.xii bears the same title. Raising the same question 
with regard to Scripture, the later chapter is briefer than the present one and 
adds nothing to it. 

56. Entire chapter, omitting the last three sentences of the first paragraph, 
reproduced in Hugh's De contemplatione et eius speciebus (Haureau, ed., 
Nouvel examen, pp. 177-8; on the authenticity of the work, see D. Lasic, 
"Hugo de Sancto Victore auctor operis 'De contemplatione et ejus specie- 
bus,"' Antonianum, XXVIII [1953], 377-88), where meditation is presented 
as a division of contemplation, itself defined as "the setting out of the mind 
along the manifold roads of salvation" and "an illumination of the mind 
which fixes it, to its salvation, upon the invisible things of God." These 
definitions, as well as the present chapter's reference to the divine command- 
ments and works substantiate the view that the "arts" of Didascalicon i-iii, 
hardly profane, are part of a "philosophy" which includes Sacred Scripture 
among its sources and intends nothing less than man's salvation. 

57. "praecipiens . . . promittens... terrens" The De contemplatione et eius 
speciebus (Haureau, ed., Nouvel examen, p. 178) reads "praecipiens... pro- 
hibens . . . permittens," which makes better sense. The reading "permittens" 
is supported by three MSS of Buttimer's gamma class (see Buttimer, p. 60). 

58. Cf. William of Conches' commentary on the Timaeus {PL, CLXXII, 
250): "As Priscian says when speaking of exercises for boys, to recollect is 
to gather into one a number of things held in the mind by study or 

59. Image unhappily borrowed from Augustine De Trinitate xn.xxiv.23 
{PL, XLII, 1011A). 

60. Cf. the instruction on the art of memorizing, the tables, and the 
mnemonic devices included in Hugh's Chronica (William M. Green, ed., 
"Hugh of St. Victor, De tribus maximis circumstantiis gestorum," Spec, 
XVIII [1943]) and suggestive of the high value Hugh places on factual 
knowledge. Cf. Didascalicon vi.iii. 

61. Verses quoted in John of Salisbury Policraticus vn.xiii (C. C. J. Webb, 
ed. [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909], II, 43), where they are attributed to 
Bernard of Chartres. Quoted again in the twelfth century by Peter Comestor 
Sermo III {PL, XCVIII, 1730D), and in the thirteenth century by Vincent of 
Beauvais Speculum doctrinale i.xxviii (Douai, 1624) and Guibert de Tournai 
De modo addiscendi iv.xxvi (Bonifacio, ed. [Turin, 1653], p. 243). 


62. Cf. Quintilian Institutiones oratoriae i.xviii; xn.i; Seneca Epistulae 
morales esp. lxxxviii. 

63. Ref. to King Agathocles, who drank from a goblet of clay after 
drinking from one of gold to remind himself of his humble origin. See 
Valerius Maximus Facta et dicta memorabilia vn.iv. 1 ; the work was frequently 
epitomized during the Middle Ages. Cf. M. Junianus Justinus Historiarum 
philippicarum libri XLIV xxn.i and Cicero Ver. n.iv. 5 5 . 

64. Cf. Horace Saturae n.ii.2 and Vergil Eclogae viii.63. 

65. From Jerome Epistulae ep. liii.i.2 (CSEL, LIV, 443). 

66. Buttimer's text has been repunctuated here as follows: "nugigeruli 
nunc quidam, nescio unde gloriantes." See Buttimer, p. 63. 

67. Cf. Job 12:2. 

68. Cf. Pare, Brunet, Tremblay {Renaissance du Xlle siecle, p. 67, n. 5), who 
see in these words an unmistakable allusion to Abaelard. Not merely these 
words, however, but the entire chapter alludes to Abaelard, who, in the 
Historia calamitatum mearum (J. T. Muckle, ed., MS, XII [1950], 163-214), 
describes his presumption in setting up as master while still a student (ibid., 
p. 176); his attempt to out-dispute his master William of Champeaux, 
founder of Saint Victor and therefore "forefather" to Hugh {ibid.); his 
contempt for the venerated Anselm of Laon, whose lectures in divinity he 
abandoned, asserting that to literate men, the text of Scripture and its glosses 
were enough, without a master, to enable them to expound the Sacred Text 
(ibid., p. 180); his notorious affair with Heloise {ibid., pp. 182-91); and the 
condemnation and burning at Soissons of his De unitate et trinitate divina 
(ibid., pp. 192-6). On Abaelard's personality, see Pare, Brunet, Tremblay, 
Renaissance du XI Ie siecle, pp. 277-81. 

69. See n. 35. 

70. 3 Kgs. 1. Interpretation in last paragraph of present chapter. 

71. Quoted from Jerome Epistulae ep. Lii.iii.2 (CSEL, LIV, 416). 

72. Buttimer's text (p. 65) reads tristior here, but I have used tritior, which, 
besides being the reading of Jerome, Hugh's source, is the reading of MS N 
of the Didascalicon, a MS which contains a good text (see Buttimer, p. xxxi) 
and one whose readings must be followed elsewhere. 

73. The best MSS of Jerome omit any name here. That Jerome was 
thinking of Theophrastus, however, may plausibly be inferred from Cicero 
Tusc. disp. 1n.xxviii.69. On Themistocles as an aged Greek of worthy 
accomplishment, see Cicero De senectute vn.xxi. 

74. Ibid, v.xiii. 

75. Isocrates is the correct reading in Jerome Epistulae ep. Lii.iii.2 
(CSEL, LIV, 416); cf. Cicero De senectute v.xiii. 

76. Stesichorus is the correct reading in Jerome, ref. cited in n. 71. 

77. Quoted from Jerome Epistulae ep. Lii.iii.3 (CSEL, LIV, 417-8). On 
Homer and Nestor, see Cicero De senectute x.xxxi. 

78. Quoted, with adaptation, from Jerome, ref. cited in, n. 77. 

79. Cf. Martianus Capella De nuptiis (Dick, ed., p. 62), and gloss of Remi- 
gius of Auxerre (Bibliotheque Nationale, MS Latin 14754* fols. 23 v -24 r ): 
c'Memorantur hii duo, labor et amor, subvehere lecticam a fronte, hoc est ab 


anteriore parte. Nam posticam, id est extremam partem lectice sustulerunt 
pimelia et agrimnia dilecta mancipia. Pimelia graece : latine cura. Non ilia 
quae sollicitudines saeculi parit, sed ilia quae studium sapientiae. Agrimnia 
vigilia interpretatur, et his duabus rebus, curaet vigilia, acquiritur sapientia." 
Allusion to the same passage from Martianus found in John of Salisbury 
Metalogicon iv.xvii (Webb, p. 183; McGarry, p. 229). 

80. Cf. Remigius's gloss on Martianus (Bibliotheque Nationale, MS Latin 
14754, fol. 2 2 v ): "Haec autem lectica significat corpus omnium philoso- 
phorum. Lectica iiii portatoribus gestabatur et humanum corpus iiii de- 
mentis subsistit. Et pulchre duobus sexibus portabatur, duobus scilicet 
pueris et duabus puellis sicut in sequentibus legitur, quia iiii elementorum 
duo quodammodo sunt mares, ignis et aer, duae feminae, terra et aqua." 
Cf. Dunchad on Martianus (Lutz, ed., p. 3). 

8 1 . Quoted from Jerome Epistulae ep. Lii.xi (CSEL, LI V, 43 5 ). Cited by 
Anselm of Havelberg Epistula ad Abbatem Ecbertum {PL, CLXXXVIII, 
1 1 20) ; Anselm, proponent of the canonical reform in which the Abbey of 
Saint Victor figured, applied the saying to Rupert of Deutz, Cistercian 
proponent of monasticism. The phrase, thus, is found in the polemics 
between monks and canons over the true nature of "vita aspostolica." 
See Chenu, "Moines, clercs, et laics," RHE, XLIX (1954), 72, where 
Anselm of Havelberg is quoted and discussed. 

82. Buttimer reads "quia magistros suos imitari nolunt." The variant 
volunt, attested by three MSS, one of them "H" which Buttimer rates highly 
(see Buttimer, p. xx), makes better sense. Hugh is ironical here. On con- 
temporary masters who grew rich in fees, see Pare, Brunet, Tremblay, 
Renaissance du Xlle siecle, pp. 76-7. 

83. "exilium" On exilium for the wise man, cf. Seneca Epistulae morales 
LXVIII and CII; John of Salisbury Epistula C XXXIV (to Thomas 
Becket) (PL, CXCIX, 113). 

84. Cf. In Ecclesiasten homiliae (PL, CLXXV, 22 iC): "All the world is a 
foreign soil to those whose native land should be heaven. ...Therefore 
comes a 'time for scattering stones' (Eccl. 3:5), so that man may see he has 
no stable dwelling here and may get used to withdrawing his mind and 
freeing it from the chains of earthly pleasures." 

85. Ovid Epistulae ex Ponto i.iii.35-6. 

86. Cf. Vergil Eclogae 1.68-70. 

87. See Vernet, DTC, VII, 241, and ref. to Cicero there given. 

88. Cf. Horace Carmina n.xvi.9-12. On various interpretations placed 
upon this autobiographical reference in their bearing upon Hugh's origin, 
see Taylor, Origin and Early Life of Hugh of St. Victor, pp. 5 1-4. 


1. Taking the variant depromi, substantiated by MS N, which Buttimer 
rates highly (see Buttimer, p. xxxi), in place of Buttimer's deprimi, which 
makes poor sense. 


2. Substance of this chapter from Jerome In libros Samuel et Malachim 
{PL, XXVIII, 5 5 2 ff.) or Isidore Etymologiae vi.i, neither of whom, however, 
divides the New Testament into three groups parallel to the Old. On the 
originality of Hugh's grouping, see Ludwig Ott, "Hugo von St. Viktor und 
die Kirchenvater," Divus Thomas (Ft.), ser. 3, XXVII (1949), 184; cf. Baron, 
Science et sagesse, p. 104, who, without denying Hugh's originality, finds 
earlier traces of the division. 

3. Though the meaning of the Hebrew titles in this chapter is to be found 
in Hugh's sources, Hugh himself undertook to learn Hebrew. On this 
point, see Smalley, Study of the Bible, p. 103. Cf. Abaelard's recommendation 
that Heloise and her nuns learn Greek and Hebrew {PL, CLXXVIII, 325 
and 5 1 1-2). 

4. Hugh excludes these books from the canon on the authority of Jerome ; 
see n. 33 and context. 

5. Adapted from Isidore Etymologiae vi.ii.1-12. 

6. Adapted from ibid., vi.ii.26-7. 

7. Adapted from ibid., vi.ii.13. 

8. Adapted from ibid., vi.ii.28-33. 

9. Quoted from ibid., vi.iii.1-2. 
[ o. Quoted from Jerome In libros Samuel et Malachim {PL, XXVIII, 5 5 1 A). 

1. Adapted from Isidore Etymologiae vi.iii.3-5 ; vi.iv.1-2. 

See Jerome Praefatio in Pentateuchum {PL, XXVIII, 150A-B). 
3. Adapted, from Isidore Etymologiae vi.iv.3-5. 
[4. Cf. Gregory Regulae pastoralis liber n.xi {PL, LXXVIII, 48D). 
5. Adapted from Isidore Etymologiae vi.ii.35-9. 
[6. Adapted from ibid., vi.ii.44-9. 

7. Quoted from ibid., vi.ii.50-3. 

8. Quoted from ibid., vi.ii.2-6. 

9. Adapted from ibid., vi.ii.7-9. 

20. Adapted from ibid., vi.ii.9-11. 

21. Quoted from ibid., vi.ii.22-4. 

22. Adapted from ibid., vi.ii.25-7. 

23. Quoted from ibid., vi.ii.14-5. Cf. Jerome Praefatio in Job {PL, 
XXVIII, 1081A-B). 

24. Quoted from Jerome In libros Samuel et Malachim {PL, XXVIII, 
5 5 3A). 

25. Adapted from Isidore Etymologiae, 21. 

26. Adapted from Jerome Comm. in Ecclesiasten {PL, XXIII, 1063A-4B) 
with interpolation from Isidore Etymologiae vi.ii. 1 8-20 and Jerome In libros 
Samuel et Malachim {PL, XXVIII, 551A). Cf. Hugh's In Ecclesiasten 
homiliae {PL, CLXXV, 116 [misnumbered 161] B). 

27. Adapted from Jerome Praefatio in Danielem {PL, XXVIII, 1291B- 

28. Quoted from Isidore Etymologiae vi.ii.12. 

29. Quoted from Jerome In libros Samuel et Malachim {PL, XXVIII 
5 54A). 

30. Adapted from Isidore Etymologiae vi.ii.28. 


31. Quoted from ibid, vi.ii.30. 

32. Quoted from ibid, vi.ii.32. 

33. Quoted from Jerome Praefatio in Salamonem {PL, XXVIII, 1242 A- 
3 A). 

34. Quoted from Jerome In libros Samuel et Malachim {PL, XXVIII, 

35. Adapted from ibid. {PL, XXVIII, 554A-B). 

36. Both paragraphs quoted from Isidore Etymologiae vi.xv; found also in 
Rhabanus Maurus De universo Cf. Jerome Praefatio in Evangelia {PL, 
XXIX, 528A-42A). Illustrations of canon tables in the Book of Kells in 
W. R. W. Koehler, ed., Medieval Studies in Memory of A.. Kingsley Porter, II 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1939), 644-61. 

37. Both paragraphs quoted from Isidore Etymologiae vi.xvi.1-4. This 
and the following chapter comprise Rhabanus Maurus De universo v.vii. 

38. Dates of the four synods, or General Councils, named by Hugh are as 
follows: Nicaea, 325; Constantinople, 381; Ephesus, 431; Chalcedon, 451. 

39. Previous three paragraphs quoted from Isidore Etymologiae v1.xvi.5- 

40. Adapted from ibid., vi.viii.17 and vi.ii.46. 

41. Adapted from ibid., vr.ii.48-9. 

42. Quoted from ibid., 

43. On the meaning of "authentic," see Pare, Brunet, Tremblay, Renais- 
sance du Xlle siecle, pp. 147-8, and M.-D. Chenu, " 'Authentica' et 'magi- 
stratia': deux lieux theologiques au Xlle-XIIIe siecles," Divus Thomas 
(Piacenza), XXVIII (1925), 257-85. 

44. Quoted from Isidore Etymologiae vi.vii.2-3. 

45. Adapted from the pseudo-Gelasian decretal 1v.ii.180 ff. (E. von 
Dobschutz, ed., Texte und Untersuchungen, XXXVIII [Leipzig, 1912], 36-7). 
That Hugh's knowledge of the decretal came to him via Ivo of Chartres 
Panormia is the judgment of Ludwig Ott (ref. cited in n. 2), reaffirming the 
conclusion of Dobschutz. 

46. Quoted from the pseudo-Gelasian decretal iv.v.232-6 (Dobschutz, 
ed., pp. 44-5). 

47. Adapted from the Libri pontificalis pars prior li (Theodore Mommsen, 
ed., MGH :Gesta pontificum romanorum, I [Berlin, 1898], 117). 

48. Quoted from the pseudo-Gelasian decretal 1 v. v. 242-6 (Dobschutz, 
ed. p. 46). 

49. Entire chapter quoted from the pseudo-Gelasian decretal v.ii-xi.263- 
353 (Dobschutz, ed., pp. 49-60). 

50. Adapted from Isidore Etymologiae vi.xiii. 

51. Adapted from ibid., vi.xiv.8. 

52. Adapted from ibid., vi.x.1-2, vi.xi.1-2. 

53. Adapted from ibid., vi.viii.2-5. 

54. Taking expositiones, the reading of MS "H", which Buttimer (p. xx) 
evaluates as one of the three best MSS of the Didascalicon, in place of Butti- 
mer's expositores, which makes poor sense. 

55. Cf. William of Conches' commentary on the Timaeus {PL, CLXXII ? 


250): "A comment, following the thought alone, pays no attention to the 
continuity or exposition of the letter. A gloss, however, does all these 
things; it is therefore called 'gloss' as meaning tongue. It must give as clear 
an exposition as if it were the tongue of a doctor speaking." 
56. Adapted from Isidore Etymologiae 


1. Hugh's threefold understanding of Scripture derives from the historic^ 
significatio typica, moralitas of Gregory the Great; see Didascalicon vi.iii. n. 9' 
A threefold understanding of Scripture is also taught by Jerome {historia'' 
tropologia, intelligentia spiritualis'), who was influenced in turn by Origen and 
Philo Judaeus. A tradition of fourfold interpretation is found, e.g., in 
Augustine {historia, allegoria, analogia, aetiologid), Bede {historia, allegoria, 
tropologia, anagoge), and Bede's many imitators, including the comparably in- 
fluential Rhabanus Maurus. Refs. for the authors named are: Gregory 
Moralium libri Epistula missoria iii {PL, LXXV, 513C); Jerome Epistolae 
ep. cxx.xii {PL, XXII, 1005); Augustine De Genesi ad litter am imperjectus 
liber ii {PL, XXXIV, 222); Bede De tabernaculo et vasis eius {PL,~X.CI, 
410B-D); Rhabanus Maurus Commentaria in Exodum m.xi {PL, CVIII, 
147D-8B). Further authors and refs. in Pare, Brunet, Tremblay, La 
Renaissance du Xlle siecle, 221-2, and in Jean Danielou, "Les divers Sens de 
l'Ecriture dans la tradition chretienne primitive," ETL, XXIV (1948), 
119-26. Cf. Hugh's De scripturis et scriptoribus sacris iii {PL, CLXXV, 12), 
where Hugh subdivides allegoria into simplex allegoria and anagoge. 

2. Quoted verbatim from Isidore Quaestiones in Vetus Testamentum Prae- 
fatio iv {PL, LXXXII, 208), but independently applied by Hugh to 
Scripture. Earlier source in Augustine Contra Faustum Manichaeum xxn.xciv 
{PL, XLII, 463), which, however, is not verbally identical with Hugh. 

3. So Augustine reasons on the utility of tropes and figures in Scripture, 
De doctrina Christiana 11. vi. 8 {PL, XXXIV, 39). 

4. Cf. ibid., i.ii; ii.i; iii.v ff. {PL, XXXIV, 10, 35, 68 ff.). 

5. Taking natura in the first of the three senses defined by Hugh in 
Didascalicon i.x, namely, as the divine Wisdom, Second Person of the God- 
head, conceived as archetypal exemplar of creation. See ibid., n. 69. 

6. Cf. Augustine In Joannis evangelium xiv.iii.7 {PL, XXXV, 1506): "We 
speak flying words which pass away: as soon as your word has sounded in 
your mouth, it passes . . . into silence." De Genesi ad litteram liber imperjectus 
v. 19 {PL, XXXIV, 227): "...away with the impiety by which we should 
think that the Word of God, the only-begotten Son, is like a word uttered by 
us. The Word of God. . . neither begins to be nor ceases." De civitate Dei {PL, XLI, 484): "God does not speak as do we to one another — 
For the speaking of God, anterior and superior to all his works, is the immu- 
table Idea of his work. It has no noisy and fading sound, but an energy 
which abides eternally and brings forth effects in time." 

7. Cf. John the Scot De divisione naturae in.xxxv {PL, CXXII, 723): "As 


through sense perception one comes to a concept, so through the creature 
one comes back to God." 

8. Peter. 5:8. 

9. Isa. 61:10. 

10. Isa. 44:21-22. 

11. Isa. 13:11. 

12. Isa. 14: 26. 

13. Isa. 13:17. 

14. Isa. 19:2. 

15. Ps. 21 : 17-19. 

16. Gen. 10: 20, 31. 

17. Gen. 11 : 1. 

18. Matt. 13:28. 

19. John 6:71. 

20. Isa. 14: 12. 

21. Entire chapter quoted, with some omissions and adaptations, from 
Isidore Libri sententiarum i.xix.1-19 {PL, LXXXIII, 581A-6A). Pare, 
Brunet, Tremblay, Renaissance du Xlle siecle, p. 229, mistakenly observe of 
these rules that Hugh "les emprunte mot pour mot, sans nommer leur 
auteur, non pas au De doctrina Christiana, mais au De Genesi ad litter am de saint 
Augustin"; cf., however, ibid., p. 222: "Hugues, afin de guider l'interprete, 
expose alors les sept regies de Tichonius, dont le De doctrina Christiana 
donnait deja la substance, mais dont il emprunte le texte a saint Isidore." 
On the rules, see F. C. Burkitt, The Book of Rules of Tyconius (Oxford, 1894). 

22. Wisdom 6: 1. 

23. "moralitatis gratiam" The phrase is Gregory the Great's. Entire 
context of phrase quoted in Didascalicon vi.iii.n.9. 

24. Matt. 6:33. 

25. Gregory's Moralium libri, sive expositio in librum Job is an example of 
scriptural commentary with conspicuous moral orientation. Treating first 
the historical and allegorical senses of a passage, it culminates in exposition 
of the moral sense. See, e.g., Gregory's treatment of the first four verses of 
Job — the historical sense {PL, LXXV, 5 27D), allegorical sense {ibid., 5 3 3D), 
and moral sense {ibid., 542D-5 54C). Cf. also Gregory's general observations 
on the relation of Scripture to moral concern : "We ought to transform what 
we read into our very selves, so that when our mind is stirred by what it hears, 
our life may concur by practicing what has been heard" {ibid., 542C); and 
"Sacred Scripture holds a kind of mirror to the eyes of our mind so that our 
interior face may be seen in it. There we recognize what is shameful in our- 
selves, what beautiful Scripture tells the deeds of the saints and excites 

the hearts of the weak to imitate them" {ibid.). 

26. "colore dictaminis" Cf. Hugh's dedication to his elegantly phrased 
ascetical treatise, De arrha animae: "I do not wish to stir you here by the art 

of literary composition {colore dictaminis') " (Karl Miiller, ed., Hugo von 

St. Victor: Soliloquium de arrha animae und De vanitate mundi [Bonn, 
1913], p. 3; PL, CLXXVI, 951). 

27. For use of the term "philosophy" and its cognates in a strictly moral- 


istic context, see, e.g., Hildebert of Lavardin's letter to William of Cham- 
peaux on the latter's monastic conversion {PL, CLXXI, 141 f.) : "... now at 
last you have decided to philosophize," etc. Such a use represents a tradi- 
tional Christian extension of the Socratic emphasis on moral uprightness in 
the philosopher and derives from the identification of the "wisdom" sought 
with Christ, Wisdom of the Father. 

28. "occupatio" Cf. Hugh's exegesis of Eccl. 1:12-3 ("proposui in 
animo meo quaerere et investigare sapienter de omnibus quae fiunt sub sole. 
Hanc occupationem pessimam dedit Deus filiis hominum ut occuparentur in 
ea") in In Ecclesiasten homiliae {PE, CLXXV, 149D-59B). The kind of 
reading condemned as occupatio is that classifiable with works performed 
"under time and for time" and which are "vain in act and fruit"; opposed is 
reading classifiable with works done "under time but for eternity" and which 
"in act are, in a measure, vain, but which in fruit are not so, since even if the 
work itself passes away, its reward does not" {ibid., 151C). Intellectual 
occupatio is a greater evil than preoccupation with material goods; see 
Didascalicon n.xii.n.48, esp. the definition of occupatio there cited. 

29. Matt. 1 1 : 28-29. 

30. Ps. 70: 15-17. 

31. See Palladius Paradisus sen historia lausiaca xxviii, "Vita abbatis Pauli 
simplicis" {PE, LXXIII, 1126C-30A; tr. Ernest A. Wallis, The Paradise of 
the Holy Fathers, I [London: Chatto and Windus, 1907], 125-8). The Paul 
intended was a late fourth-century ascetic, one of the desert fathers. 

32. Cf. James 1:22; Romans 2:13. 

33. Ps. 75:3. Cf. Isidore Etymologiae xv.i.5, where Sion is interpreted as 

34. Eccl. 12: 12-3. 

35. Cf. Jerome Contra Vigilantium xv {PE, XXIII, 351B). 

36. Ps. 18:12. 

37. Buttimer's arcem consilii emended to arcam consilii. Cf. Hugh's De area 
Noe morali ii {PE, CLXXVI, 63 5 A f.), where the construction and inhabiting 
of the area sapientiae in the soul are treated. 

38. Jos. 1 : 18; cf. 1 Par. 22: 13 and 1 Cor. 16: 13. 

39. Ps. 33:9. 

40. "reddere rationem de ea . . . fide" Quoted from 1 Peter 3 : 1 5 , in which, 
however, the correct reading is "reddere rationem de ea...spe." On 
variations of this this text and the relation of the common twelfth-century 
form of it, here cited by Hugh, to the twelfth-century preoccupation with the 
place of reason in faith, see de Ghellinck, Mouvement theologique, pp. 279-84; 
discussion of Hugh's use of the phrase, p. 282. 

41. Vernet, DTC, VII, 292, regards Hugh's three types of readers as 
taken from Bernard Sermones in Cantica sermo xxxvi {PE, CLXXXIII, 
968D). Bernard's classification, however, is fivefold and applies not to 
readers of Scripture but, more generally, to seekers after knowledge: "There 
are some who wish to know merely to know, and this is base curiosity ; there 
are some who wish to know in order to become known themselves, and this 
is base vanity; . ..there are some who wish to know in order to sell their 


knowledge for money or for honors, and this is a base effort. But there are 
some who wish to know in order that they may edify others, and this is 
charity, and some who wish to know in order that they may be edified, and 
this is prudence." 


1. See Didascalicon m.viii.n.54. 

2. By saying that "the order sought in the disciplines" — i.e., an order of 
study based upon natural priority, like the priority of arithmetic to music 
(see Didascalicon m.viii) — is to be sought among history, allegory, and 
tropology, Hugh emphasizes that these three are not merely senses of 
Scripture but separate studies, to be pursued successively. Cf. Pare, Brunet, 
Tremblay, Renaissance du Xlle siecle, pp. 222 ff., and diagram, p. 219, who, 
however, may go too far in referring to these studies as "disciplines"; 
Hugh's term for them is eruditiones or lectiones. See De sacramentis i.Prologus 
{PL, CLXXVI, 183; Deferrari, p. 3): "Since I previously dictated a com- 
pendium on the first instruction in the Sacred Utterance, which consists in a 
historical reading, I have now prepared this second instruction, which con- 
sists in allegory, for those who are to be introduced to it." (Deferrari's 
translation altered). 

3. Borrowed from Gregory the Great; see n. 9. Pare, Brunet, Tremblay, 
Renaissance du XI Ie siecle, p. 259, mistakenly suggest, instead, Rhabanus 
Maurus; see De universo xiv.xxiii {PL, CXI, 400D ff.), where the image 
represents an approach to Scripture taken also from Gregory but possibly 
influenced by others as well. In the chapters immediately following, Hugh 
identifies the foundation with "history," or the literal level of Scripture; the 
building itself with "allegory," which includes both the mysteries of faith 
and the method of deriving them from the letter; and the color with "tropo- 
logy," the moral interpretation of Scripture, aimed at personal sanctification. 

4. With these four historical considerations, cf. the three discussed in 
Hugh's De tribus maximis circumstantiis gestorum (Green, ed., Spec, XVIII 
[1943], 484-93) and the six "circumstances" pertinent to allegorical inter- 
pretation in De scripturis et scriptoribus sacris praenotatiunculae xiv ff. {PL, 
CLXXV, 20 ff.). On the place of history in Hugh's thought, see Pare, 
Brunet, Tremblay, Renaissance du Xlle siecle, pp. 218-27; W. A. Schneider, 
Geschichte und Geschichtsphilosophie bei Hugo von St. Victor: Ein Beitrag t^ur 
Geistesgeschicbte des 12. Jahrhunderts ("Munster'sche Beitrage zur Geschichts- 
forschung," Folge III, Heft 1; Miinster, 1933), who, however, is unac- 
quainted with the whole of Hugh's De tribus maximis circumstantiis gestorum; 
and M.-D. Chenu, "Conscience de l'histoire et theologie au Xlle siecle," 
AHDL, XXI (1954), 107-33. 

5 . Quoted from Marbodus De omamentis verborum Prologus {PL, CLXXI, 

6. "Saepe nocturnus horoscopus ad hiberna pervigilia excubavi" On 
horoscopus as one of the thirty-six fixed stars, see the Latin Asclepius in 


(Scott, ed., I, 325). Martin of Laon Scholica graecarum glossarum (Laistner, 
ed., p. 437) glosses horoscopus as horanim inspector, but the hours involved 
may have been night hours and measured by the fixed stars. 

7. "quae secundum proprietatem verborum exprimitur" The meaning 
seems to be, "any narrative which makes literal sense." The "proper 
nature" or "property" of words is apparently to signify literally or directly 
(cf. the brief discussion of literal vs. allegorical signification, above v.iii). 
Hugh discusses passages lacking literal sense below, vi.x; passages lacking 
literal sense would belong to allegory, not to history. 

8. Cf. Jerome Epistula cxxix (ad Dardanum) vi {PL, XXII, 1 105) : " . . . the 
truth of history, which is the foundation of spiritual understanding"; 
Rhabanus Maurus De universo xxn.i {PL, CXI, 5 94C) : "... Divine Scripture 
is a honeycomb filled with the honey of spiritual wisdom." 

9. Quoted, with slight adaptations, from Gregory the Great Moralium 
libri Epistula missoria iii {PL, LXXV, 513C). Cf. Hugh's De area Noe 
morali i.i {PL, CLXXVI, 621): "God dwells within the human heart in two 
ways, namely, through knowledge and through love. Yet, there is but one 
dwelling, for everyone who knows God loves him, and no one can love him 
who does not know him. Yet, knowledge and love of God differ in this way, 
namely, knowledge builds the house of faith while love, through virtue, 
paints the edifice as with color spread upon the whole." "History" and 
"allegory" provide knowledge, faith-knowledge, one might say; "tropo- 
logy" provides love and virtue. Cf. Didascalkon i.v and viii, where know- 
ledge and virtue are said to work the restoration of man's nature. 

10. Gen. 1:1. 

11. Gen. 2: 8. 

12. Ps. 77:70. 

13. Ps. 7:13-14- 

14. With the exposition that follows, cf. Philo of Alexandria, cited with- 
out ref. in Smalley, Study of the Bible, p. 5 : "Allegory is 'a wise architect who 
directs the superstructure built upon a literal foundation.' " The resemblance 
is more than coincidental, but I cannot trace a line of transmission from Philo 
to Hugh, who seems to borrow the analogy directly from Gregory's 
Moralium libri; see n. 9 and context. 

15. The eight "courses" dictate the structure of Hugh's De sacramentis, 
composed to provide students with the definitive knowledge of doctrine he 
requires as a prerequisite to allegorical interpretation. See De sacramentis 
1. Prologus {PL, CLXXVI, 183 ; Deferrari, p. 3). Table of correspondences 
between the "courses" and parts of the De sacramentis in Pare, Brunet, 
Tremblay, Renaissance du Xlle siecle, 263-4; cf. G. Robert, Les Ecoles et 
Penseignement de la theologie pendant la premiere moitie du Xlle siecle (Paris, 1909), 
pp. 140-8, who first recognized in the present chapter a sketch later filled 
out in the De sacramentis. 

16. Ps. 17:12. 

17. Ezech. 1:19. 

18. Ibid., 1 : 20. 

19. II Cor. 3:6. 


20. I Cor. 2:15. 

21. The Pauline Epistles are fourteen in number; the number fourteen is 
twice seven, the perfect number. 

22. Cf. William of Conches' commentary on the Timaeus {PL, CLXXII, 
246) for preliminary definitions of both kinds of justice, natural ("it was not 
invented by man. . . it is most evident in the creation of the universe") and 
positive ("it is invented by man... it is most evident in the decrees of the 
state"); the Timaeus, associated with natural justice, and the Republic, as- 
sociated with positive justice, are observed to constitute "one and continuous 
tract upon justice" {ibid., 250). On natural justice as productive of standards 
of positive justice, or morality, see, in the same commentary, William's 
moralisatio of the movements of the stable firmament and the erratic planets : 
"God gave man eyes so that when man saw that there are two motions in the 
heavens and two in himself, and that the Divine Wisdom makes the erratic 
planets follow the rational motion of the firmament, man would subject the 
erratic movements of his flesh to the rational motion of his spirit, a matter 
for practical philosophy" (quoted in Jeauneau, "La Notion ftintegumentum," 
AHDL, XXIV [1957], 77). Equally striking is Hugh's moralisatio of the 
movement from chaos to order in the six days of creation {De sacramentis 
i.i. 3 [PL, CLXXVI, 1 8 8C ff. ; Deferrari, pp. 8-9]) : "The omnipotent God . . . 
just as he made everything else for the rational creature, so in all [the works 
of the six days] must have followed a plan especially adapted to the benefit 
and interest of the rational creature. Now this plan was one in which not 
only a service but also an example should be prepared for the rational 
creature. . . . The rational creature itself was first made unformed in a way 
proper to it, and was afterwards to be formed through conversion to its 
Creator. Therefore, exteriorly, it was first made to see matter unformed, 
then formed, so that it would perceive how great was the distance between 
mere being and beautiful being. And by this it was warned not to be content 
with having received mere being from the Creator through its own creation, 
but to seek beautiful and happy being, which it was destined to receive from 
the Creator through turning toward him with love." (Deferrari's translation 

23. "omnis natura rationem parit, et nihil in universitateinfecundumest," 
the passage has a Hermetic ring. Cf. Latin Asclepius i.iv (Nock, pp. 299- 
300), where the reproductive power of all species is discussed: ibid, m.xiv 
(Nock, pp. 3 1 3-4), where the power of procreation is attributed to both 
matter and spirit as a "quality of nature, which has in itself the power and 
material of both conception and birth"; and esp., ibid., vi.xxi (Nock, 
pp. 321-3) on the fecundity of all created beings: "it is impossible that any 
one of the things that exist should be infecund." 

24. Isa. 7: 14. 

25. Mich. 5 :z. 

26. Ps. 86:5. 

27. Ps. 67:21. 

28. Ps. 109: 1. 

29. Ps. 109:3. 


30. Dan. 7: 13-14. 

31. Luke 1 : 26-31. 

32. Isa. 7: 14. 

33. Luke 2:4-7. 

34. Mich. 5 : 2. 

35. John 1:1. 

36. Mich. 5 : 2. 

37. John 1 : 14. 

38. Isa. 7:14; cf. Matt. 1:23. 

39. Eccli. 1:1. 

40. II John 1:1. 

41. Rom. 16:25-7. 

42. Ps. 10:15. 

43. Ps. 56:5. 

44. Ps. 102: 15. 

45. Ps. 78:7. 

46. Job 9:13. 

47. Job 7:15. This and the previous example are adduced by Gregory 
the Great Moralium libri Epistula missoria iii {PL, LXXV, 51 3D) to show 
the impossibility of understanding all things in Scripture literally. 

48. Isa. 4: 1. 

49. The exclusively allegorical interpretation is Origen's; see Jerome 
Translatio homiliarum Origenis in visiones Isaiae Homilia in: "De septem 
mulieribus" {PL, XXIV, 910 ff.). Jerome himself, in his commentary on 
Isaias, gives both a literal and an allegorical interpretation; Commentaria in 
Isaiam prophetam n. iv {PL, XXIV, 72-3). 

50. Quoted from Augustine De Genesi ad litteram i.xxi{PL, XXXIV, 262). 

51. Quoted from ibid., i.xviii {PL, XXXIV, 260). 

52. Cf. Didascalicon in.ix. 

53. Cf. Hugh's De contemplatione et ejus speciebits (Haureau, ed., Nouvel 
Examen, pp. 177-210), which, however, gives brief treatment to meditation 
as but one species of contemplation and which, moreover, gives the im- 
pression of being an outline rather than a finished treatise; cf. Baron, 
Science et sagesse, p. xxxi, who regards the work as a reportatio. 

54. "ad puram et sine animalibus coenam" These are the concluding 
words of the Latin Asclepius (Nock, 355), here interpolated into a Christian 
context. Failure to recognize the source led Grabmann to transcribe the 
passage as "ad puram et finalem coenam" {Geschichte der scholastischen 
Methode, II, 235, n. 3). 


1. Cf. Boethius De arithmetica i.i {PL, LXIII, 1079D). 

2. "Virtus est habitus animi in modum naturae rationi consentaneus" 
Variant form in De sacramentis {PL, CLXXVI, 273 B; Deferrari, 
p. 105): "Virtus... est... affectus mentis secundum rationem ordinatus." 


Ultimate source, Cicero De inventione ii.liii: "Virtus est animi habitus modo 
atque rationi consentaneus." Cited with slight variations, not without their 
significance, by Augustine De diversis quaestionibus i.xxxi {PL, XL, 20); 
William of Conches, commentary on the Timaeus {PL, CLXXII, 247) ; and 
the brano revision of William of Conches De philosophia mundi (Ottaviano, 
ed., p. 29). Thierry of Chartres, in his commmentary on the De inventione, 
glosses Cicero's definition as follows: "The definition of virtue is to be 
understood thus : virtue is a habit of the mind by which the mind is made to 
return to the norm of nature through following reason. Vice exceeds the 
norm of nature ; virtue, through following reason, produces a return to this 
norm" (quoted in Delhaye, "Enseignement de la philosophic morale," MS, 
XI [1949], 98)- 

3. Schematization of the three evils, three remedies, and three arts in 
Richard of Saint Victor Liber Excerptionum i.iv {PL, CLXXVI, 195) and 
the brano revision of William of Conches De philosophia mundi (Ottaviano, 
ed., pp. 22-3), where, however, "eloquence" is bracketed with "wisdom" as 
a twofold remedy against ignorance. Cf. the fourfold scheme of Bernardus 
Silvestris Commentum super sex libros Eneidos Virgilii (Riedel, ed., p. 36): 
"There are four evils which beset human nature: ignorance, vice, lack of 
skill in speaking, material want. To these four evils, four goods are op- 
posed: to ignorance, wisdom; to vice, virtue; to lack of skill in speaking, 
eloquence; to material want, sufficiency." 


1. With the material of this chapter, cf. Isidore Etymologiae vm.ix.i ff. ; 
Rhabanus Maurus De magicis artibus {PL, CX, 1095 ff.); and the brano 
revision of William of Conches De philosophia mundi (Ottaviano, ed., p. 35). 


1. Buttimer's text (p. 134) has here been repunctuated as follows: "Ideo 
omnis motus et conversio creaturae rationalis esse debet ad mentem divinam, 
sicut omnis motus et conversio creaturae visibilis est ad rationalem creatur- 
am." On the created universe as a network of hierarchically arranged causes 
deriving ultimately from the primordial causes or exemplars in God (eternal 
and invisible ; causes only, not effects ; rooted in the divine Will, ordered by 
the divine Wisdom, made fruitful by the divine Power), see De sacramentis 
i.ii.22 {PL, CLXXVI, 216C; Deferrari, p. 41) and i.ii.2 {PL, CLXXVI, 
206D f. ; Deferrari, pp. 29 ff.); on the creative extension of the primordial 
causes through three orders of created being, (1) temporal and invisible 
(angels), (2) temporal and partly invisible, partly visible (men), (3) temporal 
and visible only, down to the ultima et postrema universorum (effects only, 
causes to nothing below themselves), see ibid., i.iv.26 {PL, CLXXVI, 
246A-C; Deferrari, pp. 73-4). The term "rational creature" Hugh some- 


times restricts to angels alone, created with primordial matter in the first 
instant of time {ibid., i.i.5 [PL, CLXXVI, 189D f.; Deferrari, p. 10]; cf. 
Adnotationes elucidatoriae in Pentateuchon v [PL, CLXXV, 3 4 A]), sometimes 
extends to man, like the angels created prior to the rest of creation not in 
time but in dignity, and, before the fall, directly illuminated by God with 
knowledge of the natures of all beings {De sacramentis, 5, 12-15 [PL, 
CLXXVI, 263B f., 266B £, 270C ff.; Deferrari, pp. 94, 97, 102-4]). The 
orientation or "conversion" of every being is properly toward that for which 
it was created, its "final cause"; in man's case, this is God; in the world's, 
man {ibid., i.ii.i [PL, CLXXVI, 20 5 B f. ; Deferrari, pp. 28-9]). 

2. Buttimer's text (p. 134) here repunctuated as follows: "Sicut homo, 
cum quid mente conceperit, ut aliis etiam patere possit quod sibi soli notum 
est, foris exemplum eius depingit, postea etiam ad maiorem evidentiam, quo- 
modo id quod ad exemplum propositum est cum ratione eius concordat, 
verbis exponit; ita Deus, volens ostendere invisibilem sapientiam suam, 
exemplum eius in mente creaturae rationalis depinxit, ac deinde corpoream 
creaturam faciens, foris illi quid intus haberet ostendit." 

3. Cf. De tribus diebus xxv {PL, CLXXVI, 83 5B); De sacramentis i.v.2-5 
{PL, CLXXVI, 247A-9B; Deferrari, pp. 75-7). According to Hugh, divine 
ideas, communicated to the angelic intellect, provided the exemplars accord- 
ing to which primordial chaos was ordered by God in the works of the six 
days. Underlying this view is Hugh's repeated insistence, as against criticism 
by William of Conches, upon the didactic purpose of the mode of creation 
and upon the literal, not merely figurative, import of the hexaemeron. A 
series of texts of varying date give the impression of a debate between 
William and Hugh on this point: (1) William, in his commentary on the De 
consolatione philosophiae (Parent, Doctrine de la creation, p. 129), declares it 
heresy against the divine goodness to affirm that God created original con- 
fusion or chaos ; (2) Hugh, in Adnotationes elucidatoriae in Pentateuchon iii {PL, 
CLXXV, 33 A ff.), observes: "It is neither wrong nor unsuitable to say that 
God created something imperfect or unformed ; . . . daily he makes children 
who are imperfect with respect to the growth that is to follow, but perfect in 
the number of parts, that is, feet, hands, and the like"; God created initial 
chaos and ordered it through six days "not because he lacked power to do 
differently (hardly true), but because he intended an example and lesson for 
the rational creature. Just as he first conferred being, and then beautiful 
being, upon things, so upon angels and men, to whom he first gave rational 
being, he would afterward have given blessed being, if they had remained 
faithful"; (3) William, in De philosophia mundi i.xxi {PL, CLXXII, 5 3 A ~ D ) 
and in his commentary on the Timaeus (Parent, Doctrine de la creation, pp. 
1 5 8 ff.), remarks that angels did not need external instruction since they knew 
all things from within, and men did not exist to be instructed at the time of 
creation; (4) Hugh, in the De sacramentis 1.L3 {PL, CLXXVI, 188C-9B; 
Deferrari, p. 9) reaffirms his belief that both angels and men learn from the 
ordering of initial chaos not to be satisfied with mere existence, and adds : 
"But if anyone asks what rational creature existed in the very beginning of 
the universe, to whom this example and lesson could be proposed, one can 


easily reply that the angels were already created and that they were admon- 
ished by this fact to know themselves, and that to the end of time men would 
be created, who, although they did not see creation when it was accom- 
plished, nonetheless, taught by the Scriptures, could not fail to know that it 
was accomplished" (Deferrari's translation altered). If anyone wishes still to 
disagree with Hugh's reasons for his belief, let him, in all friendliness "seek 
out some better and more subtle idea," Hugh adds. 

4. Gen. 1:3. 

5. For example, Gen. 1 : 14-16: "And God said: Let there be lights made 
in the firmament of heaven, to divide the day and the night. . . . And it was 
so done. And God made two great lights. ..." 

6. Cf. Augustine De Genesi ad Utteram (PE, XXXIV, 268-70): 
"When, therefore, we hear, 'And God said: Let it be,' let us understand 
what existed in the Word of God. . . . But when we hear, 'And it was so,' let 
us understand the rational creature's knowledge of the thing destined for 
creation and foreseen in the idea of the Word of God; for God first 'creates,' 
so to speak, in the rational creature those things which, by a prior movement 
in the Word of God, he knew to be destined for creation. Finally, when we 
hear it said, 'God made,' let us understand that the created object itself has 
been brought forth according to its kind." Cf. Abaelard Theologia Christiana 
{PE, CLXXVIII, 1 1 29C) and Thierry of Chartres De sex dierum operibus 
(Haring, ed., p. 185). 


The following list is restricted to the more important primary works cited in 
the notes to the translation of the Didascalkon, and to secondary materials 
which the translator has found particularly useful for understanding the 
sources of the text, the text itself, and the intellectual and historical milieu in 
which the text first appeared. Recent editions of primary works are listed 
under the editor's name only. 


Abaelard, Peter. Introductio in theologiam. PL, CLXXVIII, 979-1 114. 

Theologia Christiana. PL, CLXXVIII, 1123-1330. 

Alanus de Insulis. De planctu naturae. PL, CCX, 431-82. 

Theologiae regulae. PL, CCX, 617-84. 

Alcuin. Dialogus de rhetorica et virtutibus. PL, CI, 919-50. 

De dialectica. PL, CI, 951-76. 

Alonso, Manuel, ed. Hermann de Carintia: De essentiis. Comillas [San- 

tander], Universidad Pontificia, 1946. 
Articella. Venice, Baptista de Tortes, 1487. 
Augustine. Contra academicos. PL, XXXII, 905-58. 

Contra Faustum manichaeum. PL, XLII, 207-518. 

De civitate Dei. PL, XLI, 13-804. 

De diversis quaestionibus. PL, XL, 11-100. 

De Genesi ad litteram. PL, XXXIV, 245-486. 

De Trinitate. PL, XLII, 819-1098. 

Retractationes. PL, XXXII, 583-656. 

Barach, Carl Sigmund, and Wrobel, Johann, eds. Bernardi Silvestris De 
mundi universitate libri duo sive megacosmus et microcosmus. Innsbruck, 

Baron, Roger, ed. "Hugonis de Sancto Victore Epitome Dindimi in philo- 
sophiam: introduction, texte critique et notes," Trad. XI (195 5), 91-148. 

ed. "Hugonis de Sancto Victore Practica geometriae: introduction, 

texte," Osiris, XII (1956), 176-224. 

Baur, Ludwig, ed. Gundissalinus, De divisione philosophiae. BGPM, 

Band IV, Heft 11-111. Miinster, 1906. 
Bode, Georgius Henricus, ed., Scriptores rerum mythicarum latini tres 

Romae nuper reperti. Cellis, Impensis E. G. C. Schulze, 1834. 
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. De arithmetica. PL, LXIII, 1079- 


Commentaria in Porphyrium a se translatum. PL, LXIV, 71-158. 


In Porphyrium dialogi. PL, LXIV, 9-70. 

Bossuat, R., ed., Alain de Lille, Anticlaudianus. Texte critique avec une 

introduction et des tables. Paris, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1955. 
Bovo of Corvey. Commentary on the De consolatione philosophiae in.m.ix 

of Boethius. PL, LXVI, 1239-46. 
Bubnov, Nicolaus, ed., Gerberti opera mathematica. Berlin, 1899. 
Biilow, G., ed., Des Dominicus Gundissalinus Schrift de processione mundi 

herausgegeben und auf ihre Quellen untersucht. BGPM, Band XXIV, 

Heft iv. Munster, 1925. 
Burkhard, Carolus, ed., Nemesii episcopi Premnon physicon. Leipzig, 

B. G. Teubner, 19 17. 
Buttimer, Charles Henry, ed., Hugonis de Sancto Victore Didascalicon de 

studio legendi. A critical text. Studies in Medieval and Renaissance 

Latin, X. Washington, Catholic University of America Press, 1939. 
Cousin, Victor, ed., Ouvrages inedits d'Abelard. Paris, 1836. 

ed., Petri Abaelardi opera. Paris, 1849. 

De Rijk, L. M., ed., Petrus Abaelardus: Dialectica. Assen, 1956. 

Dick, Adolphus, ed., Martiani Minnei Felicis Capellae De nuptiis Philologiae 

et Mercurii libri Villi. Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1925. 
Dobschiitz, E. von, ed., Decretum pseudo-Gelasianum. Texte und Unter- 

suchungen, XXXVIII. Leipzig, 191 2. 
Eyssenhardt, Franciscus, ed., Macrobius. Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1893. 

ed., Martiani Minnei Felicis Capellae De nuptiis Philologiae et Mer- 
curii libri Villi. Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1866. 

Freundgen, Joseph, tr., "Hugo von St. Viktor, Das Lehrbuch." Sammlung 

der Bedeutendsten padagogischen Schriften aus alter und neuer Zeit. 

Band XXIII. Paderborn, Ferdinand Schoningh, 1896. 
Gibb, John, and Montgomery, William, eds., The Confessions of Augustine. 

Cambridge Patristic Texts. Ed. by A. J. Mason, Cambridge, Cambridge 

University Press, 1927. 
Green, William M., ed., "Hugh of St. Victor, De tribus maximus circum- 

stantiis gestorum," Spec, XVIII (1943), 484-93. 
Gregory the Great. Moralium libri, sive expositio in librum Job. PL, 

LXXV, 509-1162. 
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Haring, Nicholas M. "The Creation and Creator of the World according to 

Thierry of Chartres and Clarenbaldus of Arras." Introductory study and 

texts of the De sex dierum operibus of Thierry of Chartres and the Liber 

de eodem secundus of Clarenbaldus of Arras. AHDL, XXII (1955), 

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De sacramentis christianae fidei. PL, CLXXVI, 173-618. 

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De scripturis et scriptoribus sacris praenotatiunculae. PL, CLXXV, 


De tribus diebus. PL, CLXXVI, 811-38. 

De unione corporis et spiritus. PL, CLXXVII, 285-94. 

Expositio in Hierarchiam coelestem. PL, CLXXV, 923-1154. 

In Ecclesiasten homiliae. PL, CLXXV, 113-256. 

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Praefatio in Evangelia. PL, XXIX, 515-30. 

Praefatio in libros Samuel et Malachim. PL, XXVIII, 547-58. 

Praefatio in Pentateuchum. PL, XXVIII, 147-52. 

Praefatio in Salamonem. PL, XXVIII, 1 241-4. 

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logiques de Platon a Copernic. Vol. Ill, L'Astronomie au moyen age 

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Flatten, Heinrich. Die Philosophic des Wilhelm von Conches. Coblenz, 

Gorres-Druckerei, 1929. 



Gilson, Etienne. A History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages. 
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"La Cosmogonie de Bernardus Silvestris," AHDL, III (1928), 1-28. 

Grabmann, Martin. Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode. 2 vols. 

Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder'sche Verlagshandlung, 191 1; reprinted, 
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G. C. Sansoni, 1955. 

"L'anima mundi nella filosofia del XII secolo," GCFI, XXX (195 1), 


"Sull'attribuzione a Guglielmo di Conches di un rimaneggiamento 

della Philosophia Mundi," GCFI, XXX (195 1), 119-25. 
Gwynn, Aubrey. Roman Education from Cicero to Quintilian. Oxford: 

The Clarendon Press, 1926. 
Haskins, Charles Homer. Studies in the History of Mediaeval Science. 

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Paris, 1872. 

Hugues de S aint- Victor : nouvel examen de l'edition de ses oeuvres. 

Paris, 1859. 

Jaeger, Werner. Paideia : the Ideals of Greek Culture. Tr. Gilbert Highet. 

Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1939. 
Jeauneau, Edouard. "L'Usage de la notion d'integumentum a travers les 

gloses de Guillaume de Conches," AHDL, XXIV (1957), 35-100. 

"Simples Notes sur la cosmogonie de Thierry de Chartres," Sophia, 

XXIII (1955), 172-83. 

Kleinz, John P. The Theory of Knowledge of Hugh of Saint Victor. 

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Hugonis de S. Victore theologia perfectiva : eius fundamentum philo- 

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Aaron, 139 

Abaelard, Peter, xii, 4, 6, 158/22, 217/23; on 

the classic philosophers, 13, 167/284, 

182/226, 192/269; disputations of, 16, 18, 

19, 23, 166/272, 215/268; on the world 

soul, 25, 28, 178/28, 179/210 

Z?£ dialectica, 179/210 

Expositio in Hexaemeron, 202/244 

Historia calamitatum mearttm, 15 8/22, 166/2 
67, 215/268 

Introductio in theologian:, 179/210 

Logica ingredientibus, 207/288 

Theologia Christiana, 167/284, 179/210, 190 
#56, 192/269, 197/29, 228/26 

Z>tf imitate et trinitate divina, 179/210, 

bdias, 104 

belard, jw Abaelard, Peter 
Abisag, 98,99 
Abraham, 84, 86, 210/234 
Action: philosophy and, 9, 10, 15, 48, 54, 

132-33, 161/221; divine and human, 55, 

190//59; for the perfect (student), 130-31 
Acts of the Apostles (N.T.), 103, 104, 107, 

1 14-15, 137 
Actuality: Divine Wisdom and, 14, 15, 

164/242, 156; powers of the soul and, 50; 

change and, 53-54; reason and, 58-59, 

73, 156 
Adalbold of Utrecht, 168/293, 185/235, 192 

#69, 198/225 
Adam of Saint Victor, 5,37 
Adelard of Bath: on the arts, 18, 195/2/276, 

2; 212/246 

De eodem et diver so, 166/271, 169/21 18, 
178/28, 189/253, 193/271, 195/2/276, 2; 
202/247, 2 1 2/246 
Qttaestiones naturales, 188/245, 191/266, 
203//56, 204/260 
Aemilian, 84 
Aesculapius, 85 
Agathocles, King, 215/263 
Aggeus, 105 
Agriculture: among the arts, 33, 74, 83, 

153; provinces of, 51, 77; origins 84, 85 
Alanus de Insulis, x, xi, 189/253 

De plane tn naturae, 179/210 

Theologiae regulae, 182/226 
Alcabitius, 20 
Alcmon of Crotona, 86 
Alcuin, 3, 161/221 

De dialectica, 183/227 

Alexander, 106 

Alexandria, 106 

Allegory: in Scripture, 35, 120, 121, 127, 
135, 136, 138, 214/254, 219/21, 220/225, 
222/2/22, 3, 4; 223/2/27, 9; the study of, 139- 
44, 145-46; see also Involucrum (integtt- 

Alphabets: origin of, 85-86, 210/231; He- 
brew, 105-106, 108-109, in 

Ambrose, Saint, 104, 115 
Sermo ii in Ps. cxviii, 1 77/24 
Sermo x, i~/jn4 

Ammonius of Alexandria, 112, 161/221 

Amos, 104 

Amphio, 84 

Analecta Mediaevalia Namurcensia, i-j$nij4 

Andrew of Saint Victor, 4 

Angels: nature of, 14, 27-28, 156, 170/2127, 
184/231, 185/238, 186/242, 190/259; the 
Devil as, 125; as rational beings, 226/21, 
227/23; see Ottsiai 

Animals, distinguished from man, 5 1 

j\nima mundi, see World soul 

Anselm of Havelberg : Epistula ad Abbatem 
Ecbertttm, 216/281 

Anselm of Laon, 215/268 

Apicius, 85 

Apocalypse (N.T.), 104, 107, 111, 115, 144, 

Apocrypha, 103; defined, 107-108; listed, 

Apollo, Tripod of, 46, 177/24; as author of 

medicine, 85 
Apostles, Acts of the(N.T.), 104, 107, 114- 

15, 137 

Aptitude, for study, 43-44, 91, 93; see also 

Apuleius, 84 

Aquila, 106 

Arabic tradition, 6, 1 59/211, 203/253 

Arator, 115 

Archetypal essences, see Ottsiai 

Architecture, 62, 84; typifying the study 
of Scripture, 140-42, 222/23, 223/29 

Argument, theory of, 81-82, 83, 153, 207 

Aristotle, 3, 21, 160/214, 167/285, 172/2160; 
on logic, 6, 86; division of philosophy 
by, 8, 19, 36, 62, 1 59/21 1, 161/221, 207/2 
88, 208/23; entelechy and, 26, 178/27; on 
Zoroaster, 154; Marietan on, 160/213 
De interpretatione, 207//88 

2 3 8 


Aristotle {continued) 
Metaphysics, i6i«2i 
Topics, 1 61/221 

Arithmetic: in the quadrivium, 67, 71, 83; 
power of, 67, 201/239; subjects of, 68, 
153, 203/255 

Arithmology : the creating "One," 24, 65, 
I99«27; and number "Four" of the soul, 
64-66; and number "Four" of the body, 
66-67, 198/22 5; Lambda diagram, 199/226; 
number "Fourteen," as perfect, 224/221 

Arius, 113,115 

Armament, 74, 76, 83, 153, 205/268 

Arnobius, 2io«34 

Arnulph of Orleans, 173/2174, 182/226 

Artaxerxes, King, 85 

Articella, 206/275 

Arts and sciences, The : education and, 4, 5 ; 
schematization of, 6; "Quaternary" of, 
7-19, 159/212; Divine Wisdom and, 11, 
29-31, 61, 195/22; in the interpretation of 
Scripture, 32, 33, 35, 44-45, 173/2172; 
origins of, 46-47, 51-52, 59-60, 83-86, 
161/220, 183/230, 210/234; order and meth- 
od of study of, 83, 86-87, 153; function 
of, 71-73, 152, 226/23; teaching of, 89-90; 
order within, 91-92; permanence in, 
195/22; see also specific categories, i.e., 
Logical arts; Mechanical arts; Practical 
arts ; Theoretical arts ; and see specific arts, 
e.g., Eloquence 

Asclepius, 161/221, 167/284, 225/254; on na- 
ture, 13, 20, 169/2118, 189/253; on two- 
fold nature of man, 184/232; on fire, 
193/271, 194/274; on fixed stars, 222/26; 
on procreation, 224/223 

Astrology, see Astronomy, astrology and 

Astronomy, 23-24, 31, 32, 83, 171/2143; 
superlunary and sublunary worlds, 9, 
27, 54, 188/252, 189/253, 190/256; province 
of, 67, 70, 71, 153; astrology and, 68, 
84, 202//44, 209/214, 210/234; reason and, 
2242222; see also Stars; Sun 

Athanasius, bishop of Alexandria, 115 

Atlas, 84 

Augustine, Saint, ix, xi, 3, 104; influence 
on Hugh, 7, 8, 13, 28, 29-32, 36, 161/230, 
171/2/2135, 143; 185/238, 214/259; division 
of philosophy and, 8, 36, 161/221, 190/2 
57, 203/258; on Genesis, 12, 13, 19, 163/2 
34, 185/238, 192/269, 225/2/250-51, 228/26; 
on Divine Wisdom, 14, 24, 164/2/239, 42; 

176/23, 181/2/218, 21; on the nature of 
philosophy, 15, 165/247; outline of pagan 
knowledge, 31-32; number of writings, 
104, 115; on fourfold interpretation of 
Scripture, 219/2/21-4, 6; 220/221 
De civitate Dei, 161/221, 167/286, 175/21, 
181//19, 186/242, 187/243, 192/269, 194/2 
74, 208/2/21-2, 209/215, 213/249, 219/26 
Confessiones, 185/238, 163/234, 1641142. 
De consensu evangelistarum, 164/242, 208/21 
Contra academicos, 183/227 
Contra Faustum manichaeum, 219/22 
Z)tf diversis quaestionibus , 164/242, 192/269, 

Z)tf doctrina Christiana, xi, 7, 28, 161/221, 
197/218, 220/221; compared with 7V2£ 
Didascalicon, 29-32, 36, 171/2/21 36-39, 

143, 147-5° 
Enarrationes in psalmos , 164/242, 205/271 
Z?£ Genesi ad litteram, 163/234, 181/221, 

186/242, 219/2/21, 6; 220/221, 225/2/250, 

51 ; 228/26 
Z)tf Genesi contra Manichaeos, 163/234 
Z)e Genesi liber imperfectus, 163/234 
.De immortalitate animae, i^^nji 
In Joannis evangelium, 192/269, 219/26 
Z?£ libera arbitrio, 164/239, 181/218 
Z)£ musica, iqinji 

Deordine, \6jn4j, ijinni$5, 143; 193/271 
Retractationes, 171/2135, 193/271 
Sermo cxvii: De verbis evangelii Johannis, 

.De Trinitate, 171/2134, 176/23, 183/227, 

186/242, 190/257, 214/259 
Z)e z'era religione, 165/247 
Aulus Gellius: Nodes atticae, 211/241 
Ausonius: Ludus de VII sapientibus, iJin^ 

Babylon, 123-24,139 

Barach, Carl Sigmund (ed.): Bernardi Sil- 
vestris De mundi universitate libri duo sive 
megacosmus et microcosmus , 178/27; see also 
Wrobel, Johann 

Barnabas, Saint, 107 

Baron, Roger: "Hugonis de Santo Victore 
Epitome Dindimi in philosophiam: intro- 
duction, texte critique et notes," 163/233, 
165//47, 166/260, 174/24, 181/219, 196/27, 
198/225, 204/264 

"Hugonis de Sancto Victore Practica 
geometriae: introduction, texte," 188/2 
52, 203/252 



"Notes biographiques sur Hugues de 
Saint-Victor," 174/2180 

Science et sagesse che^ Hugues de Saint- 
Victor, 158/21, 160/216, 161/219, 166/264 
170/2127, 171/2143, 175/21, 217/22, 225/2 


Basil, bishop of Cappadocia, 115 

Baur, Ludwig (ed.) : Domini cms Gundissalinus, 
10, 159/2/26, 11; 163/224, 183/229, 206/279 

Bede, 3, 104, 115, 161/221 

De Tabemaculo et vasis eius, 219/21 

Beichner, Paul E. : The Medieval Represen- 
tative of Music , Jubal or Tubalcain? 209/210 

Bernard of Chartres, 14, 24, 186/242; on 
study, 211/244, 2 1 2/248 

Bernard of Clairvaux: Sermones in Cantica, 

Bernardus Silvestris, xii, 4, 173/2174, 176/2 
3, 182/226, 186/242, 189/253 
Commentum super sex libros Eneidos Vir- 

gilii, 190/256, 226/23 
Z>tf mundi universitate, 25, 178/27, 188/247 

Bible, The: .SVe Scriptures, The 

Bibliotheque de I'Ecole des Charles, 1 5 8/24 

Bischoff, Bernhard: "Aus der Schule Hu- 
gos von St. Viktor," 158/22 

Bode, Georgius Henricus (ed.): Scriptores 
rerum mythicarum, 202/242, 205/272, 206/2 
73, 210/226 

Body, The: nature of, 9, 18; action and, 
10; intelligence and, 11, 47, 169//116, 
184/232, 186/242; eye of the flesh, 14, 
175/25; powers of the soul and, 48-49, 
63-64, 198/223; arithmetical series re- 
presenting, 64, 65, 199/226; number 
"Four" of, 66-67; rnusic of, 69; "Chair 
of Philology" and, 100; of God, in 
Scriptural metaphor, 122-23; of the 
Devil, in Scriptural metaphor, 125; 
angels and, 170/2127; primordial causes 
and, 186/240 

Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus, ix, x, 
3, 169/21 19, 182/226; division of philo- 
sophy and, 8, 10, 11, 27, 33, 62, 73, 
161/221, 181/221, 196/27, 204/264, 206/281; 
on Divine Wisdom, 13, 19-20, 24, 163/2 
30, 181/2/217, 19, 21; 195/21, 198/220; on 
perfect good, 23, 175/21; on the world 
soul, 25, 28, 179/210; on grammar, 80; 
translations of Cicero and Aristotle, 84, 
207/288; on the arts, 161/221, 195/22, 204 
7264, 213/249; on self-knowledge, 176/23; 

on the powers of the soul, 182/2/222-24, 
198/223; on numbers, 199/227, 201/2/238- 
39, 202/2/241, 46-47; 203/251, 225/21 
/Jte arithmetica, 181/220, 195/22, 196/27, 

201/238, 202/2/241, 46; 204/264, 225/21 
Comment aria in Porphyrium a se translatum, 
io-ii, 161/221, 182/2/222-24, 195/275, 
206/281, 208/288 
jCV consolafione philosophiae, ix, 13, 19-20, 
27, 1 6 1/22 1, 182/225, 198/223; William 
of Conches on, 8, 20, 21, 25, 162/223, 
169/2/2107, 108, no, 115; 179/210, 190 
2/59, 193/271, 196/27, 197/212, 198/225, 
201/2/239-40, 203/257, 205/265, 227/23; 
Remigius of Auxerre on, 175/21, 179 
/210, 188/249, 192//69, 193/271, 195/72, 
Contra Eutychen, 193/270 
Z)tf hebdomadibus, 16 9/2 119, 185/236 
Z?« musica, 1 81/21 9, 202/247, 203/251 
7/2 Porphyrium dialogi duo, 161/221, 181/221, 
195/2 1; 197/215, 198/220, 203/257, 
Z)tf syllogismo hypothetico, 1 81/217 
7/2 Topica Ciceroni s commentaria, 207/288, 

21 3/249 
Z?£ Trinitate, 161/221, 185/235, 197/218 
Z)£ imitate et uno, 199/227 
Bologna, School of, 4 
Bonaventure, Saint, 5 
Bonnard, Fourier : Histoire de I'abbaye royale 
et de I'ordre des chanoines reguliers de Saint 
Victor de Paris, 158/21 
Book of Kells, 218/236 
Bovo of Corvey : In Boethii De consolafione 
Hi. m. ix commentarius, 185/235, 193//71, 
Brunet, Adrien: See Renaissance du xiie 

siecle (Pare, Brunet, Tremblay) 
Bruyne, Edgar de, 171/2143 
Burkhard, Carolus (ed.): Nemesii episcopi 

Premnon physicon, 180/214, 184/232 
Burkitt, F. C. : Book of Rides of Tyconius, 

Buttimer, Charles Henry (ed.) : Hugonis de 
Sancto Victore Didascalicon de studio legendi, 
ix, xi, 7, 158/24, 161/220, 174/23, 185/2/2 36- 
37, 186/241, 187/243, 188/246, 197/211, 
198/2/220, 24; 211/242, 215/2/266, 72; 216 
22/282, 1; 218/254, 221/237, 226//1, 227/22 

Cadmus, 86 



Canonical Epistles (N.T.), 104, 107, 144 
Canonical tables (N.T.), 11 2-1 3 
Canticle of Canticles, 103, 105, no, 144 
Cappuyns, Maieul: Jean Scot Erigene, sa 

vie, son oeuvre, sa pensee, 208/73 
Carolingians, ix, 3 
Cassiodorus, 116, 210/734 

Institutiones divinarum et saeculariam lec- 

tionum, xi, 7, 28, 29, 1 61/721, 1 72/7/71 5 3- 

57, 195/7/72, 6; 197/7/78-9, 16; 198/719, 

203/755, 206/767, 208/26, 209/7/712, 14; 

Didascalicon compared with, 32-33, 36, 

I 83/727, 202««42-43 

Catiline, Sallust on, 16 
Cato, 20, 69, 99 

Concerning Agriculture, 84 
Ceres, 85 

Chalcedon, Council of, 114, 21 8/738 
Chalcidius, ix, 19, 25, 26, 178/76; "three 
works" doctrine and, 27; on the world 
soul, 169/7118, 178/7/76-7, 179/79, i8o/z«ii, 
13; 189/754; astronomy of, 186/7/742- 
43, 188/752, 190/752, 193/771 
Platonis Timaeus interprete Chalcidio cum 
eiusdem commentario, 13, 161/721, 179/79, 
180/713, 184/734, 185/735, 187/7/743, 52; 
190/759, 192/769, 193/771, 199/726, 200 
7729, 209/715 
Chaldeans, 84, 85-86, 210/734 
Challoner, Bishop, xi 
Cham, son of Noah, 84, 154, 210/734 
Chaos, 13, 23, 160/716 

Chartrianism : Hugh and, 4, 13, 24, 28, 36, 
166/772, 167/783, 211/744, 212/748; arith- 
mology and, 198/725; on re.r and verba, 
204/761; the trivium and, 211/744, 212/748 
Chenu, Marie-Dominique: " 'Authentica' 
et 'magistratia' : deux lieux theologiques 
au Xlle-XIIIe siecles," 218/743 
"Conscience de 1'histoire et theologie au 

Xlle siecle," 222/74 
"L'Homme et la nature: perspectives 
sur la renaissance du Xlle siecle," 
159/75, 164/735 
"Imaginatio: note de lexicographic phi- 

losophique medievale," 182/723 
"Involucrum: le mythe selon les theolo- 

giens medievaux," 182/726 
"Moines, clercs et laics au carrefour de 
la vie evangelique (Xlle siecle)," 164 
«35, 174/7181, 216/781 
"Platon a Citeaux," 198/725 

Theologie au Xlle siecle, La, 159/735, 
164/735, 170/7129 
Christianity: Neoplatonism and, 13; of 

Hugh, 22, 23, 24, 167/788, 168/791; 

didascalic literature and, 28-29; pagan 

knowledge and, 30-31, 34-35, 173/7/2167- 

68 ; meditation on death and, 62 
Church, The, xi; Councils of, 1 13-14, 

218/738; doctrine of, 142-43, 150, 223/7 

1 5 ; fathers of (See specific names) ; heresy 

and (See Heresy) 
Cicero, Marcus Tullius (Tully), ix, 3, 13, 

x 6, 37, 57, 75, 86, 167/7/784, 86; 215/7/763, 

73; 216/787 

Defato, 207/788 

De finibus, 167/786 

De inventione, 173/7174, 192/767, 205/770, 
207/788 225/72 

De natura deorum, 167/786, 193/771, 208/71, 

Z?? officis, 183/727 

De oratore, 183/227, 195/778, 211/738, 212 
7747, 213/749 

Republic, 84 

Z)e senectute, 215/7/773-77 

S omnium Scipionis, ix-x, 13; jw a/ro Ma- 
crobius, Commentarium in somnium 

Topica, 86, 207/788, 213/749 
Cistercianism, 4 
Clarenbaldus of Arras, xii, 5, 182/726, 197 


/./for de eodem secundus, 170/7127 
Clement, Saint, 107 
Codex, defined, 118 
Coleman-Norton, P.R. : Cicero's Doctrine 

of the Great Year, 167/786 
Comestor, Peter, 5, 214/761 
Commentaries, defined, 119, 218/755 
Commerce, 74, 76-77, 83, 153, 205/768 
Concupiscence, 65, 200/729 
Constantine the African (Constantinus 

Afer), 201/737, 204/760 
Constantine Augustus, 113 
Constantinople, Council of, 113, 218/738 
Contemplation, 225/753; eye of, 14-15, 

177/75; in the pursuit of Truth, 29, 54; 

as fifth step in perfection, 132-33; defin- 
ed, 214/756 
Cookery, 85 
Corax, 86, 211/738 
Corinthians, 221/738, 223/719, 224/720 



Cornelius, 84 

Comificians, 4, 16; on study, 174/23 

Cosmimetry, 70, 203/753 

Cosmology, x, xi, 10, 13; heterodox texts 

and themes, ly-zSpassim 
Councils (Synods), 1 13-14, 218/738 
Courcelle, Pierre, 20-21 

"Etude critique sur les commentaires de 
la Consolation de Boece," 163/731, 
i66««73-74, 80; 168/793 

Let/res grecques en Occident de Macrobe a 
Cassiodore, 1 58/23, 16 1/72 1 

"Peres devant les enfers virgiliens, Les," 
Cousin, Victor (ed.) : Outrages inedits d' 'Abe- 
lard, 179/210 

Petri Abaelardi opera, 202*744 
Crane, R. S. (ed.) : Critics and Criticism, 

Ancient and Modern, 1 59/210 
Creation: as the work of God, 12, 13, 14, 

19, 21-26, 55, I38, 156, 1907/59, 224«22, 

228/76; the world soul and, 19, 26, 27; 
primordial causes and, 53, 186/739, 4 1 > 
226/71, 227/73; procreation by heat and 
moisture, 57, 194/772; pagans on, 167/7/7 
86, 88; mathematics and, 202/741 

Croydon, F. E. : "Notes on the Life of 
Hugh of Saint Victor," 174/7180 

Cyprian, bishop of Carthage, 115 

Cyril of Alexandria, 115 

Cyrus, 139 

Daedalus, 85 

Daniel (O.T.), 103, 105, no, 145-46, 225/7 
30; St. Jerome on, 217/727 

Danielou, Jean: "Les divers sens de l'Ecri- 
ture dans la tradition chretienne primi- 
tive," 219/21 

Dares the Phrygian, 86 

David, King, 98, 103, 104, 105, 109, 139; 
Samuel and, 108; See also Psalms (O.T.) 

Death, 52, 53, 62; "Eighty," the number 

designating, 65-66; Plato on, 197/79; the 
soul and, 200/732 

Decretals (N.T.), 104; Pseudo-Gelasian, 

Deferrari, Roy J. (tr.) : Hugh of St. Victor 
on the Sacraments of the Christian Faith, 
164/736, 174/24, 117/25, 179/210, 181//15, 
184/232, 185/238, 186/7/239, 40, 42; 196/23, 
222/22, 224/222, 225/22, 226/21, 227/23 

Delhaye, Philippe: "L'Enseignement de la 

philosophic morale au Xlle siecle," 

173/2174, 225/22 

"La place de l'ethique parmi les disci- 
plines scientifiques au Xlle siecle," 
Delphic altar inscription, 46, 177/24 
Democritus, 84, 98, 154 
Demosthenes, 86 
De Rijk, L. M. (ed.): Petrus Abaelardus: 

Dialectica, 179/210 
Deuteronomy (O.T.), 108 
Devil, The, 122, 125 
Dialectic, 81-82, 86 
Dick, Adolphus (ed.): Martiani Minnei 

Felicis Capellae De nuptiis Philologiae et 

Mercurii libri viii, 208/2/21, 8; 211/235 
Dickerman, S. O. : De arguments quibusdam 

apud Xenophontem, Platonem, Aristotelem 

obviis et structura hominis et animalium 

petitis, 176/23 
Dickinson, J. C. : Origins of the Austin 

Canons and Their Introduction into England, 

Dioscorus, bishop of Alexandria, 114 
Dionysius the Areopagite, 116 
Disciplines, see Arts and sciences, The 
Disputation, 8, 16, 18, 22 
Divination, 154-55 
Dobschiitz, E. von (ed.) : Decretum pseudo- 

Gelasianum, 218/2/245-46, 48-49 
Donatus, 80, 90, 207/284, 210/734 

Ars major, 207/785, 210/734 

Ars minor, 207/782 
Douay translation of Bible, xi 
Dramatics: among the arts, 31, 32, 74, 83, 

153, 206/279; province of, 79, 205/268 
Duhem, Pierre: Le systeme du monde, 206/275 
Dunchad: cited, 198/225, 211/237, 216/280; 

on Martianus, 204/262, 205/272, 208/21 

"Eagerness to inquire," 97-99, 100 

Ecclesiastes (O.T.), 103, 105, 109, no, 
167/286, 185//38, 192/269, 193/271, 200/231, 
216/284, 221/2/228, 34; 225/739; Jerome on, 
in, 169/7121, 217/726 

Ecclesiasticus (O.T.), 105, in 

Economics, 74, 205/765 

Education: twelfth-century changes in, 4, 
5; teaching methods, 89-90, 92, no; 
obstacles to, 126-27; Hugh's methods of 
learning, 136-37, 144; didactic literature 
and, 170/713 1 ; postulates of Hugh's 



Education {continued) 

theory, 1 867/42; see also Study 

Egypt, 84, 85, 86, 97, 2037754, 2107734, 
211777735-36; in Scripture, 124 

"Eighty," the number designating life's 
end, 65-66 

Elements : of the soul's composition, 46-47, 
179779; "Chair of Philology" and, 100; 
of the mathematic arts, 153; in divina- 
tion, 154-55 

Eloquence: philosophy and, 15-16, 17; 
logic and, 31, 59, 73, 1957778, 2077787; 
commerce and, 76-77; theory of argu- 
ment and, 81-82, 83, 153, 207777787-88; 
letter and sense in Scripture, 121-22, 
143-44, 145, 147-50, 21977776, 7; 2247722; 
Adelard of Bath on, 1957776; ethics and, 
1 73771 74, 226773 ; see also Allegory; Gram- 
mar; Poetry 

Elysium, 9, 154, 1907756 

Empedocles, 25, 26, 1807711 

Entelechy, x; nature of, 24-25, 46; human 
soul and, 26-27, 169*116, 17877776-8, 
17977779-10; see also World soul 

Ephesians (N.T.), 2037750 

Ephesus, Council of, 113-14, 2187738 

Epicurus, 11, 58 

Eratosthenes, 84 

Erhardt-Siebold, E. and R. von: Cosmology 
in the Annotations in Marcianum: More 
Light on Erigena's Astronomy, ic/$nji 

Erigena, see John the Scot 

Esdras, 103, 106; restoration of the Old 
Testament, 105, 109, no 

Edras (O.T.), 103, 105, no 

Esther (O.T.), 103, 105 

Ethics: philosophy and, 8, 33, 71, 73, no, 
1837727; Scripture and, 35 ; origin of, 84, 
2097715; natural and positive justice in, 
145, 17377174, 2247722; see also Morals; 

Etruscans, 1 5 5 

Etudes classiques, 1 5 8774 

Etymology : of philosophy, 15; of the 
names of the arts, 67-68, 70, 71, 73, 74, 
76, 77, 79, 85, 87; of things pertaining 
to reading, 1 18-19 

Euclid, 84 

Euhemerus, 208771 

Eusebius of Caesarea, 106, 109, 112, 115; 
on Origen, 116 

Eutyches of Constantinople, abbot, 1 1 4, 1 1 5 

Eve, creation of, 1647736 

Evil: relation of wisdom to, 12, 52, 183 
7730; intellectual occupatio as, 18, 129-30, 
2217728; Scripture on, 123; three evils to 
which man is subject, 152, 226723; magic 
and, 154-55 ; as concern for the needs of 
life, 2027/48; see also Morals; Virtue 

Exemplar of Creation, i^; see also Wisdom, 

Exodus (O.T.), 103, 108, 137 

Exposition, order in, 91-92, 93, 147, 150 

Eyssenhardt, Franciscus (ed.): Macrobius, 
1847/32, 1877743, 1887/7/45, 52; 1907/56, 
1927/69, 1937/71, 1947/72, 1957/79, 1987/7/ 
23, 25; 1997/7/26, 27; 2007/7/29, 3 2 

Ezechiel (O.T.), 103, 104-105, 107, 109, 
139, 143, 144, 2237/7/17-18 

Fabric-making, 74, 75, 83, 85, 153, 2057/68 

Fall of Man, The, 138-39; Divine Wisdom 
and, 8, 24, 29-30, 1777/5; philosophy 
and, 11-12, 14-15, 17-18, 141, 163/77/31, 
33; human perfectibility and, 28, 1847/ 
32, 1967/3 

Fate, 1867742, 1907/59 

Fathers of the Church, see specific names, 
e.g., Augustine, Saint 

Fiction, as an art, 31, 32 

Fire, cosmic or ethereal, 27, 53, 1697/121, 
1887/52; superlunary nature and, 10, 
189775 3 ; as mediator between reason and 
the senses, 57, 1937/71; Jupiter and, 57, 
1947/74; moisture and, 1947/72 

Firmicus Maternus: Matheseos libri, 20, 

Fishing, 33 

Flaccus, 109 

Flatten, Heinrich: Die Philosophie des Wil- 
helm von Conches, 1607/16, 1977/18 

Flesh, The : See Body, The 

"Foreign soil," 36-37, 101 

Fronto: Strategematon, 84 

Fulgentius, 2047/63, 2057/72 

Galen: Tegni, ix, 3, n, 2067/75-78 

Games, origin of, 85 

Gelasius, 115, 2187/7/45-49 

Genesis (O.T.), 12-13, 103, 108, 137, 144, 
156, 1707/127, 1857/38, 1917/7/60-62, 1927/ 
69, 2207/7/16-17, 2237/7/10-11, 2287/7/4-5; 
Augustine on, 1637/34, 18 17/21, 1867/42, 
219/7/71, 6; 2207/2I, 2257/7/50-51, 2287/6 



Gennadius, 115 

Genus, in Scripture, 123-24 

Gerbert (Sylvester II, pope), 161/721 

Geyer, B. (ed.): "Peter Abaelard's philo- 

sophische Schriften," 207/788 
Ghellinck, Joseph de, quoted, 36 

Mouvement theologique du XI Ie siecle, 1 5 8« 

I, I59«8, l62/722, 174^175, 22I«40 

Table des matures de la premiere edition 
des oeuvres de Hugues de Saint-Victor, 
1 61/720 

Gilbert of Porree, 16 

Gilduin, Abbot of Saint Victor, 158/71 

Gilson, Etienne : "Cosmogonie de Bernar- 
dus Silvestris, La," 186/742; Spirit of 
Mediaeval Philosophy, The, iljn^ 

Gloss, defined, 119, 218/755 

God: work of, 9, 93, 132-33; relation of 
nature to, 12, 21-22, 27, 52-53, 57, 164/z 
35, 167/7/786-88, 169/7/7116, 121, 176/72; as 
creator, 19, 21-22, 23-24, 26, 138, 156, 
167/7/786-88, 226/71, 227/73, 228/76; man's 
relation to, 22, 24, 32, 36, 51, 54-55, 61, 
121-22, 132-33, 145, 156, 219/7/76, 7; 
223/79, 224/722; Scripture as the Word of, 
34, 121-22, 219/7/76, 7; as Wisdom and 
Light, 176/72; world soul and, 178/78, 
189/753; see also Trinity, The; Wisdom, 

Godfrey of Saint Victor, 4 
Fons philosophiae, 1751JIJ4 

Good, Form of the, 19, 23, 46, 168/793, 

Gorgias, 86 

Gospel, see New Testament 

Grabmann, Martin: Geschichte der scholas- 
tischen Alethode, i^ynnj, 12; 225/754 

Grammar: function of, 15-16, 80, 82, 83, 
206/781; origin of, 86; teaching of, 90, 
212/748; poetry and, 211/744, 212/748; see 
also Eloquence 

Greece, the origins of the arts and, 83-86 

Green, William M. (ed.): "Hugh of St. 
Victor, De tribus maximis circumstantiis 
gestorum," 214/760, 222/74 

Gregory the Great, Saint, ix, 104, 128, 
220/7/723, 25; 222/73 
Moralium libri, 219/71, 220/725, 223/79, 

Regulae pastor alis liber, 217/714 

Gregory, bishop of Nazianzen, Saint, 115 

Gregory of Nyssa, Saint, 115 

Gregory, Tullio: Anima mundi: la filosofia 
di Gitglielmo di Conches e la scuola di 
Chartres, 160/716, 162/723, 179/710, 184/734 
"Sull'attribuzione a Guglielmo di Con- 
ches di un rimaneggiamento della 
P hi I sophia Mundi," 175/71 

Guibert de Tournai: De modo addiscendi, 

Gundissalinus, 159/7/76, 11; 163/724 

Gwynn, Aubrey: Roman Education from 
Cicero toQuintilian, 158/73 

Habacuc (O.T.), 104 

Hagiographers (O.T.), 103, 104, no, in 

Halm, Carolus (ed.) : Rhetores latini minores, 

Hamersleben, Saxony, 37, 38 

Haring, Nicholas M. : "The Creation and 
Creator of the World According to 
Thierry of Chartres and Clarenbaldus of 
Arras," 196/77, 200/728, 202/741, 228/76 

Haskins, C. H. : Renaissance of the Twelfth 
Century, 207/784 

Studies in the History of Mediaeval Science, 
206/775, 209/714 

Haureau, Barthelemy: Histoire de la philo- 
sophic s colas ti que, 18, 166/764; Hugues de 
Saint- Victor : Nouvel examen de l' edition de 
ses oeuvres 177/74, 214/7/756-57, 225/753; 
Notices et extraits de quelques manuscrits 
latins de la Bibliotheque Nationale, 179/710 

Heinze, Max (see Ueberweg, Friedrich, and 
Max Heinze) 

Helm, Rudolfus (ed.): Fabii Planciadis 
(Fulgentii) opera, 204/763, 205/772 

Heloise, 215/768, 217/73 

Henry V, emperor, 38 

Heresy: heterodox themes and texts, 19-28, 
168/793; the Apocrypha and, 107-108, 
118; four principal synods and, 1 13-14; 
of Abaelard, 179/710 

Hermagoras, 86 

Herman of Carinthia: De essentiis, 169/71 18 

Hermetic texts, ix, 13, 19, 20, 28; see also 

Hesiod Ascraeus, 84, 98 

Hierocles of Alexandria, 195/779 

Hilary, bishop of Poitiers, 1 1 5 

Hildebert of Lavardin, 220/727 

Hildegarde of Bingen, 203/753 

History: Scripture as, 12-13, 120, 121, 127, 

135-39, 214/754, 219KI, 220/725, 222/7/72, 



History {continued) 

3, 4; 223/2/27-9; Augustine on, 31, 32; 

first written, 86 
Homer, 98, 99, 208/21, 215/277 
Homily, denned, 119 
Honorius Augustodunensis, xi, 18 

De animae exsilio et patria, i66«70 

De imagine mundi, 170K127, 2037253 

Libellus octo quaestionum, 170/2127 
Horace, 37 

Carmina, 216/288 

Saturae, 215/264 
Hugh, archdeacon, 37, 38 
Hugh of Saint Victor: commentaries, 21, 

166/282; biography of, 36-39; works, 


Adnotationes elucidatoriae in Pentateuchen, 
167/288, 170/2127, 226/21, 227/23 

.De ^4ra2 AW morali, 29, 163/233, 166/263, 
167/285, 171/2132, 172/2166, 196/23, 221 
«37, 223/29 

De a/r/.w animae, 37, 174/2178, 220/226 

De astronomia, 158/21 

Chronica, 214/260 

De contemplatione et eius speciebus, \7~in\, 
214/2/256, 57; 225/253 

Didascalicon : see Introduction, 3-39, and 
notes to text, passim 

In Ecclesiasten homiliae, zj, 163/233, 166/2/2 
66, 68; 167/2/286-87, 168/2/289-90, 172/2 
162, 173/2174, 176/23, 185/238, 188/247, 
190/259, 217/226; on the world soul, 
193/271; on heat, 194/272; on the Fall 
of Man, 1 96/23, 200/231; on man's soul, 
198/223, 202/248; on the world, 216/2 
84; on study, 221/228 

Epitome Dindimi in philosophiam, 12, 15, 
158/21, 163/2/231, 33; 165/2/247-53, I74« 
4, 177/25, 181/219, 183/230, 196/27, 198/2 
25, 204/264 

Expositio in Hierarchiam Coelestem, iG^n 
42, 168/291, 170/2128, 172/2166, 173/2/2 
167-69, 173; 176/22, 177/25, 193/271 

De grammatica, 158/21, 207/284, 212/248 

Indiculum of Hugh's works, 161/220 

De ponder ibus, 158/21 

Practica geometriae, 158/21, 188*252, 203/2/2 

52-5 3 
De sacramentisChristianae fidei, 158/21, 164 
22/236, 41; 167/288, 171/2151, 173/2/2171- 
72, 179/210, 181/215, 184/232, 185/238, 
186/2/239-40, 42; 196/23, 222/22, 223/215, 

224/222, 225/22, 226/21, 227/23 
.De sacramentis legis naturalis et scriptae 

dialogus, 158/21, 172/2166, 173/2/2170-72 

176/22 177/25 
De sapient ia animae Christi, 14 1 64/23 9, 

De scrip tur is et scrip toribus sacris, 158/21, 

166/262, 174/24, 219/21, 222/24 
De /ri£«.r diebus, 26 169/21 16 173/2170, 

175/21, 177/24, 181/219, 186/242, 227/23 
De Tribus maximis circumstantiis gestorum, 

214/260, 222/24 
De unione corporis et spiritus, 1 81/21 5, 

193/271, 201/237 
De vanitate mundi, 172/2166 174/2178 
Hugonin, Flavien, 36, 172/2160 
Humility, 94-97, 131, 136, 137 
Hunting, 74, 77-78, 83, 153 
Huygens, R. C. B. : "Mittelalterliche Kom- 
mentare zum O <?«/ perpetua," 168/293, 

"Idea," jee Wisdom, Divine; Ousiai 
Imagination, 66-67, 201/237 
Immortality, 163/233 
India, 85 

Infernum, 9, 54, 190//56 
Integumentum, see Involucrum (Integumentum) 
Intelligence, .ree Reason 
Intelligentia, 55, 190/257 
Invention, 81-82 

Involucrum (Integumentum), x, 163/231, 166/2 
72, 182/226; world soul and, 25, 199/226- 

Isagoge Johanitii ad Tegni Galiegni, ix, 11, 

Isaias (O.T.), 103, 104-105, 108, 144, 148, 

220/2/29-14, 20; 224/224, 225/2/232, 38, 48, 

49; St. Jerome on, 193/271, 225/249 
Isidore of Seville, Saint, 3, 104, 115, 184/232 

Etymologiae, 7, 28, 29, 80, 161/221, 170/2 
131, 181/219, 183/227, 196/2/24-6, 197/2/2 
8-9, 16; 202/2/242-44, 46; 203/255, 205/2 
67, 206/2/274, 80; 207/286, 208/2/21, 4, 6, 
7; 209/2/29, 11, 14, 15; 210/2/216-18, 
20-22, 27-33; 211/239; 226/21; on the 
Bible, 217/2/22, 5-9, 11, 13, 15-23, 25, 
26, 28, 30; 218/2/231-32, 36, 37, 39-42, 
44, 50-53; 219/256, 221/233 

D/^ri sententiarum, 174/23, 220/221 

De natura rerum, 169/2121 

Quaestiones in Vetus Testamentum, 219/22 



Isis, 85, 86, 210/219 

Isocrates, 3, 98, 215/275 

Ivo of Chartres: Panormia, 218K45 

Jaeger, Werner : Paideia : The Ideals of Greek 

Culture, 1 5 8«3 
James, Saint: Canonical epistle of, 107, 

Jansen, Wilhelm: Der Kommentar desClaren- 

baldus von Arras %u Boethius de Trinitate, 

I97«l8, 2O0/228 

Jean de Toulouse: Annates, 158/21 

Jeauneau, Edouard: "L'Usage de la notion 
d' integumentum a travers les gloses de 
Guillaume de Conches," i62«23, 167/285, 
182/226, 190/256, 199/226-27, 200/228, 204 
#63, 224/222 

Jeremias (O.T.), 103, 104-105, 108, 109, 
no, III 

Jerome, Saint, ix, 104, 193/271, 215/2/265, 
71, 76-78; 216//81, 217/2/22, 4, 10, 12, 
23-24, 26-27, 29; 218/2/733-36, 219/21, 221 
«35, 223/28, 225/249; translations of 
Scripture, 106, 109, 217/212; library of, 


Commentaria in Ecclesiasten, in, 169/21 21, 

Commentaria in Isaiam prophet am, 193/271, 

Contra Vigilantium, 221/235 
Epistulae, 215/2/265, 71, 76-78; 216/281, 

/« Libros Samuel et Malachim, 21 7/2/72, 10, 

24, 26, 29; 218/734-35 
Praefatio in Danielem, 217/227 
Praefatio in Evangelia, 218/236 
Praefatio in Job, 217/223 
Praefatio in Pentateuchen, 217/212 
Praefatio in Salamonem, in, 218/733 
Translatio homiliarum Origenis in visiones 
Isaiae, zz^n^y 
Jesus Christ, 21, 22, 23, 167/285; as A/o«j, 
19, 23, 179/210; Scripture and, 35, in, 
139, 141, 146; Nestorian heresy con- 
cerning, 114; as Form of the Good, 175 
/21, 176/22 
Jesus, son of Sirach, 103, 105, in 
Joannine prologue, 13, 23 
Job(O.T.), 103, 105, 109, no, 144, 215/267, 

217/723, 220/225, 225/2/246-47 
Joel (O.T.), 104 
Johannitius, ix, 11, 206/2/275-78 

John, Saint, 112, 115, 175/21; Gospel of, 
104, 107, in, 144, 176/22, 192/269, 220/2 
19, 225/2/737, 40 
John Chrysostom, Saint, 115 
John of Salisbury, x, 4, 5, 160/715; on tne 
Cornificians, 16, 174/73 
Epistula, CXXXIV (to Thomas Becket) 

Metalogicon, 6, 165/2/755-57, 174/23, 175/21, 
192/268, 193/271, 207/288, 211/244, 212/2 
48, 213/2/250-52, 215/279 
Policraticus, 214/261 
John the Scot, x-xi, 3, 23, 24, 161/721, 191/2 
64; on the ousiai, 14, 152, 186/7/739, 42; 
on the arts and religion, 15, 83, 165/247; 
on world soul, 25, 26; on man's soul, 
179/210, 180/214, 181/2/216, 21; on time and 
eternity, 185/235; on threefold knowl- 
edge, 204/263 

Commentary on £><? consolatione philoso- 
phiae, 168/293, I 75 WI > I 79 WIO » 192/269, 
193/271, 198/225 
Commentary on Martianus {Annotations 
in Marcianum, Lutz ed.), 178/27, 201/7 
40, 205/769, 208/76, 210/7/226, 31, 211/238 
Z)tf Divisione narurae, 165/247, 180/214, 
181/2/216, 21; 185/238, 186/2/739, 42; 
192/769, 208/73, 219/77 
De praedestinatione, lG^n^i 
Jonas, 104 
Jones, Leslie Webber: 

"Influence of Cassiodorus on Medieval 

Culture," 172/7152, 209/2/212,14 
(tr.) Introduction to Divine and Human 
Readings by Cassiodorus Senator, 1 61/221, 
172/2/2153-55, 157; 183/727, 196/2/74, 6; 
197/7/28, 9, 16; 202/242-43, 203//55, 205 
Joseph, 124 

Josephus, 84, 109; Antiquitates , 210/234 
Josue (O. T.), 103, 108, 137, 221/238 
Jourdain, Charles (ed.): "Commentaires 
inedits de Guillaume de Conches et de 
Nicolas Triveth sur 'La Consolation de 
la Philosophic' de Boece," 162/223, 165 
2258, 166/261, 169/2/2108-109, 179/210, 193/7 
71, 196/27, 197/212, 201/2/239-40, 203/257, 
Excursions historiques et philosophiques a 

travers le moy en-age, 162/223 
Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la 
Bibliotheque Imperiale, 162/223 



Judas, 125 

Jude (N. T.), 107 

Judges (O. T.), 103, 104, 108, 137 

Judgment, 81-82 

Judith (O. T.), 103, 105, in 

Julius Atticus, 84 

Justinus, M. Junianus : Historiarum philip- 

picarum libri, 215/263 
Juno, 204/263 
Jupiter (Jove), 57, i94>?74 
Juvenal, 20 
Juvencus, 115 

Keil, Heinrich: Grammatici latini, \j1n4, 

Kells, Book of, 21 8/736 

Kilgenstein, Jakob: Gotteslehre des Hugo 
von St. Viktor, 1 72/21 60 

Kilwardby, Robert, 5 

De ortu et divisione philosophiae, 206//79 

Kings (O.T.), 103, 106, 108, no, 137, 215/2 

Kleinz, John P., 36 

Theory of Knowledge of Hugh of Saint Vic- 
tor, 172/2160, 193/271 

Klibansky, Raymond : "The Rock of Par- 
menides : Mediaeval Views on the Origin 
of Dialectic," 211/2//35, 36 

Knowledge: defined, 9; man's attain- 
ment of, 10, 52; relation to philosophy, 
15, 30-31, 81-82, 132-33, 207///287-88; 
love of God and, 17-18, 223/29; as evil, 18, 
129-30, 202/248; of like by like, 46-47, 
180/21 1; Hugh's analysis of, 61, 176/22, 
1 81/21 5 ; understanding and imagination, 
66-67, 201/237; William of Conches on, 
160/216, 197/712; mechanical arts and, 
201//37; the senses and, 203/259; See also 
Arts and sciences; Philosophy; Under- 

Koehler, W. R. W. (ed.) : Medieval Studies 
in Memory of A. Kingsley Porter, 218/236 

Lactantius, 210/734 

Laistner, M. L. W. : "Notes on Greek from 
the Lectures of a Ninth Century Monas- 
tery Teacher," 191/764, 222/76 

Lambda diagram, 199/726 

Langton, Stephen, 5 

Lasic, Dionysius: "Hugo de Sancto Vic- 
tore auctor operis 'De contemplatione et 
eius speciebus,'" 214/756 

Hugonis de S. Vic fore theologia perfectiva: 
eius fundamentum philosophicum ac theo- 
logicum, 164/737 

Law, The Biblical Books of the, 103, 104, 
105-106, no, in, 144 

LeClercq, Jean: "Le De grammatica de 
Hugues de Saint-Victor, "207/783, 212/248 

Lectio, see Study 

Leo, Pope, 115 

Leviticus (O.T.), 103, 108 

Liber (deity), 85 

Liber, defined, 118 

Liber Her met is Mercurii Triplicis de VI rerum 
principiis, x, 20, 27, 166/277, 1 69/2/71 20, 
121; 188/252; astronomy of, 189/7/253, 
55; 192/769; on Matentetradem, 208/28 

Liberal arts, 75, 89, 1 71/21 3 5 

Libraries, 4, 105, 106, 115 

Libri pontificalis pars prior (Mommsen, ed.), 
2 1 8/747 

Linus, 83, 84, 208/71 

Literature: didactic, 3-4, 28-36, 158/23, 159 
nnd, 10; poetic, 21, 88; Victorine versus 
Chartrian attitudes toward teaching of, 
87-89, 211/744 212/248; Scripture as, 128; 
encyclopedic, 170/21 31 

Logical arts: relation to philosophy, 8, 
10, n, 12, 15, 17, 31, 32, 62, 71, 161/2/7 
20, 21; 181/221, 182/724, 204/764; origin 
of, 57-60, 86; function of, 72-73, 153, 
204/761 ; division of, 79-80, 83, 153, 206/7 
8 1 ; grammar in, 80 ; theory of argument 
in, 81-82, 207/2/287-88 

Lucan, 69, 212/248 
Pharsalia, 202/248 

Luke, Saint, Gospel of, 104, 107, 112, 191 
2763, 225/2/731, 33 

Lutz, Cora E. : Glossae in Martianum, 204/2 
62, 205/272, 208//1, 211/737, 216/780 
Iohannis Scotti annotationes in Marcianum, 
178/27, 201//40, 205/269, 208/26, 210/2/7 
26, 31; 211/738 
"Remigius' Ideas on the Origins of the 
Seven Liberal Arts," 210/234 

Lybia, 85 

Lydians, games of, 85 

Macedonius, 113 

McGarry, Daniel D. (tr.): The Metalogicon 
of John of Salisbury, 165/2/255-57, 1 74/23 , 
175/21, 192//68, 193/271, 207/288, 211/744, 
212/748, 213/7/750-52, 215/279 


2 47 

Machabees (O.T.), 103, 105, in 
McKeon, Richard P., histories of rhetoric, 
dialectic, and poetic, 1 597210 
Selections from Medieval Philosophers, 18222 
24, i95«75 
Macrobius, ix, 13, 19, 167/2/284, 86; on 
mathematics, 196/27, 1 98/22 5, 199222226-27, 
2002229, 2032253 

Comment arium in somnium Scipionis, ix, 13, 
1672286, 177224, 180/212, 1842232, 1877243, 
188/245, 5 Z '> 190/256, 192/269, 193/271, 
194/272, 195/779, 196/2227, 9; 197/29, 198 
22/223, 25; 199/2/226, 27; 200/2/229, 32; 
Saturnalia, ijjn4, 203/253 
Mabillon: Vetera .analecta, 1 74221 80 
Magic, 31, 32, 154-55 
Malachias (O.T.), 105 
Mamertus, Claudianus: Z?<? j/fl/22 animae, 

Man: spiritual perfectibility of, 3, 11, 13- 
15, 18-19, 28, 1647236; relation of, to 
nature, 9,12, 46-47, 56, 145, 156, 1812216, 
2247222; relation of, to Divine Wisdom, 
22, 24, 32, 36, 51, 54-55, 61, 121-22, 132- 
33, 145, 156, 219/2//6, 7; 223/29, 2242222; 
twofold nature of, 54, 190/257; music of, 
69 ; see also Fall of Man, The 
Manegold of Lautenbach : Opusculum contra 

Wolf elm um coloniensem, 1 93/27 1 
Manitius, Max, 36 

Geschichte der lateinischen Literatur des Mit- 
telalters, 159/212, 172//160, 180/214 
Marbodus: De ornamentis verborum, 222775 
Marcian, Emperor, 114 
Marietan, Joseph, 36 

Probleme de la classification des sciences 
d'Aristote a Saint-Thomas, 159117, 16072 
13, 172/2160 
Mark, Saint, Gospel of, 104, 107, 112 
Marrou, Henri-Irenee : Histoire de P 'educa- 
tion dans Pantiquite, 1 58723 ; Saint Augustin 
et la fin de la culture antique, 158/23, 171/2136 
Martianus Capella, x, 3, 6, 20 

De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii. 205/2/269, 
72; 208/2/21, 6, 8; 210/2//19, 23-26, 31, 
34; 211/235-38; Remigius on, 178/27, 
189/255, 198/225, 204/263, 205/272, 208/2 
6, 210/2/219, 24, 31; 215/279 216/280 
Martin of Laon: Scholica graecarum glos- 

sarum, 191/264, 222226 
Matentetraden, see Pythagoras 

Mathematics: as an art, 17, 31, 32, 61, 62, 
8 3> J 53> 196/27; logic and, 58, 59-60; 
understanding and, 63-64; number 
"four" of the soul and, 64, 198/225; the 
quadrivium and, 67, 201/239; astrology 
and, 68, 202/2/244-45 > function of, 72, 73, 
204/261; imagination and, 73; false, in 
magic, 154, 155; arithmetical progres- 
sions of soul and body, 199/226; creation 
and, 202/241; see also Arithmetic; Arith- 
mology; Geology 

Matthew, Saint, Gospel of, 104, 107, 112, 
144, 174222, 202/248, 220/2/218,' 24; 221/229 

Matthew of Venddme, 4 

Maximianus: Elegiac, 188/250 

Maximus the Confessor, 181/216 

Meaning : Scriptural relation of Word and 
Idea, 121-22, 143-44, 145, 147-50, 219/2/2 
6, 7; 224/222; allegory and, 140-44 

Mechanical arts: in philosophy, 10,12, 15, 
17, 51-52, 56, 60, 62, 73, 165/259, 181/221, 
182/224, 183/2/227, 30; 1847232, 204/764; 
three works and, 27, 56, 190/259, 191/264; 
sevenfold division of, 32, 33, 74-75, 83, 
153, 205/268; origins of, 38-39, 84-85; 
understanding and, 55, 201/237; see also 
specific arts, e.g. Fabric-making 

Medicine: function of, 33, 78-79; as an art, 
74, 83, 153, 161/221, 206/2/275-78; origin 
of, 85 

Meditation, 15, 151, 2147256, 2257253; study 
and, 91, 92-93, 132-33; scrutiny and, 
99-100; see also Contemplation 

Memory, study and, 87, 91, 93-94, 120, 
214/2/258, 60 

Mercury (deity), 75, 77, 84, 155, 169/21 18, 
205///269, 72; 206/273, 210/234 

"Mercury," 19, see also Asclepius 

Meyer, P. G. (ed.) : "Hugo von Sankt Vik- 
tors Lehrbuch," 180/214 

Michaeas (O.T.), 104, 2242225, 225/2/234, 36 

Mignon, A., 36, 172/2160 

Origines de la scolastique et Hugues de Saint 
Victor, 160/213 

Minerva (Pallas-deity), 73, 85, 204/263 

Miscellanea moralia in honorem eximii domini 
Arthur fanssen, i-jyiij^ 

Mommsen, Theodore (ed.): Gestorum ponti- 
ficum romanorum liber pontificalis, 2187747 

Monad, 200/229; see also "One" 

Monasteries, 4, 28-29, 32-33, 38 

Montpellier, School of, 4 



Moody, Ernest A. : Truth and Consequence 

in Modern Logic, 19 5/277 
Moon, see Astronomy, superlunary and 

sublunary worlds 
Morals, 9, 93, 94, 220/227; the Scriptures 

and, 13, 121, 127-30, 138, 220/225, 223/29; 

parsimony and, 100, 131 ; tropology and, 

127-28, 144-45, 224/222; magic and, 154- 


Moses, 84, 85, 86, 103, 104, 105, in, 139 

Muckle, J. T. (ed.): "Abelard's Letter of 
Consolation to a Friend ( Historia cala- 
mitatum mearum) ," 158/22, 215/268 

Mullach, F. (ed.) : Fragmenta philosophorum 
graecorum, 161/221, 179/29, 180/213, I 84«34, 
185/235, 186/242, 187/2/243, 52; 190/259, 
192/269, 193/271, 195/279, 199/226, 200/229, 

Miiller, Karl (ed.): ///go von St. Victor, 
Soliloquium de arrha animae und De 
vanitate mundi 174/2178, 220/226 

Miiller, Martin (ed.): Quaestiones naturales 
des Adelardus von Bath, 188/245, i9i«66, 
203/256, 204/260 

Musaeus, 208/21 

Music: in the quadrivium, 67, 71, 83 ; three 
varieties of, 69-70; origin of, 84, 202/2 
42, 209/210; typifying the Scriptures, 120- 
21; proportion and, 153 

Mynors, R. A. B. (ed.) : Cassiodori Senatoris 
institutions, 1 61/221, 172/2/2153-55, 157; 
183/227, 196/2/24, 6; 197/2/28, 9, 16; 198/2 
19, 202/2/242-43, 203//55; 205/267, 209/2/2 
12, 14 

Nabuchodonosor, 139 

Nahum, 104 

Natural history, 31, 32 

Nature: character of, x, 9-10, 24, 27, 53, 
56-57, 185/238, 188/2/244-45; man's rela- 
tion to, 9, 12, 46-47, 56, 145, 156, 181/216, 
224/222; God's relation to, 12, 21-22, 27, 
52-53, 57, 164/235, 167/2//86-88, 169/2/2116, 
121; 176/22; world soul and, 26, 27, 
169/2/2115-18, 178/2/26, 7; theology and, 
34-35, 173/2/2167-68; mechanical arts and, 
56; procreation and, 145, 224/223 

Nehemias, 105, no 

Nemesius: Premnon physicon, 180/214, 184/2 

Nemroth (Nimrod), 84, 209/214 

Neoplatonism, 13, 19, 185/238, 192/269 

Nestorius, 114, 115 

New Testament, The, 111-112, 141 ; Gospel 
in, 103, 104, 112-13, 125, 137, 138, 146; 
Books of, 104; Authors of, 107; Canons 
of, 1 1 2-1 3; books most useful in study 
of, 137, 144, 145-46; see also specific Books 

Nicaea, Coucil of, 113, 218/238 

Nicholas of Clairvaux, 198/225 

Nichomachus, 83-84 

Nicostrata, 86 

Nile River, geometry and, 203/754 

Ninus, King of Assyria, 85,154 

Noah, 84, 125, 139, 154, 210/234 

Nock, A. D. (ed.): Corpus Hermeticum 16 1/2 
21, 184/2//32, 33, 189/253, 193/271, 194/274, 
224/223, 225/254 

Numbers (O.T.), 103, 108 

Oceanus, 57 

Old Testament, The, 102, 138, 149; Books 
of, 103-104; Authors of, 104-105; trans- 
lators of, 106; sense of the names of the 
Sacred Books, 108-n 1 ; books most use- 
ful in study of, 137, 144, 145-46; see also 
specific Books 

"One," as expressing the soul, 64-65 ; as 
expressing God, 1 99/227; Boethius, Ma- 
crobius, William of Conches on the num- 
ber, 199/227; see also Monad 

Order, 214/254; of exposition, 91-92, 93, 
147, 150; sought in the disciplines, 135, 
222/22; of books in study, 145-46; of 
narration, 146-47; in study of the arts, 


Orellius, J. C. (ed.): M. Tullii Ciceronis 
opera, i^^nji 

Origen, 104, 106, 109, 219/21, 225/249; num- 
ber of writings, 115; Eusebius on, 116 

Orleans, School of, 4 

Orosius, 115 

Orpheus, 208/21 

Osee (O.T.), 104 

Osiris (deity), 85, 86, 210/226 

Ostlender, H. (ed.): Theologia Summi Boni, 

Ott, Ludwig: "Hugo von St. Viktor und 
die Kirchenvater," 217//2; 218/2/243, 45 

Ottaviano, Carmelo (ed.): Un brano inedito 
del la "Philosophia" di Guglielmo di Conches, 
26, 160/216, 165/259, 175/21, 178//8, 183/2 
30, 196/27, 205/268, 211/244, 225/22, 226/2/2 
3. 1 



Ousiai, 9, 14, 53, 152, 186/2/239, 42 

Ovid, 173K174, 182/226 
Epistulae ex Ponto, 216/285 
Metamorphoses, ij6n$ 

Paganism, 21, 22, 167/285, 168/291; "world- 
ly theology" of, 34-35, 173/2/2167-68; 
Augustine's outline of pagan knowledge, 

Palladius: On Agriculture, 84 

Paradisus seu his tor tea lausiaca, 221/231 

Pallas (Minerva-deity), 73, 85, 204/263 

Pamphilus, 106, 115 

Paper, origin of, 119 

Paralipomenon (O.T.), 103, 106, no, 137 

Pare, Gerard : Les ide'es et les lettres au XI Ie 
siecle : Le Roman de la rose, 1 89/75 3 ; see also 
Renaissance du Xlle siecle (Pare, Brunet, 

Parent, Joseph-Marie: Doctrine de la crea- 
tion dans I'ecole de Chartres, 28, 162/723, 
166/2/272, 81; 168/798, 169/2/2108, 109; 
172/2160, 175/21, 179/210, 180/21 1, 185/2/2 
35, 38, 186/242, 190/259, 192/269, 193/271, 
207/284, 227/23 

Paris, Judgment of, 204/263 

Parmenides, 86, 97, 98, 211/235 

Parsimony, 100, 131 

Patriotism, in the philosopher, 101 

"Pattern," see Wisdom, Divine 

Paul, Saint, 104, 107, 144, 147, 224/22 1 

Paul (4th century ascetic), 130, 221/231 

Pedersen, J0rgen : "Recherche de la sagesse 
d'apres Hugues de Saint- Victor," 175/21, 

Pelasgians, 85 

Pentateuch (O.T.), 103, 104, 108 

Performance, see Action 

Persians, 155 

Persius, 20: Saturae, 188/249 

Peter, Saint, canonical epistles of, 107, 

Pherecydes, 86 

Philo Judaeus of Alexandria, 105, in, 
219/21, 223/214 

Philology, 100, 215/279, 216/280 

Philosophy: defined by Hugh, x, 9, 10, 
33-34, 48, 51, 172/2160, 181/219, 196/26; 
fourfold division of, xi, 7-19, 28, 60, 
61-62, 83, 152-54, 160/216, 161/2/219, 21; 
182/224; relation to Divine Wisdom, xi, 
9, 11-19, 22, 24, 29-32, 33-34, 3 6 > 47, 48, 
61, 164/242, 167/285, 172/2/2162, 165; 177 

/2«4-5; schematizations of, 5-6, 159/213; 
threefold division of, 8, 10; origins of, 
12; Scripture and, 30, 32, 33, 35, 44-45, 
103, 173/2172; as pursuit of wisdom, 48, 
50-51, 61; stages of, 130-31, 132-33, 
177/25; see also Arts and sciences, The; 
and see specific schools or aspects of philosophy, 
e.g., Neoplatonism 
Phrygians, 155 

Physics: in philosophy, 8, 17, 33, 62, no, 
153; Scripture and, 35; defined, 71, 
203/257; function of, 72-73, 203/257, 204 
/2/261-62; origin of, 83 
Pilumnus, 85, 210/224 
Pindar, 109 
Pisistratus, 106, 115 

Plato, 3, 11, 95, 98, 167/285, 175/21 ; division 
of philosophy and, 8, 62, 203/258; cos- 
mology of, 19, 166/273; trinitarianism 
and, 19; on justice, 84, 209/215, 224/222; 
Socrates and, 86, 211/236; Abaelard on, 
167/284, 178/28, 179/210 
Parmenides, 202/241 
Phaedo, 197/29 
Republic, 84, 224/222 

Timaeus, i-x, 8, 13, 19, 22, 161/223, T 66« 
73; Chalcidius on, 13, 161/221, 179/29, 
180/213, I 84«34, 185/235,186/242,187/2/2 
43, 52; 190/259, 192/269, 193/271, 199/2 
26, 200/229, 209/21 5 ; William of Conches 
on, 20, 21, 25, 27, 162/223, 163/231, 
166/261, 169/2/2107, 108; 178/28, 179/2 
10, 182/226, 184/234, 185/235, 190//59, 
196/27, 198/225, 199/2/226-27, 200/228, 
203/257, 209/215, 214/258, 218/255, 224/2 
22, 225/22, 227/23; on the world soul, 
24-25, 26, 28, 46, 169/21 18, 178/2/26-8, 
1 79/2/29- 10, 192/269; arts represented 
in, 212/248 
Platonism, 13, 19, 23-24 
Pliny, 83: Historia naturalis, 208/25 
Poetry, 21, 167///283, 85; 211/2//44-45, 48; 

Scriptural use of, 108-109 
Politics, 74, 205/265 

Porphyry: Boethius on, 10-11, 161/221, 
181/221, 182/2/222-24, 195/2/275, 1; 197/215, 
198/220,203/257, 205/266,206/2/275-78, 81; 
Zi/<? of Pythagoras, 195/279 
Poverty (parsimony), 100, 131 
Practical arts: virtue and, 10, 152, 182/224, 
183/2/227, 30; in philosophy, 35, 51-52, 



Practical arts {continued) 

60, 62, 74, 161/2/220, 21, 181/221, 204//64; 

division of, 83, 153; understanding and, 

Prayer, 15, 132-33 
Premier Congres Internationale de geographic 

historique, II Memoires, 209/214 
Primordial causes, see Ousiai 
Priscian, 80, 90, 182/226, 207/2/283-84, 214/* 


Institutiones grammaticae, ijjn^., 207/284 

Private science, 74, 83, 153 

Proculus, 115 

Procreation, 145, 224/223 

Prometheus, 85, 97 

Prophets: Twelve, 103, 104-105, 109; mi- 
nor and major, 104-105; "sealed," 145- 

Prosper, 115 

Proverbs (O.T.), 103, 105, 109-11, 192/269 

Prudentius, 20, 115 

Psalms (O.T.), 103, 105, 109, 144, 145, 
174/21, 191/265, 192/269, 2oi«33, 220/215, 
221/2/230, 33, 36, 39; 223/2/213-14, 16, 
224/2/226-29, 225/2/242-45 

Pseudo-Dionysius : Celestial Hierarchy, x, 
14, 164/242, 193/271 

Ptolemy: Canones, 84, 209/214 

Ptolemy Philadelphus, king of Egypt, 106 

Public science, 74, 83, 153 

Pythagoras, 20, 46, 48, 83-84, 98; teaching 
methods of, 87, 211/241; on the quater- 
nary number of the soul, 195/279, 198/225; 
on the number '"Two," 200/228; Remi- 
gius and, 208/28, 209/29 
A.ureum carmen, 195/279 
Matentetraden, x, 20, 84, 189/2/253, 55; 

Quadrivium, The, 4, 8, 22, 33; Scripture 
and, 35; Hugh's study of, 37, 38; divi- 
sions of, 67, 196/27; of the mechanical 
arts, 75, 205/268; Pythagoras and, 87, 
189/255; Rhabanus on, 161/221 

Quintilian, 3, 86, 173/2174 

Institutiones oratoriae, 21 3/249, 215/262 

Radulfus Ardens: Speculum universale, 159/2 

Rankin, O. S.: Israel's Wisdom Literature, 


Raynaud de Lage, Guy: Alain de Lille, 189 

Reality, see Actuality 

Reason: nature of, 9, 176/22; eye of, 14, 
177/25; world soul and, 26, 46-47, 169/2 
116, 179/210; powers of the soul and, 
49-50, 65; reality and, 58-59, 73, 156; 
analysis and, 92; faith and, 134, 221/240; 
Divine Wisdom and, 156, 181/221, 186 
Z242, 201/237, 228/26; primordial causes 
and, 186/240, 226/21, 227/23; astronomy 
and, 224/222 

Reinhard, bishop, 38 

Remigius of Auxerre, x, 20, 23, 168/293, 
170/2127, 191/264; on anima mundi, 25, 
26, 178/27, 179/210, 193/271; mythologi- 
cal lore of, 167/285, 194/274; on the 
arts, 195/22, 210/2/219, 24, 26, 31, 34; 
21 1/2/235-36; on Pythagoras, 189/255; 
208/28, 209/29 

"Commentary of Remigius Autissiodo- 
rensis on the De consolatione philoso- 
phiae of Boethius," 175/21, 179/210, 
188/249, 192/269, 193/271, 195//2, 200/229 
Remigii A.utissiodorensis in Martiani Ca- 
pellae De nuptiis comment arius, 178/27, 
189/255, 198/225, 204/263, 205/272, 208/2 
6, 210/2//19, 24, 31; 215/279, 216/280 

Renaissance du Xlle siecle (Pare, Brunet, 
Tremblay), 159/2/25, 9; 160/2/214-15, 161/2 
18, 197/218, 204/261, 207/284, 208/21, 211 
22/242-43, 212/245, 215//68, 216/282, 218/243, 
219/21, 220/221, 222/2/22-4, 223/215 

Resurrection, 141 

Rhabanus Maurus, 3, 161/221; formulation 
of the arts, 171/2143; on origin of arts, 

Commentaria in Exodum, 219/21 
De institutione clericorum, 7, 28-29 
De magicis artibus, 226/21 
Z>£ universo, 183/227, 218/2/236, 37; 222/23, 

Richard of Saint Victor, 5, 15 9/2 11 
.L/for exceptionum ( Excerptiones priores) , 
163/233, 183/230, 203/255, 204/262, 226/23 

Richer: Historiarum libri, 1 61/221 

Riedel, Guilielmus (ed.): Commentum Ber- 
nardi Silvestris super sex libros Eneidos 
Virgilii, 2.1(311^ 

Robert, G., cited, 223/215 

Romans (N.T.), 221/232, 225/241 

Roscelin, Jean, 19 



Rufinus, 115 

Rupert of Deutz, 216//81: In Ecclesiasten, 

Ruth(O.T.), 108, in 

Sabellianism, 19 

St. Pancras priory, Hamersleben, 37, 38 

Saint Victor, Abbey of, 3, 4, 19, 1 58/7/71-2, 

173/7174; necrology on Hugh, 37-38; 

Codex, 209/714 
Sallust, 16: Bellum Jugurthinum, 188/148, 

Samuel (O.T.), 103, 104, 105, 108 
Sapientia, distinguished from scientia, 190/2 


Saul, 108 

Saxony, 37, 38 

Scheda, denned, 1 18-19 

Schmid, Toni: "Ein Timaios-kommentar 
in Sigtuna," 162/723, 179/710, 184/734 

Schmidt, O. : Hugo von St. Victor als Pdda- 
gog, 159/79 

Schneider, A. : Abhandlungen %ur Geschichte 
der Philosophic des Mittelalters, 18 0/7 11 

Schneider, W. A. : Geschichte mid Geschichts- 
philosophie bei Hugo von St. Victor, nzn^ 

Scholasticism, 36, 159/76, 160/713 ; see a ^ so 
specific scholastic writers, e.g., Thomas 

Schools, medieval, 4 

Schulte, Karl: Das Verhdltnis von N others 
Nuptiae Philologiae et Mercurii ^um Kom- 
mentar des Remigius Autissiodorensis, 210 
77/726, 31 

Science : distinguished from intelligentia, 5 5 , 
190/757; public, private and solitary, 74, 
83, 153; distinguished from sapientia, 
190/757; see also Arts and sciences, The; 
and see specific categories of science, e.g., 

Scott, Michael, 15 9/7 11 

Scott, Walter (ed.) : Hermetica, 222/76 

Scriptures, The, xi: Hugh's conception of 
philosophy and, 12-13, x ^» 2I > 2 3> 2 4» 2 ^» 
34-36, 167/785, 172/7166, 177/74, 214/756; 
Augustine's conception of philosophy 
and, 30, 32; arts in interpretation of, 32, 
33, 35, 44-45, 173/7172; Cassiodorus and, 
33; study of, 102-19, 133-34, 135-51; 
order and number of Books of, 103-104, 
217/73; threefold understanding of, 120- 
21, 219/71; the nature of meaning in, 

121-22, 143-44, 145, 147-50, 219/7/76, 7; 
seven rules of utterance in, 122-25; 
recapitulation in, 125; fruit of sacred 
reading, 127-28, 129-30, 220/725; Books 
most useful in historical study, 137; 
Books most useful in allegorical study, 
144, 145-46; on Nature as primordial 
cause, 192/769; order in the exposition 
of, 214/754; see also Apocrypha; New- 
Testament, The; Old Testament, The; 
and see specific Books, e.g., Genesis (O.T.) 

Scrutiny, 99-100 

Sedulius, 20, 115 

Seleucus Nicanor, 106 

Seneca, 3 ; Epistulae morales, 215/762, 216/783 

Senses, The : powers of the soul and, 9, 49, 
51, 64, 65; entelechy and, 26; imagina- 
tion and, 66-67, 201/737; knowledge and, 
203/759; understanding and, 219/77 

Sermo, defined, 119, 160/716 

Servius, 80, 90, 207/783 
Comm. in Verg. Georg., 188/745 

Seth, sons of, 210/734 

"Seven rules" of Scriptural interpretation, 

Silverstein, Theodore: "Adelard, Aristotle, 

and the De natura deorum," 193/771 

"The Fabulous Cosmogony of Bernar- 

dus Silvestris," 176/73, 178/77, 189/753 

See also Liber Hermetis Mercurii Triplicis 

de VI rerum principiis 

Sikes, J. G. : Peter Abailard, 179/710 

Silk, E. T. : "Pseudo-Johannes Scottus, 
Adalbold of Utrecht, and the Early Com- 
mentaries on Boethius," 192/769 

Silvestre, H. : "Commentaire inedit de Jean 
Scot Erigene au metre IX du livre III du 
'De consolatione philosophiae' de Boe- 
ce," 168/793, 175/71, 179/710, 192/769, 193 
/771, 198/725 

Simonides, 98 

Sin, see Evil ; Morality ; Virtue 

Smalley, Beryl: Study of the Bible in the 
Middle Ages, 159/78, 1 61/71 7, 217/73 

Socrates, 3, 21, 81, 86, 98, 167/785, 192/769, 
215/775; ethics and, 84, 154, 209/715, 211 
7735, 220/727 

Solitary science, 74, 83, 153 

Solomon (O.T.), 105, 109-11, 130, 139, 
192/769, 220/722 

Sophocles, 98-99 

Sophonias, 105 



Sophroniscus, 81 

Soul, The: number "Four" of, x, 10, 60, 
64-66, 184/232, i95«79, 198/225; powers 
of, 9, 10, 48-50, 178/28, 182/2/222-24; pre- 
existence of, 23, 163/231; entelechy and, 
26-27, 169*116, 178/2/26-8, 179/2/29-10; 
divided nature of, 46, 1 78/28, 179/210, 
i85«38; composition of, 46-47, i8i«i6; 
incorporeality of, 47, 1 80/2/21 2, 14; the 
body and, 48-49, 63-64, 66-67, 198/223; 
music of, 69; meditation and, 93; three- 
fold nature of, 200/229; see also World 
soul, The 

Species, in Scripture, 123-24 

Speech, arts of, see Eloquence; Grammar; 

Stahl, William Henry (ed.): Alacrobius' 
Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, 1 67/2 
86, 184/232, 187/243, 188/2/245, 52; 190/256, 
192/269, 193/271, 194/272, 195/279, 196/27, 
197/29, 198/2/223, 25; 199/2/226-27, 200/2/229, 

Stars: as divine beings, 20, 23-24, 186/242, 
187/243, 190/259; astrology and, 68; fixed 
stars as measurement of time, 137, 222/2 
6; relation of stars to Nature, 188/252, 

Statius, 20 

Stesichorus (Tersichorus), 98, 215/276 

Stewart, H. F. : "A Commentary of Re- 
migius Autissiodorensis on the De con- 
solatione Philosophiae of Boethius," 175/21, 
193/271, 195/22 

Stoicism, 13 

Stolzle, Remigius: Abaelards 11 21 %u 
Soissons verurtheilter Tractatus De imitate 
et trinitate divina, 179/210 

Students: Hugh on ability in, 43-44; efforts 
of, 87-89, 91, 126-27, 136-37; necessary 
qualifications for study, 90-101; eager- 
ness to inquire, 97-99; beginning, and 
educated, 130-31, 132-33; three types 
of, 133-34, 221/241 

Study, 3, 15, 29; three points of reading, 
44; order and method of, 83, 86-87, 
126-27; necessary qualities for, 90-101; 
meditation and, 92-93, 132-33 ; choice of 
books, 96, 128-29, 137, 142, 144; etymo- 
logy of things pertaining to, 11 8-1 9; 
fruit of sacred reading, 127-28, 220/225; 
intellectual occupatio in, 129-30, 221/228; 
as first stage of philosophy, 177/25 

Sumnmm Bonum, 19, 23, 46, 168/293, T 75 WI 

Sun, The: aetherial fire and, 27, 169/2121, 
189/253, 193/271; superintendence of 
growth and decay, 188/252, 190/259 

Sybil, The, 19 

Sylvester II, Pope (Gerbert), 161/221 

Symmachus, 106 

Synods (Councils), 113-14, 218/238 

Tages, 155 

Tagus, 85 

Taylor, Henry Osborn: The Mediaeval 

Mind, 172/2152 
Taylor, Jerome: Origin and Early Life of 

Hugh of St. Victor: An Evaluation of the 

Tradition, 174/2180, 216/288 
Tersichorus (Stesichorus), 98, 215/276 
Thales of Miletus, 83 
Theatrics, see Dramatics 
Themistocles, 98, 215/273 
Theodosius Augustus, 114 
Theodosius the elder, 113 
Theodotion, 106 

Theology: shift from positive to systema- 
tic, 5; as an art, 33-34, 62-63, IIO > I 7 zn 

160; pagan, 34-35, 173/2/2167-68; in the 

theoretical arts, 73, 83, 153 
Theophilus, Bishop of Alexandria, 107, 115 
Theophrastus, 215/273 
Theoretical arts: place of, in philosophy, 

10, 12, 51-52, 60, 62, 71, 152, 161/2/220-21, 

181/221, 182/224, 183/2/227, 30; 184/232; 

division of, 33, 72-74, 83, 153, 203/258; 

understanding and, 55, 201/237 
Thierry of Chartres, 6, 16, 24, 160/215, 

182/226, 198/225, 207/284, 225/22, 228/26 

Disputatio adversus Abaelardum, 179/210 

Disputatio altera adversus Abaelardum, 

Heptateuchon, 6, 207/284 

Librum hum, 200/228 

De sex dierum operibus, 168/299, 179/210, 
196/27, 200/228, 202/241, 228/26 
Thomas, Prior of Saint Victor, 158/21 
Thomas Aquinas, Saint, 5, 6, 160/213, 172/2 

Thomas Becket, 216/283 
Thorndike, Lynn: A History of Magic and 

Experimental Science, II 197/218 
"Three," as number representing divisions 

of the soul, 200/229 
"Three eyes," 14, 164/242, 177/25 



"Three manners of things," doctrine of, 
x , 9> 27, 52-54, 155-56 

"Three works," doctrine of, x, 9, 27, 55-56 

Tichonius, see Tyconius 

Time: astronomy and, 9, 54; eternity and, 
52, 184/234, 185K35; in scriptural meta- 
phor, 124-25, 147; creation and, 167/286; 
superlunary world as, 189/255, 190/256 

Tisias, 86, 211/238 

Titian, 86 

Tobias (O.T.), 103, 105, hi 

Tor ah, The, 103; 

Tours, School of, 4 

Travel, and the philosopher, 101 

Tremblay, Pierre: See Renaissance du Xlle 
siecle (Pare, Brunet, Tremblay) 

Trinity, The : Wisdom as Second Person of, 
xi, 17, 24, 29, 175/21, 181/219; pagans and, 
19, 192/269; Abaelard on, 25, 179/210; 
Scripture on, 35, 141, 142, 173/2170; 
geometry and, 203/25 5 

Trivet, Nicolas, 162/223 

Trivium, The, 22, 33, 35, 173/2174; Hugh's 
study of, 37, 38; of the mechanical arts, 
75, 205/268; Pythagoras and, 87; Char- 
trians on, 211/244 

Tropology: in Scripture, 35, 120, 121, 135, 
173/2174, 214/254, 219/zi, 222/2/22-3, 223/29; 
morals and, 127-28, 144-45, 224/222 

Troy, 86 

"Truth," see Wisdom, Divine 

Tubal Cain, 84, 85, 209/210 

Tully, see Cicero, Marcus Tullius (Tully) 

Tyconius, 220/221 

Twelve Minor Prophets, 103, 104-105, 109 

"Twenty-seven" as number representing 
all visible things, 65 

"Two," the number as principle of mu- 
tability, 66-67, 200/228 

Ueberweg, Friedrich, and Max Heinze: 

Grundriss der Geschi elite der Philosophie, 18, 

Understanding, 9, 92, 121-22; the senses 

and, 203/259, 219/27; see also Knowledge; 

Universities, 4 
Usage, science and, 59-60 

Valerius Maximus: Facta et dicta memora- 
bilia, 215/263 
Valerius Soranus, 57, 194/274 

Varro, Marcus Terentius, 3, 83, 84, 86, 


Periphysion, 47, 180/214 
Venus (deity), 204//63 
Vergil, 19, 37, 57, 182/226, 208/21, 212/248 

Aeneid, 173/2174, 190/256, 226/23 

Eclogae, 212/245, 215/264, 216/286 

Georgica, 84, 188/245, 194/273, 203/256 
Vernet, F., 36, 216/287 

"Hugues de Saint-Victor," 172/2/2160, 

166; 221/241 
Victor, Saint, relics of, 37, 38 
Victorines, 3, 4, 19, 15 8/2/21-2, 173/2174; 

necrology entry on Hugh, 37-38; 

twelfth-century codex, 209/214 
Victorinus: Expositio in librum De Inven- 

tione, ly^n-fi 
Vincent of Beauvais, 5 : Speculum doctrinale, 

Viniculture, 85, 210/226 
Virgin Mary, 146 
Virtue: man's attainment of, 9, 10, 52, 

54-55, 128; befitting philosophers, 131, 

197/29; defined, 152, 225/22; four cardinal 

virtues, 183/227; eloquence and, 226/23 
Vitruvius, 3, 161/221 

De architectura, 84, 198/225, 212/246 
Vivarium, 29, 33 
Volumen, defined, 118 
Vulcan (deity), 85 
Vyver, A van de, x, 209/214 

Wallis, Ernest A. : The Paradise of the Holy 
Fathers, 221/231 

Walter of Mortagne, 164/239 

Webb, C. C. J. (ed.): Joannis Saresberiensis 
Metalogicon, 165/2/255-57, 174/23, i75«i, 
192/268, 193/271, 207/288, 211/244, 212/248, 
213/2//50-52, 215/279 
Joannis Saresberiensis Policraticus, 214/261 

Weisweiler, Heinrich: "Arbeitsmethode 
Hugos von St. Viktor, ein Beitrag zum 
Entstehen seines Hauptwerkes De sacra- 
men 'tis," 174/24 

"Sakrament als Symbol und Teilhabe: 
Der Einfluss des Pseudo-Dionysius 
auf die allgemeine Sakramentlehre 
Hugos von Sankt- Viktor," 164/242 

William of Champeaux, 158/22, 193/271, 
215/268, 220/227 

William of Conches, 5, 6, 23, 159/212; on 
division of philosophy, 8, 10, 17, 172/2 



William of Conches {continued) 

160, 183/730, 197//12; compared with 
Hugh, 16, 18, 21, 27, 39, i6o«i6, 164/; 
36, 166/7/769, 72; 175/71, 197/718, 201/77737, 
39; on angels, 28, 170/7127, 227/73; 
mythological lore in, 167/785, 204/763; 
Arabic tradition and, 203/753 
Commentarius in Timaeum Platonis, 13, 20, 

21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 162/723, 163/731, 166/7 
61, 169/7/7107-108, 178/78, 179/710, 182/7 
26, 184/734, 185/735, 190/759, 196/77, 
198/725, 199/7/726-27, 200/728, 203/757, 
209/715, 212/748, 214/758, 218/755, 22 4" 

22, 225/72, 227/73 

Commentary on De consolatione philosophiae 
of Boethius, 8, 20, 21, 25, 162/723, l( ^9 
77/7107-108, no, 115; 179/710,190/7/756, 
59; 193/771, 196/77, 197/712, 198/725, 
201/7/739-40, 203/757, 205/765, 227/73 

Dragmaticon philosophiae, 1 8 8/745 

Philosophia mundi, 16, 26, 160/7 16, 163/7 
33, 164/736, 165/7/754, 59; 166/769, 1 &9 n 
107, 175/21, 178/78, 183/730, 184/734, 
196/77, 201/737, 204/7/760, 61; 205/768, 
206/781, 207/784, 211/744, 225/72, 226/7/7 
3, 1; 227/73 
William of St. Thierry, 179/710 
Willner, Hans (ed.): Adelard von Bath 

Traktat De eodem et diver so, 166/771, 178/7 

8, 189/753, 193/771, 195/7/776, 2; 202/747, 

Winnigstedt, Johann: Halberstadter Bi- 

schofschronik, 38 
Wisdom, Divine, 4-5, 10; as Second Person 

of the Godhead, xi, 17, 24, 29, 175/71, 

1 81/71 9; philosophy's relation to, xi, 9, 
11-19, 22, 24, 29-32, 33-34, 36, 47, 48, 
61, 164/742, 167/785, 172/7/7162, 165, 177 
77/74-5; tri e arts and, 8, 29-31, 61, 195/72; 
actuality and, 14, 15, 156, 164/742; paga- 
nism and, 21-22; man's relation to, 22, 
24, 32, 36, 51, 54-55, 61, 121-22, 132-33, 
156, 219/7/76, 7; 223/79; Scripture and, 34 

Wisdom of Solomon, The(0. T.), 1 09-11, 
192/769, 220/722 

World soul, The (Anima mundi), nature 
and, x, 24-25, 26, 27, 169/7/71 1 5-18, 178 
77/76-7; cosmic fire and, 27, 169/7121, 189 
w 53> I 93^7 I J f ate an d, 190/759; arithmo- 
logy of, 199/7/726-27 

Wrath, 65, 200/729 

Wrobel, Johann (ed.): Bernardi Silvestris 
De mundi universitate libri duo sive mega- 
cosmus et microcosmus, 178/77; see also Ba- 
rach, Carl Sigmund 

Platonis Timaeus interprete Chalcidio cum 
eiusdem commentario, 161/721, 179/79, 
180/713, I 84«34, 185/735, 186/742, 187 
77/743, 52; 190/759, 192/769, 193/771, 
199/726, 200/729, 209/715 

Xenocrates, 98 

Xenophon: Memorabilia, ijjn4 

Zacharias, 105 

Zahel ben Bischr, 20: Z?^ electionibus, 189/7 

Zeno, 98, 193/771 
Zetus, 84 
Zoroaster, king of the Bactrians, 154 

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